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NATURE AND FORM OF THE CONTRACT
SECTION 1. AT COMMON LAW‘
1. JENNINGS v. HATLEY, Yelvcrton 20.’
Court of Queen’s Bench, Mich. Term, 44 and 45 Eliz.
Oral promise to pay debt of another, good at common law.
Consideration, sufliciency of to support such promise.
The plaintiff declared that such a day and year he recov
ered against one Basset in the Common Pleas in an action of
debt on a bond of 501. and upon that recovery he took forth a
special cap. utlagat. for the body, goods and land of Basset; and
shewed the tenor of that writ specially, and the defendant per
ceiving the plaintiff intended to serve the said writ on the goods
of the said Basset, desired the plaintiff to stay the execution of
the said writ till such a day; and if Basset did not that day pay
the plaintiff the 501. in consideration of such stay of execution of
the said writ, and for 2s. 4d. to be given the defendant by the
plaintiff for renewal of the said writ of capias, the defendant
promised, if Basset by the day limited did not pay the 501. that he
would pay it the plaintiff: and alleged in facto the stay of the
execution at the defendant's request, and the giving of the 2s. 4d.
for the renewal of the said writ, and that Basset did not pay
the 501. at the day, &c. to his damage 100 marks, and upon non
assumpsit pleaded it was found for the plaintiff: and it was
alleged in arrest of judgment, that the consideration is not good,
but void and against law: for the capias utlagal. is the queen’s
‘It was not necessary at common law that the contract of a surety or
guarantor should be in writing. Brandt on Suretyship & Guaranty, § 37.









































































































































2 FISH \'. R'1c1I.\RDsoN [Chap. I
suit; and therefore a promise made in consideration to stay the
queen’s suit is not good: for if goods are stolen from J. S. and
a stranger promises that in consideration J. S. will not prosecute
any indictment against him who stole them, that he will give him
so much money, this is a void promise; for it is in hindrance of
the queen’s justice and benefit: But by Gawdy, Fenner and Yel
_ verton the consideration is.good: for this cap-ias utlagat. issued
upon the original suit of the party, so the benefit which the queen
is to have is by means of the party, and he is at the charge of
suing it forth, and hath the carriage of the writ: and if the party
is taken he shall be in execution at the suit of him who recov
ered; and if the queen by virtue of the capias utlagat. has any
goods, she is to satisfy the party at whose suit the outlawry
came; but nota, Popham contra in the case supra; for it is merely
the queen’s suit, which the party neither can, nor ought to delay:
for the queen’s attorney may take such goods, although he that
recovered will not sue for them. But judgment for the
plaintiff according to the opinion of the three justices. And in
this case it was said to be adjudged between Garnons and Layton,
that if a man is taken on a capias utlagat. after judgment, he is in
execution for the party; and if he escapes, although he was taken
at the queen’s suit, yet the party has such an interest in the body,
that he shall have escape against the sheriff. Quod nota; Yelver
ton was of counsel with the plaintiff.
!‘ FISH v. RICHARDSON, Yelverton 55.“
Court of King’s Bench, Mich. Term, 2 ]ac.
Oral promise of executor to pay debt of testator good at com
mon law.
Consideration, forbearance sufiicient to support such promisc.
The case was such: Fish had a debt owing to him by the
testator Richardson on a simple contract: and came to the de
fendant and told him of it; who said, that if the plaintiff would
forbear suit against him for a time, he promised to pay him; it is
a good promise in law; for although the defendant might wage
his law in an action brought against him by the law, because it is
of another’s contract; yet in law such debt on simple contract re
mains a debt, and is not absolved by the testator’s death: And
according to the book Io Hen. 6 an action of debt lies against the
“









































































































































Sect. 1] PETRIKEN. V. BALDY 3
executor for it; and if he plead to it
,
and doth not demur upon
the declaration, judgment shall be given against him; and the court
ex-officio will not abate it without the challenge o
f
the party; but
if the heir promises on forbearance of suit to pay such debt, yet
no assumpsit lies against him; for there is no consideration, be
cause the heir is liable to no debt without specialty.
-
3
. PETRIKEN v. BALDY, 7 W. & S. 429.
Supreme Court, Pennsylvania, 1844.
Oral promise to pay debt o
f
another must be established b
y
clear and explicit evi -
Error to the Common Pleas of Columbia county.
Peter Baldy against Dr. David Petriken.
This was an action o
f assumpsit to recover a debt due b
y
Francis Tully to the plaintiff, upon the promise o
f
the defendant
to pay it in consideration of forbearance.
The plaintiff offered in evidence an item o
f charge in his book,
in the account o
f
the defendant, “21 July 1831 amount answered
for Hugh Laughlin $2.89,” with proof by the clerk who made the
entry, that he would not have made it without the defendant's
direction, that this was his invariable mode o
f making such en
tries, both as regards the defendant and other persons. The de







the defendant was given
by the clerk o
f
the plaintiff as follows:
“The account was shown to Dr. Petriken in the forepart o
f
Oct. 1830, on o
r
after the 5th o
f
Oct. 1830. I was clerking for
Mr. Baldy at the time; he was absent in the city purchasing goods;
before he went to the city, he gave me a charge respecting some o
f
the contractors on the Pennsylvania Canal line that had been deal
ing with us; the estimate was to have been drawn while he would
be absent. Among the contractors indebted to Baldy at that time
was Francis Tully, and the principal one I was charged with at
tending to. I was directed to call on Dr. Petriken for the amount
o
f
this bill, having been assumed by him on the morning the esti
mate was to be paid over to the contractors. I came out to make
some inquiry about these persons indebted to Mr. Baldy, and I
conversed with a number o
f persons about the probability o
f
the
estimate being paid that day. I met Dr. Petriken, asked him about
some o
f









































































































































4 PETRIKEN v. n.\Lov [Chap. I
call on him for the amount of this bill against Tully. I had not
the bill with me; he (the Doctor) replied that I had better attend
to some other accounts; that there were other accounts that were
much more in danger of being lost; that he and Baldy would fix
that themselves ;that Francis Tully could not draw any.money from
the Canal Commissioners; that the money came through his (the
Doctor’s) hands; that he had the drawing of the money in that
contract. This was the substance of the conversation at the
corner, and I returned to the store. On the same day and about
the middle of the day, the Doctor called in at the store and asked
to see the bill against Francis Tully, and I handed him this bill.
this very paper in my own handwriting. He took it and added
it up; it had been added up to $274.52V2 at the date 28th Sept.
1830; from that date to 5th Oct., inclusive, there had been five
charges made that was not added up; that he footed up, making
the amount $343.52;/4. He noted the amount down on a letter
or piece of paper and took it with him. The Doctor put this same
amount down in pencil on this account; the marks are here yet.
He only wanted the amount, I was going to show him the items.
He replied he only wanted the amount of the account. I showed
this account to Francis Tully, before I saw the Doctor at the
corner; it was shown to him at different times and also that day
of the estimate; he admitted it to be correct. He never paid it nor
anybody else.”
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that
the evidence, taken to be true, is not sufficient to charge the de
fendant with the debt. But the court was of a different opinion,
and submitted the evidence to the jury, who rendered a verdict
for the plaintiff:
Cornby and Greenough for plaintiff in error.
Cooper and Bellas, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROGERS, J.—It has been frequently regretted that the fourth
clause of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2. ch. 3, which requires
J
that to charge a person for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another, the agreement should be in writing, was not extended to
this State. In Pennsylvania, however, the law is otherwise, for
such agreements may be proved by parol; but as a protection
against fraud, it is required that the evidence of the promise
%§l‘lOuld
be clear and explicit, that there should be no room to sus
pect mistake, misapprehension, or any unfairness in the trans









































































































































Sect. 1] PETRIKEN v. n.\LDY 5
tions. It is the charge in the book account, against the defendant,
of the assumption of the debt of Hugh Laughlin. It is not pre
tended that this is such an item as is properly chargeable in a book
account, but it is insisted that with the aid derivable from the clerk
who made the entry, it was properly received in evidence. * * *
We think the testimon ' ent' ncertain and unsatisfactory.
t is not unreasonable to require clear and explicit proo 0 t e
agreement; and this is absolutel necessar to uard a ainst
fraud. If by an inspection of the book he had remembered that the
erfiy was made on the authority of the defendant, it would be a
different question, for the book is only important as a means of
refreshing the memory of the witness. But, unfortunately, he
has no recollection whatever of it. And the only evidence of the
agreement is an inference, which he derives from the fact that
it is his handwriting, and his belief that he never put such charges
in the books without the direction of the person who had assumed
to pay.
In connection with this is the charge of the court in relation
to the assumption of the debt against Francis Tully. It is alleged
that the defendant assumed to pay this bill. That Tully was in
debted to the plaintiff, would not seem to be questioned; but did
the defendant assume to pay the debt? * * That there was some
understanding between the plaintiff and defendant in relation to
debt of Tully may be reasonably inferred from the evidence, but
what the contract or agreement was, nowhere appears. The money
due Tully on his contract was to come through the hands of the
defendant, but as it belonged to Tully, Dr. Petriken would have
no right to pay it to Baldy without the assent of Tully, and there
is no proof that Tully assented to any such disposition of the
money. But did the defendant make himself absolutely
respon4\
sible to the defendant, [plaintiff] and if so, what was the consid
eration of the promise to pay? Of the nature of the agreement we
are left in the dark, and of any consideration I cannot see a par-I
ticle of proof. Of these material points we are left entirely to
conjecture. To make the defendant amenable for this debt it is 1
necessarv for the laintiff to prove, distinctlv, the areement or
romise to a the I-J» 1- o cu- -- - - -
sufficient consideration On both points the plaintiffs proof is
defective In the declaration it is alleged that the promise is in
consideration of forbearance. 1t cannot be seriously contended
th:1t' there was any contract made with Clayton, who acted as the
agent of Baldy; if his evidence proves anything. it proves a pre









































































































































6 CR.A.I.G. V. V.A.N. PELT [Chap. I
Tully was a sub-contractor under Petriken, and that the money,
under some arrangement, was receivable by Petriken, but that
would not authorize Petriken to pay Baldy without Tully's con
sent, and such assent is neither shown nor alleged. Why, then,
should Petriken assume to pay this debt? What reason had he,
what motive or consideration was there moving from Baldy to
induce him to become liable for the debt of Tully, when, under the
evidence, if he paid he must do so at his own risk? We may
readily believe that standing in elation he does to Baldy and
no legitimate or safe inference can be drawn. On neither point,
therefore, does it seem to me that the plaintiff has given such
evidence as we have a right to require, for it must be remembered,
on him is thrown the burden of proof. On another trial, the dec
laration may be amended so as to avoid the objections made to it
.
It may be sufficient to observe, that in the other point we perceive
110 error.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
SECTION 2. UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS *
A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE.
a
. Of the words “No action shall be brought.”
4. CRAIG v. VAN PELT, 3 J. J. Marshall 490.
Court o
f Appeals, Kentucky, 1830.
Surety cannot recover back money voluntarily o
r coercively
paid by him in response to his oral promise.
Statute does not render oral promise to pay debt o
f
another










Thomas Easterby, as administrator o
f
Thomas Martin, hav
ing obtained a judgment against John Van Pelt, executor, and
“The fourth section o
f
the Statute o
f Frauds, 29 Car II, chap. 3, in its
original form as given in Browne on the Statute o
f Frauds, 5th ed. page
648, is a
s follows:
IV. And bee it further enacted b
y









































































































































Sect. 2] CRAIG V. VAN PELT 7
Mary Blair, executrix, of Robert Plummer, and caused a fieri
facias on the judgment to be levied on assets in their hands; they
replevied the debt for two years, with Silas Craig as their surety.
At the expiration of the two years, a fieri facias on the re
plevin bond was levied on the property of Craig, and he was
compelled to pay the amount due. To recover the money thus
paid, Craig filed his motion, on sufficient notice, against Samuel
Van Pelt, as the administrator of John Van Pelt. After hearing
the testimony the circuit court dismissed the motion, and Craig
appealed.
Waiving objections not affecting the merits (and there are
some such which might sustain the judgment), we shall consider
only the main question involved in the case.
It was abundantly proved by parol testimony that the execu
tor was anxious to pay off the amount of the execution without
replevying. But as the judgment had been rendered against the
testator, as the surety of Levi Craig, a brother of Silas Craig, the
execution was held up by the sheriff, a few days, for the purpose
of giving time to ascertain whether Silas would, as Van Pelt said
he had promised to do, pay the debt. -
Silas, being consulted, admitted that he had promised to pay
the debt for his brother, and that he had, as he then supposed, prop
erty of Levi's in his hands, sufficient to indemnify him. But he
solicited time, and, to obtain it
,
urged the propriety o
f giving a
replevin bond.
Van Pelt persisted in his opposition to the replevin, and said
that he would prefer paying off the execution at once. But, on
receiving positive assurances from Silas Craig that he would dis
charge the bond when it should become due, he yielded, and the
bond was given.
Whether these facts constitute a bar to the motion, is the
only question to be considered.
Craig insists that they do not, for the following reasons:
from and after the said fower and twentyeth day o
f
June noe Action shall
be brought whereby to charge any Executor o
r
Administrator upon any
speciall promise to answere damages out of his owne Estate or whereby
to charge the Defendant upon any speciall promise to answere for the
Debt, Default o
r Miscarriages of another person or to charge any person
upon any agreement made upon consideration o
f Marriage or upon any




Hereditaments or any interest in
or concerning them or upon any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space o
f
one Yeare from the makeing thereof unlesse the





Note thereof shall be in writing and signed b
y
the Partie to be charged
there with o
r











































































































































8 c11.\m \'. \‘.\N 1112L1‘ [Chap. I
l. The assumpsit was a collateral undertaking, without writ
ing, to pay the debt of another.
2. It was not to be performed in a year, and, therefore, for
these reasons, is within the operation of the statute of frauds and
perjuries.
3. Parol evidence was inadmissible to prove the promise,
because the parties are, (as he supposes) estopped by the recitals
in the bond.
The last reason is futile. The testimony does not contradict
the bond. The bond shows that Craig signed it as surety only.
No attempt was made to prove that he was the principal. The
sole object and effect of the evidence was to prove why he be
came surety, and that, in consideration of the motives which in-
duced him to sign the bond, he promised to pay the amount of it
when it should be collectible. This surely contradicts nothing in
the bond.
It is not necessary to decide whether the promise was within
the statute, because, admitting that it was, for either or both of
the reasons assigned, nevertheless it is our opinion that the statute
will not avail Craig, sp as to sustain his motion.
The statute would not render the promise void. Its only effect
would be, to prevent the enforcement of the contract by suit.
The promise is not now executory. ‘ It has been executed by
Craig. The party in whose favor it was made, is not attempting
to coerce performance. He prosecutes no suit. He is passive and
content. But Craig, after having paid what he assumed to pay,
sues to recover it back, because, if he had not paid it, he could not
have been forced to do it by suit. There was no express promise
to refund, and the law cannot imply one. Ex acquo et bono, no
implication arises in his favor.
It is only while the contract remains executory, that the
statute applies to it; after it shall have been executed, it would
be preposterous to suffer its cancelment, merely because, as an
express contract, it could not have been enforced. by action. by
either party. To give such an operation to the statute, would
pervert its aim and convert it into a sword instead of shield. It
would then be a statute to encourage and legalize fraud, and not
an act to prevent fraud.
This statute is exclusively preventive. It gives no remedy, it
only withholds remedial aid.
The principles established in Roberts \'. Tmmel, 3 Monroe










































































































































Sect. 2 || BE.A.I. V. BROWN O
Craig is endeavoring to recover money by pleading the
statute. It was not framed to be an engine for any such purpose.
It is not material whether Craig paid the money voluntarily
or coercively._Van Pelt did not coerce him. The sheriff, knowing
the contract and the reasons why the replevin bond had been exe
cuted, levied the execution on the property of Craig, as he ought
to have done. By the operation of law then, without the active
OFTTTTTOper interference of Van Pelt, Craig has redeemed his
promise, and the law will not turn round and restore to him his
money, unless he can show that it has been taken from him ille
gally, unjustly, or fraudulently, which he has not attempted to
do. But it was taken from him by the law, and in pursuance of
his own contract, with which he was morally bound to comply.
Judgment affirmed.
5. BEAL v. BROWN, 13 Allen I 14.
. Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1866.
One who has carried out his oral promise and paid the debt of
another may recover the amount so paid in an action against the
original debtor.
Contract upon an account annexed. The defendant, admit
ting the correctness of the plaintiff's account, claimed in set-off a
larger sum for money paid for the plaintiff, on a verbal guaranty
of a debt from the plaintiff to B. F. Poland.
At the trial in the superior court before Rockwell, J.
,
the
defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the plaintiff
desired to make a purchase o
f
leather on credit from Poland, who
would not sell the same to him without a guaranty o
f payment o
f
the price; and thereupon, at the special request o
f
the plaintiff,
the defendant verbally guaranteed such payment, and the leather
was accordingly delivered to the plaintiff; and subsequently, the





the same fell due, the defendant, upon Poland's demanding pay
ment o
f
the residue from him, gave his memorandum check for
such residue to Poland, and before the same was paid the plain
tiff forbade the payment of it by the defendant, the defendant,
however, paid the same.
There was a conflict o
f
evidence upon most o
f
these matters.
The judge ruled that there was no sufficient evidence to war
rant the jury in returning a verdict for the defendant for the














































































































































10 nE.\L v. nnowrz [Chap. I
plaintiff, for the amount of his account; which was accordingly
done. The defendant alleged exceptions.
E. Ames, for the defendant.
P. Sim_mons, for the plaintiff.
B1oF.i.ow_. C. J.—There was direct and positive evidence that
the defendant, at the plaintiffs request, entered into a verbal
guaranty of a debt due from the plaintiff, in pursuance of which
the former subsequently paid the debt. This evidence, if believed,
would have required the jury to find that the money charged in
the account in set-olI was paid at the special instance and request
of the plaintiff, and that the item of money so paid was a valid
set-off to the plaintiffs claim. Of the credibility of this evidence,
it was the exclusive province of the jury to judge; and it was
erroneous to withdraw it from their consideration.
The statute of frauds cannot avail the plaintiff, as an an
swer to the set-off. Although the verbal guaranty was within it
,
and might have been avoided if the defendant had seen fit to rely
upon the statute when called on by the plaintiffs creditor for the
payment of the debt, the defendant was not bound to set it up.
He had a right to perform his parol undertaking. It was a con
tract made on a good consideration, which the statute does not
declare void or illegal, but only provides that no action shall be
maintained upon it against the guarantor. But this enactment is
exclusively for the benefit of the guarantor and is designed to pro
tect him from the danger of being made liable for the debts of
another by false testimony. He may elect to fulfill his verbal
promise, and if he does so and pays money in pursuance thereof,
the principal debtor is liable for the amount as for money paid
at his instance and request. The statute of frauds can have
novoperation as between the original debtor and his guarantor. Ca
hill v. Bigelow, 18 Pick. 369, 372. Nor can the plaintiff resist the
defendant's claim in set-off on the ground that he forbade the
payment of the debt by the defendant. Even if such prohibition
could be allowed to have any effect, if seasonably made, the evi
dence shows that it was not made until the defendant had become











































































































































Sect. 2 | PHILBROOK. V. BEI. K.N.Al’ II
6. PHILBROOK. v. BELKNAP, 6 Vt. 383.
Supreme Court, Vermont, 1834.
The statute prohibits suits upon certain contracts for want
of writing, but does not make them void. It operates upon the
contract only while it is crecutory.
This was an action on book account, referred to auditors in
the county court, who found for the defendant, and made the
following special report of the facts in the case:
“The plaintiff produced the following account, to-wit:
‘William Belknap to Alfred Philbrook, Dr.
1831, Oct. I. To labor 5% months, commencing 11th
April, 1831, and ending about the last day of September
following, at $8.00 per month—$44.00.
The defendant produced no account. The plaintiff offered
himself to testify to his account, to which the defendant objected;
he, the defendant, offering to prove that the labor charged was
done under a contract by the parties, that plaintiff should labor
for defendant three years, which was not performed on the part
of the plaintiff. The objection was overruled, and the plaintiff
sworn and testified in the case. The defendant was also sworn
without objection, and testified in the case. The plaintiff having
testified that he performed the labor, that it was worth the sum
charged, and that he had received no pay therefor, rested his case.
The defendant then offered to prove that the labor charged was
performed under a contract, that plaintiff was to labor for defend
ant three years, at eight dollars per month, which contract plain
tiff had violated, by refusing to labor other than the 5% months
as charged. To this evidence the plaintiff objected, that such
testimony was irrelevant, and would constitute no defense in
law. The objection was overruled and the testimony admitted,
the parties having both testified relating to the amount. The de
fendant and sundry other witnesses having also been examined,
the auditor finds the following facts in the case: That in April,
1831, the plaintiff, having had some practice in edge-tools, applied
to defendant, who was a master millwright, to hire out to defend
ant to work with him at the defendant's trade, when it was agreed
by the parties that plaintiff should work for the defendant at said
trade three years at eight dollars a month, the defendant to in
struct the plaintiff in the art or trade of a millwright; but if
plaintiff left the defendant before the end of the three years, unless









































































































































12 PHILBROOK v. m:i.1<1\.\P [Chap I
plaintiff then, in April, 183I, commenced laboring with defendant,
and continued for five months and a half. during which time he
was a faithful laborer at the trade, and well earned the defendant
the sum charged in plaintiff’s account, the defendant having the
whole of said time received in goods out of different stores one
dollar per day and board for the plaintiff’s services for which the
plaintiff had received no pay; that defendant, during said time
boarded and properly instructed the plaintiff in said trade; that
at the end of said five and a half months, plaintiff gave notice to
defendant, that unless his wages were raised to one hundred and
twenty dollars per year, he should quit, which being refused
by defendant, plaintiff did quit, against the will of the defendant.
said employment and town, without any reasonable cause, and has
never since returned or offered to return to defendant's employ
ment; that said contract between the parties was verbal and never
reduced to writing. Vi/hereupon, the auditor. after offering the
parties to refer the law arising upon the facts to the court, (which
they declined) reports that there is nothing due from either party
to balance book accounts, (the auditor having disallowed the only
item in the case) whereupon finds for the defendant his cost.”
The county court reversed this decision of the auditor, and
gave judgment for the plaintiff. To this the defendant excepted,
whereupon the cause passed to this court for further adjudication.
The opinion of the court was pronounced by
PHELPS, J.—This case comes before us upon a special report
of the auditor. It seems. that the auditor, upon the facts stated
in his report, found for the defendant; the county court reversed
that decision, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. To this the
defendant excepted. and the question now is, which of the parties,
upon the facts found. is entitled to judgment. An exception is
taken to the form of the action, which we do not think well found
ed. If the plaintiff be entitled to recover at all, the claim becomes
a mere claim for services at a fixed monthly compensation, and
an ordinary subject of book charge, and of recovery in this form
of action. The objection that the special contract precludes a
recovery, depends upon the terms and effect of that contract, and
goes to the merits. rather than the form. of the action. The effect
of the contract upon this question. depends upon the inquiry
whether the performance of the labor is a condition precedent to
the right of recovery, or, on the other hand, whether the promises
are independent.. _
The subject of dependent and independent covenants, or









































































































































Sect. 2] PHILBROOK v. BELKNAP 13
have been expended upon it, that, like some other branches of
the law, it seems to be involved in a sort of artificial embarrass
ment. If, in this case, the plaintiff had stipulated for a gross
sum, to be paid at the expiration of his service, the performance
of the labor would doubtless be regarded as a condition prece
dent. But as the compensation was at a certain rate per month, if
it should appear that payment was to be made as fast as it was
earned, the case would be different. The auditor does not report
when the wages were to be paid; but fortunately there is a fact
stated in the report, which relieves us from all difficulty on the
subject. It is clearly competent, for the parties to make their
undertakings dependent, or independent, as they deem expedient;
and where their intent is ascertained it is decisive of the question.
In this case, the stipulation that the plaintiff should have nothing
for his services, if he left the service of the defendant before the
expiration of the three years, makes the performance of the whole
service a condition precedent; and if that part of the contract be
binding upon him he cannot recover. -
It is argued, however, that the contract is void, by force of
the statute of frauds. Admitting that this contract is within the
terms of the statute, yet it may be well to inquire, what is the effect
of the statute upon it. Although it is common to speak of a con
tract as void by the statute of frauds, yet, strictly speaking, the
statute does not make the contract void, except for the purpose of
sustaining an action upon it
,
to enforce it. The statute provides,
that no action shall be sustained upon certain contracts, unless
they are evidenced by writing. It operates, therefore, upon the
contract, only while it is executory. It does not make the perfor
mance of such a contract unlawful, but, if the parties choose to
perform it
,
the contract remains in full force, notwithstanding the
statute, so far as relates to the legal effect and consequence of
what has been done under it. Hence a party may always defend
under such a contract, when sued for any act done under it. Thus,
suppose a crop of grass is sold by parole, and the vendee enters
upon the land and cuts it. If an action of trespass should be
brought against him, by the vendor, upon the ground that the con
tract was void, still, although the contract is within the statute,
it would furnish a sufficient defence, because it is executed. This
very case affords an illustration of the effect of the statute. If
the defendant had sued the plaintiff for not performing the con
tract, in not serving the full period, the case would be open to a
defence under that statute; the contract being, to the purposes of









































































































































1.1 PHILDROOK v. BBLKNAP [Chap. I
on it as such. But in this case the contract, so far as the service
has been performed, is executed, and is relied on as regulating
and determining the right of the plaintiff to compensation for
what has been done under it. We are here concerned only with
what has been done. The question is
,
what the plaintiff is entitled
to for his labor; and this depends upon the terms of the contract,
under which he performed the service. Had the -whole service
been performed, the rate of compensation would, without doubt,
be regulated by the terms of the contract. No court would dis
card that contract, and resort to a quantum meru.-it. The prin
ciple is the same as to a performance in part. The defendant may
be without remedy, for the desertion of the plaintiff, but he may
certainly protect himself as to what Has been done.
Any other rule would be productive of monstrous injustice,
and make the statute an instrument of fraud. It is on this ground,
that courts of equity will enforce a contract of such a nature,
which is partly performed, where the party cannot be made good
without a full performance. The statute was merefy intended to
prevent frauds, by setting up and enforcing, by parol proof,
simulated contracts, and hence is called the statute of frauds and
perjuries. It was not intended to vary or control contracts, which
the parties have voluntarily caried into effect; nor to deprive par
ties of the protection of such stipulations as they may have made
for their security, and in reliance upon which they have acted.
This construction is the only safe one that can be given to
the statute, and it is the only one which has ever been given to it
,
Suppose a party enters into possession, under a parol lease for
years; was it ever imagined that he could be made liable as a tres
passer? Suppose a promise to pay‘ the debt of another, and the
debt actually paid. Was it ever attempted to recover back the
money by force of the -statute?
_
We are the more satisfied with this view of the subject, as
we are persuaded that full justice will be done by it. The plain
tiff is doubtless amply compensated, for the loss of the stipulated
wages, by the instruction received, and the enhanced wages which
hegmay obtain elsewhere in consequence; and the defendant gains
mg, as he loses the services of the plaintiff when they become
in e valuable.
§t only remains to add, that this case falls most clearly within
the decision of Hare v. Bell, ante p. 35.
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-
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7. LEROUX v. BROWN, 12 Com. Bench 801."
Court of Common Pleas, Mich. Term, 1852.
An oral agreement made in France and valid there is not
enforceable in England, by reason of the pth section of 29 Car. II,
chap. 3.
-





ting in Middlesex, in Trinity Term last. It appeared that an oral
agreement had been entered into at Calais, between the plaintiff
and the defendant, under which the latter, who resided in England,
contracted to employ the former, who was a British subject resi
dent at Calais, at a salary o
f
£100 per annum, to collect poultry
and eggs in that neighborhood, for transmission to the defendant
here,—the employment to commence at a future day, and to con
tinue for one year certain.
Evidence was given on the part o
f
the plaintiff to show, that.
by the law o
f France, such an agreement is capable o
f being en
forced, although not in writing.
For the defendant, it was insisted, that, notwithstanding the
contract was made in France, when it was sought to enforce it
in this country, it must be dealt with according to our law; and
being a contract not to be performed within a year, the statute o
f





, required it to be in writing. -
Under the direction o
f
the learned judge, a verdict was en
tered for the plaintiff on the first issue,—leave being reserved to
the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for him
on that issue, if the court should be of opinion that the contract
could not be enforced here.
Hawkins, in the last term, obtained a rule nisi, accordingly.
Allen, Serjt., and Metcalfe, now showed cause.
Honeyman (with whom was Hawkins) in support of the rule.
JERVIs, C
. J.—I am of opinion that the rule to enter a non
suit must be made absolute. There is no dispute as to the prin
ciples which ought to govern our decision. My Brother Allen
admits, that, if the 4th section of the statute of frauds applies, not
to the validity of the contract, but only to the procedure, the plains
tiff cannot maintain this action, because there is no agreement, nor
any memorandum o
r
note thereof, in writing. On the other hand.
it is not denied by Mr. Honeyman,—who has argued this case in
a manner for which the court is much indebted to him,-that, if
* The arguments o
f















































































































































16 LEROUX v. BROWN [Chap. I
the 4th section applies to the contract itself, or, as Boullenois ex
presses it
,
to the solemnities of the contract, inasmuch as our law
cannot regulate foreign contracts, a contract like this may be
enforced here. I am of opinion that the 4th section applies
not to the solemnities of the contract, but to the procedure; and
therefore that the contract in question cannot be sued upon here.
The contract may be capable of being enforced in the country
where it was made: but not in England. Looking at the words of
the 4th section of the statute of frauds, and contrasting them with
those of the 1st, 3rd, and 17th sections, this conclusion seems to
me to be inevitable. The words of s.4 are, “no action shall be
brought upon any agreement which is not to be performed within
the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agree
ment upon which such action shall be brought, or some memoran
dum or note thereof. shall be in writing, and signed by the party
to be charged therewith. or some other person thereto by him
lawfully authorized.” The statute, in this part of it, does not
say, that, unless those requisites are complied with, the contract
shall be void, but merely that no action shall be brought upon it:
and, as was put with great force by Mr. Honeyman, the alterna
tive. “unless the agreement, or some memorandum or note thereof.
shall be in writing,”—words which are satisfied if there be any
written evidence of a previous agreement,—shows that the statute
contemplated that the agreement may be good, though not cap
able of being enforced if not evidenced by writing. This therefore
may be a very good agreement, though, for want of a compliance
with the requisites of the statute, not enforceable in an English
court of justice. This view seems to be supported by the authori
ties; because, unless we are to infer that the courts thought the
agreement itself, good, though not made in strict compliance with
the statute. they could not consistently have held, as was held in
the cases referred to by Sir Edward Sugden, that a writing sub
sequent to the contract, and addressed to a third person, was suffi
cient evidence of an agreement, within the statute. It seems,
therefore, that both authority and practice are consistent with
the words of the 4th section. The cases of Carringtou v. Roots,
and Reade v. Lamb. however, have been pressed upon us as being
inconsistent with this view. It is sufficient to say that the atten
tion of the learned judges by whom those cases were decided, was
not invited to the particular point now in question. What they
were considering was, whether, for the purposes of those sections,
there was a.ny substantial difference between the 4th and 17th









































































































































Sect. 2] LEROUX v. 1:Row.-\' 17
sections has been the subject of discussion on other occasions.
In Crosby v. Wadszuorth, 6 East, 602, Lord Ellenborough, speak
ing of the 4th section, says,——-“The statute does not expressly and
immediately vacate such contracts, if made by parol: it only pre
cludes the bringng of actions to enforce them.” Again, in Lay
tlwarp v. Byant, 2 N. C. 735, 3 Scott, 238, Tindal, C. J., and
Bosanquet, J., say distinctly that the contract is good, and that the
statute merely takes away the remedy. where there is no memor
andum or note in writing. I therefore think we are correct in hold
ing that the contract in this case is incapable of being enforced by
an action in this country, because the 4th section of the 29 Car. 2,
c. 3, relates only to the procedure. and not to the right and validity
of the contract itself. As to what is said by Boullenois in the
passage last cited by Brother Allen, it is to be observed that the
learned author is there speaking of what pertains ad vinculmn
obligationis ct solemnitatem, and not with reference to
the mode of procedure. Upon these grounds, I am of
opinion that this action cannot be maintained, and that the rule to
enter a nonsuit must be made absolute.
MAUL1:, J.—I am of the same opinion. The 4th section of the
statute of frauds enacts that “no action shall be brought upon any
agreement which is not to be performed within the space of one
year from the making thereof. unless the agreement upon which
such action shall be brought. or some memorandum or note there
of, shall be in writing. and signed by the party to be charged there
with, or some other person thereto by-him lawfully authorized.”
Now, this is an action brought upon a contract which was not to
be performed within the space of one year from the making there
of, and there is no memorandum or note thereof in writing signed
by the defendant or any lawfully authorized agent. The case,
therefore, plainly falls within the distinct words of the statute.
It is said that the 4th section is not applicable to this case. because
the contract was made in France. This particular section does
not in terms say that no such contract as before stated shall be of
any force; it says, no action shall be brought upon it. In their
literal sense, these words mean that no action shall be brought
upon such an agreement in any court in which the British legis
lature has power to direct what shall and what shall not be done:
in terms. therefore, it applies to something which is to take place
where the law of England prevails. But we have been
pressed with cases which it is said have decided that









































































































































18 LEROUX \‘. 1!R()WN [Chap. I
tion, are equivalent to the words “no contract shall be al
lowed to be good,” which are found in another part of the statute.
Suppose it had been so held, as a general and universal proposi
tion, still I apprehend it would not be a legitimate mode of con
struing the 4th section, to substitute the equivalent words for those
actually used. What we have to construe is, not the equivalent
words, but the words we find there. If the substituted words im
port the same thing, the substitution is unnecessary and idle: and if
those words are susceptible of a diflierent construction from those
actually used, that is a reason for dealing with the latter only.
It may be, that for some purposes, the words used in the 4th and
17th sections may be equivalent; but they clearly are not so in the
case now before us; for, there is nothing to prevent this contract
from being enforced in a French court of law. Dealing with the
words of the 4th section as we are bound to deal with all words
that are plain and unambiguous, all we say, is
,
that they prohibit
the courts of this country from enforcing a contract made under
circumstances like the present,—just as we hold a contract in
capable of being enforced, where it appears upon the record to
have been made more than six years. It is parcel of the procedure,
and not of the formality of the contract. None of the authorities
which have been referred to seem to me to be at all at variance
with the conclusion at which we have arrived.
T.u.FoiJRo, J.—I am of the same opinion. The argument of
Mr. Honeyman seems to me to be quite unanswerable. That drawn
from Laythoarp v. Bryant and that class of cases in which it has
been held that the 4th section of the statute of frauds is satisfied
by a subsequent letter addressed to a third party, containing evi
dence of the terms of the contract, shows clearly that that section
has reference to procedure only, and not to what are called by the










































































































































Sect. 2 | II.V.I.I. V. SOU LE 19
S. HALL v. SOULE, 11 Mich. 494."
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1863.
An oral promise to pay the debt of another is void and can
not furnish a valid consideration for a subsequent promise in writ
ing.
Error to Calhoun Circuit. The facts sufficiently appear by the
opinion.
H. M. & IV. E. Cheever, for plaintiff in error.
Joslin & Blodgett, for defendant in error.
CAMPPEI.I., J.—This was an action brought against defendant
to recover from him, as guarantor or surety, the sum of $500, for
which it was alleged he became responsible for his son, Harrison
Soule. The goods were sold in 1858, and in January, 1859, Harri
son Soule, to whom they were sold and charged, gave his notes
for the amount due, which remain unpaid. It appeared from the
parol evidence that previous to the sale defendant had agreed, if
plaintiff's firm would give Harrison Soule a credit to the amount
of $500, that he would be responsible for its payment. The only
written instrument offered in evidence was a letter written July
7
,
1861, which, so far as it relates to the transaction in suit, was
a
s follows: “And now I hardly know what to say to you. I
think, on the whole, that you will have to rely on my pledge al
ready made, that as soon and fast as I can, I will see that $500 of
the demand you hold against Harry is paid; beyond that I do not
think myself under obligation.”
It is entirely clear from the tenor of this letter that it does




contract, but refers to it as a matter understood. The parol evi
dence shows what this contract was, and explains fully a
ll
the con
ditions and pledges. But under our statute any agreement to pay
"The statute under consideration, Sec. 3183, C. L. 1857; Sec. 9515,
C
.
L. 1897, provided: “In the following cases specified in this section.
every agreement, contract o






memorandum thereof be in writing
and signed b
y
the party to be charged there with o
r by some person b
y
him
thereunto lawfully authorized, that is to say:
1
. Every agreement that, by it
s terms, is not to b
e performed in one
year from the making thereof;
2






. Every special promise o
r undertaking made upon consideration o
f
marriage except mutual promises to marry;
4

















































































































































20 scoTT v. BUSH [Chap. I
the debt of another is absolutely void, unless a note or memoran
dum of it is made in writing: Comp. L. sec. 3183.“ It has always
been settled that the memorandum must show the whole terms of
the contract, and that no resort can be had to parol evidence to
add to them. Our statute does not require a contract of this
kind to set forth its consideration, but makes no other change;
sec. 3187. It is impossible to draw from this writing any recital
or evidence that defendant made any promise to pay for a future
credit to be given to Harrison Soule. The plaintiff below sought
to rely upon it as a written memorandum of a former verbal agree
ment. But it does not recite any agreement, present or past,
except to pay existing and not contemplated future indebtedness.
Whether such a memorandum of a past transaction would have
the full effect claimed for it
,
becomes, therefore, immaterial.
Viewed as a present contract to pay an existing debt, it is
not and could not well be claimed that the contract is valid, be
cause there is an entire absence of consideration for it
,
so far as
the evidence showed. and the declaration avers none. The pre
vious verbal agreement being null, it could not form a valid con
sideration for this promise.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Manning and Christiancy, JJ., concurred.
Martin, Ch.J., did not sit in this case.
9
. SCOTT v. BUSH, 26 Mich. 418.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1873.
An oral agreement to purehase lands is z"oid and money paid
by the vendee under such agreement and with the understanding
that the vendor may retain the same as stipulated damages in the
event the vendee fails to complete the bargain, may be recovered
back in a suit for money had and receiz-ed, notwithstanding thefi
vendor is avilling and offers to convey.
Error to Jackson Circuit.
Gibson 6' Wolcott, for plaintiff in error.
Johnson 6' Montgomery, for defendant in error.
CAMPBELL, _l.—This case presents the single question, wheth
er a person who has made a verbal arrangement with another to
purchase land of him, and has paid money with a stipulation that









































































































































Sect. 2] SCOTT V. BUSH 2I
can recover back the money, where the vendor is willing and
offers to convey.
It is necessary to consider on what grounds the holder of
the money can claim to hold it
. It cannot be held as in any way
analogous to a gift. It is delivered upon condition, to be held in
case o
f
failure to perform an expected act, but, in case o
f per
formance, to be applied towards the full price o
f
land. It cannot,
then, be put upon any other ground than that o
f
an agreement,
involving rights and obligations on both sides, and a forfeiture
upon the default o
f
the party paying over the money.
This agreement is an agreement for the purchase and sale o
f
lands; and the stipulation for the forfeiture o
f
the deposit is the
agreed penalty, or, more properly, the stipulated damages for its
breach. If the contract is valid, the forfeiture is valid, as it is not
claimed to be unreasonable; but if the contract is not valid, then
no part o
f
it can be enforced, without leading to confusion and
contradiction.
Under our statutes every contract, for the sale o
f
lands is












his agent, lawfully ap
pointed in writing—2 Comp. L., 1871, sec. 4694. The law does
not require the purchaser to sign the agreement, and he is liable,
therefore upon the written contract, though his own assent is
verbal.—Hollond v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238. The statute does not
require the consideration to be set forth in writing, but, allows it
to be proved otherwise—sec. 4695.
The validity o
f part performance, as taking contracts out o
f
the statute so as to authorize their specific performance, is also
declared—sec. 4606. #
The only consideration for the agreement o
f
the purchaser
to forfeit his deposit in this case, was the verbal promise o
f
the
vendor to convey. No possession was given o
f
the land, and no
act whatever was done b
y
the vendor. The payment o
f
the de
posit was not such an act o
f part performance as would, under
any o
f
the authorities, authorize the purchaser to demand a
specific performance.
There was, then, no consideration whatever for his agree
* The statute under consideration, Sec. 4694, C
.
L. 1871, Sec. 9511,
C
.
L. 1897, provided: “Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, o
r
for the sale o
f any lands, o
r any interest in lands shall
be void unless the contract or some note o
r
memorandum thereof, be in
writing, and signed b
y
the party by whom the lease o
r





some person thereunto b
y










































































































































22 SCOTT V. BUSH [Chap. I
ment, and it gave him no rights against the vendor. The arrange
ment, therefore, was in no sense a contract, and he was not bound
by it
. Until both parties are brought into binding relations, their
dealings have n
o
effect. They can only be regarded as preliminary
negotiations, which confer no rights.




a single party to force a contract on the other. If
there was no contract already in existence, the subsequent assent
o
f
both was as necessary as if they had never negotiated. A
party who has never become bound, cannot be held b
y
any but his
own agreement. And the cases which intimate that one party
cannot retract, if the other is willing to perform, give to the ar
rangement all the effect o
f
a solemn contract, and enable agree
ments to be made as well as enforced, at the will of one of the
parties, without any concurrence o
f
the other. -
We have held in Chamberlain v. Dow, 10 Mich. R., 319;
Hall v. Soulc, 1 1 Mich. R., 191; Holland v. Hoyt, 11 Mich. R.,
23S; and Grimes v. Wanl’echten, 20 Mich. R., 410, that a con
tract void under the statute o
f frauds, is a mere nullity, and can
not be used for any purpose whatever. And we cannot conceive
o
f
such a thing as a contract which cannot be enforced as a con
tract, and yet can be the foundation o
f legal obligations arising
out o
f nothing else.
The decisions which have been made in several states refer,
for their authority, chiefly to some early decisions in New York.
The brief report in Dowdle v. Camp, 12 J. R., 451, rested the
refusal to allow the purchase money to be recovered back from
a vendor willing to perform, on the ground that equity would
compel performance in favor o
f
the purchaser. And the same
doctrine was held in Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio R., 51, where the
purchaser's possession was more distinctly relied on. And in
Rice v. Pect, 15 J. R., 503, and Thayer v. Rock, 13 Wend., 53, it
was said that there could be a recovery back o
f money paid, where
there was no such exceptional circumstances. And in Duncan v.
Baird, 8 Dana, IoI, where a payment had been made in a specific
article, and not in money, the court held that there was no room
for even an implied assumpsit, and that the action should be re
plevin o
r trover, for the chattels withheld.
Some decisions have apparently disregarded this distinction
between contracts, made valid b
y
part performance, and stipu
lations o
r arrangements, which have never become binding. An




in law, as valid
a
s in equity, for al
l










































































































































Sect. 2 | PIKE V. BROWN 23
An equitable right is as good a consideration for a contract as a
legal right.—Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich., 238. Had the plaintiff
in this case obtained possession from the defendant, under the ver
bal arrangement, the contract would have been taken out of the
statute, and would not have been void. But as the case stands,
we cannot see why, if the willingness of the vendor to convey,
entitles him to keep money paid and agreed to be forfeited, he
would not equally be entitled to enforce a promise to pay a like
sum, on the same conditions. There is no middle ground between
binding contracts, and the absence of any binding obligation.
We think the court below erred in refusing to allow a re
covery, and that the judgment should be reversed, with costs and
a new trial granted.
The other Justices concurred. -
b. Of the words “special promise.”
IO. PIKE v. BROWN, 7 Cush. 133.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1851.
The statute limits the words “special promise" to promises
actually made. Promises implied by law are circluded.
Writ of review. The case was argued at the last November
term, by I. It’. Richardson for the plaintiff in review, and by H. C.
Hutchins, for the defendant in review. The opinion of the court
exhibits all the facts.
SHAw, C. J.—This case comes up on a writ of review, grant
ed on petition, to enable the plaintiff in review, defendant in the
original action, to correct and set aside, if he can, a judgment re
covered by Brown against him.
The original action was assumpsit to recover a sum of money,
alleged to be due to him from the original-lieuw" on these
grounds: Brown, by deed poll, expressed to be in consideration
of $4.OOO, conveyed an estate to Pike, designated as a house and
lot on South Cove, and described. As bel"g subject to a mortgage,
to secure Brown's note to one Walker, for $2,825, payable in four
years, with an amount of interest specified, payable semi-annually;
“which said sum is part of the consideration before named, and
this deed is on condition that said Pike shall assume and pay said
note and the interest thereon, as they severally become due and









































































































































24 PIKE v. nnowN [Chap. I
took possession of the estate conveyed, and held it till a half
year’s interest became due; he did not pay it
,
but Brown, being
liable for it on his note, was called upon to pay it and did pay it
to the mortgagee. and brought this action of assumpsit to re
cover it.
The court are of opinion that this action can be maintained.
The principle is well settled, that where one, by deed poll, grants
land, and conveys any right, title or interest in real estate to
another, and where there is any money to be paid by the grantee
to the grantor, or any other debt or duty to be performed by the
grantee to the grantor, or for his use and benefit, and the grantee
accepts the deed and enters on the estate, the grantee becomes bound
to make such payment, or perform such duty.and not having sealed
the instrument, he is not bound by it as a deed; but it being a
duty, the law implies a promise to perform it
,
upon which promise,
in case of failure. assumpsit will lie.
The most common and familiar case is that of a lease. or the
creation of a term by deed poll, one of the stipulations of which
is. that the lessee pay certain rents at certain times. The lessee
does not contract by deed, but from the rent reserved the law
implies a promise. It seems impossible to distinguish this case
from that of Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510. The counsel for
the defendant supposed that the marginal note to that case an
nounced a principle not warranted by the case. We can see no
such discrepancy. The case stated certain facts and circumstances.
upon which it was contended that the promise arose; the marginal
note announced the general principle to be extracted from the
case. The statement of the general principle would, of course,
avoid all the particular circumstances, which were immaterial,
and could not affect the result. This appears to be the only dis
crepancy between the marginal note and the detailed case. This
case was referred to, with approbation, in a later case, in which
the general principle above mentioned is restated. Felch. v.
Taylor, 13 Pick. 133. That was the assignment of a lease; this
is the transfer of an equity of redemption. Each is an interest in
land, and each is transferred. by deed poll, to an assignee, on the
terms of paying money or doing some duty. There it was to pay
money to a third person, which the grantor had covenanted to pay ;
here it was to pay the principal and interest of the grantor’s note,
and exonerate him from such payment.
Again: if we look at the intention of the parties, it seems to
us the result is the same. The deed was inform not the convey









































































































































Sect. 2] PIKE \'. nnowN 25
though, in legal effect. it conveyed an equity of redemption. The
consideration for the entire estate was $4,000, of which Brown's
mortgage to Walker was a part, which the defendant assumed and
undertook to pay, as part of such consideration. Such payment.
when made according to such stipulation, would relieve the plain
tiff from his personal obligation to Walker and release the estate
from the lien upon it. A sti ulati ' _' uable
consideration moving
'
much monev is a _
urse me, if. not lvm
' '
'n
1 aves me liable _' ’
'
_' d.
t was urged on the consideration of the court, that this was
a condition affecting the estate, and not creating a personal liabili
ty; and that if the grantee failed to perform the condition. the
grantor’s only remedy was a forfeiture. We think this is not so.
If a condition at all, it is a condition subsequent. which might op
erate as a breach, and warrant a reentry for condition broken.
But if the grantor has this remedy, it is collateral only, and far
from being adequate. Take again the case of a lease by deed
poll, the lessee “yielding and paying” rent. etc. These words are
held to constitute both a condition and an obligation. It would
afford a poor remedy, if
,
after the enjoyment of the estate by the
lessee for several terms, say years or quarters, the lessor could
only take the estate back again. No; all such words are to be
construed according to the subject matter. and if they are such
as ordinarily imply stipulation or undertaking, they create an im
plied promise, although they are also words of condition. In
Goodwin v. Gilbert, the words in the deed poll. in which the duty
was reserved, are not given; but in the case last cited, of Felch
v. Taylor, 13 Pick. 133, the words in the devise. which stands on
the same footing with a deed poll, were “upon condition that the
said Daniel do pay,” etc.. and afterwards in the deed of the de
visee to a third person, “excepting same condition ;” it was held,
in both instances, to create a debt or duty on which assumpsit
would lie.
It was insisted, that this promise, if it exist~
promise to pay the debt gflgnotherl gpd sg ygjd by the statute of
frauds, if not mare m ri in ' also that it concerned real estate,
and so was vOl( u same statute. We
think neither objection tenable. Although the CO11Sl erai
this promise was a conveyance of real estate. it was a considera
tion past and e e promise emained a simple obliga









































































































































26 EAST WOOD V. KEN YON |Chap. I
to pay the debt of another, the substance of the contract with the
plaintiff was on a consideration moving from him, to pay his
debt, for his benefit, and to exonerate him, and was no less a
direct promise to the plaintiff, because, in the performance of it
,
it would satisfy a debt due to another-- Besides; promises im
plied by law are not within the statute.
Judgment affirmed, with 3dditional interest and costs of
review.
11. EAST WOOD v. KENYON, II Adol. & El. 438, 39 E. C. L. 245.
Court o
f
Queen's Bench, Hilary Term, 1840.
The statute applies only to promises made to the person to
whom another is answerable.




. J. The first point in this case arose on
the fourth section o
f
the Statute o
f Frauds, viz., whether the prom
ise o
f




another person.” Upon the hearing we decided, in
conformity with the case o
f
Buttemcre v. Hayes, 5 Mee. & W.




. The facts were that the plaintiff was liable to a Mr. Black
burn on a promissory note; and the defendant, for a consideration,
which may for the purpose o
f
the argument be taken to have been
sufficient, promised the plaintiff to pay and discharge the note to
Blackburn. If the promise had been made to Blackburn, doubt
less the statute would have applied: it would then have been
strictly a promise to answer for the debt o
f another; and the




that it is not less the debt
o
f another, because the promise is made to that other, viz., the
debtor, and not to the creditor, the statute not having in terms




is to be made.
But upon consideration we are of opinion that the statute applies
only to promises made to the person to whom another is answer
able. We are not aware o
f any case in which the point has arisen,
o
r
in which any attempt has been made to put that construction
upon the statute which is now sought to be established, and which
we think not to be the true one.*
Rule to enter verdict for defendant discharged.
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*
c. Of the word “agreement.”
I2. w#. et al. v. WARLTERS, 5 East Io.”
Court o
f King's Bench, Easter Term, 1804.
The word "agreement” as used in the statute must be under
stood to embrace the consideration for the promise as well as the
promise itself.
Where one promised in writing to pay the debt o
f
a third




The plaintiffs declared that at the time o
f making the promise




exchange, dated the 14th February, 1803, drawn b
y
one W. Gore
upon and accepted b
y
one J. Hall, whereby Gore requested Hall,
seventy days after date, to pay to his, Gore's order, £50 16s. 6d.;
which bill o
f exchange Gore had before then indorsed to the plain
tiffs, and which sum in the bill mentioned was at the time o
f
mak
ing the promise b
y
the defendant due and unpaid. And thereupon
the plaintiffs, before and at the time o
f making the said promise
by the defendant, had retained one A
.
a
s their attorney to sue
Gore and Hall respectively for the recovery of the said sum so due,
&c. whereof the defendant at the time o
f
his promise, &c. had notice.
And thereupon, on the 30th o
f April, 1803, at &c., in consideration
o
f





defendant, would forbear to proceed for the recovery o
f
the said
56l. 16s. 6d., he, the defendant, undertook and promised the
plaintiffs to pay them, by half-past four o'clock on that day, 56l.
and the expenses which had then been incurred by them on the
said bill. The plaintiffs then averred that they did, within a
reasonable time after the defendant's promise, stay all proceed
ings for the recovery o
f
the said debt, and have hitherto forborne
to proceed for the recovery thereof; and that the expenses b
y
them incurred on the said bill at the time o
f making the promise
b
y
the defendant, and in respect o
f
their having so retained the
"The rule o
f
this case continued the rule in England until the adoption
o
f
the Mercantile Law Amendment, so-called, in 1856, 19th and 20th Vic.,
chap. 97. Among the American cases following this rule are: Weldin v.
Porter, 4 Houst. (Del.) 236; Hargraves v. Cooke, 15 Ga. 321; Elliott v.
Giese, 7 Harr. & J. 457; Underwood v. Campbell, 14 N. H. 420; Laing v.
Lee, 20 N
. J. L. 337 (but see statutes); Drake v. Seaman, 97 N. Y. 234;
Parry v. Spikes, 49 Wis. 384; McFarlane v. Wadhams, 165 Fed. 987. Some
states have changed the phraseology o
f
the statute. California, for exam
ple, has omitted altogether the word “agreement.” Some o
f
the statutes
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said A., and on account of his having, before the defendant’s
said promise, drawn and engrossed certain writs called special
capias, against Gore and Hall respectively on the said bill, amount
ed to 201., of which the defendant had notice; yet the defendant
did not, at half-past four o'clock on that day, &c., nor at any
time before or since, pay the said sum of 561. and the said ex
penses incurred, &c. There was another special count, charging
that the reasonable expenses incurred on the bill were so much,
which the defendant had refused to pay. And the common money
counts.
In support of the undertaking laid in the declaration, the
plaintiffs, at the trial at Guildhall, produced the written engage
ment signed by the defendant, which was in these words:
“Messrs. Wain & Co.. I will engage to pay you, by half-past four
this day, fifty-six pounds and expenses on bill that amount on
Hall. (Signed) Jno. Warlters (and dated), No. 2, Cornhill,
April 30th, 1803.” Vi/hereupon it was objected, on the part of
the defendant,that though the promise, which was to pay the debt
of another, were in writing, as required by the Statute of Frauds.
yet that it did not express the consideration of the defendant’s
promise, which was also required by the statute to be in writing;
and that this omission could not be supplied by parol evidence
(which the plaintiffs proposed to call in order to explain the oc
casion and consideration of giving the note) ; and that for want of
such consideration appearing upon the face of the written memor
andum, it stood simply as an engagement to pay the debt of
another without any consideration, and was, therefore, nndum
paetum and void. And Lord Ellenborough, C. J., upon view of
the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car, 2, c. 3, s. 4, which avoids any special
promise to answer for the debt of another, unless the agreement
upon which the action shall be brought, or some memorandum
or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith,” &c., thought that the term agreement im
ported the substance at least of the terms on which both parties
consented to contract, and included the consi(,lgr_ation movingJ3
the promise, as well as the promise itself: and the agreement in
this sense not having been reduced to writing for want of includ
ing the consideration of the promise, he thought it could not be
supplied by parol evidence, which it was the object of the statute
to exclude; and therefore nonsuited the plaintiffs. A rule nisi
was obtained in the last term for setting aside the nonsuit and
granting a new trial, on the ground that the statute only required









































































































































Sect. 2 | WAIN, ET AI.., V. WARLTERS 29
that parol evidence might be given of the consideration which
did not go to contradict, but to explain and support the written
promise.
Garrow and Lawes showed cause against the rule.
Erskine and Marryat, in support of the rule.
LoRD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J.
,
after noticing the definition o
f





. Comyns, who considered it as





and which, as he says, ought to be so certain and complete, that
each party may have an action upon it; for which, in addition to
the author's own authority, was cited that o
f Plowden; and bet
ter (his Lordship observed) could not be cited:
In all cases where, b
y long habitual construction, the words
o
f
a statute have not received a peculiar interpretation, such as
they will allow of, I am always inclined to give to them their
natural ordinary signification. The clause in question in the
Statute o
f Frauds, has the word - (“unless the agree




note thereof shall be in writing,” &c.) And the question is
,
Whether that word is to be understood in the loose incorrect sense





more proper and correct sense, as signifying
* 1: - *DDGez O [lt O Lot 1C ICŞa. Oil Oil C "le WO *
to which we are bound to give its proper effect: the more so
when it is considered by
whom—that statute
is said to have been
drawn, b
y
Lord Hale, one o
f
the greatest Judges who ever sat in
Westminster-hall, who was as competent to express as he was able
to conceive the provisions best calculated for carrying into effect
the purposes o
f
that law. The person to b
e charged for the debt
o
f another, is to be charged in the form o
f
the proceeding against
him, upon his special promise' but without a legal consideration.
to sustain it
,
that promise would be Illini ###!!!
# # ':The Statute never meant to enforce any promise whic -
fore invalid, merely because it was put in writing. The obligatory
part is indeed the promise, which will account for the word
promise being used in the first part o
f
the clause, but still in order
to charge the party making it
,
the statute proceeds to require that
the agreement, b
y
which must be understood the agreement in
respect o
f
which the promise was made, must be reduced into
writing. And indeed it seems necessary for effectuating the ob
ject o
f









































































































































30 wAIN, ET AL., V. WARLTERS [Chap. I
writing as well as the promise; for otherwise the consideration
might be illegal, or the promise might have been made upon a
condition precedent, which the party charged may not afterwards
be able to prove, the omission of which would materially vary the
promise, by turning that into an absolute promise which was only
a conditional one: and then it would rest altogether on the con
science of the witness to assign another consideration in the one
case, or to drop the condition in the other, and thus to introduce
the very frauds and perjuries which it was the object of the act
to exclude by requiring that the agreement should be reduced into
writing, by which the consideration as well as the promise would
be rendered certain. The authorities referred to by Comyns,
Plowd. 5, a, 6, a, 9, to which may be added Dyer, 336, b
.,
all show
that the word agreement is not satisfied unless there be a consider
ation, which consideration forming part o
f
the agreement ought
therefore to have been shown; and the promise is not binding b
y
the statute unless the consideration which forms part o
f
the agree
ment be also stated in writing. Without this, we shall leave the
witness whose memory o
r
conscience is to be refreshed to supply
a consideration more easy o
f proof, or more capable o
f sustaining
the promise declared on. Finding therefore the word agreement
in the statute, which appears to be the most apt and proper to
express that which the policy o
f
the law seems to require, and
finding no case in which the proper meaning o
f
it has been relaxed,
the best construction which we can make o
f
the clause is to give




GROSE, J.—It is said that the parol evidence tendered does
not contradict the agreement; but the question is
,
Whether the
statute does not require that the consideration for the promise
should be in writing as well as the promise itself? Now the words
o
f
the statute are, “that no action shall be brought whereby to
charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the
debt, &c., o
f
another person, &c., unless the agreement upon which







shall be in writing, &c., what is required to be in writing, there










Now the agreement is that£ each party isto do or perform, and by which both parties are to be bound; and
this is requiróTIOTUTTWTITIng. TTTWTC only necessary to
show what one o ci- lo
,
it would be sufficient to state
the promise made b
y









































































































































Sect. 2] WAIN, ET AL., V. WARLTERS 3 I
it
. But, if we were to adopt this construction it would be the
means o
f letting in those very frauds and perjuries which it was
the object o
f
the statute to prevent. For, without the parol evi
dence, the defendant cannot be charged upon the written contract
for want o
f





parol evidence then is to make him liable: and thus he would be




parol testimony, when the
statute was passed with the very intent o
f avoiding such a charge,
by requiring that the agreement, b
y
which must be understood (the
whole agreement, should be in writing.
LAWRENCE, J.—From the loose manner in which the clause
is worded, I at first entertained some doubt upon the question; but
upon further consideration I agree with my lord and my brothers
upon their construction o
f
it
. If the question had arisen merely
o
n
the first part o
f
the clause, I conceive that it would only have
been necessary that the promise should have been stated in writ
ing; but it goes on to direct that no person shall be charged on









THE II:"T-I-m writing: which shows
that the word agricculent was meant to be used in a sense differ
ent from promise, and that something besides the mere promise
was required to be stated. And as the consideration for the£ that ought also to be stated in
writing. - J
LEBLANC, J.—If there be a distinction between agreement
and promise, I think that we must not take it that agreement in
cludes the consideration for the promise as well as the promise
itself: and I think it is the safer method to adopt the strict con
struction o
f
the words in this case, because it is better calculated
to effectuate the intention o
f
the act, which was to prevent frauds
and perjuries, b
y
requiring written evidence o
f
what the parties
meant to be bound by. I should have been as well satisfied, how
ever, if
,
recurring to the words used in the first part o
f
the clause,
they had used the same words again in the latter part, and said
"unless the promise o





memorandum thereof, shall be in writ
ing.” But not having so done, I think we must adhere to the
strict interpretation o
f
the agreement, which means the consider
ation for which as well as the promise b
y
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I3. PACKARD v. RICHARDSON, et al., 17 Mass. 121."
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1821.
A written promise to pay the debt of another without a re
cital in the writing of the consideration upon which the promise
is founded is in compliance with the statute of frauds.
Assumpsit by the endorsee of a promissory note, made by
the Stony Brook Manufacturing Company, of which the defend
ants were members, signed by Henry Fiske, their agent, payable
to one Asa Kingsbury, or order.
The defendants are counted against in various ways, upon
their supposed liability, on account of a written promise on the
back of the note, in the words following, viz., "We acknowledge
ourselves to be holden as surety for the payment of the within
note:” signed by the defendants.
-
Usury was attempted to be set up in defense, and Henry
Fiske, who signed the note as agent, was called to prove it; but
being objected to he was rejected.
The counsel for the defendants also objected to the proof
of consideration for the guaranty, by oral testimony; and contend
ed that, as no consideration was stated in the writing, the promise
was within the statute of frauds and void.
The points were ruled against the defendants by the chief
justice, before whom the cause was tried upon the general issue,
at the sittings here during the present term.
Sumner, for the defendants.
Webster and Morey for the plaintiffs.
PARKER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case presents two questions of importance, neither of
which has received a judicial determination in our courts. The
arguments upon them have been exceedingly ingenious as well
as able, leaving nothing untouched in point of authority or general
reasoning, which has relation to the subject. * * * [Matter per
taining to the first question is omitted].
* * * The other question presented by this case is of a
more embarrassing nature; not so much on account of any in
trinsic difficulty in construing the statute out of which the ques
tion arises, as from an unwillingness to differ from the high
"Among cases following the rule of this case are: Sage v. Wilcox,
6 Conn. 81; Gillighan v. Boardman, 29 Me. 79; Little v. Nobb, Io Mo. 3
(see Hain v. Benton, 118 Mo. App. 557); Ashford v. Robinson, 8 I red.
Law 114; Moore v. Eisaman, 201 Pa. St. 190; Perley Potter & Co. v.
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authorities, who have adopted a construction, which, after mature
deliberation, we think is not warranted by the statute itself, or
any particular exposition which has been given to it since it was
enacted, until the case of Wain v. IVa‘'rlters was decided, in the
year 1804.
The case, as stated in the declaration, and as it was made out
in proof, would admit_of our avoiding the naked question present
ed by the report. For the plaintiff having made an attachment
of property belonging to the company, and having relinquished
that attachment upon receiving the guaranty of the defendants;
according to most of the authorities, the promise would not be
within the statute; there being a new consideration, between the
new contracting parties, sufficient to maintain the promise with
out writing. But as the question is now fairly presented to us,
and as has been ably argued, and as it often arises at nisi prius, we
think it best to give our reasons for deciding that a promise to
pay the debt of another, in writing, and signed by the party in
tending to be bound, is a sufficient compliance with the statute,
without any recital in the writing of the consideration upon which
the promise is found.
The original promise is by the Stony Brook Manufacturing
Company, by a note payable on demand. After the making of the
note, and after it was endorsed to the present plaintiff. the de
fendants severally signed their names on the back, and over their
signatures were written these words :—“We acknowledge our
selves holden as surety for the payment of the within note.”
The consideration existing was, that these defendants were
members of the company which made the note; and that a suit,
which had been commenced, was stopped by the plaintiff, at their
request. But this consideration was proved by parole, and the
writing acknowledges no consideration whatever.
It is somewhat remarkable that a statute, which has so im
portant a bearing upon contracts in daily use, should have re
mained without the construction recently given to it
,
from the
time of its enactment, which was in the 29 Car. 2, to the year I804,
when the case of Wain \'. iVarIters was decided. That it did so
remain will appear from the circumstance, that neither the coun
sel in arguing that case, nor the Court in deciding it
,
refer to any
preexisting case in support of their doctrine; a doctrine which,
when announced, excited much surprise both in England and in
this country.
Our provincial act was passed in the year 1692. and con









































































































































34 P.\CK.\.RD \'. RICH.-\RDSO.\' [Chap. I
statute of the commonwealth, which, as well as the provincial act,
is similar in substance, and, except in one instance where the
sense is not altered, is copied verbatim from the English statute.
So that we have had the statute in operation more than a century,
within which period innumerable collateral engagements have
been made; and it has never, until within a few years, as far as
we can ascertain, been doubted that, if one man, for a sufficient
consideration, deliberately signed his name to a promise to pay the
debt of another, he would be bound by it
,
although no consider
ation whatever was mentioned in the writing which he signed.
Although some consideration must exist to give validity to
such a promise, it is generally of a nature not to be disputed; and
if disputed, has been proved by parole testimony. The considera
tion need not be for the benefit of the party making the promise,
and it seldom is for his benefit; forbearance to sue, or the sur
ceasing of a suit, being most frequently the consideration of such
undertakings, and these being altogether for the benefit of the
original debtor. This being the case, it would seldom, if ever,
enter into the imaginations of the parties to such a contract, that
unless the motives and considerations, which led to it
,
were put
down in writing, the engagement was void.
Having made these preliminary remarks, I shall proceed to
consider the statute, and what is its most obvious construction,
without reference to decided cases; and then take a view of the
decisions which have been had upon it
,
both in England and in
this country.
The first section of our statute of 1788, c. 16, corresponds,
as has been observed, exactly with the fourth section of the statute
of 29 Car. 2. Exclusive of other subjects provided for in the
same section, it enacts, “That no action shall be brought, whereby
to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for
the debt, default, or misdoings of another person, unless the
agreement, upon which such action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or some person there
unto by him lawfully authorized.”
The obvious purpose of the legislature would seem to be to
protect men from hasty and inconsiderate engagements, they
receiving no beneficial consideration; and against a misconstrue
tion of their words by the testimony of witnesses, who would
generally be in the employment and under the influence of the
party wishing to avail himself of such engagements. To remove









































































































































Sect. 2] PACKARD v. RICHARDSON 35
signed; in order that it may be a deliberate act, instead of the
effect of a sudden impulse, and may be certain in its proof, in
stead of depending upon the loose memory or biased recollection
of a witness. The agreement shall be in writing—what agree
ment? The agreement to pay a debt, which he is under no moral
or legal obligation to pay, but which he shall be held to pay, if
he agrees to do it
,
and signs such agreement.
This appears to be the whole object and design of the legis
lature; and this is effected, without a formal recognition of a con
sideration; which, after all, is more of a technical requisition, than
a substantial ingredient in this sort of contracts. And it would
seem, further, that the legislature chose to prevent an inference
that the whole contract or agreement must be in writing; for it is
provided that some memorandum or note thereof in writing shall
be sufficient. What is this but to say, that if it appear by a written
memorandum or note, signed by the party, that he intended to
become answerable for the debt of another, he shall be bound,
otherwise not?
How then is it possible, with these expressions in the statute,
to insist upon a formal agreement, containing all the motives or
inducements which influenced the party to become bound? Yet
such is the decision of the Court of King’s Bench, in the case of
Wain v. Warlters. -
But in a case happening in the same court a short time after
wards, on another section of the same statute, a different con
struction is adopted. By the seventeenth section of the British
statute, and the second section of our own, it is provided, “That
no contract for the sale of any goods, wares, or merchandise, for
the price of ten pounds or more, shall be allowed to be good, ex
cept the purchaser shall accept part of the goods so sold, and
actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind
the bargain, or in part payment, or that some note or memoran
dum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the
parties to be charged with such contract, or their agents thereun
to lawfully authorized.” Yet in the case of Egerton v. Matthews‘
it was decided that a memorandum, containing only one side of
the bargain, and without any consideration expressed, was suffi
cient. VVhen this case came before Lord Ellenborough, at nisi
prius, he thought it governed by the case of Wain v. Warlters;
and it is certainly difficult to perceive a difference between the
two cases.
If the word agreement imports a mutual act of two parties,









































































































































36 PACKARD v. RICH.-\RDSON [Chap. I
two. In a popular sense, the former word is frequently used as
declaring the engagement of one only. A man may agree to pay
money, or to perform some other act; and the word is then used
synonymously with promise or engage. But the word bargain is
seldom used, unless to express a mutual contract or undertaking.
If then the technical meaning of the word agreement made it
necessary to insert the consideration in a collateral promise to pay,
why not the word bargain also, as Lord Ellenborough at first
supposed? But the court, Lord Ellenborough consenting, over
ruled the decision at nisi priu_s', and decided that a contract for
the sale of goods was valid, without any consideration expressed
in the contract.
There are certainly grounds to suppose that some doubts
began to be entertained of the correctness of the decision in
Wain v. '.WarIters. W e cannot otherwise account for the unwil
lingness to apply the same principle to the case of Egerton v.
Matthezvs; and we shall see hereafter, that there was considerable
cause for the Court of King’s Bench to hesitate, before they ap
plied the-rule to other cases.
The import of the word agreement forms the principal, if
not the only ground of argument, in favor of the doctrine; and
because the word bargain is used in the seventeenth section, in
stead of the word agreement, the law is different. Well might
Chief Justice Parsons say, as he did in the case of Hunt, Adm., v.
Adams, when the two cases of Wuin v. Warlters and Egerton v.
Matthews were incidentally brought before him; “These two de
cisions are not easily to be reconciled. A bargain is a contract or
agreement between two parties, the one to sell goods or lands,
and the other to buy them. . A contract of this sort is void in law,
unless made on sufficient consideration. And the consideration of
a bargain seems to be as necessary a part of it
,
as of any other con
tract or agreement; and there is the same danger of perjury in
proving the consideration of a bargain by parole, as of any other
agreement. But if the word agreement may be understood in the
popular sense, as not necessarily including the consideration for
it
,
we may approve of the decision in the latter case, while we
may doubt as to the former case.”
But admitting the case of Wain v. IVarlters to have been
received in England, as giving the true construction of the statute,
and that the rule is well settled in that country,—which, it will be
seen presently, is far from being the case,—it does not necessarily
follow that it should be adhered to here. The decision took place
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the opinion of great and learned men, not as an authority. We
are to consider what has been the practical construction in our
own country; and believing that to have been for more than'a
century different from the rule so lately adopted in England, it
would be ,too late for us to resort to the etymology of a word for
the purpose of obtaining a new construction, and to insist upon
the legal import, instead of the popular sense of terms, which the
legislature are as likely to have taken in the latter as in the former
sense.
But it should be considered, in the second place, that this
doctrine, when first promulgated in England, was not well re
ceived by the profession, and that to this day it is doubted and
questioned, whenever it is advanced. The case of Wain v. Warl
ters appears to have been concurred in by all the judges of the
King’s Bench, but never seems to have been cited as an authority,
without an apparent reluctance in the court to apply the same rule
to other cases: and whenever it was possible. some distinction
seems to have been sought out to save the case before the court
from the operation of the rule.
Lord Ellenborough took the lead in the decision, grounding
himself on the word agreement, and on the known accuracy of
Sir Matthew Hale, who was supposed to have drawn the statute.
Mr. Justice Lawrence, on the contrary, entertained doubts, and
thought the statute loosely penned. Mr. Justice LeBlanc con
curred, but expressed a wish that the statute had not reached the
case of a promise, so as to require the consideration to be in writ
mg.
If, as Mr. Justice Lawrence thought. the statute was loosely
penned, it may be supposed the word agreement was untechnically
used, or used in the popular sense; in which case it seems agreed
that the subsequent words would not require that the consideration
should be in writing. The same section provides for the case of
an agreement in consideration of marriage, and of an agreement
not to be performed within a year. The use of the word in these
provisions led to the adoption of the same word in the succeeding
part of the section, without any intention. I apprehend, of pre
scribing the form in which a promise in writing should be drawn
up, to make it binding.
I have already adverted to the case of Egerton \'. illattlu"Zvs,
as departing from the principle adopted in that of Wain \'. WarI
ters. And as late as the year 1816, in the case of Goodman v.
Chace, the case of Wain v. Warlters was again brought before









































































































































38 PACKARD v. RICICIARDQON [Chap. I
upon a capias ad satisfaciendmn. He had applied to the attorney
of the creditor for time, and in the meanwhile to be released. The
attorney consented, provided Chace's father would sign a written
paper in the following words: “I do hereby undertake and agree
to put the above defendant into the custody of the she iff of H.
on or before Saturday next; and in default of my d ng so, I
undertake to pay the damages and costs for which the said de
fendant has been this day taken in execution by the said sheriff,
at the suit of the above-named plaintiff,” The case of Wain v.
PVarItcrs was cited to show that the agreement was void, because
no consideration was expressed in it. The counsel for the plain
tiff denied the case to be law. Lord Ellenborough said, “It would
be very desirable to have a further examination into the decisions
on the other side of the hall, where these cases more frequently
occur than here, in order that we may more clearly ascertain what
the practice is there ;” and for this purpose a second argument
was ordered. But afterwards the court declared that it was not
necessary to hear counsel, as this was a case clearly not within the
statute, it being an original undertaking of the defendant Chace.
sen. No doubt this decision was right; but the case is cited to
show that counsel were allowed to deny the authority of Wain v.
IVarlters, and that the court hesitated so far as to order a second
argument. There is strong reason to believe that the decision
would have been overruled, if the case then before the Court had
not been settled upon another principle.
In chancery the doctrine was not at all well received. In
the case of a petition to be allowed to prove a debt which was
guarantied against the guarantor, no consideration being ex
pressed, the case of Wain v. Warlters being cited, the counsel for
the petitioner said the decision of the Court of King’s Bench in
that case could not be supported. The Lord Chancellor Eldon
said, “There is a variety of authorities directly contradicting the
case in the King’s Bench, which is a most important case in its
consequences; for the undertaking of one man for the debt of
another does not require a consideration moving between them.”—_
14 Yes. jun. 189—So in the case Ex parte Garden. Mr. Bell, in
support of the petition, mentioned the case of Wain v. PVa~rlter.s',
as one which could not be supported. Lord Eldon said, “The
first objection. viz., that which I/Vain v. Warlters was cited to sup
port, is of great importance. Until that case was decided, some
time ago, I had always taken the law to be clear that if a man
agreed in writing to pay the debt of another, it was not necessary









































































































































Sect. 2] PACKARD v. RICHARDSON 39
This is very strong language; and yet, probably, every judge and
lawyer in England and in this country would have felt himself
warranted in saying the same. I 5 Ves. Jun. 286.
But this is not all. The Common Bench also signified their
'dissent from this doctrine, as much as could be done with
out deciding directly contrary to it. Thecase of Morris v. Stacy
was for the price of shoes sold to another person. The defendant
was the agent and as such ordered the shoes. He proposed
to give bills drawn by Wallis on Bromley, endorsed by Burns.
He was pressed to endorse them himself, but refused, saying he
would give a letter of guaranty, which would be as good. The
letter was in these words: “I herewith send you draughts drawn
by Wallis, accepted by Bromley, and endorsed by Burns; and
should the bills not be honored when due, I promise to see that
they do so.” The counsel for the defendant cited the case of Wain
v. Warlters. Gums, C. J., said, “It is sufficient, if it appears on the
face of the letter that, in consideration the plaintiff would take
the notes, the defendant would indemnify him. The consideration
therefore is apparent. I do not think it necessary, in this case,
to overrule the decision in It/ain v. I/Varltcrs. I think this under
taking binding, notwithstanding that case.” Holt's N. P. 153.
This was in 1816, and it may be plainly inferred, from what fell
from the chief justice, that if it had been necessary, the case of
Wain v. IVarIters would have been overruled. It was virtually
overruled, although not expressly; for no consideration in truth
appears in the letter. The signer says, I herewith hand you
draughts. This imports no consideration, and it was only from
extrinsic evidence that the chief j ustice’s notion of a consideration
could have been obtained. Anything seems to have been caught
at. to save a case from the operation of the doctrine in Wain v.
Warlters.
Such being the reputation of that case in England, it surely
does not present a very formidable obstacle to a different con
struction of the statute in this country; and certainly it would not
warrant us in overruling what we believe has been the practical,
as well as the just construction in our courts for so long a period.
It is indeed desirable that statutes, made for the regulation of
personal contracts in commercial countries, should receive similar
adjudications in all courts. But it is better for those courts, who
may have adopted a novel construction, to retrace their steps, and
go back to the old foundations, than that others, from a spirit of
comity, should imitate them; for innovation in the administration
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dreaded than anywhere else; as it tends to unsettle the minds of
the community, and to introduce into the judicial tribunals the
practice of legislating, under the guise of declaring the law, which
is their proper function.
We have taken pains to inquire what reception the doctrine,
which we consider novel and unsound, has met with in any of the
courts of the United States; and we do not find it has been rec
ognized any where but in New York. We are in the habit of
showing great respect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of
that state; for that bench, ever since we have been enabled to
judge of its character by the masterly reports of Mr. Johnson,
has been distinguished by great learning and uncommon legal
acumen. If any thing could cause us to hesitate in pronouncing
an opinion, which we have arrived at after mature deliberation, it
would he to find that opinion contradicted by a deliberate de
cision of a court we so highly respect.
But there are some circumstances attending the decision
upon this subject by that court, which we think may justly, in
some measure, impair it
s
influence on our minds. The case o
f
Sears v. Brink, in which the question first occurred, happened
not a great while after the case o
f
Wain v. Warlters was first
promulgated in this country. The habitual veneration, which the
courts o
f
this country have ever entertained for the opinions o
f




King's Bench, would naturally lead to the adoption o
f
those opin
ions, in analogous cases. The judicial propensity is to repose
upon authority. This propensity, although almost always useful,
a
s it tends to repress ingenious searches after novelties and dis
tinctions; which, if indulged, would produce uncertainty in that
science, which, more than a
ll others, the public interest requires
should be fixed and stable, may sometimes lead to a hasty adop
tion o
f principles, which a deliberate investigation would prove
unsound. In this case o
f
Scars v. Brink, Judge VANNEss, who
delivered the opinion o
f
the Court, seems to have relied more
tipon the argument and reasoning o
f
Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, in
the case o
f
Wain v. Warlters, than upon the resources o
f
his own
mind, for the construction o
f
the statute; and this it would be
natural for any judge to do, under the like circumstances. Like
him, he resorts to the etymology, and the technical import o
f
the
term agreement, as the basis o
f
his construction.
I think that it has been shown that too much stress was laid
upon this source o
f argument. Indeed, I cannot but entertain
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of New York, or Massachusetts, ever looked into Plowden or
Comyns, or any law dictionary, to ascertain the force and meaning
of that term, as has been done since, in order to make out the
construction of the statute. Sometimes the sense of an instrument
or statute is lost by looking too deep for it; as men have been
known to impoverish themselves by digging into the bowels of the
earth for riches, which they would have obtained with less labor
by working upon it
s
surface. Not that I am disposed to treat
with disrespect the labors and researches o
f patient and learned
jurists, in ancient o
r
modern times. Certainly the science o
f
law
requires such investigations, but, as in other sciences, the object
o






a distance, when all the time it has been near.
Another thing is worthy o
f remark, viz., that it is probable




Brink was discussed, knew that the case of Wain v. Warlters was
a suspected case in England; for neither o
f
them advert to any o
f
the cases in which the doctrine has been doubted. Indeed, the
strongest o
f
those cases has been passed upon since the case o
f
Scars v. Brink. The case o
f
Wain v. Warlters a
t
that time stood
in New York unquestioned, and therefore came with great force
upon the minds o
f
the bench and bar.
But afterwards, in the case o
f
Leonard v. Vredenburg, the
question was again presented to the New York court; and Chief
Justice Kent bestowed the attention o
f
his powerful mind upon it
.
I do not understand him as approving the doctrine. On the con
trary, in reference to the cases o
f
Wain v. Warlters and Sears v.
Brink, he says, -“I have not been altogether satisfied with the
decisions referred to.” He then discovers, what did not occur to
him at the trial o
f
the action, that it admitted o
f
a distinction from
those two cases, and therefore says—"The present motion can be
determined in favor o
f
the plaintiff, without disturbing them.”
He then proceeds to make an ingenious, and I think, a just clas
sification o
f
the cases which have generally been thought to come
within the statute.
His first class is
,
where credit has been given upon the pre
vious agreement o
f
a third party to pay, o
r guaranty payment, for
goods which shall be delivered. This he calls a collateral engage




except the debt which is created. The collateral undertaking in
such case is the essential ground o
f
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time with the principal, is within this class. Wide Hunt, Adm., V.
Adams, 5 Mass. Rep. 358, and Stadt v. Lill, 9 East, 348.
The second class is
,
where the collateral security is subse
quent to the creation o
f
the debt, and not the inducement to it
.
Here a further consideration must be proved, such, I suppose, as





And the third class is
,
when the promise to pay the debt o
f
another arises out of some new consideration of benefit or harm,
moving between the new contracting parties. Such is the case,
when the creditor gives u
p
some lien o





the third party to pay the debt. This
latter class he considers an original undertaking, capable o
f be
ing proved by parole, as not coming within the statute; and this




. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886.
Now it is a little remarkable, that, in giving so minutely the
qualities o
f
these different classes o
f contracts, and in adverting
to Wain v. JVarlters, as coming within the second class, nothing
is said from which the necessity o
f having the consideration, as
well as the promise, in writing, can be inferred. All the infer
ence, which can be fairly made, is
,
that such a promise must
have a new consideration proved. But the kind o
f proof is left
undecided; and the case before the Court was determined to be
within the third class, which required no proof o
f
a distinct con
sideration. There was therefore no necessity o
f “disturbing the
cases which had been decided,” and with which the learned chief
justice, "was not altogether satisfied.”
But if the word agreement in the statute is to be referred to
collateral promises, as was determined in the cases o
f
Sears v.
Brink and Wain v. Warlters, it is not easy to see why the first
class o
f cases, any more than the second, should be excluded from
the operation o
f
the rule. There must be a consideration. This
is admitted on all hands. The only question is about the mode o
f
proof.
When a man, for his own debt, makes a promissory note,
not negotiable, and a third party puts his name on the back o
f
the note, this is to be considered a promise to pay the debt o
f
another, and he may be sued either as a surety o
r guarantor. If
h
e is considered a surety, according to our case o
f Hunt, Adm. v.
Adams, he is viewed as an original promisor; and no other evidence
o
f
consideration would be required, than against the principal in the
note. But no man can be held on such a promise, unless it be in
writing and signed b
y
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and yet whatever consideration moved to the undertaking, may
be proved by parole, according to our law, and to the case of
Leonard \'‘. Vredenburg.
Suppose a promissory note given by A to B payable in sixty
days, expressly in consideration of a preexisting debt; and C at
the same time writes on the back, “I promise to pay the contents
of the within note in ninety days, if A does not pay it according
to its tenor, demand being made upon A, when it falls due, and
notice given to me of non-payment.” This is certainly a promise
to pay the debt of A. No consideration is ex ressed; and yet
the consideration is the credit iven to A. It comes withm the~unless in writing. But
this agreement would be within Chief Justice Kent's first class
of cases, in which the consideration may be proved by parole. All
the mischiefs, supposed to be provided against by the statute,
would exist in the case put, as much as if the collateral under
taker had signed his name the day after the original promise;
which would bring the promise within the second class of cases,
supposed by Chief Justice Kent to be governed by the case of
Wain v. Warlters.
This important question came before the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the case of Violet v. Patton, 5 Cranch 142.
The case was from Virginia, and arose on their statute
of frauds, which is like ours and the English statute;
except that it provides that the undertaking shall be
void, unless the promise or agreement shall be in writ
ing, and signed by the party, &c. Chief Justice MARsHALL,
in delivering the opinion of the Court, considers the variance from
the English statute so essential, that the doctrine in the case of
ll/ain v. Warlters does not apply. It is worthy of remark that the
words of the Virginia statute are precisely what Mr. Justice LE
BLANC said, in the case of Wa-in v. I/Varlters, he wishes the Eng
lish statute had been. There must be a consideration to a promise,
as well as to an agreement; and if the intention of the legisla
ture was that the consideration of an agreement should be in
writing, there seems to be no reason of policy why a different
principle should be applied to a promise. For the evils to be
remedied by the statute are as great in one case as in the other;
it being as easy to set up the consideration of a promise by per
jury, as the consideration of an agreement.
The case of Russell v. Clark 65' AL, 3 Dallas, 415, was re
ferred to by the counsel for the defendants, as deciding that the
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writing. But we have looked into that case, and do not find it to
be so. Letters were relied upon to prove that the defendants
promised to guaranty certain bills of exchange; but the letters
did not prove the fact. Parole evidence was admitted at the Cir
cuit Court, to prove that a promise was really intended by the
letters; but the Supreme Court reversed the decision, on the
ground that, by the statute, the whole agreement, that is
,
the whole
promise, was required to be in writing; and this was certainly
correct. Nothing was said about the consideration.
We have not been able to find that any judicial decision has
taken place upon the statute of frauds, &c., in any other court
within the United States than those I have alluded to. In a note,
however, to the case of Wain v. Warlters, in the Connecticut
edition of East’s reports by Mr. Day. an elaborate examination
of the doctrine is given by their late Chief Justice Swift. In his
argument he has gone into a profound investigation of the legal
meaning of the word agreement, in order to meet the principal
argument of Lord Ellenborough; and he concludes with a de
cided disapprobation of the doctrine laid down by the Court of
King’s Bench.
With respect to our own Court, whenever the case of Wain
v. Warlters has been cited, it has been treated as doubtful, and
has never been recognized as law. I have already cited the ob
servations of Chief Justice Parsons upon it. in the case of H uni,
.-‘1dm., v. Adams; and there is no doubt. from what fell from that
great man upon that occasion, that, had the case before him re
quired it
,
he would have saved us the trouble of this elaborate
investigation. .
The case of Ulen v. Kittredgc, 7 Mass, Rep. 233, was decided
in direct opposition to the principle contended for by the defend
ants in this action: although the cases of VVain v. Warlters and
Smrs v. Brink were cited and urged by the able and learned coun
sel for the defendant. Indeed, the Court, in the case referred to.
went far beyond what is necessary to support the action now be
fore us. For the endorsement of Kittredge was in blank_. upon a
pre-existing note, to which he was not a party; and the plaintiff
was permitted, not only to prove by parole the consideration, but
to insert the words of a guaranty over the name of Kittredge,
upon proof that he declared his signature as good. for the pur
pose intended, as if anything had been written over it.
Upon this review of the cases, which have arisen in this coun
try and in England upon this important subject. we are relieved
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Bench, or of New York, in declining to adopt the construction
which they have given to this statute.
We find the case of Wain v. Warlters to have been received
with doubt and hesitation by the tribunals of the same country
in which it was decided; that the case of Scars v. Brink has not
been fully recognized, in any case arising subsequently in New
York; that in the Supreme Court of the United States the doc
trine was doubted, and the application of it avoided; that in Con
necticut an eminent jurist has borne testimony against it; that in
our own state, a judge of the first eminence has spoken of it unfav
orably; and that one case has been decided in direct opposition
to it.
We are not, therefore, overruling a settled principle, or in
troducing a new construction, in refusing to yield to this doctrine,
but are merely vindicating what we believe to be the true and
established construction, from the doubts brought upon it by
the decision of the Court of King's Bench.
A contemporaneous is generally the best construction of a
statute. It gives the sense of a community, of the terms made
use of by a legislature. If there is ambiguity in the language, the
understanding and application of it
,
when the statute first comes
into operation, sanctioned b
y long acquiescence on the part o
f
the
legislature, and judicial tribunals, is the strongest evidence that it
has been rightly explained in practice. A construction under
such circumstances becomes established law; and after it has been
acted upon for a century, nothing but legislative power can con
stitutionally effect a change. We can say with Lord Ellenborough
that, until the case o
f
Wain v. Warlters was decided, “we had al
ways taken the law to be clear, that if a man agreed in writing to
pay the debt o





the writing;” and so understanding
the law, we have no authority o
r disposition to change it
.
The Court, for the foregoing reasons, are unanimously o
f
opinion that the plaintiff's action is well maintained b
y
the writ
ing declared on, and b
y
the parole proof which was given to
support it
.
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I4. REED v. EVANS, et al., 17 Ohio 128.
Supreme Court Ohio, in Bank, 1848.
The consideration for a promise to pay the debt of a third
person need not be in writing.
This is a writ of error, directed to the Court of Common
Pleas of Lucas County.
The original action was founded upon the following guar
anty: “$175. For value received, I promise to pay to John For
man & A. G. Evans, or order, one hundred and seventy-five dol
lars, with interest from date, to be paid as follows, to-wit: one
third in one year, one-third in two years, and the remaining third
in three years. Witness my hand and seal, this 28th day of Janu
ary, A. D. 1836.
HENRY REED, JR. (Seal).
I hereby obligate myself that the above note shall be paid in
three years from this fourth day of June, 1838.
HENRY REED.”
The declaration contains four counts.
The first averred a general indebtedness from Henry Reed,
jr., to the plaintiffs, and in consideration that the plaintiffs would
give time to said Henry Reed, jr. for the payment thereof, until
three years from the fourth day of June, 1838, he, the defendant,
by his promise in writing, bound himself to pay the same at such
time—that time was given accordingly, and excused demand and
notice at the expiration of the guaranty because of the insolvency
of the principal.
The second was like the first, except that the indebtedness
was described according to the fact, as by the note.
The third was like the second, except that demand and notice
was averred instead of the excuse.
The fourth was the common count.
Plea, the general issue.
The case was submitted to the court, without the interven
tion of a jury, and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs. * * *
Young & Waite, for plaintiff in error.
Fitch & McBain, for defendants.
BIRCHARD, C. J.—This case was submitted to the court below
upon the proofs offered by the plaintiff. Exception was taken
to the sufficiency of the testimony offered in support of the action.
The court found it sufficient, and no motion for a new trial was
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dence, and in no other way, can the questions argued upon the as
signment of error be considered. \'iewed in this light, the proof
offered below should be considered as establishing every fact
which may reasonably be inferred from the evidence, without
drawing therefrom forced or violent inferences. Trying the evi
dence by this rule, did it establish the cause set forth in the dec
laration P
The consideration of the promise declared upon is alleged to‘
have been forbearance to sue Henry Reed, jr. for three years.
from the fourth of June, 1838.
The evideny to support this averment consisted of thee
written prom/isewréf proof that no Clflitcfl
of payment from Henry
Reed, jr. was made within three years,‘ that plaintifff below for
bore to prosecute for three years. and that after the expiration
of that time, the defendant below offered to pay the claim in ()hio
state bonds. That again, in 1842. he proposed paying the same
in property, or excused himself when called on. by alleging in
ability for want of means, but at no time denied his liability to
pay the same.
Now it may be said that this all does not prove directly thai
the consideration alleged actually existed. yet one could scarce
doubt from these facts that a good consideration did exist; and
the presumption is that it is the one set forth in the declaration.
It is unreasonable to presume that the written engagement was
entered into without cause. The judges of the court of common
pleas had the facts so before them that they were justified in draw
ing all reasonable and fair inferences that could-be well based
upon this evidence. They might well presume, from the cir
cumstances, that the delay granted to the maker would not have
occurred without cause.. That the promises to pay in state bonds
or other property, as well as the excuses for non-payment, would
not have been made without a binding promise. The circum
stances, viewed in a favorable light, certainly looked toward the
support of a consideration for the written guaranty; and to no
other than the identical one set forth in the declaration. \\"e are
not prepared, therefore, to say that the court erred in this respect.
‘But it is further urged that no evidence was admissible to
prove any consideration, none being expressed in the written
guaranty.
This objection presents a vexed question, arising out of the
act for the prevention of frauds -and perjuries. 1t is believed that
in this state it has been hitherto uniformly held, that a promise.









































































































































48 REED v. Ev.\NS [Chap. I
consideration, would sustain an action, and that such a consider
ation might be proved by parol, and need not be set forth or in
corporated in the writing itself. Upon this question different
courts have held different opinions. It was to me a matter of some
surprise to find that the law of this state, upon this point, was
considered unsettled. The case was brought into bank, in order
that a reported case. in accordance with what was supposed to
have been the uniform current of decisions in this state, might be
placed within the ‘reach of every one, and not because the point
was regarded doubtful.
Our statute is similar. so far as it bears upon this question, to
the English statute of 29th Charles 2d, c. 3, s. '4. In 180-L, in the
case of J/Vain \'. Warlters, that statute, for the first time, received
a construction requiring a recital, in writing. of the consideration
on which a promise to pay the debt of another is founded. The
doctrine seems to have taken the profession in England by sur
prise. It has been repeatedly questioned in England, but has
hitherto been sustained there. 1-I Ves. p. 189; 15 \~'es. p. 286.
In 1808, the principle held in Wain v. H/arlters was adopted
in New York. and these decisions have been perhaps the means
of giving a more extended currency to the doctrine of that case
in some of our sister states, and possibly may have contributed
to its stability in the country of its origin. But in 1809, in the case
of Hunt v. Adams, 5 1\Iass. Rep. 360, the doctrine of -_Wain v.
W arlters was departed from, by the supreme court of Massachu
setts, and, as we think, very good reasons were given for the
departure by the learned Chief Justice Parsons. He held the
English case to be one of first impression, but admitted that if
the word agreement, as used in the statute, is to be taken not in a
popular but in a strictly legal sense. it might be unreasonable to
question that decision. He held. however, that the word
agreement originally incorporated into the statute, was
used in the ~. as intending the undertaking of the
party charged, and not necessarily including the consideration for
it. This view of the statute was reaffirmed by the same court in
1821, in a learned and able opinion by Parker, C. J._. ig Packard
v. Richardson ct al., r7 Mass. Rep. I 37, in which he reviewed at~e cases then decided upon this subject. His conclud
ing remarks are worth copying. “We are not (says the judge)
overruling a settled principle, or introducing a new construction.
in refusing to yield to this doctrine; but are merely vindicating
what we believe to be the true and established construction, from
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\NN.
Well might he call it the vindication of an established con
struction, for from the reign of Charles II. to the year 1804, it
had always been understood, both in England and the United
States, that it was not necessary that the consideration should
appear on the face of the writing. So said Lord Eldon, and so
said Lord Ellenborough. The question was, what did the statute
mean, or rather what did the men who framed the act, and par
liament mean in King Charles' time, when they enacted the law?
Those best able to answer were it
s cotemporaries—the legisla




the enactment, and within
the first century afterward. Their construction, in the language
of the Massachusetts court, “became established law,” for what
ever was the meaning o
f
the statute when first enacted, should be
its meaning through a
ll
future time. It is the very essence of a
law, that it be uniform and unchangeable.
Again, it is said there should have been a demand and notice
o
f non-payment. To this, we reply, that the engagement was an
original undertaking to pay the amount o
f
the note in three years.
It was not an engagement that the maker should pay the note when
due and if not, that the guarantor would Day it, but that in con
sideration that the payee would delay the payment until two years
after the maturity o
f
the note, the guarantor would pay it
. No







the note; it was not contemplated b
y
the parties. On
the contrary, the consideration o
f
the promise not only excused
the making o
f
such demand, but made one improper. The promise
was made because the payee had agreed to delay payment—when




. Of the words “memorandum or note.”
15. THE ARGUS COMPANY., respondent v. THE MAYOR, &c.,




f Appeals, New York, 1874.
A resolution of a common council, duly adopted and entered
upon it
s





constitutes a memorandum o
r
note in writing.
Appeal from judgment o
f
the General Term o
f
the Supreme
Court in the third judicial department, reversing a judgment in
favor o
f plaintiff, entered upon the report o
f
a referee and grant
ing a new trial. (Reported below, 7 Lans., 264).











































































































































50 ARGUS COMPANY. V. THE MAYOR [Chap. I
The common council of defendants, on the 26th day of
January, 1863, adopted the following resolution:
“Resolved, That the proceedings of this board be reported for,
and published in, one daily paper, to be designated by the board,
at an annual expense not to exceed $1,000; and that all city ad
vertising be published, at the rates prescribed by law for the pub
lication of legal notices, in the same paper, such designation to be
for the term of three years; also, that all printing and binding
chargeable to the city be done by the proprietor or proprietors of
such paper for the like term, at the rates current in the city, and
that the chamberlain be and he is hereby authorized and directed
to enter into contract accordingly with such proprietor or proprie
tors as the board may designate."
The said resolution was adopted by a vote of two-thirds of
all the members, taken by yeas and nays. On motion, the Atlas
and Argus, a daily newspaper published by plaintiff, was designat
ed “as such official paper." The resolution and motion were entered
in the book of minutes, and the minutes for the day, thus entered,
were signed by the clerk of the common council. In pursuance
of said resolution, a contract in writing was executed on the 27th
day of January, 1863, by the chamberlain on behalf of the de
fendants and by plaintiff, for three years from that date.
On the 16th day of January, 1866, the common council adopt
ed the following resolution:
“Resolved, That the Argus be, and hereby is
,
designated as
the official paper, in accordance with the former resolutions o
f
the
common council, establishing an official organ for the city.”
This resolution was not adopted b
y
a vote taken b
y
yeas and
nays entered on the minutes, but the resolution was entered on





cil. “The Argus" mentioned in the resolution was the newspaper
published by the plaintiff. After the resolution was adopted, the
plaintiff subscribed a written acceptance thereof, which was filed
b
y
it with the clerk o
f
said common council o
n
the 27th day o
f
January, 1866, and no contract with defendant's chamberlain was
made. After such acceptance, the plaintiff proceeded to, and did
publish the proceedings o
f
the common council, in The Argus, and
continued so to do for the space o
f
three years thereafter. On the
4th o




terms rescinding the resolution o
f January 15, 1866, and another
resolution amending that o
f January 26, 1863, in substance strik
ing out the clause as to publication o
f
the proceedings, and giving
the residue o
f









































































































































Sect. 2] ARGU'S COMPANY \". THE MAYOR 5 I
After the passage of said resolutions, plaintiff served written
notice on the common council, protesting against the same, claim
ing it
s paper to be the official organ, and expressing it
s willingness
to do the work and perform it
s
contract. Plaintiff claimed to
recover the contract price for publishing the proceedings o
f $1,000




Moak for the appellants.
Samuel Hand for the respondent.
Fol.GER. J.—The plaintiff seeks to recover upon an agreement
which, by it
s terms, was not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof. It can do so if the agreement, or some note
o
r
memorandum is in writing and subscribed b
y
the party to be
charged thereby. * * *
In this case the party to be charged, and whose subscription
is needed is the defendant, a municipal corporation. It is plain
that such a defendant can make no note or memorandum, nor
subscribe the same, save b
y
an officer o
r agent thereof. It is so,




and that the action o
f








r secretary. Hence it is that it
s agreements are
rarely oral, but, pari passu with the making of them, they are on
the instant o
f




them is made; and the minutes o
f
the day's doings o
f
the body, being signed by the clerk thereof, there is a subscription
o
f





authorized. This is a satisfactory compliance with the statute. It
meets the purpose and intention o
f
the law, b
y providing an endur
ing and unchanging evidence o
f
the agreement; and it meets its




it in writing, sub
scribed b
y
the party to be charged thereby, the subscription made
by an authorized agent. And so are the authorities. (Johnson
v
. Trinity Ch. Society, 11 Allen 123: Tufts v. Plymouth Gold
Mining Co., 14 id
.
407; Chase v. City of Lowell, Gray 35;









n agreement as to the work which the defendant









three years from it
s adoption, and
so require a new passage to be still operative. Until rescinded in






city to have it











































































































































52 ARGUS COMPANY v. THE MAYOR [Chap. I
to be designated by the city. It was this designation, only, which
had a limit to a term of three years. The resolution, as to all but
the party with whom the agreement was to be, was perpetual, un
less rescinded by action of the city; and it needed nothing but the
designation of some daily paper, at the end of each term of three
years, entered upon the daily minutes, signed by the clerk, to do
all which the city need to do, to make a note or memorandum in
writing, subscribed by the party to be charged thereby.
The resolution of 15th January, 1866, also recorded in the
minutes and signed by the clerk, designating anew the plaintiff’s
daily paper, started another term of three years. For the agree
ment was already there, save the name of the party to be agreed
with, and that this resolution supplied.
Nor did this last resolution need to be passed with a call of
the ayes and nays, and they entered upon the record. It was not
a law or a resolution involving an appropriation or payment of
money for any purpose. (Laws of 1848, chap. 139, p. 217, sec. 1).
The purpose was decided upon by the former resolution. The
design of the -provision of the act of 1848, is to expose to accounta
bility to the public, those who in places of public trust, sanction
new objects and purposes for expenditure of public money. An
expenditure having been once determined upon, it does not again
involve it
,
that by resolution one is selected to do the work, any
more than where an office under the city government, having been
created by resolution and a compensation having been attached to
it
,
by a subsequent resolution one is named to fill it.
Nor does the resolution contemplate that the chamberlain
is to negotiate for the publication of the proceedings of the
board at :1 sum less than $1,000. It is a proposal—in connection
with the other resolution, designating the plaintiff's paper as the
official organ—to the plaintiff, to pay it not to exceed $1,000 for
doing certain work; the plaintiff's answer is an acceptance of that
sum and an agreement to do the work therefor. It is different
from Hagvdock v. Stow (40 N. Y., 364). That was a power
intrusted to an agent, with a minimum limit of price, but no max
imum ; and hence the duty of
_ the agent to his principal to obtain
more if he might. This is an offer by one party to another, which
the other accepts without intervention of an agent, and the maxi
mum compensation named is the compensation agreed for. Be
sides, the direction to the chamberlain does not contemplate any
change of the terms of the resolution; he is directed to enter into
a contract accordingly, i. e., in the terms specified in the resolution.









































































































































Sect. 2] ARGUS COMPANY V. T H E MAYOR 53
already done his duty in making the contract, with which the de
fendant is satisfied. The second resolution, of January 16, 1866,
is an offer by the defendant to renew it for another term of three
years; and so the defendant does not remain free from obligation,
under that resolution, until the chamberlain has again entered into
a contract. The contract which he was directed to make, expres
sing no more in fact than the resolution of 1863, was satisfactory
to the defendant. The defendant, agreeing to the terms of that
resolution and contract, by the resolution again designating the
daily paper of the plaintiff, proposed to it to renew the same for




that proposal, the contract was renewed
for another three years' term, and, as we have seen, was legally
embodied in writing, and was subscribed according to the statute.
A letter from a party to be charged, specifying the terms of an
agreement, and directing an assignment to be drawn in accordance
with it
,
is a good memorandum o
f
the contract, though the assign
ment never be made. (See Smith v. Watson, cited in Gibson v.
Holland. Law Rep. [1 Com. Pl. 6). The common council did
not contemplate not being bound, until a contract other than the
resolutions and some acceptance o
f
it was made. Those cases
which have turned on such point, have been where a further con
tract was needed to express the details o
f
the bargain, where those
had yet to be arranged between the parties.
Nor does the fact that the rates for printing and binding are
not expressed, but reference is made to something outside o
f
the
contract, and which must be established by parol testimony, in
validate the contract. This contract is not so much open to ob
jection for this cause, as if no price was expressed, nor reference
made to anything b
y
which it might be determined, and the par
ties were left to proof o
f
a quantum meruit. Yet in such case, a
memorandum has been held to be in compliance with the statute.
(Hoadly v. McLaine, 10 Bing., 482; Ashcroft v. Morrin, 4 M. &
G
.
450). The first resolution does not require that the chamberlain
ascertain what the current rates are, when he enters into his con
tract, and make them the rule o
f compensation the three years
through. What he is to do, if he does aught, is to put into his con
tract the phrase o
f
the resolution. For the designation and the
contract is for three years; and the rates current at the beginning
o
f
the term, may be quite different from those current in any
time and at all times through the term o
f
three years, that the
defendant contracts, willing to pay it
s designated official paper









































































































































54 ARGUS COMPANY V. T H E MAYOR |Chap. I
terms current for the same service, in the city where the work
is done, from time to time.
Nor is the idea that there was no delivery to the plaintiff
of the resolution of 1866, one that can prevail. There had once
been delivery of the same agreement and performance of it by
both parties. It was not changed. The resolution of 1866 was
but a proposal to the plaintiff to renew it
. It was adopted 16th









the plaintiff. The resolution o
f
January, 1866, at once on it
s passage, was reported for and de
livered to the plaintiff, to the knowledge o
f
the defendant's agents.
Nor is it always needed that there be delivery to the other con
, tracting party, to bind the one who is sought to be charged by
the note o
r
memorandum. Where one, b
y
his agent, has dealt
with another, a written communication to the agent, reciting the
terms o
f
the agreement made b
y
the agent with that other, and
ratifying the same, will answer the statute. (Gibson v. Holland,
supra). And so will a written communication to the other, ex
pressive o
f





[N. S., | 843). The plaintiff did accept the
proposal for a renewal b
y filing its written acceptance with the
clerk o
f
defendant. The clerk had no authority to make a con
tract o
r





the common council, and an organ o
f




y acting under it to the knowledge and with the
assent o
f






The plaintiff has a good cause o
f
action on the contract; but
for the reason given b
y
the General Term, it was proper that there
should be a new trial, rather than judgment absolute ordered in
that court. But there being a stipulation under the eleventh sec
tion o
f
the Code, on appeal to this court, the order o
f
the General
Term, should be affirmed, and judgment absolute for the plaintiff.
All concur, except Grover and Rapallo, J.J., dissenting.









































































































































Sect. 2] CASEY V. BRABASON 55
B. PROMISES NOT WITH IN THE STATUTE.
a. When the promise is the original undertaking of the promisor.
16. CASEY v. BRABASON, Io Abb. Pr. 368.
Supreme Court, New York, Special Term, 1860.
One who signs a note as if he were principal is in law an
riginal promisor, although in fact he was a mere surety.
Motion for a new trial.
This action was brought upon a promissory note, in the
words and figures following, to-wit:
“$200.
On or before two years, we jointly and severally promise to
pay to Michael Casey, or his order, the sum of two hundred dol
lars. Given under our hands,
January 8, 1856." (Signed) BERNARD McCABE,
Catholic Pastor.
CHARLEs J. BRABASON."
The defendant alleged in his answer that he signed the note
as surety, and without consideration.
The proof showed that the note was given for a debt of Mc
Cabe's, and that the defendant signed it as his surety, without re
ceiving any consideration therefor.
The defendant insisted that he was not liable, but the judge
held otherwise, and directed the jury to find for the plaintiff; to
which decision and direction the defendant excepted. The jury
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $229.10.
The action was tried at the Chenango circuit in February,
1860. -
Defendant moved for a new trial on a case and exceptions.
The other points in the case need not be stated, as they were
not deemed of sufficient importance for examination.
Wm. H. Hyde, for plaintiff.
Horace Packer, for defendant.
BALCOM, J.—The instrument in question is a valid promis
sory note, although it does not contain the words for value re
ceived, or any words tantamount to them. (Edwards on Bills and
Promissory Notes, 56, 78; 1 Cow, 2d ed., 163).
The defendant's counsel does not deny but that McCabe was
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\.
sideration therefor. He insists that the statute of frauds applies
to the case, and exempts the defendant from the payment of the
note. The statute is
,
that “every special promise to answer for
the debt, default, o
r miscarriage o
f another,” shall be void, unless




andum thereof expressing the consideration, be in writing, and
subscribed b
y
the party to be charged therewith. (2 Rev. Stat.,
135, sec. 2).
McCabe owed the plaintiff the money mentioned in the note;
and the defendant, though in fact a mere surety, signed the note
a
s principal, with Mc Cabe. The note, therefore, was not a





I think the debt, for which the note was given, a sufficient
consideration to uphold the note against the defendant as well
a
s McCabe. The note, on it
s face, is an original undertaking o
f
both of them.
If the defendant had indorsed the note for the accommoda
tion o
f McCabe, instead of signing it as maker, he would clearly
have been liable on it
,
if it had been duly protested for non-pay
ment; and I am unable to see why he is not liable on it as maker.
I am of the opinion that the statute of frauds does not apply
to the case; and that the jury were properly directed to find a ver
dict in favor o
f
the plaintiff for the amount o
f
the note.
The point that the defendant supposed he was only
signing his name to the note as a witness when he wrote it
,
is
untenable; for his answer concedes he signed it as surety.
I think there was no question for the jury upon the evidence;
and that the defendant's motion for a new trial should be denied,
with $10 costs. -
17. MORRIS, et al., v. OSTERHOUT, et al., 55 Mich. 262.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1884.
A promise to pay for goods supplied to a third person is not
within the statute o
f
frauds as a promise to pay the debt o
f
another person.
Assumpsit. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.
T
. J. O'Brien, for appellants.
Cooper & Winsor, for appellees.
SHERwooD. J.—The plaintiffs, who are millers residing at
Reed City, brought their action o









































































































































Sect. 2] MORRIS V. OSTER HOUT 57
ants, who are engaged in the lumber business and reside at Grand
Rapids, to recover for a quantity of flour and mill-feed, amount
ing to the sum of $482.92. James H. Carey had a contract with
defendants whereby he was to do sawing and make shingles for
them at Careyville, in Lake county, where the defendants had a
quantity of pine timber. The flour and feed was purchased by
Carey and used by him while doing the sawing for defendants,
and when he made the purchase he told the plaintiffs that the
goods were for the defendants; that he was at work for them, and
that they had ordered him to get the goods for them. The plain
tiffs seek to hold the defendants liable under the authority, which
was verbal, thus claimed to have been given Carey to make the
purchase, and a subsequent promise claimed to have been made
by Hughart to pay for the goods, which, however, is denied by
the latter. The defendants claim that by the terms of their agree
ment with Carey they were under no obligation to supply the
goods or to make advances to Carey, and that they never author
ized him to make the purchase on their account.
The questions at the circuit were mostly those of fact, and
were submitted to the jury, who, under the rulings and charge of
the court, rendered their verdict for the plaintiffs for the amount
claimed. The defendants bring error, and the rulings and charge
of the court are now before us for review.
At the close of the trial the defendants' counsel asked the
court to direct a verdict for the defendants. The request was
refused.
We do not think the record presents a case for the instruc
tion asked. Carey swears, in substance, that the defendants gave
him authority to make the purchase on their credit, and the credi
bility of his testimony was for the jury. If he stated truly the
direction sworn to by him as coming from defendant Hughart,
the jury would be warranted in finding that the defendants au
thorized the purchase. The promise would be by defendants and
not by Carey, and therefore not within the statute of frauds.
It would be a debt contracted upon their own promise, and not a
liability for the debt of another.
It is alleged as error that the court refused to give defendants'
second, eighth and ninth requests to charge, which requests were
as follows:
“Second. If the jury finds from the evidence that the goods
were charged, shipped and billed to Carey; that no bill was ever
sent to the defendants; that the plaintiffs took an order on the









































































































































58 MORRIS v. OSTERHOUT [Chap. I
this order and requested its acceptance and payment, and still
retain this order—such evidence is inconsistent with the claim
now made by the plaintiffs, and they cannot recover in this action.”
“Eighth. Under the undisputed facts in this case, it appears
that Carey is still liable to the plaintiffs for the amount of the
goods in question. and the plaintiffs cannot recover in this action.”
“.-\‘iut/1. It is not sufficient for the jury to find that I-Iughart
authorized Carey to buy in their name and upon their credit. They
must also find from the evidence that_the credit was given to
Osterhout and Hughart and not to James H. Carey. And in
arriving at a conclusion on this point they should consider all the
acts and conduct of the plaintiffs: such as the entry in their books,
the shipping of the goods, the taking of the order, their repeated
efforts to collect it
,
and their present possession of it.”
The second and eighth requests, we think, were properly
refused. The facts stated in the second request exclude the idea
that the inconsistency claimed for them is susceptible of explana
tion. but such is not the law. The eighth request seeks to have
the court state what the undisputed facts show. What they show
was a question for the jury, and in this case cannot be considered
disconnected with the other testimony in the case bearing on the
same point.
The circuit judge in his charge stated to the jury that the
first proposition for the plaintiffs to establish was that Carey was
authorized by defendants to purchase the goods for them; and
second, that plaintiffs. when Carey made the purchase, relied en
tirely upon defendants, and not upon Carey, for the pay; and if
they found in the affirmative of these propositions the plaintiffs
would be entitled to recover; if not, the defendants must prevail.
He further told them that, in solving these propositions, they must
take into consideration all the testimony in the case, including the
actions of the parties. We think these charges sufficiently cover
the substance of the defendants’ ninth request.
We have carefully examined the remainder of the charge
excepted to by defendants’ counsel and do not find any error
therein. The facts were for the jury, and whether the court
below or this court would or would not have come to the conclu
sion reached upon the testimony is not for our consideration. W e
find no error in the record committed by the court, and here our
duty ends.
The judgment must be affirmed.
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18. GIBBS, et al
.
v
. BLANCHARD, 15 Mich. 292.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1867.
A joint promise to pay the debt of one is an original under
taking as between the promisors and promisce and does not come
within the statute o
f
frauds.
The facts and the exceptions to the rulings and the charge o
f
the court are stated in the opinion.
M. J. Smiley, for plaintiff in error.
H. F. Severens, for defendant in error.





the defendants below) comes within
the second clause o
f






a “special promise to answer for the debt, default, o
r mis
doings” o
f Daily, the other defendant. -
The declaration contains a special count upon the contract,
and the common counts for goods sold and delivered. The special
count sets forth that, “in consideration that said plaintiff agreed
to sell to the said Daily a certain horse which the plaintiff then
and there had, o
f
the value o
f sixty dollars, undertook and prom
ised the said plaintiff to make, sign and deliver their promissory
note to said plaintiff o
r bearer, in the sum o
f sixty dollars, for the
purchase price o
f
said horse, which said promissory note was to
b
e payable thereafter, in six months from date.” It further alleges
that the plaintiff, relying upon said promise o
f
said defendants,
and in consideration thereof, did sell and deliver the horse to said
John Daily, for the price o
f sixty dollars. The breach alleges the
failure and refusal to make and deliver the note, as well as the
refusal to pay the money.
It was clear, from the evidence, that the horse was bought
for the benefit of, and delivered to Daily, and that the plaintiff
would not have sold the horse on the credit o
f Daily alone. But
upon the question, whether Daily and Gibbs were to give a joint
note, o
r





to become his guarantor, the evidence was conflicting.
There was evidence from which the jury might have found a
joint promise, or, in other words, a promise b
y
both to execute
and deliver to the plaintiff a joint note for the price; and from the
circumstances and subsequent acts o
f
the parties, the jury might
have been authorized to find that the note was to be made payable
in six months, though they might also have found that no partic
ular time was mentioned o
r expressly agreed upon for which the









































































































































60 o11ms \'. BLANCHARD [Chap. I
The evidence tending to show that the promise was joint,
or that a joint note was to be given, was substantially this: Gibbs
and Daily called upon the plaintiff together. and Gibbs asked
plaintiff if he wanted to sell his mare. ‘Plaintiff said he did. Gibbs
inquired the price, and being told sixty dollars, wanted to know if
plaintiff would take Daily’s note if he, Gibbs. would sign it and
see it paid; to this plaintiff assented. The mare not being present,
and Gibbs, being anxious to get home, said Daily might go with
plaintiff and see the mare, and if the mare suited him he might
fetch her back with him and draw up a note and Daily might sign
it
,
and the first time he, Gibbs, went to town he would sign it.
The mare was delivered to Daily, who signed a note for it at six
months, which was afterwards endorsed by Gibbs on Sunday.
This note was produced on the trial and tendered back to defend
ants.
The court charged the jury that “if it was the understanding
of the parties that Daily was the purchaser. and that he should
give his note to the plaintiff for the price, and that Gibbs should
so sign as only to be liable as indorser, the plaintiff must fail. If
however, the understanding of the parties was, at the time, that
Gibbs and Daily were the buyers of the mare, and that both were
to be liable as purchasers for the purchase price, and, accordingly,
should become joint makers of a promissory note for its payment,
though Daily was less relied upon by the plaintiff than Gibbs, and
though, in point of fact, it was understood that the mare, when
bought should belong to Daily, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
That the principle in this class of cases is, that if the agreement
be such that two persons, in the purchase of goods, do at the same
time become co-debtors to the seller for the price, then both are
purchasers, and the case is not within the statute of frauds, and
no memorandum in writing is necessary. But if it be such that
one, at the time, becomes debtor to the seller, and the other
security only for the debt, it is within the statute of frauds, and
the undertaking of the security is void unless a memorandum of
it in writing is made.”
Though the question is one requiring some accuracy of dis
crimination, I have come to the conclusion, after a careful exam
Iination of the authorities, that the charge of the court was not
only correct, but that it expresses the true rule of law applicable
to the question with remarkable clearness.
No question can arise as to the sufficiency of the considera
tion for the undertaking of Gibbs, whether original or collateral,
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would not have parted with his property. The consideration,
therefore, is equally as good in law as a sale of the horse to him
alone would have been for his sole promise to pay the price.
The plain ordinary meaning of the language used in this
clause of the statute would seem sufficiently to indicate that the
class of special promises required to be in writing includes only
such as are secondary or collateral to, or in aid'of the undertaking
or liability of some other party whose obligation, as between the
promisor and promisee, is original or primary. If there be no
such original or primary undertaking or liability of another party,
there is nothing to which the promise in question can be secondary
or collateral, and the promise, is
,
therefore, original in its nature,
and not within the statute. In other words, the statute applies
only to promises which are in the nature of guaranties for some
original or primary obligations to be performed by another. This
has been settled by a remarkably uniform course of decision since
the passage of the statute (29 Car. II., ch. 3, Sec. 4), which does
not essentially differ from our own and those of most of the states
of the Union. So numerous and so uniform have been the deci
sions upon this point, that it would savor of affectation to cite
them. They will be found cited in most of the elementary
treatises: See Browne on Stat. Frauds, ch. Io; Chitty on Cont..
p. 442, et seq.; 2 Pars. on Cont., 4th ed., 301. And though the
terms original and collateral have been criticized, yet when used,
the one to mark the obligation of the principal debtor, the other
that of the person who undertakes to answer for such debt, they
are strictly correct. and give the true view of this clause of the
statute: Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412, 414; Browne on Stat.
Frauds, ch. Io, Sec. 192.
As a result of this principle, that one must be held originally
or primarily, and the other only collaterally, or in default of the
former it follows that the statute only applies to such promises
made in behalf or for the benefit of another, as would, if valid,
create a distinct and several liability of the party thus promising,
and not a joint liability with the party in whose behalf it is made.
For if one be bound in the first instance and at all events, and the
other only contingently, or on default of the first, the liability
could not be joint. On the other hand, if the promise or the obli
gation of the two be joint, as between them, on the one side and
the promisee on the other, then neither is collateral to the other
and such joint promise is original as to both. Hence it has been
held in England that an agreement to convert a separate into a









































































































































62 GIBBS v. BLANCHARD [Chap. I
new debt, in consideration of the former being extinguished: E.r
parte Lane, I De Gex. 300; Browne on Stat. of Frauds, I93.
VVhere the question arises (as it has in almost all the cases)
as one of the several liability of the party promising in behalf of
another (as for the price of goods sold to another), the tr_ue rule
undoubtedly is
,
that if the latter (to whom the goods are sold)
be liable at all, then the promise of the former is collateral. and
must be in writing; because, from the very nature of such a case,
the party to whom the goods are sold. and in whose behalf the
promise is made, is the principal debtor, and because it would be
manifestly unreasonable to hold that both were in such cases
severally liable as principals, as upon several original undertak
ings at the same moment. See Hetfield et a1. v. Dow, 3 Dutcher,
440; Dixon v. Frasec, I E. D. Smith, 32. And this rule applies
equally when the promise is made in reference to a pre-existing
liability of another, if the plaintiff in accepting the promise does
not release the principal. In reference to all such cases the
authorities may be said to be entirely uniform. But the rule thus
established as to cases where the question is one of the sereral
liability of the party making the special promise, can, I think,
have no application to the question of a joint liability upon a joint
promise of the two. The only intimation to the contrary which
I have seen is to be found in a dictum of Judge Catron in
Matthews v. Milton, 4 Yerg. 576, a case in which no such question
was involved, there being no evidence tending to show a joint
promise. To say that when the party originally owing the debt,
or for whom goods are purchased and to whom they aredelivered,
is liable at all, no other person can be held severally liable unless
the promise be in writing, is merely saying that such promise
is collateral, and, therefore. within the statute. But to say that
they cannot both become jointly liable upon their joint promise,
not in writing, to pay such debt or the price of such goods, if
the party originally owing the debt or receiving the goods be at all
_ liable, is but another form of declaring that it is not competent
for both to become original promisors, as between them and the
promisee, unless both are under an equal obligation, as between
themselves, for the ultimate payment of the debt. Such a propo
sition, it seems to me, can not be maintained either upon a prin
ciple or authority. Such an objection to a joint promise seems
rather to have reference to some supposed defect of consideration
(a question entirely distinct from the statute) than to the promise.
And, if the party promising jointly with another to whom goods









































































































































Sect. 2 | GIBBS V. BLAN CII ARD 63
as between the two promisors, he, not having received the goods,
is under no obligation to pay; then the same reason ought to op
erate with still greater force against his several promise to pay the
whole price of goods received by the other. But the law in the
latter case is weli settled the other way.







. Dow, above cited, that, “to settle the rights o
f promisors
inter sese, to ascertain as between them who is to pay the debt









follows that he who b
y
the arrangement between the promisors
ultimately may be bound to pay the debt, as to the promisce, the
principal debtor. That does not concern him.” This view, it
seems to me, rests upon sound reasons—reasons which must nat
urally enter into the consideration o
f
business men, in the ordi
nary transactions o
f
business. Where a party has been willing to
put himself in the position o
f
an original promisor (either jointly
o
r severally) to a vendor for goods purchased for the benefit of,
o
r
delivered to, another, the vendor has a right conclusively to
presume that such relations o
r arrangements exist between the
two as to make it the duty o
f
the party o
r parties promising, a
s
between themselves, to pay according to the promise. And to allow
the contrary to be shown to defeat the promise would operate
a
s
a fraud upon the vendor.
The question o
f
a joint promise appears to have been seldom
raised for adjudication in connection with the statute o
f frauds;
but the following cases fully sustain the proposition that a joint
promise o






a debt contracted at the time for his benefit (as for
goods bought for and delivered to the one), does not come within
the statute, but is an original promise, as between them and the
promisee, and valid without writing: Ex parte Lane, I De Gex,
300; Wainwright v. Straw, 15 Vt. 215; Stone v. Walker, 13 Gray,
613; and Hetfield v. Dow, 3 Dutcher 440. See also b
y analogy
Batson v. King, 4 H. & N., 739. The same doctrine is laid down
by Mr. Browne in his able treatise on the statute of frauds: Ch.
Io, Sec. 197.
It is true that in Wainwright v. Straw, which most resembles
the present case, the decision is placed in part upon the ground
that the sale was made to both. The facts were that Straw and
Cunningham both went to plaintiff's store and said they wished
to buy a stove for Straw, but that both would be responsible.
Now, I can see no difference in legal effect between the case










































































































































64 o11ms v. I3L.\NCH1.\RD [Chap. I
and both of us will be responsible.” and the case where A says.
“B wishes to purchase a stove. but we will both be responsible.”
Substantially, the transaction is the same; inboth cases alike it is
a sale for the benefit of the one on the joint credit of the two, and
the real question in both cases is, whether the credit was given to
both jointly. I do not think the court, in Waimuright v. Straw,
based their decision upon the narrow and merely verbal ground of
the use of the first person plural. showing merely who wanted‘ the
stove, but upon the broad ground above stated. that it was sold
upon their joint credit. And in all such cases where the saleis
upon the joint credit and promise of the defendants, though the
property is purchased for and delivered to but cne of them, I
think the legal effect of the transaction constitutes, as between
them and the vendor, a sale to the two jointly. The sale as be
tween the vendor and the vendee is to the party or parties to
whom the credit is given for the price. without reference to the
question for whose use it is purchased, or who. as between the
promisors, is to be its owner when bought.
This brings us to another point in the case. The sale (if
upon the joint credit and promise of the defendants) was a joint
sale to both, as between them and the plaintiff. But in the
special count of the declaration it is alleged as a sale to Daily
alone. The plaintiff cannot, therefore, recover upon the special
count.
But upon the count for goods sold and delivered, the sale
having been made to both, the plaintiff would be entitled to re
cover, if the facts be such as would warrant a recovery upon a sale
made for the joint benefit of, and the property delivered to both.
I think there was no error in the charge or proceedings of










































































































































Sect. 2] FIRST N.ATIONAL BANK V. CHIALMERS 65
b. When the promisor is virtually discharging his own debt.
19. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, respondent, v. CHALMERS,
et al., appellants, 144 N.Y., 432, 39 N. F. 331.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1895.
A promise made to a creditor to pay the debt of a third
person is original when such third person has transferred or
delivered to the promisgr, for his own use and benefit, money or
property in consi ion of the promisor's agreement to assume
and pa ina debt.
Such an agreement is not merely a promise to answer for the
debt or default of another, and is not within the statute of
frauds.
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the Second Judicial Department, entered upon an order
made at the May Term, 1893, which affirmed a judgment in favor
Qf the plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the Court on trial at
Circuit without a jury.
A mem. of the case on a former appeal appears in I2O N. Y.
658.
This action was brought upon an alleged agreement made by
defendants for a valuable consideration, to pay to plaintiff the
amount of an indebtedness of the firm of Charles Spruce & Co.
to it.
On October 30, 1882, said firm, being financially embarrassed,
confessed judgment to defendants for various sums due them and
for amounts owing to other parties. The statement on which the
judgment was entered, under the head of “Liabilities assumed,”
set forth, among other items, the following: “Money due by
Charles Spruce & Co. to First National Bank of Sing Sing on
overdrawn account, $1556.47.
The court found that defendarit made an absolute, uncondi
tional promise to pay plaintiff's debt.
Further facts are stated in the opinion.
Calvin Frost, for appellants.
Francis Larkin, for respondent.
FINCH, J, Wüat constitutes-an-original-uragise, upon which
the statute of frauds does not operate, and which therefore may
be VIT and effectual Without a writing, is fairly settled in one
direction at least. Wherever the facts show that the debtor has
transferred or delivered: "I'misun-lu-'o" use and '"









































































































































66 FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. CHIALMERS [Chap. I
to assume and pay the outstanding debt, and he, thereupon, has
promised the creditor to pay, that promise is original, upon the
ground that by the acceptance of the fund or property under an
agreement to assume and pay the debt the promisor has made that
debt his own, has become primarily liable for its discharge, and
has assumed an independent duty of payment irrespective of the
liability of the principal debtor. Ackley v. Parmenter, 98 N. Y.
425; White v. Rintoul, 108 id. 223. In such a case the debt has
become that of the new party promising; his promise is not to pay
the debt of another, but his own; as between him and the primary
debtor the latter has become practically a surety entitled to require
the payment to be made by his transferee. The consideration of
the primary debt, by the transfer of the money or property into
which that consideration had been in effect merged, may be said
to have been shifted over to the new promisor, who thereby comes
under a duty of payment as obvious as if such original consider
ation had passed directly to him.
The question before us therefore is whether the promise of
the defendants, made to the bank, to pay the debt due it from
Leary & Spruce, was founded upon such a transfer of property
as I have above described, and thus was original, or whether it
was not so founded, and must for that reason be deemed col
lateral.
We are bound to assume upon the findings that the promise
to pay was absolute, and clean of condition or contingency. The
question whether it was made at all was severely litigated, and
depended upon the conclusion to be drawn from testimony full of
violent contradictions, and we are not at liberty to review the
determination of fact which affirms that the promise to pay was in
truth made, and was absolute in it
s
terms as sworn to b
y
the wit
nesses on the part o
f
the plaintiff. As to the substance o
f
the
agreement between the defendants and the primary debtors, there
is also contradiction. The former assert that their assumption o
f










in other words, that their agreed liability was to pay plain
tiff only out o
f proceeds when realized, and even then out o
f any
possible excess remaining over and above their own debt. If that
is true, they were under no present duty to pay the bank when the
promise was made; the debt had not become theirs; might never
become theirs; and so their verbal promise to the bank was purely
collateral and to answer for the debt o
f
another. That proposi









































































































































Sect. 2] FIRST NATIONAL BAN K. V. CHALMERS 67
upon the authority of Belknap v. Bender, 75 N. Y. 446, which
disclosed an agreement simply to pay out of proceeds when real
ized, and so far as sufficient. On this branch of the case the in
quiry turns upon the facts, and the findings fail to disclose any
such agreement, but establish the contrary. They determine that
for a valuable ©nsideration, and by an agreement with Leary and
Spruce, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff the debt due to
it
.
This finding is free o
f any condition, and imports an absolute
agreement to pay a
t
once and in full, and so negatives the defend
ants' version o
f
the facts. It is sustained by the testimony of the





f judgment which the defendant's attorney drew,
which they accepted, upon which they issued an execution, and
which provides for an assumption o
f
the bank debt absolutely and




f frauds, were thus explicitly em
braced in the findings, except one. It is not in terms or expressly
found that the consideration, described simply as valuable, was,
beyond that, such a consideration as would avoid the statute be
cause it consisted of a transfer to the defendants for their own
use and benefit o
f
the debtor's property. That fact is involved
in the findings, since it is essential to the legal conclusion, which
cannot stand without it
. We may look into the evidence, there
fore, to see whether it would have sustained such a finding if it
had been explicitly made, and thereupon assume the fact in sup
port o
f
the judgment. (Ogden v. Alexander, 140 N
.
Y. 356.)
I can find in the proof no express agreement in words trans
ferring the real and personal estate o
f
the firm to the defendants,
but that there was such a transfer in fact is abundantly established
and beyond any reasonable doubt. The situation appears to have
been this. Leary and Spruce were manufacturers o
f
files. The
defendants in New York were the regular purchasers at established
rates, o
f
their whole product. The manufacturers became seriously
indebted to their vendees in the progress o
f
the business, and as
security therefor had given to them a mortgage on their real
estate for $2,500, dated in 1876, and payable in one year; a second
mortgage on the same land for $5,000, dated in April, 1882, and
payable in one year, and, as collateral to the last-named security,
a chattel mortgage for $5,000 covering a
ll machinery and personal
property used in the manufacture o
f
files. The stock on hand and
the equity o
f
the mortgagors still remained to them. There was
due, o
r






the final arrangement o









































































































































68 1-‘nest I\'.-\Tl0l\'.‘\L BANK v. CIIALMERS [Chap. I
that all the debt created prior to their dates was protected by the
mortgages. But an added indebtedness, not covered by the securi
ties, had later accrued in the form of two notes and one indorse
ment, amounting to about $4,200, no part of which had matured
on October 30, 1882. On that day the debtors announced to the
defendants their inability to pay. Of course the statement created
alarm. None of the mortgages secured future advances, and the
defendants found themselves unsecured creditors to the amount
of over $4,000. The chattel mortgage was not due and contained
no danger clause permitting an immediate seizure. The whole
stock on hand, manufactured and unmanufactured, was encum
bered by no lien, and that and the equity under the mortgages be
longed to the debtors, was open to attack and could be disposed of
by the firm. They estimated the entire value of their property at
$16,000, which was the footing of their last preceding inventory,
and claimed it to be sufficient, not only topay the defendants in -
full but also the bank and certain other creditors whom they wish
ed to protect. They were talking of an ‘assignment, but assured
the defendants that they were ready to give them a bill of sale of
all their property, or any other security, provided that the bank
and other named creditors were protected. The defendants
agreed to assume and pay those debts, and chose instead of a bill
of sale to take a confession of judgment. In that the debtors
swore that they were justly indebted to the defendants in a sum
made up of the total debt to the latter, and of the debts to other
named creditors, which the defendants had assumed and agreed
to pay. Had the transaction stoppediat this point it would be
difficult to support the promise to the bank, unless upon the ground
of an intended purchase by the defendants of the debtor’s assets,
the price of which was secured by the confession of judgment.
But it did not stop there. The defendants could at once have
levied upon the whole personal property, and advertised a sale of
the real estate, but all that was needless, because the debtors at
once turned ov_er the whole property to the defendants, and put
them in entire and complete possession, for their own use and
benefit. Leary abandoned it utterly and went away. Spruce re
mained as the hired servant of the defendants, working for wages
which they cut down at their pleasure, obeying their orders, ship
ping the whole manufactured product to them in New York,
drawing on them for the pay roll, and treating the property in all
respects as theirs. Not a vestige of it ever came back to the debt
ors. The latter were willing to transfer it
,
as their offer of a bill
of sale proves; they did transfer it
,
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sion of judgment and the promise to the bank, it is impossible
not to see that it was in consideration of an agreement by the de
fendants to pay the specified debts.
I have not failed to consider the attempted explanation of
Chalmers and the argument about it of his counsel. The former
sought to put himself in the attitude of a tenant under Spruce as
landlord. to claim that his wages of $20 a week were in part for
rent. and to show that the goods were sold to him by Spruce as
before the failure. But the latter, though unwillingly, contro
verted the theory, and Chalmers’ own version of the facts does not
harmonize with the explanation made. The claim that Spruce was
to remain owner and work out the debts does not account for
Leary’s abandonment of the possession, nor Spruce’s service for
wages, still less for the instant assumption and payment of all
expenses and exercise of complete control by the defendants. They
- took all the products, and if they continued to keep the accounts
in the old way it was but a natural measure of convenience in
order to separate the factory business from their own, and be able
to ascertain its ultimate results. They took the confession of judg
ment as a guard and protection against other creditors, and as a
defense of the transfer made to them. They issued no execution
at once because that was needless to attain possession, but did issue
it later when their title was threatened. That all this was done
upon an understanding and agreement in accord with the facts
seems to me a natural and necessary inference.
Nor have I overlooked the fact that the confession of judg
ment was set aside on the motion of a junior creditor. The de
fendants’ attorney, after a consultation with his clients, accepted
short notice of the motion, and then suffered it to be granted by
default. The probabilities are that the proceeding was collusive,
but if not, it was one of the risks which the defendants assumed
and is immaterial as to the result.
I have reached my conclusion without feliancc upon the pre
vious decision. of this court on the first appeal (120 N. Y. 650).
and without any reference to the doctrine of LlIzt'rt’Hc(’ v. Fox,
which has played some part in the discussion. The opinions of
the second division on the former appeal indicate that a
majority of the court did not agree upon any one proposition dis
cussed. I should treat that judgment as decisive if it had decided.
but the only authoritative‘determination was the order for a new
trial. I do not deem the doctrine of Lazvrencc \'. Fox involved in
this controversy. That doctrine applies where no express promise









































































































































7o POWER V. R.A.N. KIN [Chap. I
upon a promise between other parties having respect to the debt
due to him and as having been made for his benefit. It struggles
to obviate a lack of privity upon equitable principles, but is need
less and has no proper application where the privity exists, and a
direct promise has been made upon which the action may rest.
Here we have the promise, and if it is valid the whole problem is
solved.
I think the promise proved and found rested not only upon a
valuable consideration, but one of such character as to make the
promise original and save it from the condemnation of the statute
of frauds.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Haight, J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.
20. POWER v. RANKIN, 114 Ill. 52.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1885.
. In oral promise to pay the debt of another out of property of
the debtor placed in the hands of the promisor for that purpose is
not within the statute of frauds.
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;—
heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon
county; the Hon. W. R. Welch, Judge, presiding.
Messrs. Bradley & Bradley, for the appellant.
Messrs. Patton & Hamilton, for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was an action of assumpsit, brought by William L.
Rankin, against James E. Power, to recover $1,000, which it is
alleged Power agreed to pay in consideration that Rankin would
permit certain corn, upon which he held a mortgage, to be deliver
ed to a certain person to whom the corn had been sold by Mrs.
Glasscock. Rankin recovered a judgment in the circuit court for
the amount claimed, and that judgment was affirmed in the appel
late court.
After the plaintiff had concluded his evidence, the defendant
entered a motion to exclude the evidence from the jury. The court
overruled the motion, and this decision of the court is relied upon
aS error.
The main ground relied upon in support of the motion is
,









































































































































Sect. 2] POWER v. RANKIN 71
pay the debt of another, and was therefore void under the statute
of frauds. We do not concur in the view taken by the appellant’s
counsel. As we understand the testimony, in the fall of 188I
Mrs. Glasscock was indebted to Rankin on a certain note for
$1,249, bearing date November 16, 1881, and due October 1, 1882.
The payment of the note was secured by a chattel mortgage on a
crop of corn raised that season. In the summer of 1882, Mrs.
Glasscock contracted the corn to Ulrich, who gave Power a check
for $1,000, which he was to hold until one thousand dollars’ worth
of the corn should be delivered, when the money was to be paid
to Mrs. Glasscock, or her order. After the check was placed in
the hands of Power,and before any of the corn was delivered,Ran
kin and Power met at the office of Mr. Sales, and Rankin refused
to allow the corn to be delivered unless the money in the hands
of Power should be applied on his mortgage indebtedness. After
discussing the matter for some time, Power finally agreed if
Rankin would permit the corn to be delivered to Ulrich, he would
apply the money in his hands in payment of the note and mortgage
held by Rankin. This arrangement was made, according to the
testimony of Sales, about the first of August, 1882.
A parol promise to pay the debt of another is rendered void
by the statute of frauds, and an action cannot be enforced upon
such a promise. There is no room for doubt as to the general
rule on this subject. In Scott v. Thomas, 1 Scam. 58, it was held
that where the moving consideration for the promise is the liability
of a third person, there the promise must be in writing; but if there
is a new consideration moving from the promisee to the promi
sor there the superadded consideration makes it a new
agreement, which is not within the statute. In Borehenius v.
Canutson, 100 Ill. 82, where the plaintilf had relinquished a lien
or given up a security for a debt in consideration of a promise by
a third party to pay the debt, the promise was held to be an
original undertaking, and not affected by the statute of frauds.
Here Rankin had a lien on the corn for the payment of his debt,
which he relinquished, and allowed the corn to be sold, upon the
promise of Power that the money ($1,000) which he held in his
hands should be paid to him. A promise of this character, under
the rule established by the authorities, is an original undertaking,
and in no manner affected by the Statute of Frauds. Such being
the case, the evidence was properly admitted, and the court did
right in overruling the motion to exclude the evidence from the
]1lI'_\'.









































































































































7.: SUTTON & co. v. GREY [Chap. I
at the time Power promised to pay the money to him, and hence
no lien was waived, or security given up, on the faith of the prom
ise. This is a clear misapprehension of the evidence bearing upon
this branch of the case. It is true that Rankin fixed the date of
the promise made by Power to him, in September or October.
1881; but this was a mistake as to the date. The corn sold was
the crop of 1881. but it was not delivered until August, 1882, and
Sales, who was present and heard the arrangement made be
tween Rankin and Power, testified that it occurred “about the
beginning of the delivery of the corn, * * * from the 1st to the
nth of August, 1882.” If there had been no evidence as to the
date of the agreement except Rankin’s testimony, there might be
much force in appellant’s position on this question; but the evi-
dence of Sales places the date of the agreement beyond question,
and at the time when the mortgage lien was in full force and
effect. * * *
* * * It is also objected that a recovery could not be had
under the common counts. \'V here the promise sued upon is a
collateral undertaking, then the declaration is required to be
special; but where the promise, as here, is regarded as an original
undertaking, a recovery may be had under the common counts.
Runde v. Runde, 59 Ill. 98, is an authority in point on this ques
tion.





SUTTON & CO. v. GREY, [1894] I Q. B. D. 28
%
;“
In the Court of Appeal, 1893.
A n oral agreement to share commissions and lasses on Stock
Exelhange transactions—not within the statule of frauds.
Appeal by the defendant against the judgment of Bowen,
L. J.
,
at the trial of the action without a jury.
The plaintifis were stockbrokers and members of the London
Stock Exchange. The defendant was not a member of the Stock
Exchange. The plaintiffs had. as they alleged in their statement
of claim, in January, 1891, entered into an oral agreement with the
defendant that he should introduce clients to them, and that they
should transact business on the Stock Exchange for the clients
thus introduced. upon the terms, as between the plaintiffs and the
defendant, that he should receive one-half the commission earned









































































































































Sect. 2] surro1~: & co. \'. GREY 7 3
behalf of such clients as were introduced by the defendant, and
that the defendant should pay to the plaintiffs one-half of any loss
which might be incurred by the plaintiffs in respect of those tran
sactions.
The plaintiffs claimed from the defendant half the loss which
they had incurred in Stock Exchange transactions which they had
entered into on behalf of a client named Robertson, who had been
introduced to them by the defendant in pursuance of the oral
agreement. ,
By his statement of defence, the defendant pleaded that Sec.
4 of the statute of frauds had not been complied with; that the
contract alleged by the plaintiffs was, within the meaning of Sec.
4 of the statute of frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), “a special promise to
answer for the debt of another person :” and that. consequently.
as it was not in writing, an action upon it could not be maintained.
Stevenson, for defendant.
Rufus Isaaes, for the plaintiffs, was not called upon.
LoRD ESHER, M. R.—In my opinion this appeal should be
dismissed. I think that the judgment of Bow1£1\', L. J., was in
every respect right. I do not think that the relation between the
plaintiffs and the defendant was that of partnership. They had
no intention to become partners, and, as the law now stands, a
partnership can not be constituted without such an intention. In
my opinion the true relation between the plaintiffs and the defend
ant was this: The plaintiffs being brokers upon the Stock Ex
change, of which defendant was not a member, they agreed to
gether that the plaintiffs should carry out transactions upon the
Stock Exchange for the mutual benefit of themselves and the de
fendant. The defendant could not himself transact business upon
the Stock Exchange, and the plaintiffs made this arrangement with
him: “If you will find persons who wish to operate upon the
Stock Exchange, and will introduce them to us as clients, we will.
on behalf of the persons whom you thus introduce to us, transact
the ordinary business of a broker on the Stock Exchange, and
make ourselves personally responsible according to its rules on
these terms—that our brokers’ commission on the Stock Exchange
shall be divided between us and you, just as if you were our part
ner and a member of the Stock Exchange, and that, if there should
be a loss in respect of the transactions, you shall indemnify us
against half the loss.” The defendant verbally agreed to this, but
there was not any contract or memorandum in writing. The con- .
tract, in my opinion, is one which regulated the part which the









































































































































74 SlJT'l‘()N & co v. (;m:Y [Chap. I
and, if he was to be an agent for the plaintiffs, the contract regu
lated the terms of his agency. Again, before the transactions were
entered into, the terms were regulated by the agreement, and
they were such as to give the defendant an interest in the tran
sactions. The transactions were to be entered into by the plain
tiffs partly for their own benefit and partly for the benefit of the
defendant. Is such a contract a simple contract of guarantee—
“a special promise to answer for the debt or default of another
person”-.—so as to bring the case within Sec. 4 of the statute of
frauds, or is it a contract of indemnity? Whether any contract
is the one or the other is often a very nice question. But certain
tests have been laid down to guide the Court in determining un
der which head any particular contract comes. The principal case
in English law which affords such a guide is C onturier v. Hastie,
8 Ex. ~10. - In that case a test was given by PARKE, B., who de
livered the judgment of himself and ALDERSON, B. (from whom
POLLocI<, C. B., differed as to the construction of the contract).
The learned Judge said (at p. 55) : The other and only remaining
point is
,
whether the defendants are responsible by reason of their
charging a del eredere commission, though they have not guaran
teed by writing signed by themselves. We think they are. Doubt
less if they had for a percentage guaranteed the debt owing, or
performance of the contract by the vendee, being totally uncon
nected with the sale” (I would read that “totally unconnected with
the transaction”), “they would not be liable without a note in
writing signed by them; but, being the agents to negotiate the sale”
(that is, as I read it
,
“being connected with the transaction”), “the
commission is paid in respect of that employment; a higher re
ward is paid in consideration of their taking greater care in sales
to their customers, and precluding all questions whether the loss
arose from negligence or not and also for assuming a greater share
of responsibility than ordinary agents, namely, responsibility for
the solvency and performance of their contracts by their vendees.
This is the main object of the reward being given to them; and,
though it may terminate in a liability to pay the debt of another,
that is not the immediate object for which the consideration is
given.” There the test given is, whether the defendant is interest
ed in the transaction, either by being the person who is to negotiate
it or in some other way, or whether he is totally unconnected with
it. If he is totally unconnected with it, except by means of his
. promise to pay the loss, the contract is a guarantee; if he is not
totally unconnected with the transaction, but is to derive some
benefit from it
,
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and Sec. 4 does not apply. The rule thus laid down has been
adopted as a test in subsequent cases. In Fitzgerald v. Dressler,_
7 C. B. (N. S.) 374, COCKBURN, C. J., said (at p. 392): “The
law upon this subject is, I think, correctly stated in the notes to
Fvrth v. Stanton, 1 Wms. Saund. 211e, where the learned editor
_thus sums up the result of the authorities: ‘There is considerable
difficulty in the subject, occasioned perhaps by unguarded ex
pressions in the reports of the different cases; but the fair result
seems to be that the question whether each particular case comes
within this clause of the statute (Sec. 4) or not depends, not on
'
the consideration for the promise, but on the fact of the original
party remaining liable, coupled with the absence of any liability
on the part of the defendant or his property, except such as arises
1
from his express promise. I quite concur in that view of the doc
trine, provided the proposition is considered as embracing the
qualification at the conclusion of the passage; for, though I agree
that the consideration alone is not the test, but that the party tak
ing upon himself the obligation upon which the action is brought
makes himself responsible for the debt or default of another, still
it must be taken with the qualification stated in the note above
cited, viz., an absence of prior liability on the part of the defend
ant or his property, it being, as I think, truly stated there as the
result of the authorities, that if there be something more than a
mere undertaking to pay the debt of another, as, where the prop
erty in consideration of the giving up of which the party enters
into the undertaking is in point of fact his own, or is property in
which he has some interest, the case is not within the provision of
the statute, which was intended to apply to the case of an under
taking to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another,
where the person making the promise has himself no interest in
the property which is the subject of the undertaking. I, therefore.
agree with my learned brothers that this case is not within the
Statute of Frauds.” The learned Judge there used the words,
“has himself no interest in the property which is the subject of
the undertaking,” because he was dealing with a case of profirty;
but if his words be read, as I think they should be, “has no inter
est in the transaction,” he is adopting that interpretation of
Couturier v. Hastie, 8 Ex. 40, which I think is the right one. Then
again, in Fleet v. Murton (Law Rep. 7 Q. B. at p. 133), BLACK
BURN, J., quotes the passage which I have read from the judgment
of PARKE, B., in Couturier v. Hastic (8 Ex. 40), and thus inter
prets it: “He says that it is neither a guaranteeing nor_ a contract
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question. It seems to me, therefore, as Mr. Cohen said, that this
.custom must be taken as merely regulating the terms of the em
ployment.” If in the present case the agreement is taken as regu
lating the terms of the defeudant's employment, it is not within
Sec. 4 of the statute: on the other hand, if the transaction is
looked at as entered into partly for the benefit of the plaintiffs
and partly for the benefit of the defendant, it comes within the
rule laid down by PARKE, B., in Couturier v. Hastie, and adopted
by Cocxnunrz, C. J.. in Fitzgerald v. Dressler. The contract
is not a guarantee with regard to a matter in which the defendant
has no interest except by virtue of theguarantee; it is an indem-'
nity with regard to a transaction in which the defendant has an
interest equally with the plaintiffs. In my opinion, BOWEN, L. J.,
was right in holding that the agreement is not within the statute,
and his decision ought to be affirmed.
LoPES, L. J.—I am of the same opinion. BOWEN, L. J., has
adopted the view of the plaintiffs, that the contract was one of
indemnity, and I think he was right in so holding. The defend
ant says that the contract amounts to “a special promise to answer
for the debt or default of another person,” and is therefore within
the statute. The true test, as derived from the cases, is, as the
master of the Rolls has already said, to see whether the person
who makes the promise is
,
but for the liability which attaches to
him by reason of the promise, totally unconnected with the tran-
saction, or whether he has an interest in it independently ‘of the
promise. In the former case, the agreement is within the statute;
in the latter, it is not. In the present case, it appears to me be
yond all question that the defendant had an independent interest
in the transaction, because it was entered into for the mutual
benefit of the plaintiffs and himself. In another view, the contract
was to regulate the terms of the defendant’s employment by the
plaintiffs. In my opinion, the decision of BOWEN, L. J.
,
was right,
and the appeal must be dismissed.
KAY, L. J.—According to the report which I have of the judg
ment of BOWEN, L. J., he said, “I have come to the conclusion that
the plaintiffs are correct in saying that it was arranged between
them and the defendant that he should contribute to any loss that
might occur to them upon Robertson’s transactions.” I agree that
this arrangement hardly comes up to a partnership, though it is
very near it. The commission received in respect of any transaction
might not be all clear profit; the expenses of the office establish









































































































































Sect. 2] n.\\'1s \'. PATRICK _ 77
with the defendant was not that he should share the profit what
ever it might be. On the whole I think it would be going too far
to say that the contract was that the defendant should share in the
profits and losses of the transactions. But then comes in the prin
ciple of the decision, that a contract to employ a del eredere agent
is not within the statute and need not be in \vriting, because its
main object is to regulate the terms of the agent's employment,
and, though in the result the agent may have to indemnify the
principal against losses, that is not the main object of the contract.
The present case, however, is not strictly that of a del eredere
agent, and the question is
,
whether the exception from the statute
which has been established in the case of a del eredere agent ap
plies to the present case. I can not see any difficulty in holding
that it does, when I look at the reasons given by PARKE, B., for
the decision in Conterier v. Hastie (8 Ex. 40), when a man simply
agrees to assume liability for the debt of another, he has no inter
est whatever in the transaction, except by virtue of the guarantee.
In the present case the defendant had an independent interest
in the transactions. Another distinction is this, that the contract
is one which regulated the terms upon which the defendant was
to be employed by the plaintiffs. I agree with Bow1-:N, L. J.
,
that
“this is really a contract which regulates the terms of the agency,
and the defendant's liability to answer for the debt of another is
only an ulterior consequence of the terms in which the contract is
frame-r .” I agree that the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
c. When the promisor is beneficially interested in the
consideration.
22. DAVIS v. PATRICK, 141 U. S
. 479, 35 L. Ed. 826.
Supreme Court, United States, 1891.
A beneficial participation by the promisor in the consideration
is sntficient to make his promise original, although it ma/_v be in
form a promise to pay the debt o
f another.
The case was stated by the court as follows:
This case was commenced on the 24th day of November,
1880, by the filing of a petition in the District Court of Knox
county, Nebraska. Subsequently it was removed to the Circuit
Court of the United States, and at the May term, 1883, of that
court a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. That









































































































































78 DAVIS V. PATRICK [Chap. I
Davis V. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138. A second trial in January, 1890,
resulted in another verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and
again the defendant alleges error. The petition counts on two
causes of action. No question is made by counsel for plaintiff in
error with respect to the first count or the rulings thereon—the
only error alleged being in reference to the second count. That
count is for the transportation of silver ore from the Flagstaff
mine, in Utah Territory, to furnaces at Sandy, in the same Terri
tory. In the first trial it was claimed that IRavis, the defeadant,
was the real owner of the Flagstaff mine, and therefore primarily
responsible for a
ll
debts contracted in it
s working. The relations
between Davis and the Flagstaff Mini Sompany were disclosed
b
y
a written agreement, o
f
date December 16, 1873. By that
agreement it appeared that Davis, on June 12, 1873, had advanced




6%. interest, a sum then
due : that it had £: Davis and agreed to deliver at the ore
house of the o
f ore, of which it
had only then delivered 200 tons, although Davis had paid in
full for the entire amount. The agreement also recited that Davis
was to advance a
n aiditional amount, if needed, not exceeding
£10,000. It then provided that the mine should be put under
the sole management o
f J. N. H. Patrick, to be worked and con
trolled by him until such time as the ore sold had been delivered
and the sums borrowed had been repaid, with interest. This





with this agreement was a full power o
f attorney to Patrick.
This court held that such contract established between Davis and
the Mining Company simply the relation o
f
creditor and debtor,
and did not make him in any true sense the owner. For the
erroneous rulings o
f
the trial court in this respect, the judgment
was reversed. In the second trial, this construction of the rela
tions o
f
Davis to the Flagstaff Mining Company was followed b
y
the court, and the jury instructed that the contract put in evidence
between Davis and the Mining Company created simply the rela
tions o
f
creditor and debtor, and did not make the former liable
for expenses created in working and operating the mine; and the
trial proceeded upon the theory that during the time the services
sued for were being rendered, Davis was the party mainly and
pecuniarily interested in the working o
f
the mine, and that he
assumed to Patrick a personal responsibility for such services:
and the real question tried was whether Davis' promises were col










































































































































Sect. 2 | DAVIS V. P. \TRICK 70
Mr. J. M. Woolworth, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. John I.. I l’ebster, for defendant in error. Mr. Nathaniel
II ilson was with him on the brief.
-




That Davis was interested in having the ore transported
to the furnaces is clear. He was interested in two respects: First,
a
s to the 4,995, tons to be delivered to him a
t
the ore-house, it
being his property when thus delivered, any subsequent handling
was wholly for his benefit; and in respect to the balance, as the




the mine into money, it would help to pay the debt o
f
the Company to him. Davis, therefore, was so pecuniarily inter
ested in, and so much to be benefited by, the prompt and success
ful transportation of the ore, that any contract which he might





tion. We proceed, therefore, to inquire what he said and did.
After the execution o
f
the papers, the newly appointed manager
took possession o
f
the mine; and in the fore part o
f
1874 the
plaintiff commenced the transportation o
f
the ore under a contract
with the agent o
f
the manager. The business was carried on in
the name o
f
the Mining Company. The plaintiff understood that








him and the Mining Company. In the fall o
f
1874 Davis came
to Utah to examine the property. He was introduced b
y
the
manager to the foreman o





the mine, to which Davis assented. After this,
plaintiff, who had not received his pay in full for the services
already rendered, had an account made up showing the balance
due him, and presented it to Davis. His testimony as to the
conversation which followed is in these words: “I showed it to
Mr. Davis and told him I was not getting my money, and Mr.
Davis said my account was all right and he would be personally
responsible to me for the money, and for me to go on as I had been
doing and draw as little money as I could get along with to pay
the men and the running expenses, and he would see that I got
every dollar o
f my money.” The plaintiff's cashier who was pres
ent a




“Q. In that conversation state what Mr. Davis said about













































































































































80 l).\\'lS \‘. PATRICK [Chap. I
“A. He stated to Hr. Patrick in my presence that he would
personally be responsible for that account. He says, ‘You know,
Al., I practically own this mine, but money is scarce and we must
get what we can out of the mine.’ He says we are making large
expenditures for improvements, and he says you shall have all
the money you want to pay your men and expenses, but you
must wait for the balance, and I will see that you are paid.
What did he say in that connection to A. S. Patrick
about continuing on in the hauling of the ores?
“A. He requested him to continue in the hauling of the ores.
He requested him to do it.
“Q. In response to Mr. Davis to that request what did Mr.
Patrick say?
“A. He said to .\lr. Davis, if he would guarantee him to be _
paid he would continue to work, and Davis said he would see him
paid.”
After this, the plaintiff continued the work of transportation
until the fall of 1875. receiving such payments from time to time
as to extinguish the amount due him at the date of this conversa
tion, and leaving a balance more than covered by the work done
in 1875, and it is only for work done after these promises that
this recovery was had and in respect to which the questions pre
sented and discussed arise. The plaintiff testified to another con
versation, in September, 1876, in the city of New York. His
account of that conversation is given in these words: “Plaintiff
told Davis that his brother and himself were hard up for money.
and wanted to know if Davis would not give them some money on
the ‘Flagstaff account. for hauling the ores. Plaintiff had his
account with him and showed it to Davis. Davis said the whole
of the account was all right, and he proposed to pay the account,
and said he would pay the plaintiff. Plaintiff said to Davis that
if he would give him some money on the account it would help
him out. Davis said he had some securities in London which he
was going to sell. and would have some money in a few days
and would give plaintiff $5,000 on the account. Plaintiff said
if the money was going to be there in a few days he would wait
for it. but Davis said. ‘No; you go home and I will pledge you
my-word that I will telegraph the money to you to the First
National Bank by the first of October.’
”
And, again, he testified to an interview in 1877 with Davis, in
the city of Omaha, in the presence ofother parties, in which he
said: “Davis, you promised all along to pay me that money,“ and









































































































































Sect. 2 | D.A.VIS V. P. \TRICK 8 I
This testimony of plaintiff as to conversations with defend
ant is corroborated by other witnesses and contradicted by none.
It must therefore be accepted as presenting the facts upon which
this case must be determined. Were these promises binding upon
Davis, or of no avail to the plaintiff because not in writing?
Were it not for the statute of frauds there would be no question,
for obviously there was both promise and consideration. Defend
ant relies upon that provision of the statute of frauds which for
bids the maintenance of an action “to charge the defendant upon
any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another person, unless the agreement upon which such action
shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be
in writing,” etc. The purpose of this provision was not to effect
uate, but to prevent, wrong. It does not apply to promises in
respect to debts created at the instance and for the benefit of
the promisor, but only to those by which the debt of one party is
sought to be charged upon and collected from another. The rea
son of the statute is obvious, for in the one case if there be any
conflict between the parties as to the exact terms of the promise,
the courts can see that justice is done by charging against the
promisor the reasonable value of that in respect to which the
promise was made, while in the other case, and when a third party
is the real debtor, and the party alone receiving benefit, it is im
possible to solve the conflict of memory or testimony in any man
ner certain to accomplish justice. There is also a temptation
for a promisee, in a case where the real debtor has proved insolv
ent or unable to pay, to enlarge the scope of the promise, or to
torture mere words of encouragement and confidence into an
absolute promise; and it is so obviously just that a promisor re
ceiving no benefits should be bound only by the exact terms of
his promise, that this statute requiring a memorandum in writing
was enacted. Therefore, whenever the alleged promisor is an
absolute stranger to the transaction, and without interest in it
,
courts strictly uphold the obligations o
f
this statute. But cases
sometimes arise in which, though a third party is the original
obligor, the primary debtor, the promisor has a personal, imme
diate and pecuniary interest in the transaction, and is therefore





isee. In such cases the reason which underlies and which prompt
e
d this statutory provision fails, and the courts will give effect
to the promise. As said b
y
this court in Emerson v. Slater, 22
How. 28, 43: “Whenever the main purpose and object o
f
the









































































































































8.2 D.\\'is v. PATRICK [Chap. I
pecuniary or business purpose of his own, involving either a bene
fit to himself or damage to the other contracting party, his
promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a
promise to pay the debt of another, and although the performance
of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing that lia
bility.” To this may be added the observation of Browne, in his
work on the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 165: “The statute contem
plates the mere promise of one man to be responsible for another,
and cannot be interposed as a cover and shield against the actual
obligations of the defendant himself.” The thought is
,
that there
is a marked difference between a promise which, without any inter
est in the subject matter of the promise in the promisor, is purely
collateral to the obligation of a third party, and that which, though
operating upon the debt of a third party, is also and mainly for
the benefit of the promisor. The case before us is in the latter
category. While the original promisor was the mining company,
and the undertaking was for its benefit, yet the performance of
the contract inured equally to the benefit of Davis and the mining
company. Performance helped the mining company in the pay
ment of its debt to Davis, and at the same time helped Davis to
secure the payment of the mining company’s debt to him; and as
the mining company" was apparently destitute of any other prop
erty, and the payment of its debt to Davis therefore depended
upon the continued and successful working of this mine ; and as the
control and working of the mine had been put in the hands of
Davis so that he might justly say, as he did: “I am practically
the owner,” it follows that he was a real, substantial party in inter
est in the performance of this contract. His promise was not one
purely collateral to sustain the obligations of the mining company,
but substantially a direct and personal one to advance his own
interests. \\’hile the mining company was ultimately to be bene
fited, Davis was primarily to be benefited by the transportation of
the ore, for thereby that debt, which otherwise could not, would
be paid to him. He, therefore, in any true sense of the term, occu
pied not the position of a collateral undertaker, but that of an orig
inal promisor and it would be a shadow on justice if the admin
istration of the law relieved him from the burden of his promise
on the ground that it also resulted to the benefit of the mining
company, his debtor.
Counsel for Davis placed stress on the form of expression
attributed by Patrick to Davis. to-wit: “I will be personally re
sponsible: I will see you paid ;” and contends that the import of









































































































































Sect. 2] I).\\'lS \'. l‘.\’l‘RlCK 83
this contention, as it implies that someone else was also bound, but
the real character of a promise does not depend altogether upon
the form of expression, but largely on the situation of the parties:
and the question always is, what the parties mutually understood
by the language, whether they understood it to be a collateral or a
direct promise. Patrick declares he understood it to be a direct
promise, and acted on the faith of it. That Davis understood it
in the same way, is evidenced not only from the circumstances sur
rounding the. parties at the time, but from the fact that in a sub
sequent interview, when charged to have always promised to pay
this debt, he admits that he believes that he did. The plaintiff, be
lieving that Davis was, as he said, practically the owner, the party
primarily to be benefited by the conversion of the products of the
mine into money, understood that Davis was making an original
promise to pay for the work which he might do, and upon such
promise he might surely rely as an original promise, at least for
any work done thereafter.
The merits of the case, therefore, as disclosed by the testi
mony, were with Patrick, and the judgment in his favor was right.
It is objected that the court in its instructions spoke of Davis as
an original promisor, as one promising to pay the debt, and not
as one promising to be responsible for the debt, or to see it paid.
But as Davis, in the second conversation, promised to pay, and in
the third admitted that he had always promised to pay the debt,
we cannot think that the court misinterpreted the scope and effect
of his words. It is not probable that the parties to this transaction
understood the difference between an original and a collateral
promise. We must interpret Davis’ promise in the light of the
surroundings and of his subsequent admissions, and in that light
we cannot think that the court erred in its construction thereof;
and if the jury believed that he had made such promises, we can
not doubt that the verdict should have been as it was.
It is also objected that the court erred in not directing a ver
dict for defendant upon the ground of a departure from the allega
tions of the petition. That counts on an original employment by
Davis, in 1873, while the testimony shows that the original employ
ment was by the mining company, and that the promise of Davis
was made in the fall of 1874, and after Patrick had been at work
for months for the mining company. As no objection was made
to the admission of testimony on this ground, and as an amend
ment of the petition to correspond to the proof would involve
but a trifling change, we cannot see that there was any error in









































































































































84 TIIOMAS \'. COOK [Chap. I
instance, doubtless the court would, as it ought to have done, have
‘
permitted an amendment of the petition. There was no surprise,
for the facts were fully developed in the former trial.
Upon the record as presented, we think that the verdict and
judgment were right, and as no substantial error appears in the
proceedings the judgment is
Affirmed.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BRADLEY and Mr. Justice
GRAY did not hear the argument or take part in the decision of
this case.
d. l/Vhen the promise is to inderm1ify.‘°
23. THOMAS v. COOK, 8 Barn. & Cress. 728, 15 E. C. L. 358.
Court of King’s Bench, Mich. Term,-1828.
A promise to indemnify does not fall n-ithin either the swords
or the policy of the statute of frauds.
Assumpsit. The declaration stated that on. &c., a certain
partnership in trade between one W. Cook, since deceased, and one
N. D. Morris, was dissolved; that it was agreed between W. Cook,
since deceased, and Morris, that the former should take upon him
self the payment of certain debts, (specified in the declaration) ;
and that it was also agreed that a bond of- indemnity, executed by
W. Cook, since deceased, and two other persons, should be given
to Morris to save him harmless from the payment of the said debts.
And thereupon afterwards, to-wit, on, &c., in consideration
that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, would, together
with the defendant and W. Cook, since deceased, execute a bond
of indemnity to Morris in the sum of 41001. conditioned to save
him harmless from the said debts, the defendant undertook and
promised the plaintiff that he, the defendant, would save harmless
and indemnify him from all payments, damages, costs, and expen
ses which he (plaintiff) should or might incur, bear, pay, sustain,
or be put unto by reason or means of his so executing the said
writing obligatory. Averment, that plaintiff was afterwards com
pelled to pay on account of the said debts the sum of 3601., and
that defendant had not indemnified him. "‘ * *
‘° The authorities are divided on this proposition. Cases illustrating









































































































































Sect. 2) THOMAS \'. coox 85
Plea, the general issue and statute of limitations. Replication,
that defendant promised within six years. * * *
The learned Judge directed the jury to find a verdict for the
plaintiff for 3001., and gave the defendant leave to move to re
duce it to 1501. A rule nisi for that purpose was obtained in last
Easter term, against which
Taimton and Chilton now showed cause.
Russell, Serjt., and Curwood, contra.
BAYl.l:Y, J.—It is provided by the fourth section of the stat
ute of frauds, that “No action shall be brought to charge the de
fendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another person, unless the agreement upon which
such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note there
of, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged there
with. or by some other person thereunto by him lawfully author
ized.” Here the bond was given to Morris as the creditor; but
the promise in question was not made to him. A promise to him
would have been to answer for the default of the debtor. But it
being necessary for W. Cook, since deceased, to find sureties, the
defendant applied to the plaintiff to join him in the bond and bill
of exchange, and undertook to save him harmless. A promise to
indemnify does not, as it appears to me, fall within either the
words or the policy of the statute of frauds; and if so, there was
sufficient evidence to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict for 3001.
PARKE, J—This was not a promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another person, but an original con
tract between these parties, that the plaintiff should bc indemni
fied against the bond. If the plaintiff. at the request of the de
fendant, had paid money to a third person, a promise to repay it
need not have been in writing, and this case is in substance the











































































































































8f) JONES VS. BACON [Chap. I
24 JONES, appellant, v. BACON, as surviving Executor, etc.,
respondent, 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1895.
A promisc by glls person to indemnify gnotlich-for becoming
a guarantor for a third tickson is not within the statute and mced
not be in writing, and the assumption of the res ibilit is a
sufficient consideration for the promise.
-
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the fifth judicial department, entered upon an order made
October 3, 1893, which denied a motion for a new trial and ord
ered judgment in favor of defendant entered upon an order non
suiting plaintiff.
This action was brought to recover damages for a breach of
an oral contract alleged to have been made by James McKechnie,
defendant's testator, to indemnify him in case of lis indorsement
of certain notes made by one Kingsbury.
Upon the trial plaintiff called Kingsbury as a witness to prove
the alleged promise. His testimony on that subject was objected
to by defendant's counsel on the ground that the witness was in
competent to testify in regard thereto under section 829 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff thereupon produced and
proved and gave in evidence an instrument executed by plaintiff
under seal, by the terms of which, in consideration of the sum of
one dollar, he released Kingsbury from “all liability, responsibility
or damages” sustained or which might thereafter be sustained by
him by reason of his indorsement. This release was by an amend
ed answer set up as a defense.
The further material facts are stated in the opinion.
William H. Smith, for appellant.
Henry M. Field and Frank Rice, for respondent.
ANDREws, Ch. J.—The oral promise of the defendant's tes
tator to the plaintiff was, in substance,#'£ indorser. On the note of Kingsburyto the banking firm of WTCKechnie & Co. for a debt of Kingsbury
to the bank. The plaintiff thereupon indorsed the note of Kings
bury to the bank, and has been compelled to pay thereon the sum
of about $16,000, Kingsbury having made default and being in
solvent. This is a statement of the facts in the simplest form, and
T: question arises whether the oral promise by the defendant's
testator to indemnify the plaintiff was void under the Statute of
Frauds, as bein Promise to “answer Túr the debt. (TETätilt or
mis-carriage of another person. (*Rev. S
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.£r-0l»->ht>¢§r'p'U/i/M
This is no longer an open question in this state. It was decided in
Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657, tha~ toi"~s notwit in the statute and nee n ' 'ti that the assump
tion of the responsibility was a sufficient consideration for the
promise. e doctrine of Chapin v. Merrill was approved in Mal
Jory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412, in Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 id. 250, and
Tighe v. Morrison, 1116 id. 263, and in other cases in this court.
The same doctrine now prevails in the English courts. Thomas
v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728; Reader v. Kingham, 13 Com. Bench.
N. S. 344; Wildes v. Dudlaw, L. R. 19 Eq. Cas. 198. We do not
deem it proper to reopen the discussion or to refer to cases where
a different view has prevailed. The court below considered the
subject at large, and the able opinion of Bradley. J., refers to
many of the cases on the subject.
The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to maintain an action
except for his act in releasing Kingsbury from his liability for the
money he was compelled to pay on account of the indorsement.
The release was probably essential in order to enable the plaintiff
to make any pr~ent for indemnity, since he could
establish the promise
o~y,
the plaintiff himself not
being a competent witness by reason of the death of the promisor
McKechnie, and there being no other person cognizant of the tran
saction. y the release Kingsbur was discharged from all
responsibility to the ptaiuiis. TITplaintiff having paid the debt
in part out of his property, could, prior to the release, have main
tained an action against Kingsbury to recover the sum so paid.
Butler v. Wrtght, 20 Johns, 367; Hunt v. Amidon, 4 Hill, 345.
The indemnitor of the plaintiff, on restoring to him this sum in
performance of the contract of indemnity, would be entitled to be
substituted to the claim of the plaintiff against Kingsbury. This
stands upon the most obvious principles of natural justice. The
money paid by the plaintiff was at the request of Kingsbury,
implied from the legal liability as indorser assumed by him, and
Kingsbury was bound to reimburse the plaintiff. But, by an in
dependent contract between the plaintiff and his indemnitor, Mc
Kechnie, the latter was also bound to save the plaintiff harmless.
On performance of this obligation by the indemnitor, he would be
entitled to stand in the shoes of the plaintiff as to his right to call
upon Kingsbury. By equitable substitution the indemnitor would
take the right which the plaintiff had against Kingsbury. There
was no privity of contract between the indemnitor and Kingsbury,









































































































































88 GREEN V. CRESWELL [Chap. I
the plaintiff what he had been compelled to pay for Kingsbury,
pursuant to the contract of indemnity, the indemnitor would stand
as the equitable assignee of the plaintiff of the obligation of Kings
bury to him. Kingsbury had no equity to be relieved from his
obligation, because the plaintiff had recourse against McKechnie.
The plaintiff, though not strictly such, had the equities of a surety
against Kingsbury, and the equities by operation of law would
pass to McKechnie on his performing his contract of indemnity,
except for the release. The release of Kingsbury by the plaintiff
materially changed the rights and remedies of the defendant
against Kingsbury. It barred any claim against Kingsbury in
behalf of the estate of the indemnitor, to recover as the repre
sentative of the rights of the plaintiff against him, in case the
plaintiff should prevail in the action. Such an interference plainly
operates to, discharge the estate of the indemnitor.
Upon the ground that the release defeated the right of action,
the judgment should be affirmed.




25. GREEN v. CRESSWELL, Io Adol. & El. 453, 37 E. C. L. 250.
Court o
f
Queen's Bench, Trinity Term, 1839.
No action lies upon a promise not in writing to indemnify
plaintiff against the consequences o
f
his becoming bail for a
third person.
Assumpsit. The first count o
f
the declaration stated that,
on 2d February, 1836, a capias, directed to the sheriff o
f War
wickshire, issued from the Court o
f
Exche "GT against one Joseph
Hadley, at the suit o
f
one John Reay, £ was endorsed for "
Dail", £35, and was deliver:TTThe sheriff, who, on the day
and year aforesaid, arrested Hadley; that afterwards, to-wit, 9th




defendant, would become bail and surety for Hadley, and would,
a
s
such bail and surety, seal and as his act and deed deliver to
the said sheriff, a bail bond, conditioned for putting in special
bail b
y Hadley, defendant then promised plaintiff that he, defend
ant would save harmless and indemnify plaintiff from all payments,
damages, costs, and expenses which he, plaintiff, should o
r might
incur, bear, pay, sustain, o
r
b






so becoming bail and surety; that plaintiff, confiding, &c., did
afterwards, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, at the









































































































































Sect. 2] GREEN V. CRESWELL 89
not put in special bail,£ ; thatafterwards, to wit, 15th February. 1836, the sheriff assigned the
bail bond to Reay, who thereupon afterwards, to wit, on the day
and year last aforesaid, sued the present plaintiff on the bond in
the Court of Exchequer, and recovered judgment-for-£75-5s dam
ages and costs; and afterwards, to-wit, 11th August, 1836, sued
out execution by fieri facias against the now plaintiff, who was
thereby com y £98 6s:-ef all which, defendant had no
tice. Breach, that defendant ha indemnified plaintiff, nor
repaid him any of the £986s, nor divers other sums expended for
costs, &c., to-wit, £50, &c.
Second count on an account stated.
Pleas—1. Non assumpsit. Issue thereon.
2. To first count, actionem mon; because the promise in the
first count mentioned was a special promise to answer for the
debt and default of another person, in manner and form as in the
said first count is stated and set forth; and that no agreement in
respect of or relating to the promise and supposed cause of action
in the said first count mentioned, or any memorandum or note
thereof, wherein the consideration for the said special promise
was stated or shown, was in writing, and signed by the -defendant
or any person thereunto by him lawfully authorized, according to
the statute, &c. Replication, that the said promise was not a
special promise to answer for the debt or default of another per
son in manner and form, &c. Issue thereon.
On the trial, before PARKE, J., at the Warwickshire Summer
Assizes, 1837, evidence was given of the promise, as stated in
the declaration; but no evidence was given of any writing. The
learned judge was of opinion that the case was not within the
Statute of Frauds; and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, on
the replication to the second plea. In Michaelmas term, 1837,
GoULBURN, Sergeant, obtained a rule for a new trial or arrest
of judgment.
Balguy now showed cause.
Goulburn, Sergt., and Mellor, contra.
LORD DENMAN, C. J.
,
afterwards, in this term, (June 11th),
delivered the£ the facts,
his lordship proceeded as follows:
A motion has been made in arrest of judgment, the promise
appearing by the plea not to have been in writing, and the repli
cation only averring in answer that it was not a special promise
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The promise in eflect is
, “If you will become bail for Hadley,
and Hadley, by not paying or
a~nd,
I will save ou harmless from all tmequences of our beC0 ~ou,
I
will do it instead of him. ‘—"/M"_'_'“
If there had been no ecisions on the subject, it would appear
impossible to make a reasonable doubt that this is answering for
the default of another. The case most relied on by the plaintiff
is that of Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C. 728, where this court held that
a promise of B to hold A harmless against the consequences of his
entering with B and C
,
at B's request, into a joint bond to indem
nify D against debts due from C and D was binding, though not in
writing; BAYLEY, J., and PARKE, J., the only judges present,
saying that a promise to indemnify does not fall within the words
or policy of the statute. But the reasoning in this case does not
appear to us satisfactory in support of the doctrine there laid
down; which, taken in its full extent, would repeal the statute.
For every promise to become answerable for the debt or default
of another may be shaped as an indemnity; but even in that shape,
we cannot see why it may not be within the words of the statute.
Within the mischief of the statute it most certainly falls.
Adams v. Dansey, 6 Bing 506 (I9 E. C. L. R. 149,) does not
bear out the general doctrine. That was a promise by one parish
ioner to indemnify another against the consequences of resisting
a claim of tithe. This is not becoming responsible for debt or de
fault of any other, but merely promising to pay what the promisee
may lose by defending the promisor’s interests in a suit.
In some of the cases the language employed seems to assume
that the debt, default, or miscarriage must have been incurred
at the time of making the promise. But the common case of
becoming responsible for goods supplied to another on the faith
of that promise, and of course after it
,
shows that criterion to be
inadmissible.
A distinction was also hinted at, from the circumstances _Q_f.:;
Hadley’s debt being due to a third person, and the default there
fore incurred towards him, not towards the bail. But here again
is the surmise of an intention in the legislature which none of its
language bears out; and, besides, may it not be said that the ar
rested debtor, who obtains his‘ freedom by being bailed, under-’
takes to his bail to keep them harmless, by paying the debt, or
surrendering?
There does not appear any objection to the test laid down in
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favour of the objection. The original party remained liable; and
the defendant incurred no liability except from his promise.
Rule absolute for arresting the judgment.
26. HART LEY v. SANFORD, 66 N.J.L. 627, 50 Atl. 454, 55 L.R.A. 206.
Court of Errors and Appeals, New Jersey, 1901.
A promise by one-person to indemnify another for becoming
surcty for the promisor's son is within the statute of frauds.
Error to the Supreme Court to review a judgment in favor of
plaintiff in an action brought to enforce a promise to indemnify
plaintiff for payments which he had been compelled to make as a
surety for defendant's son. Reversed.
The facts are stated in Tre opinion.
Mr. John B. Humphreys, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Zebulon M. Ward, for defendant in error.
Dixon, J.
,
delivered the opinion o
f
the court.
The material facts in this case, as disclosed b
y
the record,
are that the defendant's son was indebted to M., who desired addi
tional security; that thereupon the defendant applied to the plain
tiff to become surety for the son, and promised him that, if he was
compelled to pay the debt, he (the defendant) would reimburse
him; that accordingly the plaintiff became surety for the son, and
subsequently was obliged to pay the debt. This suit was brought
upon the promise, which was oral only. It appears that at the
trial in the Passaic circuit the jury were instructed to find for the
plaintiff if they were satisfied the promise had been made; but the
question as to the legal sufficiency o
f
the promise was reserved
and certified to the supreme court, which afterwards advised the
circuit that the promise was valid, and thereupon judgment was
entered on the verdict.
In this court error has been assigned on the charge at the cir
cuit, as well as on the advisory opinion o
f
the supreme court; but,
there being no bill o
f exceptions presenting the charge, the assign
ment o
f
error respecting it is futile, and must be disregarded. The
assignment upon the opinion o
f
the supreme court is legal, and
presents the only question now before us, which is whether the
plaintiff's suit can be maintained, in view o
f
our statute, “that no
action shall be brought to charge the defendant upon any special
promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage o
f
another














































































































































92 HART LEY V. SAN FORD [Chap. I
and signed by the person to be charged therewith or some other
person thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized.” The advice
of the supreme court was based upon it
s opinion that under the
adjudications in this state the promise o
f
one person to indemnify
another for becoming surety o
f
a third is not within the statute.
The cases cited in that opinion to support this view are Apgar v.
Hiler, 24 N. J. L. 812; Cortelyou v. Hoagland, 40 N. J. Eq. I;
and Warren v. Abbott (36 Vroom 99), 46 Atl. 575. Of these, the
only one o
f controlling authority here is that o
f Apgar v. Hiler,
which is a decision of this court. That decision does not sustain
the broad proposition for which it was cited. This court there held
merely that, between two persons who had signed the same prom
1SSOr eties for another signer, the oral promise 9
urety to indemnify th lid. his promise was
deemed outside o
f
the statute, because by signing the note the
promisor had himself become a debtor, and so his promise to in
demnify was to answer for his own debt. In Cortelyou v. Hoag
land several stockholders and directors o
f
a corporation had
promised to indemnify another stockholder and director for in
dorsing a corporate note, and Warren v. Abbett was o
f
similar
character. In the Cortelyou Case the chancellor rested his de
cision on Apgar v. Hiler, which, as above stated, was essentially
different, and on Thompson v. Coleman, 4 N
. J. L. 216, which was





outside party,–a case where the promisee
had no redress except on the promise, and therefore clearly out
side o
f
the statute. If the decisions in Cortelyou v. Hoagland and
Warren v. Abbett are to be supported on prior New Jersey ad
judications, such support must be found in the doctrine that
where the consideration o
f




another is a substantial benefit moving
to the promisor, then the statute does not apply. This rule was
recognized in Kutzmeyer v. Ennis, 27 N
.
J. L. 371, and Cowen
hoven v
. Howeli, 36 N
.
J. L. 323. To support those decisions on
this rule, it must be held that the payment o
f
a corporate debt is





corporation,—a proposition which seems to be denied in other
tribunals. Browne, Stat. Fr. § 164. In the promise now under
consideration there was no such element, and no case has been
found in our reports involving the present question We should
therefore decide the matter on principle, o
r
a
s nearly so as related
adjudications will permit. Looked at as res nova, it seems indis
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was to respond to the plaintiff in case the defendant’s son should
make default in the obligation which he would come umder to the
plaintiff as soon as the plaintiff became surety for him,—an
obligation either to pay the light fo_r which the plaintiff was to be
surety, or to reimbikrsethe plaintiff if he paid it. In this state
ment of the nature of the promise there is, I think. every element
which seems necessary to bring a case within the purview of the
statute. The parties. in giving and accepting the promise, con
templated (I) an obli ation b a third person to the promisee,
(2) that this obligation should be the foundation of the promise,
-i
. e., that the obligation of the son to the promisee should attach
simultaneously with the suretyship of the plaintiff, and thereupon
should arise the obligation of the promisor for the fulfillment of
the son’s obligation; and (3) that the obligation of the promisor
should be collateral to that of the son. i. e., if the latter should per
form his obligation. the promisor would be discharged. while, if
the promisor was required to perform his obligation, that of the
son would not be discharged, but only shifted from the promisee
to the promisor. ' An examination of the cases will show that not
many of them are in conflict with this view, when they are free
from differentiating circumstances. In the leading case of Thomas
v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728, such a circumstance appears in the fact
that the promisor was himself a signer of the bond against which
he promised to indemnify the promisee, and thus the promise was,
in a reasonable sense, to answer for that which, as to the promisee,
was the pr0misor’s own debt. On this difference may be ex
plained the decisions in Jones v. Letcher, 13 B. Mon. 363; Horn v.
Bray, 51 Ind. 555, 19 Am. Rep. 742; Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y.
462; Sanders v. G-illespie, 59 N. Y. 250; Ferrell v. Ma.i-well, 28
Ohio St. 383, 22 Am. Rep. 393; and others.—resting on the rule
applied in Apgar v. Hiler, 24 N‘. J. L. 8i2. The remark of Bayley,
' J., in Thomas v. Cook, that a promise to indemnify was not with
in either the words or the policy of the statute, has caused much
of the confusion existing on this subject. but is more than counter
balanced by the observations of Lord Denman in Green v. Cress
well, 10 Ad. & El. 453, and Pollock, C. B., in Cripps v. Hartnoll,
4 Best & S
.
414 to the effect that a promise to indemnify may
be also an undertaking to answer for the debt or default of an
other, and that when it is it comes within the operation of the
statute. Another circumstance taking cases out of the simple
class with which we are now concerned is that mentioned in
Kutsmeyer v. Ennis, 27 N. J. L. 371, 376. viz. the existence of a









































































































































94 HARTLEY v. SANFORD [Chap. I
expressed, moving to the promisor. Such cases are Smith v.
Sayward, 5 Me. 504; Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon. 276; Mills
v. Brown, 11 Iowa, 314; Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360; Smith
v. Delaney, 64 Conn. 264; 29 Atl. 496; Potter v. Brown, 35 Mich.
274; Comstock v. Norton, 36 Mich. 277; Harrison v. Sawtell,
10 Johns. 242, 6 Am. Dec. 337; Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N.Y. 250;
Tighe v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263, 5 L. R. A. 617, 22 N. E. 164.
Cases of still another character are sometimes cited in support
of the statement that contracts to indemnify are outside of the
statute, such as Cripps v. Hartnoll, 4 Best & S. 414; Reader v.
Kingham, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 344; Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind. 315,
37 Am. Rep. 162; Keesling v. Frasier, 119 Ind. 185, 21 N. E. 552;
Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205, 49 Am. Dec. 775. But these judg
ments rest on the same idea as Thompson v. Coleman, 4 N. J. L.
216,—that there existed no other liability to the promisee than
that of the promisor, and so manifestly the statute was not ap
plicable. On the other hand, there is sufficient judicial authority
for the proposition that an undertaking to indemnify a person
for becoming surety for another is
,
in the absence of any modify
ing fact, a promise within the statute. Green v. Cresswell, 10 Ad.
& El. 453; Simpson v. Nance, I Speers, 4; Brown v. Adams,
1 Stew. (A1a.) 51, 18 Am. Dec. 36; Kelsey v. Hibbs, 13 Ohio St.
340; Clemenfs Appeal, 52 Conn. 464; Brssig v. B’r_itton, 59 Mo.
204, 21 Am. Rep. 379; Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, 56 Am.
Rep. 291, 4 Atl. 15; Draughan v. Bunting, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.)
1o; Hurt 21. Ford, 142 Mo. 283, 41 L. R. A. 823, 44 S
. W. 228;
and May v. Williams, 61 Miss. 126, 48 Am. Rep. 8o,—were de
cided on this basis. In the case last mentioned, PORTER, J.
,
stated
the true rules very clearly and concisely. No doubt, there are op
posing cases which cannot be explained on any distinguishing cir
cumstances. Such seem to be Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657;
Jones v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216; Dunn v. West,
5 B. Mon. 376; Vogel v. Melms, 31 Wis. 306, 11 Am. Rep. 608;
and Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. I9 Eq. 198. But some of these
cases merely follow Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728, without
noticing the distinction which later discussion has justified, while
others appear to have been induced by the injustice of a refusal
to enforce a promise on the strength of which the promisee in
curred his liability, rather than by a ready purpose to execute the
will of the legislature.
No doubt injustice may result from the enforcement of the
statutory rule; but that rule sprang from a conviction that its









































































































































Sect. 2 RE.W DER V. KINGHAM 05
it
s
enactment in England and perhaps every state in this Union
indicates the generality o
f
this assurance. Said Mr. Justice Ster
rett in Nugent v. Wolfc, 111 Pa. 471, 56 Am. Rep. 291, 4 Atl. 15:
“The object o
f
the statute is protection against 'fraudulent prac
tices commonly endeavored to be upheld b
y perjury, and it should
b
e enforced according to it
s
true intent and meaning, notwith
standing cases o
f great hardship may result therefrom.” With
more detail did Chief Justice Shaw, in Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc
396, 3
7 Am. Dec. 148 say: “The object o
f
the statute, manifestly,
was to secure the highest and most satisfactory species o
f
evidence
in a case where a party, without apparent benefit to himself, enters
into stipulations o





a creditor, in danger o
















y exaggerating words o
f
recommenda
tion, encouragement to forbearance-and requests for indulgence
into positive contracts.”
-
Our conclusion is that the promise proved at the trial was
insufficient to sustain the action, that the judgment for the plain
tiff should be reversed, and that, in accordance with the reserva
tion at the trial, a verdict a
n I juTgment should be entered in favor
Of the defendant.T."--~
27. READER. v. KINGHAM, 13 C. B. (N.S.) 344, 106 E. C. L. 344.
Court o
f
Common Pleas, Mich. Term, 1862. U-A- Uat v-to-w








not the Principal remains ligble_ior ille dell if he*
alocs, the promise is collateral, and must be in Jill" if not, it is** 130-~an original promise, and need not be in writing.
f
On the 6th o
f May last, the plaintiff, who was bailiff o
f
the
Buckinghamshire County Court, was about to arrest one Hitch
cock under a warrant o
f
commitment for disobedience o
f
an order,
made in a cause in the County Court o
f Malins v. Hitchcock,
when the defendant (who was Hitchcock's brother-in-law) prom
ised the plaintiff that, if he would forbear to execute the warrant,
h
e
the defendant would before 12 o'clock on the following Satur
day morning pay the plaintiff 17l., which sum the plaintiff said
h
e was authorized by Malins to take in satisfaction o
f
the debt
and costs in the County Court, o
r
surrender Hitchcock. The









































































































































96 READER v. KINGHAM [Chap. I
fendant neither paid the money nor surrendered Hitchcock. The
171. was not the whole debt and costs in the suit in the County
Court. These amounted to between 341. and 351. But the plain
tiff in that suit had authorized the bailiff to take 171. in satisfac
tion. Under these circumstances, the present action was brought
by the bailiff against Kingham upon his undertaking.
At the trial before the undersheriff of Buckinghamshire on
the 2nd of July last, it was objected on the part of the defendant,
upon the supposed authority of Buteher v. Stewart, 12 Law J.,
Exch. 291, 9 M. & W. 405, I Dowl. N. S. 620, Goodman v. Chase,
1 B. & Ald. 297, and Davies v. Fleteher, 2 Ellis & B. 271 (E. C.
L. R. vol. 75), 22 Law J., Q. B. 429, that the defendant’s promise
being a promise to answer for the debt of another, it was one
which by the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3,
required to be in writing. _
The undersheriff ruled that this was a conditional promise
to pay and therefore within the 4th section of the Statute of
Frauds, and ought to have been in writing; and that, on the evi
dence of the plaintiff, he had not released Hitchcock from the
debt. He accordingly directed the jury to find for the defendant,
reserving leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for him
for 171., if the Court should be of opinion that his ruling was
erroneous.
Evans, on a former day in this term, obtained a rule m'si.—
He submitted that the promise sued upon was an original promise
to pay the plaintiff 171. upon the consideration named, and not a
collateral promise to answer for the debt or default of a third
person within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds.
LUSH, Q.C., and HANNEN, on a subsequent day, showed
cause.—The promise in question was a promise to answer for the
debt or default of another, and therefore within the 4th section
of the Statute of Frauds: the debt of Hitchcock was not extin
guished; he remained, and still remains, liable upon the original
judgment: Davies v. Fleteher, 2 Ellis & B. 271 (E. C. L. R. vol.
75). Part of the contract here was, that, Kingham failing to pay
the money, Hitchcock was to be surrendered. The true test
whether the Statute of Frauds applies or not, is
,
whether or not
the principal remains liable for the debt: if he does, the promise
is collateral, and must be in writing; if not, it is an original prom
ise, and need not be in writing.
ERLE, C.J.—I am of opinion that this action is maintainable,









































































































































Sect. 2] READER. V. KINGHAM 97
the defendant's agreement to be in writing and signed, and con
sequently that the rule to enter a verdict for the plaintiff should
be made absolute. It appeared that one Malins had recovered a
judgment in the County Court against Hitchcock for 34l. or there
abouts, debt and costs, and that a warrant had been obtained for
the committal of Hitchcock to gaol for thirty days, and placed
in the hands of the now plaintiff, who was bailiff of the County
Court. Now, it is conceded that the arrest and imprisonment of
the debtor under this warrant would not operate a discharge of the
debt. Although the debt and costs exceeded 34l., it seems the
bailiff was instructed by Malins to accept 17l. in satisfaction. The
bailiff being about to arrest Hitchcock at the house of his relative
Kingham, the latter promised the bailiff that if he would abstain
from executing the warrant, he would on the following Saturday
either pay the 17l or surrender Hitchcock. When the Saturday
arrived, the defendant neither paid the money nor surrendered
Hitchcock. The plaintiff (the bailiff) has therefore brought this
action to recover the 17l. : and the question is whether, the prom
ise sued upon is a promise to answer for the debt or default of
Hitchcock, within the,4th section of the Statute of Frauds. I am
of opinion that it is not. The debt was due to Malins from Hitch:
cock; the promise was made to Reader. It has been distinctly
settled, that to bring the promise within the statute, the promisee
must be the original creditor. Such was the decision of the
Court of Queen's Bench in Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & E. 438
(E. C. L. R. vol. 39), 5 P. & D. 276. So also was the decision of
the Court of Exchequer in Hargreaves v. Parsons, 13 M. & W.
561, where Parke, B., gave a considered judgment to the same
effect. And so was the decision of this Court in Fitzgerald v.
Dressler, 7 C. B. (N.S.) 374 (E. C. L. R. vol. 97). There are two
cases in the Court of Queen's Bench, where the plaintiff sued on
a promise to indemnify him in consideration of his having at the
defendant's request become bail for a third party, and where it was
held that the statute required the promise to be in writing. Those
were the cases of Green v. Cresswell, Io Ad. & E. 453 (E. C. L.






150. Whether the fact o
f
the promise relating to bail makes
any valid distinction, I do not stop to consider. But clear I
am, that, upon the balance o
f authority, the promise o
f
the de
fendant in this case is a collateral promise, and not within the
statute. The debts are totally distinct debts, as well as the debt
ors. No satisfaction resulted to Malins on account o
f
what passed











































































































































98 READER V. KING HAM [Chap. I
to accept 17l. in satisfaction of the debt and costs in the county
court; but he was not his agent to postpone the payment. If
Malins had chosen, he might have revoked Reader's authority
between the time of Hitchcock's release and the Saturday; and the
payment of 17l. would have been no discharge of Malins's claim
under the judgment. The payment of the 17l, therefore, would
not necessarily have been a discharge of Malins's demand, but
only a discharge or satisfaction of the contract between Kingham
and Reader. The case is clearly not one to which the Statute of
Frauds can apply.
WILLIAMS, J.—I am of the same opinion. I think the author
ities bind us to the principle that the fourth section of the Statute
of Frauds applies only to the case of a promise made to one to
whom another is answerable. It is said that the Court of Queen's
Bench in Green v. Cresswell, Io Ad & E. 453 (E. C. L. R. vol.
37), 2 P. & D. 433, refused to acknowledge that principle, and
that that case was recently acted upon by the same Court in






150. My brother Crompton, in
giving judgment in the last mentioned case, certainly says that
the Court felt themselves bound b
y
Green v. Cresswell; yet they
did not decide it altogether with reference to such refusal. What
the Court says is this: “The point which was raised before us,




default in respect o
f
which the promise is made must be
towards the promisee, we say nothing upon; for the very point was
taken in Green v. Cresswell, and, was held not to govern the case.
We are bound b
y
Green V
. Cresswell; and, without expressing




ror upon the case before us, we hold that the nonsuit was right.”
In Green v. Cresswell, Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment
o
f
the Court, says: “The promise in effect is
,
“If you will become








f your becoming bail. If Hadley fails to do what is right towards
you, I will do it instead of him. If there had been no decisions
on the subject, it would appear impossible to make a reasonable




e actually put it on the fact o
f
the duty being due from Hadley.
And after saying that "a distinction was also hinted at from the
circumstance o
f Hadley's debt being due to a third person, and
the default therefore incurred towards him, and not towards the









































































































































Sect. 2 | READER. V. KING HAM f 90
in the legislature which none of it
s language bears out; and, be
sides, may it not be said that the arrested debtor, who obtains his
freedom b
y being bailed, undertakes to his bail to keep them harm
less, by paying the debt o
r surrendering?” So that the Court dis
tinctly put it o
n
both grounds. The same Court distinctly put it
o
n
both grounds. The same Court distinctly decided in Eastwood
v
. Kenyon, II Ad. & E. 438 (E. C. L. R. vol. 39), 3 P. & D. 276,
that the statute applies only to the promises made to the person to




f Exchequer in Hargreaves v. Parsons, 13 M. & W.
561. Notwithstanding the Court o
f
Queen's Bench in Cripps v.
Hartnoll thought themselves bound b
y
Green v. Cresswell, I do





and Hargreaves v. Parsons. By these two cases, I think we are
bound: and they distinctly establish that the statute is not applica
ble to such cases as the present.
BYLEs, J.—I am of the same opinion. The Court of Queen's
Bench in Thomas v




728 (E. C. L. R. vol. 15),
3 M. & R
.
444, held that the promise, to bring it within the stat
ute, must be made to the original creditor; and that a promise to
indemnify stands on the same ground. The Court o
f Exchequer




also lays it down that the debt in respect o
f
which the promise is made must be due to the promisee. And
the last dictum, in this Court, o
f my Brother Williams, in Fitz
gerald v. Dressler, 7 C
.
B
. (N.S.) 374 (E. C. L. R. vol. 97), is to
the same effect. The case is therefore concluded b
y
the authori
ties. If it were not so, I should come to the same conclusion from
= reading the earlier part o
f
the 4th section, which deals with prom
= ises that are to bind executors personally. The words are the plain
and obvious words to use if it was intended to apply to the orig
inal promisee, but a very roundabout way o
f expressing it if meant








a promise made to a stranger. The contract is between
Reader and Kingham,-“If you, Reader, will abstain from arrest
ing Hitchcock, I will pay you 17l.” It was contended b
y
the
counsel for the defendant that Reader was the agent o
f
Malins:
But the answer is
,
that the transaction was not for his benefit, and .
h
e
has not recognised Reader's act. The rule must be absolute.
#
KEATING, J.—I am of the same opinion. I have been much
struck with the arguments urged by Mr. LUSH and Mr. HANNEN.









































































































































IOO WILDES V. DUDLOW [Chap. I
But upon the whole, I think the balance of authority is clearly in
favor of the proposition, that, to bring the case within the Stat
ute of Frauds, the promise must be made to the original creditor.
Certainly some of the cases which have been referred to tend to
throw some doubt upon the proposition. But, to hold this case to be
within the statute, we must be prepared to overrule several very
distinct and well-recognized authorities.
Rule absolute.
28. WILDES v. DUDLOW, L. R. 19 Eq. 198.
Equity Cases, 1874.
Where one person induces another to enter into an engage
ment by a promise to indemnify him against liability, such promise
is not within the statute of frauds and need not be in writing.
[Plántiffs as legatees under the will of John Dudlow, whose
estate was insufficient to satisfy their several legacies, bring this
proceeding against the executors to compel them to account for
#IOoo alleged to have been wrongfully retained. Dudlow set up
the following defense:]"
“Moreover, upon the said bankruptcy of the said Henry At
kinson Wildes, I, John Noble Dudlow, was compelled to pay a
sum of £1000 due upon a joint and several promissory note made
by me and the said Henry Atkinson Wildes under the following
circumstances:–In or about the year 1853 the testator, who had
often assisted the said Henry Atkinson Wildes in raising money,
requested me, John Noble Dudlow, to join the said Henry Atkin-.
son Wildes in a note for £IOOO, saying “that he, the said testator,
did not like his (the said testator's) name going so often to Ran
dell & Co.” (the bankers of the said testator), “from whom the said
Henry Atkinson Wildes intended to raise the said sum, or words
to that effect, and offering to indemnify-me—from any loss that
might arise from my joining in the said nate. Under the circum
stances aforesaid, I, John Noble Dudlow, consider myself entitled
to recoup myself out of the testator's estate for the said sum of
.#IOOO, and I submit whether I am liable to account for the same.”
Mr. Glasse, Q.C., and Mr. Herbert Smith, for the plaintiffs.
Mr. Higgins, Q.C., and Mr. Grosvenor Woods, for the De
fendant Dudlow.
SIR. R. MALINs, V.C.—The question is
,
whether this contract









































































































































Sect. 2] W II.DES V. DUDLOW IOI
is
,
within the 4th section o
f
the Statute o
f Frauds, required to be
in writing. The words o
f
that clause are, “charge the defendant
upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or mis
carriage o
f
another.” What was the promise made b
y
the testa
tor in this case to the defendant John Dudlow? It was not, “I
engage with you to be answerable to you for the debt o
f Wildes,”
because Wildes did not owe Dudlow anything, but he says, “If
you will do a certain act, namely, render yourself liable for that
debt, I will indemnify you.” I think it perfectly clear that the
only contract which I have to consider is
,
that between father and
son. It is not that he will pay the debt o
f Wildes, but that if the
son will guarantee Wildes' debt he will see him harmless, or in£ If one man could induce anotherto alter his line of conduct in that way, and then meet him with
the Statute o
f Frauds, that statute, instead o
f being a protection
against fraud, would be the direct means o
f
fraud. The statute
enacts that if one man promises to pay the debt of another, the
promise is void unless it is in writing, and no one doubts that to
b
e
the law; but it appears to me, upon principle, so plain that the
present case is not within the statute, that I am very glad to find
that what occurred to me as being the proper view o
f
the case is
finally decided to be the law on the subject. There has been a
conflict o
f authority, and I confess I am surprised to find that
there has been so much conflict. The point was originally decided
by two o
f
the most eminent judges known on the bench (Mr. Jus
tice BAYLEY and Mr. Justice PARKE, afterwards Lord Wensley
dale) in the case o
f
Thomas v




728, and they de
cided it upon the plainest principles o
f
common sense and justice.
I was therefore surprised to find that in a later case of Green v.
Cresswell, Io Ad. & El
.
453, the same Court, constituted at that
time o
f
other judges had taken a different view, and a_view
which, if it had been maintained, I possibly should not have felt
myself obliged to follow. But I am happy to find that, the matter
having been most carefully and elaborately considered in the case
of Reader V. £ 13 C. B. (N. S.) 344, when the full
number o










stored. The learned judges commented upon those cases, and
said that the law was accurately laid down in Thomas v. Cook,
and I entirely agreed in that expression of opinion. I accordingly
decide that where one person induces another to enter into an en
gagement, by a promise to indemnify him against liability, that
is not an agreement within the Statute o
f









































































































































IO2 MEASE V. WAGNER [Chap. I
quire to be in writing. This is a case in which a father induced
his son to guarantee the debt of his son-in-law upon a promise
that he would see him harmless. Upon every principle of justice
he is bound to indemnify him; and I think, therefore, that the son
is perfectly right in helping himself out of the estate which has
come into his hands. The force of the decision in Reader V. King
Juyu was somewhat shaken by the opinion expressed by Mr. Jus
tice BLACKBURN in Mountstephen v. Lakeman, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir
.
App. 17; but as the decision o
f
the Queen's Bench in that case
was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber and also in the House
o
f Lords, the law rests on the plain and reasonable ground upon
which it was put in Reader v. Kingham. The decision is
,
there
fore, entirely in favor o
f
the defendant; and I hold that the Chief
Clerk has done perfectly right in allowing this £1000 with interest.
herefore the motion to vary the certificate in that respect must
be dismissed with costs.
c. II hen party for whom the promisc is made cannot be held
liable.
-
29. MEASE v. WAGNER, 1 McCord L. 395.
Constitutional Court, South Carolina, 1821.
The promise is original, when no action will lic against the
person undertaken for.
This was an action for the articles furnished the funeral of





Bradley was the widow o
f
Dr. Bradley, who left her his estate
during life, remainder to his nephew, John Bradley. Mrs. Brad
ley, prior to her death, expressed a wish to be buried in a particu





the family, and she undertook to procure the arti
cles necessary to such a funeral as the deceased had desired. She
proceeded to the shop o
f
the plaintiff, where she selected the arti
cles required, saying they were for Mrs. Bradley's funeral. She
was asked “by whom they were to be paid for?” She replied,
"charge them to the estate o
f
Dr. Bradley, and as soon as his
nephew comes to town he will pay for them, o
r I will.” The
articles furnished were such as were suitable to the condition in
which Mrs. Bradley had lived.
On the arrival of the nephew in the city, the account was pre
sented to him, and he refused to pay it
,









































































































































Sect. 2] MEASE \'. w.\o1\' ER 103
had no authority to procure the articles at his expense. The dc
fendant was then applied to, and she refused payment. Some
time after this refusal, one of the witnesses remonstrated with the
nephew on the impropriety of his conduct, when he said he would
pay it
,
but did not. It appeared that a Miss Teabout adminis
tered upon the estate of Mrs. Bradley.
The counsel for the defendant contended that she was not
responsible, as it was a collateral and not an original undertaking.
The court charged the jury that it was an original, and not
a collateral undertaking, and that the defendant was liable.
A verdict was accordingly rendered for the plaintiff. A mo
tion was now made for a new trial, on the ground that the court
misdirected the jury. i
Mr. Justice HUGER delivered the opinion of the court.
It has been regarded as settled doctrine ever since the case
of Buckmyr v. Darnall, (2 Lord Ra'ymond, I085 ; Robt. on Frauds,
218). that when no action will lie against the party undertaken
for, it is an original promise. If A promise B that in considera
tion of his doing a particular act, C shall pay him such a sum.
and if C do not pay him. he, A, will pay the same; this is said to
be no collateral undertaking on the part of A unless C was privy
to the contract, and recognized himself as a debtor also. (Fitzgib
bon. 302; Robt. on Frauds, 223.) In the case before me, the de
fendant undertook for the representative of Dr. Bradley, against
whom no action could lie for the articles furnished for the funeral
of Mrs. Bradley. And there was no privity of contract between
the plaintiff and the nephew of Dr. Bradley. But it has been
urged, that the subsequent promise of the nephew had a retro
active operation, and rendered him liable; but if he were not liable
before thepromise was made, he could not be so afterwards. It
was not in writing, and was nudum pactum. Had the defendant
undertaken for the state or legal representative o
f Mrs. Bradley,
who was legally bound to pay the expenses of her funeral, it
would have been a different question; but she unfortunately un
dertook for one who was not responsible, and who was so far from
being privy to the contract, or acknowledging himself a debtor.
refused payment and denied the authority of the defendant to ren
der him responsible.
I am of opinion. therefore. that the motion must be refused.
.\'orr, JOHNSON, RICHARDSON and COLCOCK. JJ., concurred.









































































































































104 BUCKMYR v. DARNALL [Chap. I
C. PROMISES WITHIN THE STATUTE.
a. When the party for whom the promise is made can be held
liable.”
30. BUCKMYR v. DARNALL, 2 Ld. Raymond 1085, 5 Mod. 248, Salk.
27, 3 Salk. 15, Holt 606.
Court of Queen's Bench, Mich. Term, 1704.
One having a remedy against the principal cannot have an
action against the assurer, save upon a memorandum or note in
writing.
AN ACTION upon the case wherein the plaintiff declared that
the defendant, in consideration the plaintiff, at his request locaret
et deliberarct cuidam Josepho English a gelding of the plaintiff's
ad equitandum et itinerandum—usque ad Reading in comitatu
Berks, assumpsit et promisit the plaintiff, quod the said Joseph
and Charles the said gelding to the plaintiff redeliberarent, etc.
Upon non assumpsit pleaded, this cause came to trial before Hol.T.,
Chief Justice, at Westminster Hall; and the counsel for the de
fendant insisting that the plaintiff ought to produce a note in
writing of this promise, within the statute of frauds, 29 Car. 2,
c. 3, § 4; and the Chief Justice doubting of it
,
a case was made
o
f
it and ordered to be moved in court, to have the opinion o
f
the other judges. And now it was argued this term b
y Sergeant
Darnall for the defendant and b
y
Mr. Raymond for the plaintiff.
And it was insisted for the defendant that this case was within
the statute o






for it was a promise to
answer for the default and miscarriage o
f
the person the horse .
was lent to
.
The very letting out and delivery o
f
the horse to
English implies a contract b
y English to re-deliver him, and he .
is bound by law so to do, and consequently the defendant is to .
answer for the default o
f
another. In a case, 2 Will. & Mar.,
your Lordship settled this rule, that where an action will lie
against the party himself, there an undertaking b
y J. S. is within
the statute; and where n
o
action will lie against the party himself, .
there it is otherwise. And therefore I agree this case, that if a man
should say to another, “Do you build a house for J. S. and I will -
pay you;” that case is not within the statute, because there J. S.
* Cases included under this heading are placed here to make the
contrast between them and cases included under the last preceding heading
more immediate and striking. What might appear a more natural arrange









































































































































Sect. 2] BUCKMYR V. DARNALL IO5
is not liable. But this case is not more than this, if a man should
say, do you let J. S. have-goods, and if he does not pay you I
will, and this is Æthin the statute, because an action will lie
say, “Take J/ S. | 3 your service, and if he does n
faithfully,6r if he wrongs you, I will bé responsi
was a - given to the defendant; that, that rule of the ser
geant's must be understood, where an action does or does not lie
against the party himself o
n
the contract, and not where-an-action
does o
r
does not lie against him, upon collateral respects. And,
therefore in this case, for an actual conversion, or for refusing to
redeliver the horse, English may be charged in trover or detinue,
yet, h
e being not chargeable upon the contract, the case is not
within the statute. This contract cannot be said properly to be a
promise to answer for the default or miscarriage o
f another, un
less English were liable by the first contract. -
Upon the first motion and arguing this case, the three judges
against Powys seemed to be o
f opinion that this case was not
within the statute, because English was not liable upon the con-
tract; but if any action could be maintained against him, it must be
for a subsequent wrong in detaining the horse, or actually convert
ing it to his own use. And PoweLL, Justice, said that that rule,
o
f
what things shall be within the statute, is not confined to those
cases only, where there is no remedy at all against the other, but
where there is not any remedy against him on the same con
tract. This case is just like the case where a man says, “Send
goods to such a one, and I will pay you,” that is not within the
statute, for the seller does not trust the person he sends the goods
to. So here the stablekeeper only trusted the defendant, and an
action on the contract will not lie against English, but for a tort
subsequent h
e may be charged in detinue, o
r
trover and conver
sion, which is a collateral action.
Powys, Justice, said that there was a trust to English, for
the very lending o
f
the horse necessarily implies a trust to the
person he is lent to, and consequently the defendant in this case
is to answer for the default of another, and is within the statute.
PowFLL, Justice, agreed, that if a man should say, “Lend
J. S. a horse, and I will undertake he shall pay the hire of it,”
o
r
“Send J. S. goods, and I will undertake he shall pay you,” that
those cases would be within the statute; and agreed with Powys,









































































































































100 BUCKMYR V. D.A.RNALL [Chap. I
that if any trust were given to English, then the case would be
within the statute. But he and the Chief Justice and GoULD held,
that here was no credit given to English, and the Chief Justice
agreed with him, that if there had, this promise would have been
but an additional security, and within the statute. And the Chief
Justice said, that if a man should say, “Let J. S. ride your horse
to Reading, and I will pay you the hire,” that is not within the
statute, no more than if a man-should say, "Deliver cloth to J. S
.,




hire is not bound to£: if IE berobbed of him without frau In him, he is–exeuset-VT so it
was ruled in the case o
f Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Stra. 916.
The last day o
f
the term the Chief Justice delivered the opin
ion o
f
the Court. He said that the question had been proposed at
a meeting o
f judges, and that there had been a great variety o
f
opinions between them, because the horse was lent wholly upon
the credit o
f




f opinion that the case was within the statute. The objection
that was made was, that if English did not re-deliver the horse,
he was not chargeable in an action upon the promise, but in trover
o




the bailment in detinue on the original delivery,
and a detinue is the adequate remedy, and upon the delivery Eng
lish is liable#:the #fendant is c eral, and is within the re ords
o
f
the statute; and is as much so as if
,
where a man was indebted,
J. S.
,
in consideration that the debtee would forbear the man,
should promise to pay him the debt, such a promise is void unless
it be in writing. Suppose a man comes with another to a shop to
buy, and the shopkeeper should say, “I will not sell him the goods
unless you will undertake he shall pay me for them,” such a prom
ise is within the statute; otherwise, if a man had been the person
to pay for the goods originally--So here detinue lies against Eng
lish the principal; and the plaintiff having this remedy against
English the principal, cannot have an action against the defendant
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3
1





Supreme Court, Wisconsin, 1886.
The principal being presumptively liable, the assurer's promise
is void unless in writing.
Appeal from the County Court o
f
Fond du Lac County.
Sutherland & Sutherland, for appellant.
Eli Hooker and C. E. Hooker, for respondents.
The facts will sufficiently appear from the opinion.
ORTON, J. In 1883 the village board of the village of Bran
don, in Fond du Lag-Cöunty, determined that n
o
license for the
sale of intoxicating 1. uors in said village should be granted dur
ing the£ an ordinance prohibiting such
sale and providing for the punishment o
f
those who should violate
the same. Certain persons continued to sell intoxicating liquors
in said village notwithstanding, and in violation o
f
said ordinance,
and in July,# by resolution, employed the
said£ act as the attorneys of the village
in the prosecution o
f
such offenders. The respondents, as such
attorneys o
f
the village, commenced several prosecutions under
such employment, and rendered therein legal services, amounting
in value to $173.66, u
p






n injunction was served upon said village, at the
suit o
f
one David Whitton, a taxpayer o
f
said village, restraining
the village board from appropriating o
r paying out o
f
the treas
ury any money for the payment o
f attorneys’ fees in the prosecu
tion o
f
criminal actions theretofore-or-thereafter had for the vio
lation o
f
the excise laws o
f
the state, and from appropriating o
r
paying any money for expenses incurred in such prosecutions.
Notwithstanding said injunction, the respondents continued to
render legal services for said village in such prosecutions up to
and including the 26th day o
f January, 1884, the value o
f
which
then was the sum o
f $657.34, including the above amount o
f
$173.66. The bill for these services was presented to and filed
with the village board as a claim against the village, and the
respondents brought suit against the village therefor, which suit
is still pending.
The seventh finding o
f fact, which must be received as a
verity in the case as neither party has excepted thereto, is as
follows: “That on or about the 8th day o
f September, 1883,
and subsequent to the service o
f









































































































































108 HOOKER v. RUSSELL [Chap. I
village, the defendant, George A. Russell, requested the plaintiff
to continue said prosecutions notwithstanding said injunction, and
promised and agreed to pay them for their past and future ser
vices therein in. case of their inability to collect their elaim there
for from said zillage.” It was on this promise that this suit was
brought against the appellant, and on which the respondents re
covered in the county court. There can be no question but that
this special promise of the appellant, not in writing, to answer
for the debt of the village of Brandon, is void by the statute of
frauds (R. S. sec. 2307, subd. 2). The services of the respondents
were rendered for the village, and under a contract with the vil
lage. They have presented their claim to, as being against, the
village, and have sued the village as being liable therefor. “So
long as the original debt remains payable by the debtor to his
creditor, any arrangement whatever by which another party prom
ises to pay that debt is within the very letter of the statute, no
matter from what source the consideration of the latter promise
is derived.” Emerick v. Sanders, 1 Wis. 77; Cotterill v. Stevens,
I0 Wis. 422; Cook v. Barrett, 15 Wis. 596.
Against the operation of the statute upon this promise it is
claimed (I) that it has been judicially determined, in the injunc
tion suit against the village, that the village is not liable for such
services. It is sufficiently answered th t neither of these parties
was a party to that suit, and therefore not bound by the judgment
therein. But, again, it was a suit in equity, and there might have
been other reasons for the.-in-junction than that the village was
not legally liable on the fitract to pay their attorneys for their
services in the prosecutions. (2) It is claimed that for the future
services of the respondents the credit was given to the appellant.
All the services were performed under one contract with the vil
lage. It is so alleged in the complaint, and the respondents not
only so testify, but they have preferred their claim against the
village, and brought suit against the village for it. The village
has never been released from any part of it. (3) It is claimed
that the appellant originally promised to pay for such future serv
ices on a new consideration of benefit or advantage to himself as
a citizen and officer of the village, having an interest in enforcing
the laws against the sale of intoxicating liquors. His zeal in the
cause of temperance, and his interest in enforcing the laws in
common with all other citizens, would scarcely be a good or val
uable consideration for a promise to pay. But the above finding
is sufficient to show that the same promise embraced the payment









































































































































Sect. 2] KEATE V. TEMPLE IO9
We shall not decide in this case whether the village of Bran
don is liable to the respondents on its contract, although the county
court found, as a conclusion of law, that the village was not liable
and had no authority to make the contract. The village is not a
party to this suit, and has not denied it
s liability in this suit. The
village is presumptively liable, for it has the capacity to contract.
It will be in time to decide the question of the liability of the
village on this particular contract when the action o
f
the respond
ents against the village to enforce it is on trial.
Are the£the village is not liable? It can only be determined whether the
respondents are able to collect their claim against the village,
when their suit for that purpose, now pending, shall be tried. In
any view that can be properly taken o
f
this promise, it is a col
lateral one and void.
By the Court.—The judgment of the county court is reversed,
and the cause remanded for a new trial.
v
32. KEATE v. TEMPLE, I Bos. & Pul. 158.
Court o
f
Common Pleas, Mich. Term, 1797.
In determining whether a given promise is original-ar-col:
lateral the Court will take into consideration, not only the-ca's
sions used, but the particular situation o
f
the parties-a the
amount involved in the undertaking.-- *
Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, work and labour,
and common money counts.
Plea, Non assumpsit.
This cause was tried before LAwRENCE, J. at Winchester
summer assizes 1797, when the principal facts in evidence were
as follows:
The Plaintiff was a tailor and slopseller at Portsmouth, and
the Defendant the first lieutenant o
f
his Majesty's ship the Boyne.
When that ship came into port, the Defendant applied to a third
person to recommend a slopseller, who might supply the crew
with new cloaths, saying, “He will run no risk; I will see him
paid.” The Plaintiff being accordingly recommended, the De
fendant called upon him, and used these words, “I will see you
paid a
t
the pay table; are you satisfied?” The Plaintiff answered,
“Perfectly so.” The cloaths were delivered on the quarter deck
o
f









































































































































I IO KEATE V. TEMPLE [Chap. I
fendant produced samples to ascertain whether his directions had
been followed: some of the men said, that they were not in want
of any cloaths, but were told by the Defendant, that if they did
not take them, he would punish them; and others who stated that
they were only in want of part of a suit, were obliged to take a
whole one, with anchor buttons to the jacket, such as are usually
worn by petty officers only. The cloathing of the crew in gen
eral was light, and adapted to the climate of the West Indies,
where the ship had been last stationed. Soon after the delivery,
the Boyne was burnt, and the crew dispersed into different ships.
On that occasion, the Plaintiff having expressed some apprehen
sions for himself, was told by the Defendant “Captain Grey, (the
Captain of the Boyne) and I will see you paid; you need not
make yourself uneasy.” After this the commissioner came on
board the Commerce de Marseilles in order to pay the crew of
the Boyne; at which time the Defendant stood at the pay table,
and having taken some money out of the hat of the first man who
was paid, gave it to the Plaintiff; the next man refused to part
with his pay, and was immediately put in irons. The Defendant
then asked the commissioner to stop the pay of the crew, who
answered that it could not be done.
The learned Judge in his direction to the jury said, that if
they were satisfied on the evidence, that the goods in question
were advanced on the credit of the Defendant as immediately re
sponsible, the Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict; but if they be
lieved, that at the time when the goods were furnished, the Plain
tiff relied on being able, through the assistance of the Defendant,
to get his money from the crew, they ought to find for the De
fendant.
Verdict for the Plaintiff 576l. 7s. 8d.
A rule nisi for a new trial having been obtained on a for
mer day, by Shepherd, Serjt, on the ground of the Defendant's un
dertaking being within the statute of fraud
LeBlanc and Marshall, Serjts. now shewed cause.
Shepherd, Serjt. in support of the rule, was stopped by the
Court.
EYRE, C.H.J. There is one consideration, independent of ev
erything else, which weighs so strongly with me, that I should
wish this evidence to be once more submitted to a jury. The sum
recovered is 576i. 7s.68d. and this against a lieutenant in the navy:
a sum so large, that it goes a great way towards satisfying my









































































































































Sect. 2 | KEATE G. TEMPLE III
Defendant to make himself liable, or of the slopseller to furnish
the goods on his credit, to so large an amount. I can hardly
think that had the Boyne not been burnt, and the Plaintiff been
asked whether he would have the lieutenant or the crew for his
paymaster, but that he would have given the preference to the
latter. The circumstances of this case create some prejudice
against the Defendant, but which I think capable of explanation.
There is some appearance of harshness in making the men pur
chase these cloaths against their inclination. But it was in evi
dence, that though they were pretty well cloathed, yet their
cloaths were adapted to a warm climate rather than to the service
in which they were to be engaged. It was, therefore, the bounden
duty of the officer to take some course to oblige the crew to pur
chase proper necessaries. We all know, that a sailor is so singular




e prevailed upon, without force, even to bring up
his hammock upon deck to be aired. We know, that he will risk
any danger in order to employ his money in a way that he likes,
rather than lay it out in that provident method which his situation
may require. The whole of the imputation then on the Defendant
and Captain Grey amounts to this, that when the men were to be
clothed, they wished them to be somewhat well dressed. I do not
know but that this circumstance may have had some influence





the other side, so as to make the
officer liable for so large a sum. From the nature o
f
the case,
it is apparent, that the men were to pay in the first instance; the
Defendant's words were “I will see you paid at the pay table;
are you satisfied?” and the answer then was, “Perfectly so.” The
meaning o
f
which was, that however unwilling—the men might-be
to pay themselves, the officer a
t they should
pay. The question is
,
Whether the slopman did not in fact rely
on the power o
f
the officer over the fund out o
f
which the men's
wages were to be paid, and did not prefer giving credit to that :
fund, rather than to the lieutenant, who, if we are to judge of ,
him b
y
others in the same situation, was not likely to be able to .
raise so large a sum? Considering the whole bearing o
f
the evi-.
dence, and that the learned Judge who tried the cause has not ex
pressed himself satisfied with the verdict, I think this a proper
case to be sent to a new trial. * -
HEATH, J. I am of the same opinion.















































































































































II 2 MANLEY V. GEAGAN [Chap. I
b. To answer for the debt of another.
33. MANLEY, Adm'strix, v. GEAGAN, 105 Mass. 445.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1870.
A promise to pay for work already done for a third person
without previous contract with or employment by the promisor is
a promisc within the statute of frauds.
CONTRACT by the administratrix of Edwin Manley upon an
oral promise to pay the following order:
“FALL RIVER, October 9, 1868.
“Nicholas T. Geagan.
-
“Sir: Please to pay Edwin Manley thirteen hundred and fifty-four
dollars for work on your house, corner of Bedford and Twelfth streets,
and charge the same to account of H. B. BORDEN & Co.”
The answer denied a
ll
the plaintiff's allegations, and pleaded
want of consideration, and the statute o
f
frauds.
The trial was in the superior court, without a jury, before
PITMAN, J., who made the following report of the case for the
determination of this court: -
“The plaintiff proved that her intestate, in whose favor the
order was drawn, did work as a stone mason on a block of build
ings belonging to the defendant, and which he was then erecting,
prior to the time o
f drawing this order. It appeared that the
whole contract was taken by H. B
.
Borden & Co., who employed
the plaintiff's intestate to do the mason work, and that there was
no contract between the plaintiff's intestate and the defendant, and
no employment b
y
the defendant; that after the work was done
the defendant sent word to the plaintiff's intestate to get an order
from Borden & Co. on him, adding, “I am going to pay all off Qn
the 10th, and am not going to trust Borden & Co. to pay it; I
am going to see the help a
ll paid; and that this was communi
cated to the intestate; that the next day he procured the order in





said it was a
ll right, and that he would accept it
,
and
pay it on Monday; that on Monday he could not be found, was
gone out o
f
town for a week, and has since refused to pay it. The
defendant who was called as a witness b
y
the plaintiff, testified




Borden & Co. nothing at the time when this
order was presented; and I find as a fact that it is not proved
that he actually did owe them anything. The defendant offered
no evidence.
•
“Upon the above, the court ruled that the promise o
f
the de











































































































































Sect. 2] MEAD, MASON & CO. V. WATSON II 3
being also without any consideration, no action could be main
tained on it
,
and thereupon found for the defendant. If this rul
ing is wrong, a new trial is to be had ; otherwise, judgment on
the verdict.”
-
J. C. Blaisdell, for the plaintiff.
J. M. Morton, Jr., for the defendant.
GRAy, J. The promise of the defendant was to pay fo
r
work
already done by the intestate for Borden and Company, without
any previous contract with o
r employment by the defendant. The
defendant owed Borden & Company nothing, and received no
consideration either from Borden & Company o
r
from the intes
tate for his promise. The intestate neither did any work nor paid
any money upon the faith o
f




r security against Borden & Company. Their original liability





This promise was therefore clearly a promise to answer for the
debt o
f another, and, not being in writing, was within the statute
o
f





. Stone v. Symmes, 18
Pick. 467; Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush. 488; Furbish v. Goodnow,
9
8
Mass. 206; Browne on St. o
f Frauds, §§ 172-174. .
Judgment on the verdict for the defendant.
34. MEAD, MASON & CO. v. WATSON, 57 Vt. 426.
Supreme Court, Vermont, 1885.
Guaranty o
f
a future liability—a debt to be incurred—is
within the statute precisely as it would be if the liability existed
when the promise was made.
Assumpsit. Heard o
n
a referee's report, December Term,
1884, TAFT. J.
,
presiding. Judgment for the plaintiffs. The
referee found, that the plaintiffs were dealers in doors, windows,
and materials for house furnishing; that the defendant, who was
known to be responsible, introduced Cameron to the plaintiffs;
that the house, for which the articles were purchased, was situated
on the defendant's land; that the understanding was, that when
the house was completed, it was to be deeded to Cameron's wife;
that Cameron abandoned the house before it was completed, and
it was finished b
y
the defendant, who retained the title; that the
defendant's contract with the plaintiffs was b
y
parol. The other
facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
S














































































































































114 UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL SURETY co. [Chap. I
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POWERS, J. The referee says the plaintiffs understood “that
whatever Cameron ordered for said house of the plaintiffs the
defendant would guarantee the payment of,” and the plaintiffs
“would not have sold said articles to Cameron except for this un
derstanding, that the payment was guaranteed by the defendant.”
Later on he says, “Those articles were all charged to Cameron on
plaintiffs‘ books; and plaintiffs understood that they were to col
lect the same of said Cameron, if possible, and that the defendant
was only liable to pay the same in case the plaintiffs were unable
to make collections of Cameron.”
The contract of the defendant therefore was collateral to the
contract of Cameron.
It is true that no debt existed against Cameron when the de
fendant's promise was made. But the defendant only promised
to be responsible for a future debt. His promise could only at
tach to the principal obligation of Cameron, when that obligation
came into force. The defendant did not promise to pay primar
ily, but only in case the plaintiff failed to collect of Cameron.
If the future primary liability of a principal is contemplated
as the basis of the promise of a guarantor, such promise is within
the Statute of Frauds, precisely as it would be if the liability ex
isted when the promise was made. Brandt, Sur., § 61; Browne,
St. Fr., § 162; Mats-on v. ll/lzaraut, 2 Term, 8o.
Judgment reversed, and judgment on the report for defend
ant.
'
c. To answer for the default of another.
35. UNITED STATES, to use of ANNISTON PIPE & FOUNDRY
CO., v. NATIONAL SURETY CO., 34 C. C. A. 526, 92 Fed. 549.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1899.
Bond of contractor for public zvorl2 performs double function:
(I) To secure fa-itlhful performance of contract; (2) To protect
third persons from whom contractor may obtain labor or materials
in the prosecution of the work.
In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of .\'Iissouri.
This suit was brought by the Anniston Pipe & Foundry Com
pany, the plaintiff in error, in the name of the United States,










































































































































Sect. 2] UNITED STATES v. NAl‘ION.\L SURETY co. _ 115
on a bond executed by the defendant on July 15, 1895, as surety
for T. J. Prosser, the bond having been executed pursuant to the
provisions of an act of congress approved August 13, 1894 (28
Stat. 278, c. 280), which is as follows:
“An Act for the protection of persons furnishing materials and labor for
the construction of public works.
“Be it enacted,” etc., “that hereafter any person or persons entering
into a formal contract with the United States for the construction of any
public building, or the prosecution and completion of any public work or
for repairs upon any public building or public work, shall be required
before commencing such work to execute the usual penal bond, with good
and sufficient sureties, with the additional obligations that such contractor
or contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supplying him
or them labor and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in
such contract; and any person or persons making application therefor, and
furnishing affidavit to the department under the direction of which said
work is being, or has been prosecuted, that labor or materials for the pros
ecution of such work has been supplied by him or them, and payment for
which has not been made, shall be furnished with a certified copy of said
contract and bond, upon which said person or persons supplying such labor
and materials shall have a right of action and shall be authorized to bring
suit in the name of the United States for his or their use and benefit
against said contractor and sureties and to prosecute the same to final
judgment and execution; provided, that such action and its prosecution
shall involve the United States in no expense.”
T. J. Prosser, the principal in the bond, had entered into a
contract with Charles B. Thompson, assistant quartermaster of
the United States army, who acted for and in behalf of the United
States of America, for the construction of a boiler and pump
house, pumping machinery, and connections, water mains, steel
trestle, and water tank, etc., for the water-supply system for the
new military post near Little Rock, Ark.; and the bond contained
a condition. in substance, that if said Prosser, his heirs, executors,
and administrators, should in all respects duly and fully observe
and perform all and singular the covenants, conditions, and agree
ments in and by said contract agreed to be observed and performed
by said Prosser, according to the true intent and meaning of said
contract. as well during any period of extension of said contract
as during the original term, and should make full payments to
all persons supplying him labor or materials in the prosecution
of the work provided for in said contract, then the obligation
should become void, but otherwise remain in full force and virtue.
The plaintiff company sued to recover of the defendant, as surety
in said bond, the sum of $842.98, with interest and costs, being
the value of certain water pipe which it had supplied to Prosser,
subsequent to the execution of the aforesaid bond and contract,
to enable him to execute his agreement with the government, and









































































































































116 UNITED STATES \'. NATIONAL sumzry co. [Chap. I
but had not paid for. For a defense to the action the defendant
pleaded, and the trial court so found, that subsequent to the exe- '
cution of the aforesaid bond, and the contract which it was given
to secure, the government had entered into a further agreement
with Prosser, modifying the terms of the original contract, or,
more accurately, the specifications thereto attached, in such a
manner that Prosser was required to lay only 1,866 linear feet of
six-inchwater pipe in place of 3,850 feet, as specified in the origi
nal contract, and that this change in the terms of the original
contract, or rather in the plans for its execution, was made without
the knowledge or consent of the surety company. In view of the
change in the plans for the execution of the contract which less
ened the amount of water pipe necessary to be supplied and used,
the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover. It ac
cordingly rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant, to re
verse which the record has been removed to this court by a writ
of error.
Truman A. Post, for plaintiff in error. .
J. E. McKeighan (Shepard Ba/relay, M. F. I/Vatts, and G. A.
Vanda":/eer, on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and TI-IAYER, Circuit Judges.
THAYER, C.J., after stating the case as above, delivered the
opinion of the court.
It is a familiar rule that the contract of a surety must be
strictly construed, and that it cannot be enlarged by construction,
and that when a bond, with sureties, has been given to secure
the performance of a contract, and the principal in the bond and
the person for whose benefit it was given make a material change
in the contract without the consent of the surety, the latter is
thereby discharged. For present purposes, it may be conceded
that the finding of the lower court in the case at bar discloses
such a modification of the original contract between Prosser and
the United States as would fall within the rule last stated, and
release the defendant company from its liability, if the United
States was suing for its own benefit for a breach of some provision
of the contract, the due performance of which the bond was in
tended to secure. Such, however, is not the case. The suit is
not brought by the United States to recover any damage which
it has sustained; neither is it brought to enforce any provision
of the contract which was entered into between the United States
and the principal in the bond. On the contrary, the action is









































































































































Sect. 2] unrrEn STATES v. N.\'l‘ION.\L SURETY co. 117
’
bond, which was intended solely_ for the protection of laborers
and material men who might furnish labor and materials while
the contract was being executed by Prosser. The United States
is merely a nominal plaintiff, and as such, under the provisions of
the act of congress, it cannot be held liable even for costs. The
real plaintiff is the corporation for whose use the suit was brought,
and it sues to enforce an obligation which congress required to be
inserted in the bond for its protection and for the protection of
others who might furnish labor or materials while the work was
in progress.
The real question to be considered, therefore, is whether the
act of congress under which the bond in suit was taken constituted
the United States the agent or representative of the persons who
supplied labor and materials after the contract and bond were
executed, in such a sense that its action in consenting to a modifi
cation of the contract with Prosser must be imputed to the labor
ers and material men,_and held to deprive them, as well as the
government. of all recourse against the surety.
The act of congress of August I 3, 1894, does not authorize
the United States to bring suits of its own motion against the
obligors in such bonds as are therein provided for, to recover what
is due to laborers and material men. It is not empowered to act
in their behalf in that respect, but such actions can only be brought
at the instance of persons who furnish labor and materials, who
are authorized, without previous leave being obtained from any
executive department, to. sue in the name of the United States,
and control the litigation precisely as they might control it if
the suits were brought in their own name. It is also noticeable
that in its title the act professes to be one for the benefit “of
persons furnishing materials and labor,” and that in the body of
the act the form of the condition to be inserted in the bond for
the benefit of the United States is not in terms prescribed, the only
provision in that regard being that the bond shall be “the usual
penal bond ;” meaning, evidently, such an obligation for the gov
ernment's own protection as it had long been in the habit of exact
ing from those with whom contracts were made for the doing of
public work. On the other hand, the condition for the benefit of
persons who might furnish materials or labor is carefully pre
scribed. Obviously, therefore, congress intended to afford full
protection to all persons who supplied materials or labor in the
construction of public buildings or other public works, inasmuch
as such persons could claim no lien thereon, whatever the local









































































































































118 UNITED STATES v. N.\'l‘IONAI, SURETY co [Chap. I
was no occasion for legislation on the subject to which the act
relates, except for the protection of those who might furnish
materials or labor to persons having contracts with the govern
ment. The bond which is provided for by the act was intended
to perform a double function,-—in the first place, to secure to the
government, as before, the faithful performance of all obligations
which a contractor might assume towards it; and, in the second
place, to protect third persons from whom the contractor obtained
materials or labor. Viewed in its latter aspect, the bond, by
virtue of the operation of the statute, contains an agreement be
tween the obligors therein and such third parties that they shall
be paid for whatever labor or materials they may supply to enable
the principal in the bond to execute his contract with the United
States. The two agreements which the bond contains. the one
for the benefit of the government, and the one for the benefit of
third persons, are as distinct as if they were contained in separate
instruments, the government's name being used as obligee in the
latter agreement merely as a matter of convenience.
In view of these considerations, we are of the opinion that the
sureties in a bond, executed under the act now in question, cannot
claim exemption from liability to persons who have supplied labor
or materials to their principal to enable him to execute his con
tract with the United States, simply because the government and
the contractor, without the surety's knowledge, have made some
changes in the contract, subsequent to the execution of the bond
given to secure its performance, which_ do not alter the general
character of the work contemplated by the contract or the general
character of the materials which are necessary for its execution.
W hen the government has executed the contract and taken and
approved the bond, it ceases to be the agent of third parties whom
the contractor employs in the execution of the work or from whom
he obtains materials, and the rights of such persons under the
bond are unaffected by subsequent transactions between the gov
ernment and the contractor. If such were not the case, it would
be possible for the contractor and some officer of the United States,
by making some change in the contract or specifications, to deprive
laborers and material men of all recourse against the sureties
in the bond after they had supplied materials and labor of great
value in reliance upon its provisions. It is not probable that
such a result was contemplated by the lawmaker. On the con
trary, the act bears every evidence that it was intended to provide
a security for laborers and material men on which they could rely









































































































































Sect 2] GRIFFITH V. RUNDLE II9
1ngs with the contractor, to relinquish the benefit of the security.
We are confirmed in these views by the following authorities:
Dewey v. State, 91 Ind. 173; Conn. v. State, 125 Ind. 514, 25 N.
E. 443; Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655, 59 N. W. ; Kaufmann v.
Cooper, 46 Neb. 644, 65 N. W. 796; Steffes v. Lemke, 40 Minn.
27, 41 N. W. 302. The first two of these cases are very much
in point. Bonds were given to the state of Indiana as obligee for
the doing of public work, in pursuance of a statute of that state,
which bonds contained conditions requiring—First, the faithful
performance and execution of the work undertaken by the con
tractor; and, second, the prompt payment by the contractor of
all debts incurred by him in the prosecution of the work for labor
and materials supplied by third parties. It was held, in sub
stance, that for any breach of the second condition of the bond by
the contractor the right of action was in the laborer or the mate
rial man, and that such right of action could not be defeated or
prejudiced by any act done by the obligee in the bond after the
bond had been taken and approved. It was accordingly ruled
that changes made in the contract by the parties thereto, to-wit,
the contractor and the public authorities, after the bonds had been
executed and accepted, would not deprive material men of their
right to recover against the sureties in the bond. It results from
what has been said that the judgment of the circuit court was
erroneous upon the facts found by that court, and should be
reversed. It is so ordered, and that the case be remanded for a
new trial.
36. GRIFFITH, et al. v. RUNDLE, et al., 23 Wash. 453, 63 Pac. 199,
55 L. R. A. 381.
Supreme Court, Washington, 1900.
Penalty in statutory bond as limit of liability thereon.
Appeal by defendants from a judgment of the Superior Court
for Spokane county in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought
to hold sureties on a contractor's bond liable for unpaid labor
and materials which went into the construction of the building.
Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Henley, Kellam, & Lindsley and A. G. Avery, for
appellants.
Messrs. Lewis & Lewis, for respondents.
REAVIs, J., delivered the opinion of the court:









































































































































12o GRIFFITH v. RUNDLE [Chap. I
the United States for the construction of certain buildings at the
army post near Spokane. At the time the contract was executed,
a bond was duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the
act of Congress approved August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. p. 278,
chap. 280). The law is entitled “An Act for the Protection of
Persons Furnishing Materials and Labor for the Construction of
Public Works.” Its provisions are substantially that any person
entering into a formal contract with the United States for the
construction of any public building shall be required, before com
mencing, to execute the usual penal bond with good and sufficient
sureties, with the additional obligations that the contractor shall
promptly make payments to all persons supplying him labor and
materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in the con
tract; that any persons performing labor or furnishing materials
for such work shall be furnished on application with a certified
copy of the contract and bond upon which the person supplying
labor and materials shall have a right of action, and be authorized
to bring suit in the name of the United States against the con
tractor and sureties, provided that such action shall involve the
United States in no expense. The defendants Henley and Snod
grass were sureties upon the bond, the penal sum of which was
$10,000. I/Vhile the contractor, Rundle, was engaged in the con
struction of the buildings under his contract, materials were fur
nished by plaintiffs to the contractor, and used by him in the work
of construction. Subsequently, and while the buildings were but
partially completed, the United States, in the exercise of the right
reserved in the contract, took the work out of the hands of Rundle,
and at the same time notified the sureties, Henley and Snodgrass,
of its action. Thereupon the sureties took up the work of con
struction, and completed the buildings according to Rundle’s con
tract, and the United States accepted their work as full perform
ance of the contract. For defense to the action, after some denials,
the sureties set up the fact that Rundle did not complete the con
tract, but the sureties, under its terms, made full performance,
which was duly accepted by the United States, and that in their
completion of the contract they were necessarily compelled to
expend sums in excess of $10,000, the amount of the penalty
in the bond.
I
1. The several assignments of error made by the appellants
may be grouped together, and stated as the refusal of the superior
court to admit testimony under the affirmative defense set forth
in the answer. The court excluded any evidence with reference









































































































































Sect. 2] GRIFFITH v. RCNDLE 121
formance of the contract or the payment of damages. It is main
tained by counsel for appellants that the limit of the liability of
the sureties was the penalty stated in the bond, $10,000; that, if
the sureties had not undertaken the performance of the contract
of their principal, the entire damages to both the government
and the respondents and all of the other claimants for labor and
materials would have been liquidated by the payment of $10,000;
that the fact that the sureties necessarily expended more than that
sum in the completion of the contract, and over the contract price,
relieves them from further liability. It is also maintained that,
if the contract had not been completed, the government is a pre
ferred creditor, and its claim would exhaust the penalty, and there
would be no funds left for the satisfaction of plaintiffs and other
claimants of like character; and counsel maintain that it is neces
sary to determine the question of priority of rights as between
the government and these claimants. In a case involving these
facts,—United States use of Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Rundle,—in
the United States circuit court, judgment was entered in con
formity with the contention of counsel here. But the cause was
afterwards reversed by the United States circuit court of appeals
(40 C. C. A. 450, I00 Fed. 400). and the appellate court observed:
“The undisputed facts of the present case are such that it is not
necessary to consider the question presented in the court below,
and argued here, whether if the United States had any cause of
action upon the bond in suit, its claim should be preferred to that
of the laborers and material men ; for as has already been observed,
the United States received full performance of the contract, and
therefore has no cause of complaint.” In the case of United States
use of Auniston Pipe 6' Foundry Co. v. National .S'urety Co., 34
C. C. A. 526, 92 Fed. 549, such a bond was under consideration
by the court, and it was there adjudged that the bond was intended
to perform a double function: First, to secure the faithful per
formance of the contract to the government; and, second, to pro
tect third persons from whom the contractor might obtain labor
or materials in the prosecution of the work. In its second aspect,
the bond , by virtue of the statute, contains a separate and distinct
agreement between the obligors and such third persons as to which
the agency of the government ceases when the bond is given and
approved, and subsequent changes in the contract, agreed upon
between the government and the contractor, though without the
knowledge or consent of the surety, will not release the surety
from liability to persons who supply labor or materials thereunder.









































































































































122 GRIFFITH v. RUNDLE [Chap. I -
cuted: “It is also noticeable that in its title the act professes to be
one for the benefit ‘of persons furnishing materials and labor,’
and that in the body of the act the form of the condition to be
inserted in the bond for the benefit of the United States is not in
terms prescribed, the only provision in that regard being that the
bond shall be ‘the usual penal bond ;’ meaning, evidently, such an
obligation for the government’s own protection as it had long
been in the habit of exacting from those with whom contracts were
made for the doing of public work. On the other hand, the con
dition for the benefit of persons who might furnish materials or
labor is carefully prescribed. Obviously, therefore, Congress in
tended to afford full protection to all persons who supplied mate
rials or labor in the construction of public buildings or other
public works, inasmuch as such persons could claim no lien thereon,
whatever the local law might be, for the labor and materials so
supplied. There was no occasion for legislation on the subject to
which the act relates, except for the protection of those who might
furnish materials or labor to persons having contracts with the
government. * * * Viewed in its latter aspect, the bond, by virtue
of the operation of the statute, contains an agreement between the
obligors therein and such third parties that they shall be paid
for whatever labor or materials they may supply to enable the
principal in the bond to execute his contract with the United
States. The two agreements which the bond contains—the one
for the benefit of the government, and the one for the benefit of
third persons—are as distinct as if they were contained in sepa
rate instruments, the government's name being used as obligee in
the latter agreement merely as a matter of convenience.” In the
case of Dewey v. State ex rel. McCollum, 9I Ind. 173, it was sub
stantially held that for any breach of the second condition of such
a bond by the contractor the right of action was in the laborer
or the material man, and that such right of action could not be
defeated or abridged by any act done by the obligee in the bond
after the bond had been taken and approved; and it was ruled
that changes made in the contract by the parties thereto—that is,
the contractor and the public authorities—after the bonds had been
accepted would not deprive material men of their rights to recover
against sureties in the bond. To the same effect is Conn v.
State ex rel. Stutsman, 125 Ind. 514, 25 N. E. 443, and the same
principle is affirmed in Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655, 59 N. W. 806;
Krmfmarm v. Cooper, 46 Neb. 644, 65 N. W’. 796; Steffes v.
Lemke, 40 Minn. 27, 41 N. W. 302. The practical effect of the










































































































































~ KlRKI'IAM v. MARTER 123
seems to be to coiifer a special lien in favor of such persons who
furnish labor and material, and to substitute the bond in place
of the public building as a thing upon which the lien is to be
charged. Such liens evidently appear, from an inspection of the
current legislation, to be favored, and the courts have usually
adopted a liberal rule of construction in their enforcement.
2. It is pertinent to suggest that in the performance of the
unfinished contract by the sureties, if they had expended less than
the amount to be paid by the government on the completion of the
contract, the excess or profit would have belonged to them, and,
if they undertook the completion of the contract and sustained a
loss, it would seem that it should fall upon them. As sureties
under the terms of the contract, they might elect to complete it
upon default of their principal, but such completion was not the
full performance of the contract by the principal himself. It sat
isfied the sureties’ contract with the government, but, as observed
by the circuit court of appeals in United States use of Fidelity
Nat. Bank v. Rundle, 40 C. C. A. 450, 100 Fed. 400, the United
States is not a claimant here, and the question of priority of claims
to the amount due from the sureties under the terms of the bond
is not involved in this case.
The judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.
DUNBAR, Ch. J.
,
and FULLERTON and ANDERS, JJ., concur.
a
'. To answer for the miscarriage of another.
37. KIRKHAM v. MARTER, 2 Barn. & Ald. 613.
Court of King’s Bench, Easter Term, 1819.
“Miscarriage,” as used in the statute o
f frauds, comprehends
that species o
f wrongful act for the consequences of which the
law would make the party civilly responsible.
This was an action on an oral promise. The plaintiff declared
that one T. E. Marter, before the making of the promise of
defendant, had without the leave or license of the plaintiff, wrong
fully ridden a horse of the plaintiff’s, in consequence whereof the
horse died; that the plaintiff had threatened to commence an action
against said T. E. Marter for the recovery of such damages as
plaintiff had sustained by reason of the premises; and thereupon,
in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff, at the re
quest of the defendant, would not bring any action against the









































































































































124 KIRKIH.-\M v. MARTER [Chap. I
would be content to take, for and on account of said horse, what
should be agreed upon between the defendant and one A. B.,
defendant promised to pay plaintiff what should be agreed upon
between defendant and said A. B. for and on account of said
horse. Plaintiff further declared that he had brought no action
for the cause aforesaid, and that he was willing to take, for and
on account of the horse, what had been agreed upon between the
defendant and A. B., and that defendant and A. B. did agree that
defendant should pay plaintiff fifty guineas for the said horse,
and the bill due for the maintenance and keep of the said horse.i
Breach: Theinon-payment of the said several sums.
Plea: General Issue.
'
On the trial of the cause the plaintiff proved an oral contract
as laid in the declaration. ABBOTT, C. J.
,
thought this an under
taking for the default or miscarriage of another within the statute
of frauds, and consequently that the promise ought to have been
in writing, and the plaintiff was non-suited.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial.
ABBO"l"l‘, C. J.—This case is clearly within the mischief in
tended to be remedied by the statute of frauds; that mischief
being the frequent fraudulent practices which were too commonly
endeavored to be upheld by perjury; and if it be within the mis
chief, I think the words of the statute are sufficiently large to com
prehend the case. The words are these: “No action shall be
brought to charge a defendant upon any special promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.” Now the
word “miscarriage” has not the same meaning as the word “debt”
or “default ;” it seems to me to comprehend that species of wrong
ful act for the consequences of which the law would make the
party civilly responsible. The wrongful riding the horse of an
other, without his leave and license, and thereby causing his death,
is clearly an act for which the party is responsible in damages and
therefore, in my judgment, falls within the meaning of the word
“miscarriage.” The case of Reed and Nash (1 Wilson, 305), is
very distinguishable from this: The promise there was to pay a
sum of money as an inducement to withdraw a record in an action
of assault, brought against a third person. It did not appear that
the defendant in that action had ever committed the assault, or
that he had ever been liable in damages; and the case was ex
pressly decided on the ground that it was an original, and not a
collateral promise. Here the son had rendered himself liable by









































































































































Sect. 2] B.AKER V. MORRIS I25
eration of the plaintiff's forbearing to sue the son. I therefore
think that the nonsuit was right.
Rule refused.
38. BAKER v. MORRIS, 33 Kan. 580, 7 Pac. 267.
Supreme Court, Kansas, 1885.
A promise without consideration and not in writing made
by a father to answer for the wrongful act of his minor son is
not actionable.
Error from Greenwood District Court.
At the May term, 1884, plaintiff Morris recovered a judgment
for $50 and costs against defendant Baker, who brings it here for
review. The opinion states the facts.
T. L. Davis, for plaintiff in error.
Clogston & Fuller, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VALENTINE, J.—The only question presented to this court
for determination is
,
whether the following bill of particulars sets
forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The amended
bill o
f particulars (omitting court and title) reads as follows:
“Now comes the above plaintiff, and for cause o
f complaint
against said defendant says, that said defendant is justly indebted
to him in the sum o





about the 21st day o
f December, 1883, one Frank Baker, a
son o
f
said defendant, and a minor, did negligently and carelessly





tiff; and that said stable contained one mare pony, the property of
said plaintiff; that said shot so fired and shot off penetrated the
said stable, and struck and killed said mare, said property o
f
said




ing said plaintiff in the sum o
f
$75.
“Plaintiff further says, that after said death o
f
said mare,
said plaintiff requested said defendant to pay for said mare so
killed; that agreed so to do, but has failed so to do; plain
tiff therefore says that said defendant voluntarily and o
f
his own
free will did, immediately after the injuries and damages com
plained o
f hereinbefore, come to plaintiff, and said he would pay
this plaintiff the full value o
f
said mare so killed b
y
his said son,
thereby ratifying and confirming the said acts o
f
his son Frank,









































































































































126 KEARNES V. MONTGOMERY [Chap. I
sustained by plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff prays judgment
against said defendant for the sum of $75 and costs.”
Under the authority of the case of Edwards v. Crume, 13
Kas. 348, the defendant below (plaintiff in error) is not liable,
unless by his subsequent promise and supposed ratification he has
made himself liable. In that case it is held as follows:
“Where a minor son who lives with his father and is under
his father's control commits certain wrongful acts, but where the
said acts have not been authorized by the father, are not done in
his presence, have no connection with the father's business, are
not ratified by the father, and from which the father receives no
benefit, the father is not liable in a civil action for damages for
such wrongful acts.”
See also Schouler on Domestic Relations, 361. The promise
made by defendant to pay the plaintiff for the mare killed is not
valid. It was a collateral undertaking, made without considera
tion, and was not in writing. (Sec. 6, Statute of Frauds). And
there was no ratification of the defendant's son's acts, except
such as resulted from the promise itself; and this in fact was no
ratification at all. The defendant might have disapproved the
son's acts wholly and entirely, and condemned them severely, and
yet promised to pay the value of the mare killed. * * *
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings.
All the Justices concurring.
SECTION 3. GUARANTOR AND SURETY DISTINGUISHED.
39. KEARNES v. MONTGOMERY, 4 W. Va. 29.
Supreme Court of Appeals, West Virginia, 1870.
The contract of the guarantor is collateral and secondary;
that of the surety collateral and primary or direct.
Boggess, for plaintiff in error.
Dennis & Price, for defendant in error.
The facts are stated in the opinion of Maxwell, J.
MAxwÉLL, J.—This was an action of assumpsit, to recover
from the defendant the sum of 2,000 dollars, with interest. The
facts certified show that on the 28th day of January, 1860, the
plaintiff held the bond of the defendant and one J. N. Montgomery









































































































































Sect. 3] KEARNES v. MONTGOMERY 127
said, proposed to exchange with the plaintiff for the said bond, a
. bond of 2.000 dollars executed by Thomas Creigh and L. S. Creigh
to the plaintiff; that the plaintiff refused to accept the said last
mentioned bond unless the defendant would indorse the same.
inasmuch as it was payable to the plaintiff and not to the defend
ant; whereupon the said defendant wrote his name upon the back
of the said bond, which was then accepted by the plaintiff, who, in
exchange therefor, delivered to the defendant the said bond of the
defendant and J. N. Montgomery; that afterwards, and after the
institution of the suit, but before the trial, the plaintiff wrote above
the blank indorsement of the defendant, a promise binding the
defendant as surety of the said Thomas Creigh and L. S. Creigh;
that the bond with the indorsement thereon is as follows:
“On or before the first of March, 1861, with interest from the first
of March, 1860, we or either of us bind ourselves, our heirs, etc., to pay
Alexander Kearnes the just and full sum of two thousand dollars, for
value received. _ _
“Witness our hands and seals this 28th day of January, I860.
“TnoMas CREXGH. [seal]
“Lewis S. C|u:icn.”'[seal]
“For value received, I hereby become the surety of Thomas Creigh
and Lewis S. Creigh as obligors in the within bond.
WM H. Mom0-ooiuznv.”
That the debt against the Creighs could have been made by suit in
the year 1861, and after the close of the war in 1865, and that the
said Creighs have been insolvent since 1866, and that since that
time the debt could not have been made off of them by suit. Upon
these facts judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plain
tiff in error insists that the judgment is erroneous, because upon
the facts proved. the defendant was a surety or maker of the bond
in question and primarilyliable for its payment, while it is insisted
for the defendant that he was guarantor merely and only liable
for the payment of the bond in case the money could not be made
off the makers of the paper after it fell due, by the use of due
diligence which, he insists, was not used before the makers became
insolvent. Whether the defendant is guarantor or maker depends
on the understanding of the parties. If the payee or assignee of
paper, not negotiable, indorse his name in blank on the back of it
,
he is prima facie assignor, but if a stranger indorse his name in
blank on the back of paper, not negotiable, he is prima facie guar
antor; but this presumption may be rebutted by showing the
original understanding of the parties, by showing an express
agreement otherwise, or by showing circumstances from which
one may be inferred.









































































































































128 KEARNES v. MONTGOMERY [Chap. I
differs in that respect generally from the contract of a surety
which is direct; and in general the guarantor contracts to pay if,
by the use of due diligence, the debt cannot be made out of the
principal debtor, while the surety undertakes directly for the pay
ment and so is responsible at once if the principal debtor makes
default. As the proper diligence was not used against the Creighs,
if the defendant is guarantor merely he is not liable for the pay
ment of the debt: while if he is to be treated as surety. he is liable.
It becomes, therefore, necessary to determine whether he is a
technical guarantor merely or a surety. * * *
The plaintiff, after suit brought, wrote over the name of the
defendant, “For value received. I hereby become the surety of
Thomas Creigh and Lewis S. Creigh as obligors in the within
bond.” It is upon this contract, so written by the plaintiff, that
he claims his right to recover from the defendant. The plaintiff
might write anything over the name of the defendant, consistent
with the contract of the defendant, so as to carry it out. He could ‘
not write the words which he did write. unless upon special con
tract between the parties, disclosed by the evidence and surround
ing circumstances. The evidence, instead of sustaining and au
thorizing this special contract as written by the plaintiff. does not
even tend to show_ any such understanding, but on the contrary
shows, so far as can be inferred from it
,
that the defendant was
to assume the same situation as to liability that he would have
occupied if the paper had been executed to him as payee and trans
ferred by him to the plaintiff. As the facts proved wholly fail to
show a contract on the part of the defendant to be liable as maker
or surety, it follows that he is liable only as guarantor.
The facts proved show affirmatively that, by the use of due
diligence against the Creighs, the plaintiff might have made the
money.
The judgment complained of will, therefore, have to be af









































































































































Sect. 3] SINGER MFG. CO. V. LITTLER I29
40. SINGER MAN'FG CO. v. LITTLER et al., 56 Ia. 601; 9 N.W. 905.
Supreme Court Iowa, 1881.
The assurer on the bond of an agent for the sale of sewing
machines, conditioned that such agent will account for all money
and property coming into his hands is a guarantor, not a surety.
Guarantor entitled to notice within a reasonable time of the
amount of his liability.
Appeal from Wapello circuit court.
AcTION AT LAw. The cause was tried to the court below
without a jury, and judgment was rendered for defendants.
Plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.
D. F. Miller and H. B. Hendershott, for appellant.
Wm. McNett, for appellees.
BECK, J.—1. The action is upon a bond executed by Littler
as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, conditioned





afterwards to exist, whether upon notes, accounts, o
r
in any
other manner. The petition alleges that Littler became agent o
f
plaintiff for the sale o
f sewing machines, and the bond in suit was
executed when he was appointed, to secure plaintiff from loss that
might accrue on account o
f
his employment. The petition alleges
that Littler became delinquent in his payments and executed a
note to plaintiff, upon which a judgment was afterward rendered
for the amount of his indebtedness. The sureties answered the
petition, alleging that Littler and the plaintiff entered into an
agreement whereby Littler became plaintiff's agent, and became
bound to pay to plaintiff money upon the sales o
f sewing machines,
o
r upon the indorsement o
f paper taken upon such sales, as stipu
lated in the agreement. The agreement provides that either party
may terminate the contract at their pleasure. Other conditions
need not be set out.
*
The answer further alleges that plaintiff had terminated
Littler's agency before the note was executed b
y him, and that
the defendants had no notice a
t any time that Littler was in de
fault, o
r
that any claim was made b
y plaintiff against them upon
the bond. Upon a demurrer to this answer, the court held that
the defendants were entitled to notice of the amount due from
Littler within a reasonable time after the settlement between him
and plaintiff. The court found upon the trial that no such notice
was given to the defendants, wherefore they suffered loss, and









































































































































130 smoan MFG. co. v. LITTLER [Chap. I
2. The controlling question in the case, and the only one
argued by counsel, involves the correctness of the court's ruling
in holding that defendants are not liable for the reason that notice
was not given them of the extent of Littler’s liability within a
reasonable time after his agency was terminated, and his indebt
edness fixed by his settlement with plaintiff. The ruling of the
court, we think, is correct, and in accord with Davis Sewing
Machine Co. \'. Mills, 55 Ia. 543, 8 N. W. 356. We held in that
case, “where the guaranty is a continuing one, and the parties must
have understood their liability thereunder would be increased and
diminished from time to time, and the guaranty is uncertain as to
when it will cease to be binding upon the guarantor, and when the
party indemnified has the power at pleasure to annul and put an
end to the contract guarantied, without the knowledge of'the guar
antor, he is entitled to notice, within a reasonable time after the
transactions guarantied are closed, of the amount of his liability
thereunder.” It will be observed, upon considering the statement
of the terms of the contract guarantied as above set out, that they
are within this rule, and that under it the defendants in this case
are not liable, in the absence of the notice contemplated therein.
3. But counsel for plaintiff, in an ingenious argument, at
tempt to distinguish this case from Daz.’is Sewing Machine Co. v.
Mills. They insist that while the contract in that case was a guar
anty, in this case defendants are not guarantors, but are sureties
for Littler, and are jointly liable with him upon an original con
tract. The error of this position is apparent. Littler was or
was about to become indebted to plaintiff upon the contract under
which he was appointed agent. Defendants were not bound upon
that contract. Neither were they bound upon the notes, accounts,
acceptances, or upon any contract upon which Littler became in
debted to plaintiff. They became first and only bound upon the
bond, whereby they ~ed that Littler would pay his indebtedness to plaintiff in w atever form it ass\unre'd. A guarantor
becomes bound for the performance of a prior or collateral con
tract upon which the principal is alone indebted. A surety is
bound with the principal upon the contract under which the prin
cipal’s indebtedness arises. This is a familiar doctrine of the law.
Upon applying it to the facts of the case, it will be seen that de
fendants are guarantors, and not sureties, for the performance of
the contract upon which Littler’s indebtedness to plaintiff arose.
They were therefore entitled to notice under the rule of Davis
Sewing Machine Co. v. Mills.









































































































































Sect. 3] SAINT v. WHEELER & WILSON 131
We use the term “sureties” in the foregoing discussion, to describe
one who is bound by a contract with his principa1—who joins
with his principal in the execution of the contract, and becomes
pecuniarily liable thereon. But, as we have seen, a guarantor—
'
the surety in a contract of guaranty—is not primarily liable upon
the principal’s contracts, and only becomes liable upon his default.
A guarantor, under this rule, is entitled to notice of the amount of
his liability within a reasonable time after that liability is deter
mined by the transaction between the original debtor and creditor.
Itis our opinion that the judgment of the circuit court ought
to be affirmed.
41. SAINT, et al. v. WHEELER & WILSON MFG. CO., 95 Ala. 362,
I0 So. 539, 36 Am. St. R. 210.
Supreme Court, Alabama, 1891.
Difierence beta-ecu. guarantor and surety. Surety.thi_1> indi
cated by joint contract. .
Action by \Vheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. against R. F Saint.
A. J. Crosthwaite, C. .\l. Wright, J. F. Hall and J. R. Spragins,
parties to a contract under seal, in the words and figures following:
“For value received and in consideration of the within contract, R. F.
Saint (and the other defendants, giving their names and residences re
spectively), hereby guarantee to the Wheeler & Vl/ilson Mfg. Co., its suc
cessors or assigns, the full and faithful performance of the foregoing con
tract, including all damages which may result to the said company from
any failure on the part of said R. F. Saint to perform any of the provisions
of said agreement to the amount of $1,ooo; hereby waiving all necessity
on the part of said company of instituting legal proceedings against said
R. F. Saint before having recourse on us; hereby waiving the benefit of
all constitutional or statutory homestead or exemption laws now in force;
further agreeing to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and all costs should suit
‘be necessary to enforce the collection of this bond.
“Witness our hands and seals, etc.”
This contract or bond was written on the back of the contract
therein referred to, by which said company, as party of the first
part, employed said Saint, party of the second part, as its col
lector, which contract contained these provisions, among others:
1. The party of the first part (Wheeler & \"Vilson Mfg. Co.)
agrees to employ the party of the second part as its collector.
2. The party of the second part is to engage in no other busi
ness but to devote his time exclusively to collecting claims given
him from time to time by the party of the first part.









































































































































132 SAINT v. WHEELER & WILSON [Chap. I
of the first part on Saturday of each week the full amount of all
collections made by him.
4. All notes, leases and cash received by the party of the
second part on account of the party of the first part shall be held
and rendered strictly as the property of the said party of the first
part subject to their order and under their control.
All the defendants filed the plea of the general issue.
A. J. Crosthwaite separately pleaded that, before Saint had
entered on the discharge of his duties as collector, he notified
plaintiff to take his name off the bond—that he would not become
a surety on the bond; that the plaintiff made no objection and he
was thereby released from any obligation on the bond. The other
sureties on the bond filed a separate plea that they signed the bond
with the understanding that Crosthwaite was also jointly liable
with them on the bond and that a release of Crosthwaite on the
bond without their consent released them.
The evidence introduced on the trial of the case established
the following facts: That the above contract was executed by the
plaintiff and R. F. Saint and the bond was executed by the de
fendants, Wright, Crosthwaite, Hall and Spragins, as sureties.
That Saint received from the plaintiff a large list of notes and
accounts for collection; that he collected a considerable amount
of money for it
,
paying over a portion of it and retaining or em
bezzling the balance of it. After the bond was executed, Saint
carried it or sent it to Nashville to the plaintiff; that when Saint
went to Nashville to begin work under the contract and before he
had reached that place or had received any notes or accounts from
the plaintiff, Crosthwaite notified plaintiff to take his name off the
bond, which was a revocation of his guaranty, and, plaintiff not
having refused, he regarded himself released. Plaintiff did not
decline to release him but simply asked his reasons; and after that
plaintiff gave Saint the notes and accounts to collect. That when
Saint went to Nashville to take charge of the work assigned to
him under the contract, the original contract was changed and
Saint was permitted to retain from his weekly collections all his
expenses and a salary of $50 per month instead of remitting to
plaintiff the full amount of his collections. That in February,
1888, the plaintiff, through W. W. Walls, made another change in
the contract, whereby Saint was to get only $9 per week instead of
$50 per month for his services as collector, and that Saint worked
under this last contract until he quit, but, on a settlement he made
with the company through Walls, he was allowed $50 per month.









































































































































Sect. 3] s.\mr v. WHEELER & WILSON 133
which had been put in his hands for collection under the contract.
That he was required to take up the sewing machines and sell
them again for such prices as he could get for them. and that he
did take up some machines for the plaintiff, but did not know
how many. and sold some of them under instructions from the
plaintiff. That'\\~"right, Hall and Spragins knew nothing about
Crosthwaite revoking his guaranty on the bond: that they signed
it with the understanding and agreement that Crosthwaite was
jointly liable with them. It was also proved that in February,
1888, the plaintiff, through its agent, had notice of Saint's defal
cation and that after such notice said company continued Saint in
its employment. The defendants knew nothing about the changes
made in this contract between Saint and the plaintiff after the
bond was signed. They never consented to any of the changes.
The plaintiff never notified either of them of Saint’s dishonest act
in appropriating the plaintiff’s money. Defendants then offered
to prove by each of the defendants that they had not consented
to a change in the contract and had no knowledge of such change.
Defendants introduced as evidence a number of letters writ
ten by plaintiff to the defendant, R. F. Saint, in which they author
ized him to discount notes and-use his discretion. All the letters
show that Saint was required to do other work than that required
under the written contract; all of which increased the risk which
the sureties had incurred.
In addition to the other charges requested by the defendant
in writing were the following:
5. “If the jury believe from the evidence that in February,
1888, Saint had only used $50 or $60 of the plaintiff’s money,
an_d that Saint notified the plaintiff that he was short that amount,
then it was the duty of the plaintiff to notifythe sureties, Wright,
Crosthwaite. Hall and Spragins, and, if the plaintiff failed to
notify them of such fact. they cannot recover against these sure
ties for any defalcation of Saint after that time.”
7. “If the jury believe from the evidence that A. J, Cros
thwaite was released from the bond as guaranty after the other
sureties, Wright, Crosthwaite, Hall and Spragins had signed it
,
then I charge you that such release was a material change in the
contract. And if you further believe from the evidence that such
change was made without the knowledge and consent of Wright,
Hall, and Spragins, and Crosthwaite, then the plaintiff cannot
recover against them.” _
9. “If the jury believe from the evidence that in February,









































































































































134 SAINT v. WHEELER & WILSON [Chap. I
money for it which he had converted to his own use, then it was
the duty of the plaintiff to notify Wright, Hall, Crosthwaite, and
Spragins, his securities, and if it failed to notify them, the plaintiff
cannot recover against said sureties for the money collected and
appropriated to his own use after the time.”
The defendants separately excepted to the court's refusal to
give the several charges requested by them* * *
There were verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defend
ants appeal.
Kirk <9 Almon, for appellants.
Roulhac 6' Nathan, for appellee.
McCLELL.\N, J. The contract sued is not a guaranty, but
one of suretyship. Crosthwaite and the other defendants, who
undertake that Saint shall faithfully perform his contract with the
company, are sureties of Saint and not guarantors. The distinc
tion between the two classes of undertakings is often shadowy,
and often not observed by judges and text-writers; but that there
is a substantive distinction, involving not infrequently important
consequences, is, of course, not to be doubted. It seems to lie in
this: that when the sponsors for another assume a primary and
direct liability, whether conditional or not, in the sense of being
immediate or postponed till some subsequent occurrence, to the
creditor, they are sureties; but when this responsibility is second
ary, and collateral to that oflthe principal, they are guarantors.
Or, as otherwise stated, if they undertake to pay money or do
any other act in the event their principal fails therein, they are
sureties; but, if they assume the performance only in the event
the principal is unable to perform, they are guarantors. Or, yet
another and more concise statement, a surety is one who under
takes to pay if the debtor do not; a guarantor, if the debtor can
not. The first is sponsor absolutely and directly for the prin
cipal’s acts; the latter, only for the principal’s ability to do the
act. “The one is the insurer of the debt; the other, an insurer of
the solvency of the debtor.” This is the essential distinction.
There is another, going as well to its form. The contract of sure
tyship is the joint and several contract of the principal and surety.
“The contract of the guarantor is his own separate undertaking.
in which the principal does not join.” Indeed, it has been held,
pretermitting all other considerations, that no contract joined in
by the debtor and another can be one of guaranty on the part of
the latter. (McMillan v. Bank, 32 Ind. 11, 10 Amer. Law Reg.,









































































































































Sect. 3] SAINT v. WHEELER & WILSON 135
be put, involving only secondary liability on the sponsors, though
the undertaking be signed also by the principal. However that
may be, it is certain that in most cases the joint execution of a
contract by the principal and another operates to exclude the idea
of a guaranty, and that in all cases such fact is an index pointing
to suretyship. * * *
Applying these principles to the bond sued on, the conclusion
must be that it is not a guaranty, but a suretyship, on the part of
Crosthwaite, Wright, Hall and Spragins. It is not their separate
undertaking, but the principal also executes it. While they em
ploy the word “guaranty,” they directly obligate themselves,
along with Saint, to pay—absolutely and wholly, irrespective of
Saint’s solvency or insolvency—all damages which may result
to the obligee from his default. Not only so, but they expressly
stipulate that the company need not exhaust its remedies against
Saint before proceeding against them. It is
,
in other words, and
in short, a primary undertaking on their part not secondary and
collateral to pay to the company in the event of Saint’s failure
and not an undertaking to pay only in the event of Saint’s de
fault and inability to pay. They are sureties of Saint, and not
his guarantors; and their rights depend upon the law applicable
to the former relation, and not upon the law controlling the latter.
One of the important differences in the operation, effect, and dis
charge of the two contracts finds illustration in this case. The
undertaking of guaranty. in a case like this, is primarily an offer,
and does not become a binding obligation until it is accepted and
notice of acceptance has been given to the guarantor. Till this has
been done, it cannot be said that there has been that meeting of
the minds of the parties which is essential to all contracts. * * *
Being thus a mere offer it may be recalled, as, of course, at any
time before notice of acceptance. Indeed, there are authorities
which hold that even after acceptance, and notice thereof, the
guarantor may revoke it by notice that he will no longer be bound,
unless he has received a continuing or independent consideration
which he does not renounce, or unless the guarantee has acted
upon it in such way as that revocation would be inequitable and
to his detriment; and, in cases of continuing guaranty, the effect
of such revocation is to confine the guarantor's liability to past
transactions. * * * All this is otherwise with respect to the con
tract of a surety. He is bound originally, in all respects, upon
the same footing as the principal. His is not an offer depending
for efficacy upon acceptance, but an absolute contract, depending









































































































































I36 s.\n\T v. WHEELER & WILSON [Chap. I
pleted by delivery. From that moment his liability continues until
discharged in accordance with stipulations of the instrument, or
by some unauthorized act or omission of the obligee violative of
his rights under the instrument, or by a valid release. Nothing
that he can do outside of the letter of the bond can free him from
the duties and liabilities it imposes. He cannot assert the right
to revoke unless the right is therein nominated. As was said by
the English court, “if he desired to have the right to terminate his
suretyship on notice, he should have so specified in his contract.”
Calvert v. Gordon, 3 Man. & R., 124; Brandt, Sur. Sec. 113, 1114.
The evidence here as to the release of Crosthwaite tends to
show no more than this: That after the bond had been delivered
to plaintitf. and after its officers had advised Saint that they were
ready for him to enter on the discharge of his duties under the
contract secured by the bond, he (Crosthwaite) requested plaintiff
to take his name off the paper. No assent to this request is shown,
but only an inquiry on the part of plaintiff as to Crosthwaite’s
reasons for desiring to be released. It would seem that the court
itself should have decided that these facts did not release Cros
thwaite, but the question appears to have been submitted to the
jury. If this submission, or any of the instructions accompany
ing it
,
was erroneous, no injury resulted to defendants, since the
jury determined the point against the alleged release, as the court
should have done, assuming it to have been a question of law.
On the other hand. if it were a question for the jury, it is to be
presumed they were properly instructed as to the rules of law
which should guide them to its solution, as no exceptions were
reserved in that regard. The exceptions which were reserved on
this part of the case are to charges given, and to the refusal to
give charges asked by defendants declaratory of the effect which
the discharge of Crosthwaite, if the jury found he had been dis
charged, would have upon the liability of his co-sureties. As the
jury found expressly that he had not been discharged, these ex
ceptions present mere abstractions not necessary to be decided.
V\~’e have no doubt, however, but that the law in this respect was
correctly declared by the court to be that the release of Cros
thwaite operated to release the other sureties only to the extent of
his aliquot share of the liability. * * ”
‘
_
[Reversed on the ground that Saint was retained in the plain










































































































































Sect. 3] CAMPBELL v. sm:nman 137
42. CAMPBELL v. SHERMAN (Homet‘s Appeal) 151 Pa. St. 70,
25 Atl. 35.
Supreme Court, Pennsylvania, I892.
The surety undertakes to perform the contract of the princi
pal, if the principal does not; the guarantor, ifthe principal can
not.
Appeal from court of common pleas, Sullivan county; John
A. Sittser, Judge.
Contest between J. A. Homet, claimant, and other lien cred
itors of Adam Sherman, upon distribution of a fund arising from
a sheriff’s sale of the real estate of said Sherman. From a judg
‘ mcnt allowing Homet's claim in part only, he appeals. Reversed.
I. G. Scouten, for appellant.
E. A/I. Dunham, for appellee.
MCCOLLUM, J. On the first of January, 1887, J. A. Homet,
the appellant, bought of Adam Sherman two judgments against
A. R. Robbins, on which there was then an unpaid balance of
$592.38, and they were duly assigned to him. At the same time
he loaned to Sherman $266.62. To secure the payment of the
judgments and the money loaned he received the bond of Sher
man in the sum of $859, on which, by virtue of the warrant of at
torney contained therein, judgment was entered Jan. 3, 1887. On
a distribution of the proceeds of a sale by the sheriff on the 13th
of September, 1890, of the real estate of Sherman, the appellant
claimed to apply on his judgment the fund remaining after paying
costs and prior liens. The subsequent lien creditors of Sherman
admitted that the appellant was entitled to receive the sum loaned,
with interest thereon, but contended that Sherman was released
from liability as to the balance because of the appellant's failure
to revive the Robbins judgments. To this the appellant answered
that his omission to revive these judgments did not release Sher
man, and that, if it did, thecreditors could not take advantage
of it on distribution. The conclusion reached by the learned
auditor was that he could not, at the instance of the lien creditors,
set aside or disregard the judgment on the showing before him,
but that Sherman might, in an appropriate proceeding, rely on the
appellant’s negligence as a defense to it. The learned president
of the common pleas thought that this defense could be success
fully made before the auditor by the lien creditors, and the fund
was accordingly awarded to them.
In reviewing the decision of the court below, the first import









































































































































138 CAMPBELL v. SHERMAN [Chap. I
Robbins judgments was that of a surety or of a guarantor. If he
was a surety, he was not released from liability by the negligence
of the appellant, and the contention concerning the powers of the
auditor has nothing to rest upon. It is well settled that mere for
bearance, however prejudicial to a surety, will not discharge him,
and that the failure of a creditor to revive a judgment does not
release the surety, unless there was an express agreement that it
should be kept revived for his benefit. W inton v. Little, 94 Pa.
St. 64; U. .5‘. v. .S‘impson, 3 Pen. & W. 437.
We think the undertaking of Sherman was that of a surety.
His bond included the money loaned and the balance due on the
Robbins judgments, and by its express terms was to remain in -
force until the whole sum was paid. The written conditions in
the bond define the liability of the obligor, and we cannot add to
them by implication a condition which would render them nug
atory. The written condition applicable to this contention is that,
if the judgments “shall be paid in full by the said A. R. Robbins,
his heirs and assigns, to the said J. A. Homet, then this obliga
tion to be void, otherwise to be and remain in full force and
virtue.”
The appellant purchased the judgments on the agreement of
his vendor to pay them if Robbins did not. It was a contract of
suretyship, and not of technical guaranty, on which he parted with
his money. On the failure of Robbins to pay the judgments at
maturity, he was at liberty to proceed directly against the surety.
He was not bound to resort to legal proceedings against Robbins
or to show that they would have been unavailing in order to sus
tain process upon the bond. He was under no legal duty to the
surety to revive the judgments, unless requested to do so, and, as
no such request was made, negligence in this particular cannot be
imputed to him. The law on this subject is stated by Agnew, J.,
in Reigrat v. White, 52 Pa. St. 440, as follows:
“A contract gf suretyship is a direct liability to the creditor
for theuacif to be performed by the debtor, and a guaranty is a
liability only for his ability to perform this act. In the former the
surety assumes to perform the contract of the principal debtor if
he should not, and in the latter the guarantor undertakes that his
principal can perform—that he is able to do so. From the nature
of the former, the ‘undertaking is immediate and direct that the
act shall be done which if not done makes the surety responsible
at once; but, from the nature of the latter, non-ability, in other
words insolvency, must be shown.”









































































































































Sect. 4] LOWRY V. ADAMS I39
discussing the same subject said: “The contract of a guarantor
is to be carefully distinguished from that of a surety, for whilst
both are accessory contracts, and that of a surety in some sense
conditional, as that of a guarantor is strictly so, yet mere delay
to sue the principal debtor does not discharge a surety. The
surety must demand proceedings, with notice that he will not con
tinue bound unless they are instituted. Cope v. Smith, 8 Serg. &
R. I Io.
By his contract he undertakes to pay if the debtor do not—
the guarantor undertakes to pay if the debtor cannot. The
one is an insurer of the debt; the other, an insurer of the
solvency of the debtor. It results as a matter of course out of the
latter contract that the creditor shall use diligence to make the
debtor pay, and, failing in this, he lets go the guarantor.” The
foregoing extracts from the opinions of eminent Pennsylvania jur
icts draw with remarkable clearness and precision the distinction
between a contract of suretyship and a contract of guaranty, and
accurately define the respective rights and obligations of a surety
and a guarantor. There has been no departure by this court from
the principles announced in them, and they sustain the contention
of the appellant that his omission to revive the Robbins judgments
did not affect Sherman's liability on his bond. It follows that it
was error to award the fund to the subsequent lien creditors.
Decree reversed, and record remitted to the court below, with
direction to distribute the fund in accordance with this opinion;
the costs of this appeal to be paid by the appellees.
SECTION 4. CLASSIFICATION OF GUARANTIES.
43. LOWRY, et al., v. ADAMS, 22 Vt. 160.
Supreme Court, Vermont, 1850.
Guaranty addressed to no person in particular is general.
Assumpsit upon a written contract of guaranty. The facts
are stated in the opinion.
F. E. Woodbridge and E. J. Phelps for plaintiffs.
J. Pierpont for defendant.
Pol AND, J. From the bill of exceptions and other papers
referred to in this case the following facts appear to have been
proved by the plaintiffs at the trial of this cause in the county









































































































































140 LOWRY v. ADAMS [Chap. I
and some time previous to September, 1846, had been in partner
ship with him in mercantile business in the city of Vergennes, and
had purchased the defendant’s interest in the partnership business
and had succeeded him therein. That in the month of Septem
ber, 1846, Drury, being about to go to the city of New York to
purchase his usual supply of fall goods for his store in Vergennes,
applied to the defendant for a letter of credit, to enable him to
purchase said goods; and the defendant, on the seventeenth day
of September, I846, gave to Drury a writing in these'words, to
wit: “Mr. E. N. Drury is buying goods in New York, and what
he may want, more than he pays for himself, I will be responsible
for; Vergennes, September 17, 1846. (Signed) Hiram Adams.”
That Drury carried said writing to the city of New York, and,
on the twenty-second day of September, 1846, presented the same
to Stearns & Johnson, and, upon the strength and credit of it.
purchased of them a small bill of goods. That Drury left said
paper in the possession of Stearns & Johnson, and at the same
time told them, that he should buy goods of other persons in
New York, and desired Stearns & Johnson to keep said paper in
their possession and exhibit it to those who called on them to see
it
,
and to hold it for the use and benefit of any person, from whom
he might purchase goods. That on the same day, or within a day
or two after, Drury applied to the plaintiffs to sell him a bill of
goods on credit, and at the same time informed them of said
writing, and that he had deposited the same with Stearns & John
son for the purposes above stated; and the plaintiffs thereupon
sent their clerk to the'store of Stearns & Johnson to see the writ
ing, and it was exhibited to the clerk by Stearns & Johnson, and
a copy of it was taken by him and delivered to the plaintiffs.
That the plaintiffs, being satisfied of the sufficiency of said paper,
sold and delivered to Drury a bill of goods, amounting to the
sum of $371.38, and took his note for the amount, payable in
four months from date, (September 25, 1846,) relying upon the
said paper as their security for payment. That on the ninth day
of November, 1846, the plaintiffs, upon the credit and faith of
said paper, sold and delivered to Drury another bill of goods,
amounting to the sum of $81.90. That Drury returned with said
goods to Vergennes, and continued to carry on his business there,
as a merchant, until some time in the winter of 1847, when he
failed and became insolvent, and the plaintiffs have never been
paid for said goods. The plaintiffs introduced evidence tending
to prove, that between the sixth day of December, 1846, and the
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fendant, that they had sold and delivered the above mentioned
bills of goods to Drury, upon the faith of defendant’s said guar
anty, that the same were not paid for, and that they should look
to the defendant for payment,—and also proved, that they gave
notice to the defendant, on the twenty-fifth day of January, 1847,
that Drury had not paid said note. The county court ruled, that
the plaintiffs could not maintain their suit against the defendant
upon said guaranty; whereupon the plaintiffs submitted to a ver
dict for the defendant, with leave to except to the ruling of the
court; and the question is now before us upon the correctness of
that decision.
The defendant insists, that, although the writing signed by
him was not addressed to any particular person, yet that, when it
had been presented by Drury to Stearns & Johnson, and they had
given Drury credit upon the faith of it
,
its object and purpose
had become complete and executed; and that thereafter the paper
was to have the same legal effect and consequences, as if it had
been originally addressed to Stearns & Johnson by the defendant.
If the purpose of the parties were such, that it might have
been fulfilled by such use of the paper, or if the parties, at the
time it was executed, might reasonably be supposed to have con
templated only a single purchase upon the credit of it
,
at some one
particular house, this position of the defendant is doubtless cor
rect. It becomes important, then, to ascertain and determine, if
possible, the true object and intent of the defendant executing
the paper and delivering it to Drury; for the law aims in all cases
if possible, to give effect to and carry out the real designs of the
parties in every species of contracts; and in no one class of cases
have the courts gone so far for that purpose, as in those of mer
cantile transactions and securities.
For the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the parties in
entering into any contract, courts will look at the situation of the
parties making it
,
the subject matter of the contract, the motives
of the parties in entering into it
,
and the object to be attained by
it: and, even in cases where thecontract is reduced to writing.
will allow all these circumstances to be shown by parol evidence.
if the intent of the parties, upon the face of the contract is doubt
ful, or the language used by them will admit of more than one
interpretation. See French v. Carhart, I Comst. 96, and observa
tions of J1:wrrr, Ch.J., p. 102 ; Chit. on Cont. 74, and notes. When.
from the contract itself and all the surrounding circumstances,
the true object and intent of the parties has been ascertained,









































































































































142 LOWRY v. .-mans [Chap. I
there be found in the way some stubborn, inflexible rule of law,
absolutely requiring a different determination.
Considering the case in this view, what was the intention
and understanding of the defendant, at the time he made and de
livered the guaranty, ‘or letter of credit, in question, to Drury?
Drury was going to New York to purchase his usual fall supply
of goods for the business of a country store, where goods of every
variety and description a_re usually kept for sale. The defend
ant had been a merchant himself, and had formerly carried
on the mercantile business in the same store then occupied
by Drury, and must have known, that it would be impossible
for Drury to have supplied himself with all the various kinds
of goods, usually kept for sale in a country store, at any single
house in New York, and that he must necessarily make pur
chases of goods at several different houses. The defendant,
having been in business. and known to be responsible, under this
state of things gives to Drury a general letter of credit to carry
to New York, addressed to no one, in which he agrees to be re
sponsible for the goods Drury may purchase, more than he pays
for. It would seem from the writing itself, and from the situation
of the parties, impossible for any one to doubt, what the defend
ant really intended, when he executed the paper and delivered it
to Drury. We are fully satisfied, that his object must have been.
and that he intended, to give to Drury the necessary credit to en
able him to purchase his fall stock of goods, of the various de
scriptions and varieties kept in a country store, at as many differ
ent houses, and of as many different dealers, as might become
necessary for that purpose.
Is there, then, any imperative rule of law in the way of giv
ing effect to this intention of the parties, and which will prevent
these plaintiffs, who sold goods to Drury upon the credit and
faith of the defendant’s letter, from holding the defendant liable,
because another firm had previously trusted Drury with a bill of
goods upon the credit of the same letter? No case has been
shown us, and the counsel for the defendant admits, that after a
laborious search he has not been able to find any decided case, or
statement by any elementary writer, that, upon a general letter
of credit, like the present one, the signer could only be liable to
the person who gave the first credit upon it. In the case of Mc
Clm1g ct al. v. Means, 4 Ham. Ohio R. 193, the supreme court of
Ohio seem to have held, that, upon a guaranty very similar to the
present, different persons might give credit upon the faith of it
,
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another point. We do not find, that this precise point has been
adjudged by the courts, either in England or in this country; but
in many cases we find dicta fully warranting the sustaining of
such an action. See McLaren v. Watson's Er'r, 26 Wend. 436,
437, by Verplanck, Senator; Burckhard v. Brown, 5 Hill 642.
See, also, opinion of Judge Story, in note to Story on Bills, 545
to 555; Story on Cont. 737, and cases cited in notes; Smith's
Merc. Law 448, and Am. editor's note; Lawrason v. Mason, 3
Cranch 492; Bradley v. Cary, 3 Greenl. 233. Without taking
farther space upon the question, we are not able to discover any
principle, or authority, by which we are precluded from giving to
the defendant's letter of credit the effect we are satisfied he intend
ed,—that is
,
to make himself responsible to each and every person,
who should sell goods to Drury, relying upon the faith and credit
of it
,
and that he became liable to each in the same manner, and
to the same legal effect and extent, as if he had given a separate
letter to each. * * *
The judgment o
f
the county court is therefore reversed and
a new trial ordered.
-
2-4UNION BANK OF LOUISIANA v
. COSTER'S EXECUTORS,
3 N. Y. 203.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1850.
General guaranty; consideration; notice; construction.
On the 20th o





New York, executed and sent to Kohn, Daron &
Co., merchants in New Orleans, a letter o
f
credit as follows:
“NEw York, 29 May, 1841.
“SIR: We hereby agree to accept and pay at maturity any draft or
drafts on us at sixty days' sight, issued by Messrs. Kohn, Daron & Co. o
f
your city, to the extent o
f twenty-five thousand dollars, and negotiated
through your bank. We are respectfully, sir, your obd’t serv'ts,
“HECKscHER & CostER.”
At the foot of the letter of credit was a guaranty executed at
the same time b
y
John G
. Coster, as follows:
“I hereby guarautee the due acceptance and payment of any draft






On the faith o
f
the above letter o
f
credit and guaranty, the
Union Bank o
f Louisiana, in January, 1842, purchased two drafts
drawn b
y Kohn, Daron & Co. on Heckscher & Coster, amounting











































































































































144 UNION u.mK v. cosrm [Chap. I
cording to their agreement. On the 14th of February, 1842, the
bank, under the same letter of credit, purchased another draft for
$4,000, at sixty days‘ sight, drawn by and upon the same parties;
and on the 26th of that month this draft was presented to Heck
scher & Coster, in New York, for acceptance, which they refused.
On the 9th of April, 1842, the attorney for the Union Bank gave
notice to John G. Coster that he had received the draft for col
lection, and on the 2d of May, 1842, formal notice of the protest
of the draft for non-payment was served on Mr. Coster. In
August, 1844, John G. Coster died, and the Union Bank subse
quently brought this suit in the superior court of the city of New
York, against his executors, upon the guaranty above set forth.
for the purpose of recovering the amount of the draft. On the
trial, in addition to the facts already stated, it appeared that prior
to any of the above mentioned transactions with the Union Bank,
the said letter of credit and guaranty had been held by the City
Bank of New Orleans, which, upon the faith thereof, in Decem
ber, 1841, had purchased a draft of $10,000 drawn by Kohn, Dar
on & Co. upon Heckscher & Coster. The letter and guaranty
were not addressed to any particular person or bank.
Wm. M. Evarts, for appellants.
B.. IV. Bonney, for respondents.
PRATT, J., delivered the opinion of the court. Contracts of
guaranty differ from other ordinary simple contracts only in the
nature of the evidence required to establish their validity. The
statute requires every special promise to answer for the debt, de
fault or miscarriage of another, to be in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged thereby, and ex ressing therein the con
sideration ; and no parol evidence will be a lowed as a substitute
for these requirements of the statute. But in other respects the
same rules of construction and evidence apply to contracts of
this character which apply to other ordinary contracts. Hence
the consideration which will support a contract of this character,
as in other cases, may consist in some benefit to the promisor, or
some other person at his request, or some trouble or detriment to
the promisee. (20 Wend. 184, 201; Theobald on Pr. & Surety,
3, 4; 2 H. Bl. 312.) Nor is any particular form of words neces
sarv to be used for expressing the consideration; but it is enough
if from the whole instrument the consideration expressly or by
necessary inference appears; so that it be clear that such and
no
other was the consideration upon which the promise
was made.
(24 Wend. 35;_21 id. 628; 4









































































































































Sect. 4] UNION n.\Nx v. cosri’3R 145
& Ad. 1109.) And the rule allowing two or more instruments
given at the same time and relating to the same subject matter to
be construed together as one instrument, applies also to this class
of contracts; so that when a guaranty is given at the same time
with the principal contract and forms a part of the entire transac
tion, if the consideration be stated in the principal contract,
though none be stated in the guaranty, it will suffice. 8 John. 35;
9 Wend. 218; 18 id. 114. So also as in other cases, parol evidence
of the circumstances under which the contract was made may be
given, to aid the court in giving a true construction to ambiguous
terms therein, or to show that separate contracts relate to the same
subject matter.
It should also be observed here, that our statute in terms only
requires the contract to express therein what it had been well
settled the statute of Elizabeth required it to contain, and the same
rules of construction should therefore be applied in cases under
both statutes. 24 Wend. 35.
With these observations in relation to the law governing
cases of this kind, we come to the consideration of the contract
in question.
The letter of credit of Heckscher & Coster is an original un
dertaking on the face of it to accept any drafts to be drawn upon
them at sixty days by Kohn, Daron & Co. to the extent of $25,000.
and negotiated by the bank to whom it is addressed. The con
sideration of their undertaking appears very plainly from the in
strument. It is an open proposition to the bank to which it is
addressed, that if it will purchase the drafts drawn by Kohn,
Daron & Co. they will accept and pay the same. As soon therefore
as the bank complied with the proposition the contract was closed,
and the rights and liabilities of the parties became fixed. Upon
this part of the contract there can be no question that a sufficient
consideration appears upon the face of the contract to uphold it.
But it requires no greater or different consideration to support a
guaranty than to support an original promise. The only differ-\ I
ence in the two cases consists in the former requiring the consid
eration to appear upon the contract itself, whereas the consider-.
ation to support the latter may be proved by parol. The question‘
therefore in this case is whether the consideration of the under
taking of the defendants’ testator appears upon the instrument it
self, or rather whether the two instruments may be read together.
so that the same consideration shall support both.
The guaranty is without date and at the foot of the letter









































































































































146 UNION BANK v. cosrER [Chap. I
to have been made at the same time. It is addressed to the same
person and relates to the same subject matter. It should there
fore, within every rule of construction, be deemed part of the
same transaction, and the two instruments should be read together
as one contract. The two would read thus: “In consideration
that you, the Union Bank of Louisiana, will purchase any draft
or drafts to be issued by Kohn, Daron & Co. upon Heckscher &
Coster, at sixty days, not exceeding $25,000, we the said Heck
scher & Coster will accept and pay the same; and I the said John
G. Coster agree that Heckscher & Coster shall accept and pay
the same.” Now it seems to me clear that such is the fair read
ing of the two contracts taken together; and although the con
tract of John G. Coster may be deemed collateral, yet had the two
been drawn in the above form no question could have been raised
upon the statute of frauds. But what may be fairly inferred from
the terms of a contract should be considered, for the purpose of
giving it effect, as contained in it; and this rule applies as well
to collateral as to original undertakings. 5 Hill, I47.
There is a wide difference between the guaranty of an exist
ing debt and the guaranty of a debt to be contracted upon the
credit of the guaranty. It is the difference between a. past and
future consideration. A past consideration, unless done at the
request of the promisor, is not sufficient to support any promise.
But a promise to do an act in consideration of some act to be
done by the promisee implies a request, and a compliance on the
part of the latter closes the contract and makes it binding. And
although it may be necessary from the nature of the case to prove
performance by parol, yet such evidence is no violation of the
statute requiring the consideration to be in writing. The consid
eration of the promise is expressed, and the parol evidence is only
used to show, not what the consideration is
,
but that the act
which constitutes that consideration has been performed. Any
other rule would require every person to whom a letter of credit
is directed to accept the same in writing before the drawer would
be bound. For instance, a letter drawn in the country and ad
dressed to a merchant in the city, guaranteeing the responsibility
of the person for whose benefit the same was drawn for a given
bill of goods to be sold to him, would require a written acceptance
by the city merchant before it would be binding upon the drawer.
No such strict rule can be found supported by any adjudication.
I am therefore satisfied that the consideration of the guaranty in
the case at bar sufficiently appears in the contract, and that the









































































































































Sect. 4] UNION BANK v. COSTER 147
not been able to find a case in our own or the English courts
which would conflict with the doctrine above advanced; but on
the contrary, the books are full of cases similar in their circum
stances to this case, where the guaranty has been sustained. 8
John. 35; 11 id. 221; 1o \/Vend. 218; S. C. in error, I3 id. 114;
12 id. 218; 24 id. 35; 4 Hill, 200; 4 Denio, 559; I Ad. & E. 57;
5 Bligh’s N. R. 1; 7 .\Iees. & Wels. 410; 9 East, 348: 1 Camp.
242; 3 Brod. & Bing. 211 ; 4 C. & P. N. P. 59; 8 Dowl. & Ryl. 62.
The next question raised in the case is as to notice of accept
ance. Vi/e must hold the law to be settled in this state that where
the guaranty is absolute no notice of acceptance is necessary.
Judge COWEN in Douglass v. Howland‘ (24 W end. 35), and
Judge BRONSON in Smith v. Dmm (6 Hill, 543), examined the
cases at length upon this question, and they showed conclusively
that by the common law no notice of the acceptance of any con
tract was necessary to make it binding, unless it be made a con
dition of the contract itself, and that contracts of guaranty do
not differ in that respect from other contracts. In this case the
only condition of Coster's undertaking was that the bank should
purchase the drafts to be issued by Kohn, Daron & Co., and upon
complying with that condition the rights of the parties became
fixed, and the contract binding. There is nothing in the contract
from which we can infer that it was the intention of the parties
that notice should be given in order to fix the guarantor. No
more is required to make the guarantor liable than to make
Heckscher & Coster, and the only notice to them necessary was
the presentment of the drafts for their acceptance within a rea
sonable time. Allen v. Rightmere, 20 John. 365; C lark v. Bur
dett, 2 Hall, 197; Cro. Jac. 287, 685; 2 Salk. 457; Vin. Ab.
Notice, A. 3; Com. Dig. Plead. C. 75; 2 Chitty, 403.
As to notice of non-acceptance and non-payment of the bills
by the drawees, that can only involve the subject of laches on the
part of the holders of the drafts, and all the cases, both in Eng
land and in this country, concur in holding that this defense can
only be set up to an action against the surety in cases where he
has suffered damage thereby, and then only to the extent of such,
damage. 7 Peters, 117; 12 id. 497; 1 Mason, 323, 368; 1 Story,
22; 13 Conn. 28; 5 Man. & Gran. 559; 13 Mees. & Wels. 452; 3
Kent's Com. 122. If, therefore, it were necessary in this case to
give any notice, no evidence has been given showing that the de
fendants, or the guarantor, suffered any loss in consequence of the
want of such notice.









































































































































148 UNION BANK v. COSTER [Chap. I
eration in this case, arises out of the fact that another bank had
previously purchased drafts drawn in pursuance of the letter of
credit and guaranty. It is claimed that by such purchase the
contract became a fixed and binding contract between such bank
and the promisor, and thereby lost its negotiable character, and
became located so that no other person or bank could purchase
drafts upon the credit of it.
The guaranty, in this case, was manifestly intended to accom
pany the letter of credit, and is subject, in this respect, to the
same construction. If, therefore, it was competent for Kohn,
Daron & Co. to draw several drafts not exceeding the limit in the
bill of credit specified, and to negotiate them at different banks,
and Heckscher_& Coster would be bound by their letter of credit
to accept and pay them, the guarantor would also be liable to the
same extent. As a general rule the surety is liable to the same
extent as the principal, unless he expressly limits his liability.
(Theobald on Prin. and Surety, 46.) It therefore only becomes
necessary to examine the letter of credit, and ascertain whether
it was intended to be limited to one particular bank, or is a general
letter of credit to any and all persons who may advance money
upon it. It is somewhat singular that we find so few adjudica
tions in our courts upon a class of commercial instruments which
enter so largely into the commerce and business of this country,
and of the world.
In England it seems to be at this time questionable whether
a party who advances money upon a general letter of credit can
sustain an action upon it. Russell et al. v. Wiggins, 2 Story,
214; Bank of Ireland v. Areher, 2 Mees. & Welsby, 383. The
reason assigned is that there is no privity of contract between
them. It is there assumed that it is only a contract between the
drawer of the letter and the person for whose benefit it is drawn.
But in this country the contrary doctrine is well settled. Letters
of credit are of two kinds, general and special. A special letter
of credit is addressed to a particular individual by name, and is
confined to him, and gives no other person a right to act upon it.
A general letter, on the contrary, is addressed to any and every
person, and therefore gives any person to whom it may be shown
authority to advance upon its credit. A privity of contract springs
up between him and the drawer of the letter, and it becomes in
legal effect the same as if addressed to him by name. Russell v.
Wiggins, 2 Story’s Rep. 214; 12 Mass. 154; 2 Metcalf, 381; 12
Wend. 393; 12 Peters, 207; Burkhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 641;









































































































































Sect. 4] UNION BANK v. COSTER 149
But these general letters of credit may be subdivided into
two kinds, those that contemplate a single transaction, and those
that contemplate an open and continued credit, embracing sev
eral transactions. In the latter case they are not generally con
fined to transactions with a single individual, but if the nature of
the business which the letter of credit was intended to facilitate,
requires it
,
different individuals are authorized to make advances
upon it
,
and it then becomes a several contract with each indi
vidual to the amount advanced by him. Thus a general letter of
credit may be issued to a person to enable him to purchase goods
in the city of New York, for a country store. The very nature
of the business requires him to deal with different individuals and
houses in order to obtain the necessary assortment. It has never,
as I am aware, been questioned that the guarantor might be
bound to several persons who should furnish goods upon the
credit of the letter.
So letters are issued by commission houses in the city, to
enable persons to purchase produce in the western states. The
money is obtained from the local banks in those states by drafts
drawn upon those houses, and upon the faith of the letters of
credit. It may often happen that a single bank can not furnish
the requisite amount, or it may be necessary to use money in
' different and distant localities. I am not aware of any question
ever having been raised as to the authority of different banks
to act upon the same letter of credit. It is absolutely necessary
that such should be the effect of them in order to facilitate the
commerce of the country, and to carry out the object of the parties
in issuing the letters of credit. Burkhead v. Brown-, 5 Hill, 641;
2 Story's Rep. 214..
The letter of credit in this case was evidently intended to be
general; it did not contemplate a single transaction, or draft for
the whole amount, but several drafts limited in the aggregate to
twenty-five thousand dollars. Although the address “sir,” and
“your bank,” is in the singular number, yet I think it was intended
to be used in a distributive sense, and apply to any bank or banks
who should purchase the drafts. I can see no object which the
drawers should have for limiting the party for whose benefit the
letter was issued to a single bank. It is said that it would enable
them more readily to revoke the authority. But these letters are
not issued without either undoubted confidence in the persons for
whose benefit they are drawn, or upon ample ‘security. The idea
of giving notice of revocation to any party but that for whose









































































































































150 TAYLOR V. WETMORE [Chap. I
cases of general letters. When they wish to provide for any such
contingency the letters are framed accordingly. Again, in this
case the parties themselves have treated this letter as not limited
to a single bank, for they accepted bills which had been discounted
by the plaintiffs.
I am, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiffs were authorized
to purchase bills upon the faith of the letter and accompanying
guaranty, and that the previous purchase of bills by another bank
is no defense.
Whether the letters had been revoked with the knowledge
of the plaintiffs before the draft was discounted by them, was a
question of fact for the jury. It would clearly constitute no de





superior court must therefore be affirmed with costs.
Judgment affirmed.
45. TAYLOR et al
.
v
. WETMORE et al., 10 Ohio 491.
Supreme Court, Ohio, 1841.
Special guaranty–Addressee a particular firm. Notice to
guarantor.
This is an action o
f assumpsit from the county o
f Portage.
The declaration-contains two special counts. In the first, it is
averred that one C
.
D
. Farrar, on November 26, 1836, being
desirous o
f purchasing a general assortment o
f goods in the city
o
f Pittsburg, for a retail country store, on a credit, and being
unknown to the business men o
f
said city, applied to the defend
ants, Messrs. Wetmores, then doing business a
t Cuyahoga Falls,
in Portage county, for a general letter o











which the said Farrar might be enabled to make his
purchases; and the said defendants upon such application, made
and delivered to Mr. Farrar a letter o
f credit, or written guaranty,




McBride & Co., merchants in Pitts
burg, in the words following:
“CUYAHOGA FALLs, November 26, 1836.





Farrar has concluded to purchase a few
goods; we have that confidence in Mr. Farrar, that we will say that we
will be responsible to the amount o
f
$2,000 for goods delivered him.
“We are truly,
“C. W. & S. D. WETMORE.”
And which said letter, the plaintiffs aver was taken b
y
Mr.









































































































































Sect. 4] TAYLOR v. WETMORE 151
retained it
,
as security for themselves and such other merchants in
the said city, as should, at that time and on the faith of said guar
_anty, sell goods on a credit to the said Farrar.
'
It is also averred that Mr. Farrar was unable to obtain a gen
eral assortment of goods from the house of the Messrs. McBrides,
whose business was confined to that of grocers, and therefore he
made application to the plaintiffs, upon the strength of the said
guaranty, then in the hands of McBride & C0. referring the plain
tifls to the house of McBride & C0. and to the said guaranty; that
the plaintiffs did in fact call upon McBride & Co., examined the
letter of credit, and being satisfied with their statements in regard
to the responsibility of the defendants, and of the guaranty, in
consideration thereof, sold and delivered to Mr. Farrar, upon a
credit of six months, a bill of dry goods, amounting to $760.75;
of all which the defendants had due and timely notice. The,
plaintiffs then aver that the credit has expired, and that Farrar
has omitted to pay, etc.
The second count states that on November 6, 1836, etc., in
consideration that the plaintiffs at the special instance and request
of the defendants, would sell to said Farrar, on credit, all such
goods as said Farrar should have occasion for and require of said
plaintiffs in their trade and business of wholesale dry goods mer
chants, they, the defendants, undertook and promised to pay the
plaintiffs therefor; this count then avers the sale and delivery of
goods to the amount of $760.75, on a certain credit, agreed.upon
between the parties, that the credit had expired, that Farrar had
not paid, of which the defendants had notice; avers their liability,
and breach in the non-payment.
To this declaration the defendants filed their plea of the gen
eral issue. .
The testimony submitted on the part of the plaintiffs, proves:
(1) The execution and delivery of this mercantile guaranty, as
set forth in the first count of the declaration; and (2) That a few
days after its date, it was handed to the firm of McBride & Com
pany, who not being dealers in dry goods, the witness (who was
a partner of the last mentioned firm), went with Mr. Farrar to
the plaintiffs, and the said guaranty was shown to Mr. Taylor, one
of the plaintiffs ; the witness stated to Mr. Taylor, that he had sold
a bill of groceries on the strength of the letter, and Mr. Taylor
then said he would sell a bill of goods on the strength of the
same, and Mr. Farrar accordingly obtained the goods. The clerk
and salesman of the plaintiffs prove the amount of the goods sold









































































































































152 TAYLOR v. WETMORE [Chap. I
The evidence on the part of the defendants proves that Far
rar was in business at Cuyahoga Falls from December, 1836, until
April or May, 1837, when he transferred all his goods to the de
fendants, and closed his store. That he paid none of his debts in
Pittsburg. That in September, 1837, the witness was present at a
conversation between Taylor, one of the plaintiffs, and C. W. Wet
more, one of the defendants, in which the defendant asked Tay
lor, if he considered him responsible, either legally, morally, or
honorably, for the goods Farrar had purchased of him. To which
Taylor replied he did not, but that the defendants had more goods
in their possession, received of Farrar, than they were holden to
the house of McBride for; that the goods would amount to $500
or $700. To this the defendant replied he did not know how that
was; that there was also left with them, by Farrar, notes and ac
counts to the amount of about $200, and what they could not make
up out of them, must be made up out of the goods; and if there
was any balance, so far as he was concerned, that should go to the
plaintiffs.
Birhard, for the plaintiffs.
\\-’ooD, J. Under the avertments in the declaration, and the
testimony submitted, are the plaintiffs entitled to judgment ?—and
I may here remark, in the outset, in this case, that I know of no
arbitrary rule applicable to actions founded upon mercantile guar
anties, which creates obligations between the parties to which they
have neither expressly nor impliedly assented. In all actions
founded in contract, the agreement as set forth must be proved or
the circumstances existing between the parties must be such as to
leave it clearly to be inferred. In enforcing them, courts of jus
tice, though they may sometimes be confined by technical rules,
always endeavor to ascertain the understandings and intentions
of the parties, and these are considered as the essence of their
agreements in carrying them into execution. Mercantile guaran
ties are either general or special; though a single letter of credit
may bear upon its face both of these distinctions. It may be gen
eral, as to the whole world, to whom the bearer may be accredited,
and to any portion of whom, at his own option, he may make the
guarantor a debtor, and special, as to the amount of the credit; or
unlimited or general in the amount, and special as to the parties.
The first inquiry which arises here, is, whether the guaranty
in question is not special as to persons. It is directed to the house
of McBride & Co., in the city of Pittsburg, and nothing upon its
face evincing an intention to give Farrar credit, or to incur respon









































































































































Sect. 4] GARD V. STEVENS I53
The counsel for the plaintiff here admit, that a surety can not
be held beyond the terms of his engagement, but they insist that
although it is addressed only to McBride & Co. as it does not say
“we will be responsible to you,” it is a letter of credit to any other,
who will advance the goods. It seems to us, this reasoning is more
ingenious than sound. The guaranty being addressed to A. D.
McBride & Co., it is to them the defendants speak when they say,
“we will be responsible to the amount of $2,000,” and it contains
no general terms, by which either Farrar, or the house of McBride,
had the authority to transfer it to the plaintiffs, and they to make
the defendants their guarantors, without their assent, express or
implied.
Judgment for the defendants.
46. GARD v. STEVENS, 12 Mich. 292.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1864.
Guaranty limited as to time.
Case made after judgment, from Berrien Circuit. The facts
sufficiently appear by the opinion.
C. I. Walker, for plaintiff.
G. V. N. Lothrop, for defendant.
MANNING, J.—The action is assumpsit for the price of leather
sold to one Gates, on the following guaranty:
“ST. Jose.PH, Sept. 18, 1858.
“JosepH GARD.
Dear Sir: If you will let the bearer have what leather he wants, and
charge the same to himself, I will see that you have your pay in a reas
able length of time, Yours, etc.,
“J. E. STEVENs.”
As plaintiff sold leather to Gates at several different times,
and for different amounts, the first question is whether the guar
anty is limited as to time. We think it limited to a single pur
chase or transaction. We must hold this, or that it is unlimited
both as to time and amount. Every person is supposed to have
some regard to his own interest; and it is not reasonable to pre
sume any man of ordinary prudence would become surety for
another without limitation as to time or amount, unless he has
done so in express terms or by clear implication. If the guaranty
was limited in express terms, either as to time or amount, but
not as to both, it might be said it was the intention of the guarantor









































































































































I54 SMITH V. VAN WYCK [Chap. I
not be implied. But where it contains no express limitation as to
either, and there is nothing in the instrument itself from which
it can be inferred that it was the intention of the guarantor to
leave it open as to both, we think it must be understood as refer
ring to a single transaction. The cases of Rogers v. Warner, 8
Johns. I 19, and Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 81, we think are cor
rect in principle, and not in conflict with any of the cases cited
on the argument by plaintiff's counsel.
We are further of opinion that the first moneys afterwards
received by plaintiff on Gates' general account should be applied
in payment of the leather sold on the guaranty. * * *
The judgment below must be reversed, and a judgment be
entered for the defendant, with costs of both Courts.





did not sit in this case.
47. SMITH, et al., appellant, v. VAN WYCK, respondent, 40 Mo. App. 522.
Kansas City Court o
f Appeals, Missouri, 1890.
Guaranty limited as to transactions. Rule o
f
construction.
No presumption against guarantor.







. J. * * * The plaintiffs sued defendant upon this
undertaking:
“KANSAs. CITY, Mo., July, 1885.










Smith & Sons, o
f Bloomington, Illinois,
to the amount o
f




“1501 East Eighteenth Street.”
For a bill of goods amounting to $1,240.60, sold by plaintiffs to
said Mendenhall. The facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution o
f
the said undertaking, and the relation o
f
the parties
thereto, and to each other, may be summarized thus: Defendant
had rented to Mendenhall a store and business house. Menden
hall had placed with one o
f
the plaintiffs, who were wholesale
merchants, an order for goods amounting from thirteen hundred
to seventeen hundred dollars. The plaintiffs hesitated about fill
ing the order, and one o
f
them went to defendant and told him
that Mendenhall had placed with them an order for goods to
the amount stated, and that they did not like to fill the same









































































































































Sect. 4] s.\m‘n v. v.-\.~: WYCK 155
defendant would give his guaranty for thirteen hundred dollars,
and if they sold Mendenhall more goods than that, on such excess
they would take their chances for collecting. That thereupon the
defendant signed the undertaking sued on. The plaintiffs deliv
ered Mendenhall goods to the amount of the defendant’s guaranty,
for the payment of which the defendant furnished part of the
money. The plaintiffs thereafter continued to sell goods to Men
denhall for about two years, amounting in the total to several
thousand dollars. Finally Mendenhall failed, owing the plaintiffs
on account of such sales the amount sued for. It may be well
doubted whether any question of interpretation of the said under
taking properly arises on the abstract of the record before us,
and at which alone we can look. But, waiving the consideration of
that question for the present, we may state that it appears to us
that if we interpret the language of the said undertaking in the
light of a knowledge of the relation of the parties, their antecedent
acts, and of the subject-matter of the same, as we have the right
to do, 2 Parsons on Contracts [7Ed.] top p. 564: Edwards v.
Smith, Adm’r, 63 Mo. 119; Bunce, Adm'r v. Bick’s Ex’r, 43 Mo.
266; Hutchinson v. Bowker, '5 Mees. & W. 535; Black River
L. Co. v. Warner, 93 Mo. 374, it becomes quite obvious that it
cannot he held to be a continuing one, and this, too, in view of
the maxim, z-'erba fortius accipimitur contra proferentem. It is
held in this state that when it is doubtful from the language con
tained in the contract, whether the guaranty was for a single deal
ing or a continuous one, the true principle of sound ethics is not
to set up a presumption for or against the guarantor, but to give
the contract the sense in which the person making the promise
believed the other party to have accepted it
, if
,
in fact, he did
accept it. Boehnc ct al. v. Murphy, 46 Mo. 57; Shine’s Adm’r
v. Bank, 70 Mo. 524. Extrinsic evidence cannot be received to
contradict, add to, subtract from or vary the terms of a guaranty,
but, as has been stated, when its meaning is doubtful, or obscurely
expressed, parol testimony in relation thereto, requisite to a clear
understanding of its purport, is admissible. The very language
of the instrument sued on negatives the idea that it was intended ~
to be a continuing guaranty. When the relation of the parties,
and the circumstances under which the guaranty in question was
entered into, are considered, its meaning becomes quite apparent.
The fact that plaintiffs had sold Mendenhall goods amounting to
thirteen hundred dollars, and that they would not deliver the
same to him without defendant would guarantee the payment









































































































































156 BOvILL v. TURNER [Chap. I
serted in the instrument, for which defendant bound himself for
“bills as they mature, purchased”—not to be purchased—con
clusively shows that the transaction and undertaking related solely
and entirely to the unfilled order, or orders, for goods plaintiff
had received of Mendenhall, at the time of the execution of the
contract, and not to subsequent sales and purchases. We think
that upon the record before us the judgment of the circuit court
was for the right party. The exceptions to the rulings of the
court in respect to the introduction of evidence were not preserved
by a motion for a new trial, as appears by the abstract. But,
whether this is so or not, it is quite evident that none of these
adverse rulings of the court to the plaintiffs materially affected
the merits of the case. Indeed, the plaintiffs, in their brief, make
no point in respect to that matter.
The judgment, with the concurrence of Judge ELLIsoN,
Judge GILL not sitting, will be affirmed.
48. BOVILL v. TURNER, 2 Chitty’s Practice Cases 205.
Court of King’s Bench, 1815.
Guaranty limited as to amo1mt.“‘
Bolland moved to set aside a nonsuit. It was an action for
the price of coals, the payment of which the defendant had guar
anteed in these words: “You may let Laney have coals to 501., for
which I will be answerable at any time.” Coals were supplied for
many years, and many were, from time to time, delivered and paid
for; but ultimately more than the sum of 501., was in arrear.
BAYLEY, J.—You say it is a running guarantee for 501. at all
times.
Bollamd. Laney was a dealer; he could never be supposed
to be confined to 501. only. There was notice afterwards that the
defendant would not be liable further.
AnnoTT, C. J.—There was evidence that the words “at any
time” were introduced afterwards, because the plaintiff thought
they were omitted.
B.-\YLF.Y, J.—He was only a guarantee for 501.
Rule refused.
“









































































































































Sect. 4] ROBBINS \'. 1-.u~.jon.\M 157
49. ROBBINS v. BINGHAM, 4 Johns. 476.
Supreme Court of Judicature, New York, 1809.
Guaranty limited as to parties.
This was an action of assumpsit. The declaration stated,
that the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special
instance and request of the defendant, would credit one Heman
, Dickenson, goods, &c., to the amount of 800 dollars, the defendant
would be security for the payment, &c., and averred, that the
plaintiff did deliver to Dickenson, goods, to the value of 800 dol
l rs, &c. Plea, non assumpsit. .-\t the last Rensselaer circuit,
§agreement of both parties, the cause was referred to three ref
erees, and if any questions of law should arise, before the ref
erees, they were to be referred to one of the judges of this court.
The parties, afterwards, agreed, that the evidence submitted
to the referees and the law arising thereon, should be stated in
the form of a case, and submitted to the decision of this court,
and that judgment should be entered thereon, according to the
opinion of the court, in the same manner, as if there had been a
verdict in the case.
The plaintiff produced before the referees, a letter of credit,
from the defendant, directed to theplaintiff, as follows: “Fair
field, October 2, 1804. Sir, if you will credit Heman Dickenson,
goods. to the amount of 800 dollars. I will be his security, that
he shall pay you according to the contract. Solomon Bingham,
jun.” On the back of the letter of credit was endorsed by Dicken
son, as follows, to-wit: “Received, the 15th and 16th October,
I804, on account of the within letter of credit, or recommendation,
the following sums of money, in goods, to-wit, of John Robbins,
the sum of 293 dollars and 22 cents; of Gersham, Richards and
sons, the sum of 237 dollars and 62 cents; and of Russell and
Tracy & Co., the sum of 55 dollars and 89 cents, amounting in
the whole to 586 dollars and 63 cents.”
It appeared that the goods mentioned as received from the
plaintiff, were delivered by his clerk to Dickenson, and not having
goods which suited. to the full amount of the letter of credit, he
went with Dickenson and the letter of credit to the other persons,
and offered them the benefit of the letter of credit for the residue,
saying, that the defendant was a good man for the amount; that
the other persons let Dickenson have goods to the amount specified
in the indorsement, and which were charged to Dickenson in their
books. It appeared also, that the plaintiff had been paid for the









































































































































158 m-mny MC SHANE co. v. PADIAN [Chap. I
erees reported in favour of the plaintiff for 377 dollars and 28
cents, including goods delivered by Richards and Son, and Tracey
& Co. as indorsed on the letter of credit.
Van Vcchten, for the defendant, moved to set aside the report
of the referees.
Foot, contra.
Per Curiam. The interest of the plaintiff, in the letter of
credit, was not any assignable interest; it was not a general let
ter of credit, but addressed to a particular person. The defend
ant was responsible to the plaintiff only for the goods delivered
by him and not for the goods delivered by others. The report
of the referees must be set aside.
Rule granted.
50. HENRY McSHANE CO., Ltd., v. PADIAN, 142 N. Y. 207,
36 N. E. 880.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1894.
Continuing gua'ranty; construction of the contract.
Appeal from common pleas of New York city and county,
general term.
Action by the Henry McShane Company, Limited, against
William Padian. From a judgment of the general term affirm
ing a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Thos. C. Enneruer, for appellant.
William J. Fanning, for respondent.
BARTLETT, J.—The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defend
ant upon the following guaranty:
“I, William Padian, hereby guaranty to the Henry McShane
Company, Limited, the payment by John P. Wiegers, plumber, to
them for any and all materials which they may deliver to John P.
Wiegers, I not to be liable for any balance exceeding five hundred
dollars which may become due. William Padian. Witness: W m.
H. Barth. Dated New York, March 31st, '90.
This case was tried before a referee, who held that the guar
anty was susceptible of two constructions, and admitted, to quote
from his opinion, “oral evidence of the res gcstae so as to arrive
at the probable intention of the parties.” The evidence was ad
mitted against the objection and exception of plaintiff. Upon con
flicting evidence, the referee found, substantially, that the guar









































































































































Sect. 4] HENRY MC SHANE co. v. PADl.\N 159
Wiegers, to be used in the performance of a contract named,
and that, before the commencement of this action, Wiegers had
paid for them. He further found that said guaranty was not in
tended by the parties thereto as a running or continuing guaranty,
other than for the goods already referred to, and dismissed the
complaint, with costs. The general term of the court of common
pleas for the city and county of New York affirmed a judgment
for the defendant entered upon the report of the referee. The
question presented on this appeal is whether the language of the
guaranty is so ambiguous as not to furnish conclusive evidence of
its meaning, and entitles the defendant to prove the circumstances
under which it was executed, so that the court can construe it in
the light of all the facts. If this ambiguity exists, the evidence of ‘/
the circumstances surrounding the execution of this guaranty was
properly admitted (Bank v. Kaufman, 93 N. Y. 281, and cases
cited; Bank v. Myles, 73 N. Y. 341), and, as the findings of the
referee were made on conficting evidence, they are not reviewable
in this court (Sherwood v. Hauser, 94 N. Y. 626; Fire Department
of New York v. Atlas S. S. Co., 106 N. Y. 578, 13 N. E. 329;
Grim v. .S'tark'weather, 136 N. Y. 635, 32 N. E. 701). We are,
however, unable to agree with the learned court below in its con
struction of this guaranty. We regard its language as clear, pre
scnting no ambiguity, and as creating a continuing guaranty,
which, by its terms, limits defendant's liability to any balance,
not exceeding $500, which may become due, but does not under
take to regulate the amount of John P. Wiegers’ future tran
sactions with the plaintiff. The cases are numerous, construing
instruments of this character, and it is not always an easy task
to determine on which side of the line separating continuous from‘
limited liability they belong. In Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend., at
page 84, Chief Justice Nelson remarks:
“ It is, in most of these
cases, a nice and difficult question to determine whether the guar
anty is a continuing one or not. The intent of the party, to be
derived from the words, is the only sure guide; and therefore very
little aid is to be derived from the adjudged cases, as they turn up
on the peculiar phraseology of the guaranty.” In Bank v. Myles, 73
N. Y., at page 341, Judge Earl says: “Precedents do not help
much in the construction of such instruments.” In Gates v. Mc
Kee, 13 N. Y., at page 234, Judge Denio says: “The cases are
not entirely harmonious as to the principles of construction which
ought to govern in this class of cases, but the weight of authority
is altogether in favor of construing guaranties by rules at least as









































































































































160 HENRY MC SHANE co v. PADIAN [Chap. _I
written instruments, irrespective of the consideration that the
guarantor is a surety.” In the leading English case of Mason v.
Pritehard, 12 East, 227, the court said the words were to be taken
as strongly against the party giving the guaranty as the sense of
them would admit. The supreme court of the United States has
also expressed the same views. Drummond v. Prestman, 12
Wheat. 515; Douglass v. Rc_vnolds, 7 Pet. 113, 122; Lawrence v.
McC almont, 2 How. 426.
Applying these principles to the guaranty now under con
_ sideration, it leads to the construction we have already indicated‘.
The natural and ordinary import of its language discloses an intent
on the part of the defendant to guaranty the purchases of Wiegers
from plaintiff of any and all materials, provided his liability was
not to exceed $500, on any balance which might become due. To
place upon this instrument the construction contended for by
defendant is to ignore its plain provisions, and import into the case
an entirely new contract. The defendant contends he was onlv
guaranteeing payment of $395 worth of specific materials which
were to be used in the performance of a certain building contract.
On the other hand, the plaintiff states that Wiegers was a young
man starting in business, and it was customary to require a guar
anty in such cases. The evidence in the case shows that W iegers,
after the execution of the. guaranty, made purchases of plaintiff
aggregating between six and seven thousand dollars, and made
payments of between four or five thousand dollars, and owed plain
tiffs a balance of twenty-two hundred dollars when this action was
commenced. We hold, however, that parol evidence was inad
missible as to surrounding circumstances to aid in construing this
guaranty, and rest our decision upon the language of the instru
ment solely. The answer of the defendant alleges that he was
induced to sign the guaranty by the false and fraudulent repre
sentations of plaintiff, made through its agents. The proof failed
to establish this defense, and the referee made no such finding.
The judgment appealed from must be reversed, and a new trial










































































































































Sect. 4] DOVER STAMPING CO. V. NOYES [Chap. I
51. DOVER STAMPING CO. v. NOYES, 151 Mass. 342, 24 N. E. 53.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1890.
Continuing guaranty–Interpretation of correspondence form
ing the contract.
Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk county.
Action by Dover Stamping Company against B. B. Noyes to
recover $2.10.20 and interest for goods sold and delivered by plain
tiffs to F. P. Field & Co., the payment of which plaintiffs claim
was guarantied by defendant. The guaranty relied on is contained
in the following correspondence:
“BosTON, MAss., U. S. A., Nov. 18, 1887.
“MESSRS. B. B. NOYES & Co.
“Gentlemen: We have recently become acquainted and opened trade
with Messrs. F. P. Field & Co., who seem to be good fellows, without
much money, but claim to be backed by you. Will you kindly tell us if
this is so,-if we can consider you as having responsibility for their debts,
or intending to see that they are paid. Yours truly,
“DovER STAMPING Co. C. D. F.”
“GREENFIELD, MAss., Nov. 21, 1887.
“THE DovER STAMPING Co., Boston, Mass.
“Gentlemen: We have your favor of the eighteenth instant, relating
to the firm of F. P. Field & Co. As Mr. Noyes is away, writer cannot
say what arrangement he has made with them as to being responsible for
their bills, but should presume they would not misrepresent any arrange
ment they may have with him. Mr. Noyes has helped this firm some in
starting, and considers them good, honest, hard-working fellows, who
will be likely to meet their bills. Yours respectfully.
“B. B. Noyes & Co. Jones.”
“BosToN, MASS., U. S. A., Nov. 22, 1887.
“MESSRS. B. B. Noyes & Co.
“Gentlemen: Your favor of the twenty-first instant is at hand. We
are obliged to you for your attention to our request, and glad to hear
that Messrs. F. P. Field & Co. stand so well with you. We would, how
ever, like to hear from Mr. Noyes on his return. It is needful for us to
know whether the statement of the young men is correct or not, as, leav
ing out the question of misrepresentation, they evidently have not enough
of the 'sinews of war, of their own, to carry on business successfully,
however competent and energetic they may be. Yours truly,-
“DovER STAMPING Co. C. D. F.”
GREENFIELD, MASS., Nov. 28, 1887.
“DovER STAMPING Co., Boston, Mass., North Street.
“Dear Sirs: Answering yours of 22d, I am assisting F. P. Field & Co.
in a small way, financially, and in a measure directing their efforts; and
I have advised them to pay their bills promptly at maturity, and, if they
find they are unable to do so at any time, to let me know. I think they
will follow my advice in your case. If they fail to, please let me know,









































































































































162 DOvER STAMPING co v. NOYES [Chap. I
_ Bosrou, MASS., U. S. A., Nov. 29, 1887.
“Mlissizs. B. B. Novas & Co.
“Gentlemen: Your esteemed favor from Mr. B. B. Noyes, in person,
is received. We are much obliged for the assurance given us regarding
Messrs. F. P. Field & Co., and, on the strength of it, will be glad to con
tinue the trade. Yours truly,
“Dov!-:R STAMPING Co. C. D. F.”
There was judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
E. Mera-in, for plaintiff.
Greene 6' Griswold, for defendants.
KNOWLTON, J.—The decision of this case depends on the
proper interpretation of the correspondence relied on by the plain
tiff corporation as showing a continuing guaranty by the defend
ant that F. P. Field & Co. would pay at maturity any debts they
might contract, in their dealings with the plaintiff. If these letters,
fairly construed, authorized the plaintiff to sell goods to Field &
Co. from time to time, to be paid for by the defendant if not paid
for by the purchasers, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The
plaintiff’s first letter was manifestly written in reference to pos
sible future transactions. It says that the corporation has recently
“opened trade” with Field & Co., and refers to their representation,
apparently made with a view to obtaining credit. The inquiry
relates to the subject of legal liability. The defendant is asked
whether he will be responsible for their debts, or will see that the
debts are paid. Upon receiving the letter of November 21st, writ
ten by the defendant’s clerk, in his absence, and containing a
recommendation of Field & Co., the plaintiff, by its letter of
November 22d, said, in effect, that it was not content with a recom
mendation, but wanted an explicit answer to its former letter.
Thereupon the defendant wrote the letter of November 28th, stat
ing that he was financially assisting Field & Co., and promising
to see that the plaintiff was “taken care of,” if notified that Field
& Co. failed to pay their bills promptly at maturity. This can
hardly be construed as anything less than a promise to pay if the
principal debtor did not. It also had reference to bills to be con
tracted in the future; for it was written in answer to the plaintiff’s
questions, and Field & Co.’s possible inability to pay promptly was
spoken of as something which they might discover “at any time.”
If it was necessary to give notice of the acceptance of a guaranty
given in this way, which we do not intimate, the plaintiff by its
letter of November 29th accepted it
,
and notified the defendant
that it would continue the trade on the strength of it. Here we









































































































































Sect. 4] ABBOTT v. BROWN 163
agreed that on the faith of it the plaintiff sold goods which never
have been paid for, of which the defendant has had due notice.
Upon the agreed facts, the plaintiff’s case is made out. Paige v.
Parker, 8 Gray, 211; Bent v. Hartshorn, I .\letc. 24; Jordon v.
Dobbins, 122 Mass. 170.
52. ABBOTT v. BROWN, 131 Ill. 108, 22 N. E. 813.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1889.
Guaranty absolute. Guarantor of payrnent of a promissory
note not jointly liable with maker thereof. Construction of con.
tract.
Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.
ASSUMPSIT by Henry G. Abbott against John B. Brown. The
circuit court rendered judgment for defendant, and the appellate
court affirmed the judgment. Plaintiff appeals. -
Osborne Bros. 5' Burgett, for appellant.
Osburn 65' Lynde, for appellee.
CR.-no, J.—On the Ist day of July, 1876, Kirk B. Newell,
being indebted to H. G. Abbott, the appellant, executed his prom
issory note as follows:
“Cirrcaoo, ILLs., July 1, 1876.
“One day after date I promise to pay to the order of H. G. Abbott
two thousand dollars, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum,
at First National Bank of Chicago. Value received.
(Signed) “KIRK B. NEW!-:LL.”
Indorsed on the back of the note was the following guaranty:
“For value received, I hereby guaranty the payment of the within
note at maturity, or at any time thereafter, with interest at ten per cent.
per annum until paid, and agree to pay all costs and expenses paid or
incurred in collecting the same, including attorney’s fees.
(Signed) “J. B. BROWN.”
This action was brought by H. G. Abbott against Brown to
recover certain costs and attorney's fees which he paid out and
expended in the collection of the amount named in the note in an
action against Brown on his guaranty. The costs and attorney’s
fees which the plaintiff sought to recover in this action were not
expended in attempting to collect the note which was executed by
Kirk B. Newell. No suit was ever brought on the note against
the maker, nor was any evidence offered to prove that any costs
or expenses were ever incurred in an attempt to collect the note.









































































































































164 ABBOTT v. nsowN [Chap. I
evidence, showing that on July 3, 1882, he brought an action in
assumpsit against Brown “on the guaranty signed by him, indorsed
on the note, whereby he guarantied payment of the note,” in which
he recovered judgment for the amount due on the note, $3,338.34;
that an appeal was taken by Brown to the appellate court, and
to the supreme court from the judgment of the appellate court
affirming the judgment of the circuit court, and that upon the
affirmance thereof by the supreme court Brown paid appellant the
amount of the judgment; that the firm of which witness was a
member was employed as attorneys to conduct this action, and ren
dered services therein of the value of $1,500, and they had been
paid that sum by appellant for said services ; and, also, in the prose
cution of this action, appellant expended for printing and otner
necessary expenses the sum of $26. On this evidence the circuit
court held, as a matter of law, “that the guaranty on which this
suit was brought is not an agreement to pay the costs or expen
ses or attorney’s fees, paid or incurred in a suit against Brown
upon said guaranty,”-and rendered judgment for the defendant.
There is no ambiguity in the contract of guaranty executed
by Brown. The terms of the contract are plain and easily under
stood. By the contract Brown agreed that the note should be
paid with interest at ten per cent, and he also agreed to pay all
costs and expenses incurred or paid, including attorney’s fees, in
collecting the note. Obviously the meaning of the language used
was, if costs and expenses and attorney's fees were incurred in
the collection of the note and interest from the maker, then such
costs, expenses, and attorney"s fees should be paidby Brown. If
the contract of Newell, the maker of the note, and the contract of
guaranty by Brown, were but one contract, the position of appel
lant that the action on the guaranty was an action on the note
might be regarded more plausible; but such is not the case. Dan
iel, Neg. Inst. § I752, defines a contract of guaranty as followsi
“A ‘guaranty’ is defined to be a promise to answer for the pay
ment of some debt or the performance of some duty in case of
the failure of another person who is in the first instance liable to
such payment or performance.” 2 Pars. Cont. 3, says: “Guar
anty is held to be the contract by which one person is bound to an
other for the due fulfillment of a promise or engagement of a third
party.” Story, Prom. Notes, § 457, says: “A guaranty, in its
legal and commercial sense, is an undertaking by one person to be
answerable for the payment of some debt, or the due performance
of some contract or duty, by another person, who himself remains
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*7
Ill. 574, this court, in speaking of a guaranty, says: “The contract
of an absolute guaranty is that if the principal fails to pay, the
guarantor will. If it were not so, it would not be a guaranty, but
an independent undertaking.” See, also, Rich v. Hathaway, 18
Ill. 548. Here, Newell, as maker of the promissory note, agreed to
pay a certain sum of money at a certain time. By his contract he
became liable on the note; but Brown, as guarantor, was not liable
with him. No joint liability existed. In Baylies, Sur. 389, the
author says: “In an action to enforce a contract of guaranty the
guarantor is the proper party defendant, and the principal debtor
should not be joined. As has been shown, all the parties to a
contract of suretyship may be joined as defendants; but a guar
antbr cannot be sued with his principal, for his engagement is
strictly an individual contract, and not an engagement jointly
with his principal.”
Here Brown’s engagement as guarantor was his individual
contract, under which he became bound to pay in case the maker
of the note failed to do so. When the maker of the note failed
to pay at maturity of the instrument, the guarantor then, and not
before. became liable, on his contract of guaranty, to an action.
The liability of the maker of the note and the guarantor were
separate and distinct. To enforce the liability of the maker an
action should be brought on the note against him, while to enforce
the liability of the guarantor an action could only be brought on
the contract of guaranty; and it seems plain that an agreement to
pay costs and attomey’s fees which might be incurred in one action
does not include costs and attorney's fees incurred in the other.
Here Brown, by the terms of his guaranty, bound himself to pay
costs and expenses including attorney’s fees, which might be in
curred in an action to collect the note, but he saw proper not to
agree to pay such costs and expenses as might be incurred in an
action brought on the contract of guaranty; and in the absence of
such an agreement we are aware of no principle which would make
him liable. Had a suit been brought on the note against the
maker, under the contract of guaranty, Brown would have been
liable for such costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, as
might have been incurred in that action; but no such action was
brought, and there has been no breach of his contract so far as
costs and expenses are concerned.
One other question remains to be considered: On the trial
the appellant offered to show that he employed counsel to “watch
Brown from 1878 to 1882, and the business operations in which









































































































































166 ROBERTS V. HAWKINS [Chap. I
collecting the note out of him.” Also that in April, May, June,
and July, 1882, his attorney had negotiations with Brown for the
settlement of his liability on the guaranty for which the services
of counsel were worth $50, and which sum appellant had paid. As
to those services the appellate court held if they were a proper
charge against appellee, they should have been included in the
former suit. We concur in the view of the appellate court, if any
liability existed for those services, as they had been rendered be
fore appellee was sued on the guaranty, they should have been em
braced in that action. The judgment of the appellate court will
be affirmed.
53. ROBERTS v. HAWKINS, 7o Mich. 566, 38 N. W. 575.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1888.
Guaranty absolute; guaranty of payment.
Error to Superior Court of Grand Rapids. Assumpsit.
Norris & Norris, for appellant.
J. C. FitzGerald (Charles Chandler, of counsel), for plaintiff.
LONG, J.—January 12, 1884, one Lyman D. Follett made his
promissory note as follows:
-
“$1,000.
GRAND RAPIDs, MICH., January 12, 1884.
“One year after date, I promise to pay to the order of Helen M.
Roberts one thousand dollars, with interest at eight per cent. per annum.
Value received. LYMAN D. Foll.ETT.”
And defendant signed an endorsement on the back thereof,
as follows:
“For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of the within
note. L. E. HAwKINs.”
On the delivery of this note to plaintiff, she paid Follett
$1,000. January 8, 1885, seven days before this note became due,
Follett paid one year's interest; and neither at that time, nor at
the maturity of the note, was the same presented to Follett or
defendant for payment. No notice of non-payment was given
defendant then or at any time prior to June 8, 1887. January 15,
1886, Follett paid the interest for the next year, and January 17,
1887, for the year following. About June 8, 1887, the note being
then two years and five months overdue, it was first presented to












































































































































ROBERTS v. '1-IAWKINS 167
On the trial, plaintiff, having proved the note and guaranty,
and its non-payment, rested. Defendant then sought to make his
defense as pleaded, and offered to show— _
1. That he was an accommodation guarantor, without con
sideration or security.
2. That, at or about the maturity of the note, he inquired of
the maker of the note if it was paid, and was told it was.
3. That neither at the maturity of the note, nor at any sub
sequent time, prior to June 8, 1887, was any notice of the non
payment of this note given to defendant, nor any demand made
on him for the payment thereof.
4. That at the maturity of this note, and for some consider
able time thereafter-vat least a year—Follett, the maker of the
note, was solvent, and had property out of which defendant could
have procured him to pay the note or obtained security.
5. That when defendant, on June 8, I887, learned of the non
payment of this note, the maker was insolvent, out of the jurisdic
tion, and that he could then obtain no security or payment.
The court directed a general verdict for plaintiff on all the
counts of the declaration. Judgment being entered on the verdict
in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest,
defendant brings the case into_this Court by writ of error.
The declaration contains three counts. The first alleges the
guaranty, demand of the maker at maturity, non-payment, and
notice of said demand and non-payment to defendant at maturity.
The second alleges the guaranty, the refusal by maker to
pay at maturity, and notice to defendant, at maturity, of maker’s
refusal.
The third is the common counts in assumpsit, with copy of
note annexed, and an alleged indorsement on back of L. E. Haw
kins, without any guaranty over it.
The plea is the general issue, with notice of the defense of
release by plaintiff’s failure to give notice of non-payment to
defendant, and the consequent damage and loss to himthereby.
It is claimed that the court erred in receiving the note and
guaranty in cyidence under the third count in plaintiff’s declara
tion, for the reason that the note and guaranty offered were not
the note and guaranty set forth in that count: that the contract set
out in plaintiff’s third count‘ was that defendant had indorsed his
name in blank on the back of the note, not payable to his order;
and that this would make him a maker of the note, and liable as
such, while the note offered had a guaranty of payment indorsed









































































































































108 ROBERTS v. HAWKINS [Chap. I
the court should have excluded the guaranty under this third
count, and confined the verdict to a recovery under the first two
counts.
As we view the case, however, this objection has no force.
The plaintiff being eutitled to recover under the first and second
counts of the declaration, the defendant was not prejudiced in the
course taken by the court in not withdrawing all consideration of
the case under the third count. The declaration was sufficient
in the first two counts to allow a recovery thereunder.
The chief error complained of is the exclusion of the entire
defense, and the direction of a verdict for plaintiff. On the trial
the plaintiff proved by a witness the application for the loan, the
loaning of the money, the giving of the note and guaranty, and.
after reading the note and guaranty in evidence, rested. The
defendant was then called and sworn as a witness in his own
behalf, and was asked by his counsel:
“Q. When that note became due in January, 1885,—_lanuary i5,—was
any notice given you of the fact that it remained unpaid?”
To this question counsel for plaintiff objected, that the same
was irrevclant and immaterial; that the defendant was not an
indorser nor guarantor of collection, but of payment of the note.
Counsel for the defendant then offered to show by the witness
that he had no notice of the non-payment of the note prior to
June 8, 1887; that he was an accommodation guarantor without
security; that, at or near the maturity of the note, he inquired
of the maker, and was informed that it was paid; that, at the time,
the maker of the note was solvent, and for some considerable time
thereafter—probably a year—and that the defendant could. if he
had any knowledge of its non-payment, have secured himself, or
procured the maker to pay it; that, when the defendant learned
of the non-payment of the note, the maker was insolvent, and out
of the State, and no security could have been obtained by the
defendant; the counsel then saying—
“That this, of course. is the line of defense marked out by the notice
in the pleadings. It is all covered by my brother’s argument; and, if we
have no right to show that defense, then, of course, there remains nothing
but for the court to direct a verdict for the amount of the note, and
interest.” '
The court sustained the objection, and directed a verdict for .
plaintiff. _ 4
In _considering the case, the defendant’s offer to prove this
state of facts must be taken as true. Clay, ete., Ins. Co. v. Mami
facturing Co., 31 Mich. 356. Under this offer by the defendant.
the issue is made: Is a person not being a party to a promissory









































































































































Sect. 4] ROBERTS V. HAWKINS 169
having a loan made upon the strength of his guaranty, guarantees
the payment of such note, liable thereon in case the-note is not
paid at maturity, without notice of non-payment having been
given to him by the holder at the maturity of the note, or within
a reasonable time thereafter; or in case notice is not given, and
no proceedings taken to collect the note from the maker, and the
maker of the note, at the maturity thereof, was solvent, and sub
sequently, and before suit is brought on the guaranty, becomes
insolvent, can such guarantor, when such action is brought against
him, set up such insolvency as a defense? The defense being
based on plaintiff's laches in not giving notice to the defendant
of the non-payment of this note at maturity, and the consequent
damage to defendant thereby, the correctness of the court's ruling
depends on whether or not there rested on the plaintiff the duty
to give such notice under any circumstances.
The defendant claims that his liability existed only on the
happening of a contingency and the performance of a condition;
that whether or not that contingency happened, or condition was
performed, was matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the
plaintiff, and not within his own; and that if plaintiff intended to
assert the performance of the condition, or the happening of the
contingency, whereby alone defendant was to become liable, it was
her duty to do so within a reasonable time, and, in any event,
before the maker of the note became insolvent and a fugitive; that
her neglect to do so, and the damage to him thereby, has released
him from the obligation of his conditional contract.
The position, however, of a guarantor of payment, as between
him and the maker of the note, is that of a surety. It is a com
mon-law contract, and not a contract known to the law-merchant.
It is an absolute Dromise to Day i aker ot pay, and
the right of action accrues against the guarantor at the moment
the maker fails to pay. The guarantor would not be discharged
y any neglect or even refusal on the part of the holder of the
note to prosecute the principal, even if the maker was solvent
at the maturity of the note, and su insolvent;
and the fact that no notice of non-payment was given the guar------" - - -
antor at the maturity of the note time b r1ng 111
suit, would not affect the rights of ote against"..."- * -
the guaranter. e
guarantOr
note, and taken it up, and himself
proceeded against the maker. • *
A guaranty is held to be a contract by which one person is
bound to another for the due fulfillment of a promise or engage
ment of a third party. 2 Pars. Cont. 3.









































































































































170 ROBERTS V. H.A.W KINS [Chap. I
one person to be answerable for the payment of some debt, or
the performance of some act or duty, in case of the failure of
another person who is himself primarily responsible for the pay
ment of such debt or the performance of the act or duty. 3 Add.
Cont. Sec. 11 II; 3 Kent, Comm. 121; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Wes.
734.
In the case of Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (decided in
1816), it was held that if the surety call upon the creditor to col
lect the debt of the principal, and he disregard that request, and
thereby the surety is injured, as by the subsequent insolvency of
the principal, the surety was thereby discharged. A directly con
trary decision was given by Chancellor Kent, upon argument and
full consideration, the following year. King v. Baldwin, 2 Johns.
Ch. 554. Two years later the last decision was reversed by the
court of errors by casting vote of the presiding officer, a lay
man, and against the opinion of the majority of the judges. King
v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384.
In the case of Brown v. Curtis, 2 N. Y. 226 (decided in
1849), the action was brought against the guarantor of a promis
sory note. On the trial it was admitted that there had been no
demand of the maker, nor any notice of non-payment, and the
note was dated April 2, 1838, and payable six months after the
date. The suit was brought against the guarantor in September,
1845. The defendant offered to prove that, from the time the
note fell due until the latter part of 1843, the maker was able to
pay the note; that he then failed, and was insolvent at the time
of the commencement of the suit, and still remained so. This
evidence was objected to, and excluded, and verdict directed for
plaintiff. The court (at p. 227) says:
“The undertaking. of the defendant was not conditional, like that
an indorser; nor was it upon any condition whatever. It was an absolute
agreen at the note should be paid by the maker at maturity. When
# maker failed to pay, the defendant's contract was broken, and the
plaintiff had a complete right action against him. It was no part of
the agreement that the plaintiff should give notice of the non-payment, nor
that he should sue the maker, or use any diligence to get the móñey from
firm--> roof that when the note became due, and for several
yö:3 afterwards, the maker was abundantly able to pay, and that he had
since become insolvent, would be no answer to this action. The defend
ant was under an absolute agreement to see that the maker paid the note
at maturity. * * *
“If the defendant wished to have him sued, he should have taken up
the note, and brought the suit himself. The plaintiff was under no obliga
tion to institute legal proceedings.”
The weight of authority, both in this country and in England,
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lows v. 1.ovell, 5 Pick. 310; Davis v. Huggins, 3 N. H. 231;
Page v. Webster, I 5 Me. 249; Dennis v. Rider, 2 McLean, 451.
In Train v. Jones, 11 Vt. 446, it is said:
“An absolute guaranty that the debt of a third person shall
be paid, or that he shall pay it
,
imposes the same obligation upon
the guarantor. In either case, it is an absolute guaranty of the
sum stipulated, and the creditor is not bound to use diligence, or
to give reasonable notice ‘of non-payment.”/ Noyes v. Nichols, 28
Vt. 174.
In Bloom v. Warder, 13 Neb. 478 (14 N. W. Rep. 396),
which was an action against the guarantors of payment of a prom
issory note, the court says:
“This is an absolute contract, for a lawful consideration, that
the money expressed in the note shall be paid at maturity thereof
at all events, and depends in no degree upon a demand of pay
ment of the maker of the note, or any diligence on the part of the
holder.”
Mere passiveness on the part of the holder will not release
the guarantor, even if the maker of the note was solvent at its
maturity. and thereafter became insolvent. Brecd v. H illhonsc, 7
Conn. 528; Bank \'. Hopson, 53 Conn. 454 (5 Atl. Rep. 601);
Foster v. Tolleson, 13 Rich. Law, 33; Machine Co. v. Jones, 61_Mo_
409; Barker v. Scudder, 56 Id. 276: Norton v. Eastman, 4 Greenl.
521 ; Brown \-'. Curtiss, 2 N. Y. 225; Allen v. Rightmere, 20 Johns.
365; Bank v. Sinelair, 60 N. H. Ioo; Gage v. Bank, 79 Ill. 62;
Hm1gerford v. O"Brien., 37 Minn. 306 (34 N. W. Rep. 161).
It follows that, this being an absolute undertaking on the part
of the defendant as guarantor to pay the amount of this note at
maturity in the event of the default of payment by the principal,
the guarantor could not demand any diligence on the part of the
holder of the note to collect the same from the principal. It was
his duty to perform his contract—that is
,
to pay the note upon
default of the principal; and it is no answer for him to say that
the principal was solvent at the maturity of the note, and that the
same could then have been collected of him by the holder, and that
he has since become insolvent. If he wished to protect himself
against loss, he should have kept his engagement with the holder
of the note, paid it upon default of the principal, taken up the note,
and himself prosecuted the party for whose faithful performance
of the contract he became liable.
The court properly directed the verdict for the plaintiff; and
the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, with costs.
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54. DAVIS, et al., PlFfs. in Err., v. WELLS, FARGO & COMPANY,
104 U. S. I59, 26 L. Ed. 686.
Supreme Court, United States, 1881.
Guaranty absolute. Notice of acceptance. Notice of default.
In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. James M. Woolworth, for plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. Shelfabarger 6" Wilson, for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court:
The action below was brought by VVells, Fargo & Co., against
the plaintiffs in error, upon a guaranty, in the following words:
“For and in consideration of one dollar to us in hand paid by Wells,
Fargo & Co. (the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged), we hereby
guarantee unto them, the said Wells, Fargo 8: Co., unconditionally at all
times, any indebtedness of Gordon & Co., a firm now doing business at
Salt Lake City, Territory of Utah, to the extent of and not exceeding
the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for any overdrafts now made,
or that may hereafter be made, at the bank of said VVells, Fargo & Co.
This guaranty to be an open one, and to continue one at all times
to the amount of ten thousand dollars, until revoked by us in writing.
Dated, Salt Lake City, nth November, 1874.
In ‘witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals the
day and year above written.
ERWIN DAvIS. [seal]
J. N. H. PATRICK. [seal]
“fitness: J. GORDON.”
The answer set up, by way of defense, that there was no
notice to the defendants from the plaintiffs of their acceptance
of the guaranty, and their intention to act under it; and no notice,
after the account was closed, of the amount due thereon; and no
notice of the demand of payment upon Gordon & Co., and of their
failure to pay within a reasonable time thereafter.
But there was no allegation that by reason thereof any loss
or damage had accrued to the defendants.
On the trial it was in evidence that this guaranty was exe
cuted by the defendants below and delivered to Gordon on the day
of its date, for delivery by him to Wells, Fargo & Co., which
took place on the same day; that Gordon & 'Co. were then indebted
to the plaintiffs below for a balance of over $9,000 on their bank
account; that their account continued to be overdrawn, Wells,
Fargo & Co. permitting it on the faith of the guaranty, from that
time till July 31, 1875, when it was closed-. with a debit balance
of $6,200; that the account was stated and payment demanded
at that time of Gordon & Co.. who failed to make payment; that









































































































































Sect. 4] DAVIS V. WELLS, FARGO & CO. I73
made by Wells, Fargo & Co., of the defendants below, on May
26, 1876, the day before the action was brought. There was no
evidence of any other notice having been given in reference to












account was closed; and n
o
evidence was offered o
f any loss o
r






the delay in giving the final notice o
f
Gordon & Co.'s default.
The defendant's counsel requested the court, among others
not necessary to refer to, to give to the jury the following in
structions, numbered, first, second, third and fifth.
1
. If the jury believes from the evidence that the guaranty
sued upon was delivered b
y
the defendants to Joseph Gordon,






Gordon & Co., it became and was the
duty o





said guaranty, and their intention to make
advancements o
n the faith o
f it
,
and, if they neglected c. failed
so to do, the defendants are not liable on the guaranty, and your
verdict must be for the defendants.
2
. If Wells, Fargo & Co. made any advancements to Gordon
& Co. on overdrafts on the faith o
f
said guaranty, it became and
was the duty o
f plaintiff to notify the defendants, within a rea
sonable time after the last of said advancements, of the amount
advanced under the guaranty, and if the plaintiff failed or neg
lected so to do, it cannot recover under the guaranty, and your
verdict must be for the defendants.
3





law for the court. Whether notice was given is
one o
f
fact for the jury. The court, therefore, instructs you that
if notice of the advancements made under said guaranty was not
given until after the lapse o
f
twelve months o
r upward from the
time the last advancement was made to Gordon & Co., this was
not, in contemplation o
f law, a reasonable notice, and your ver
dict. if you so find the fact to be, should be for the defendants.
5
. Before any right o
f
action accrued in favor o
f plaintiff
under said guaranty, it was incumbent on it to demand payment
o
f
the principal debtor, Gordon & Co., and, on their refusal to
pay, to notify the defendants. If the jury, therefore, find that
no such demand was made, and no notice given to the defend
ants, the plaintiff cannot recover upon the guaranty.
The court refused to give each o
f










































































































































1 4 DAvIS v. WELLS, FARGO & co. Cha . IP
The following instructions were given by the court to the
jury, to the giving of each of which the defendants excepted:
1. You are instructed that the written guaranty offered in
evidence in this case is an unconditional guaranty by defendants,
of any and all overdrafts, not exceeding in amount $10,000, for
which said Gordon & Co. were indebted to the plaintiff at the date
of the commencement of this suit. If the jury believe from the
evidence that said guaranty was by said defendants, or by any
one authorized by them to deliver the same, actually delivered
to plaintiff, and that plaintiff accepted and acted on the same, such
delivery, acceptance and action thereon by plaintiff bind the de
fendants, and render the defendants responsible in the action for
all overdrafts upon plaintiff made by Gordon & Co., at the date
of said delivery of said guaranty, andsince and which were un
paid at the date of the commencement of this suit, not exceeding
$10,000.
2. The jury are instructed that the written document under
seal, offered in evidence in this case, implies a consideration, and
constitutes an unconditional guaranty of whatever overdraft, if
any, not exceeding $10,000, which the jury may find from the
evidence that Gordon & Co. actually owed the plaintiff at the
date of the bringing of this suit; and further, if you believe from
the evidence that an account was stated of such overdraft between
plaintiff and J. Gordon & Co., then the plaintiff is entitled to inter
est on the amount found due at such statement, from the date
thereof, at the rate of ten per cent per annum.
These exceptions form the basis of the assignment of errors.
The charge of the court first assigned for error, and its re
fusal to charge upon the point as requested by the plaintiffs in
error, raise the question whether the guaranty becomes operative
if the guarantor be not within a reasonable time informed by the
guarantee of his acceptance of it and intention to act under it.
It is claimed in argument that this has been settled in the
negative by a series of well considered judgments of this court.
It becomes necessary to inquire precisely what has been thus
settled, and what rule of decision is applicable to the facts of the
present case.
In Adams v. Jones, 12 Pet. 213, Mr. Justice Story, delivering
the opinion of the court, said: “And the question which, under
this view. is presented, is whether, upon a letter of guaranty,
addressed to a particular person or to persons generally, for
a future credit to be given to the party in whose favor the
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antor that the person giving the credit has accepted or acted upon
the guaranty and given the credit on the faith of it; we are all of
the opinion that it is necessary and this is not now an open ques
tion in this court, after the decisions which have been made in
Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69; Edmonston v. Drake, 5 Pet. 624;
Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113; Lee v. Dick, IO Pet. 482; and
again recognized at the present term in. the case of Reynolds v.
Douglass, 12 Pet. 497. It is in itself a reasonable rule, enabling
the guarantor to know the nature and extent of.his liability, to
exercise due vigilance in guarding himself against losses which
might otherwise be unknown to him, and to avail himself of the
appropriate means in law and equity to compel the other parties
to discharge him from further responsibility. The reason applies
with still greater force to cases of a general letter of guaranty,
for it might otherwise be impracticable for the guarantor to know
to whom and under what circumstances the guaranty attached,
and to what period it might be protracted. Transactions between
the other parties to a great extent might from time to time exist,
in which credits might be given and payments might be made,
the existence and due appropriationof which might materially
affect his own rights and security. If, therefore, the questions
were entirely new, we should not be disposed to hold a different
doctrine; and we think. the English decisions are in entire con
formity to our own.”
In Reynolds v. Douglass, 12 Pet. 504, decided at the same
term and referred to in the foregoing extract, Mr. Justice Mc
LEAN stated the rule to be that “to entitle the plaintiffs to re
cover on said letter of credit, they must prove that notice had
been given in a reasonable time after said letter of credit had been
accepted by them, to the defendants, that the same had been ac
cepted”; and he added, “This notice need not be proved to have
been given in writing or in any particular form, but may be
inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which shall
warrant such inference.”
'
There seems to be some confusion as to the reason and foun
dation of the rule and consequently some uncertainty as to the
circumstances in which it is applicable. In some instances it has
been treated as a rule, inhering in the very nature and definition
of every contract, which requires the assent of a party to whom
a proposal is made to be signified to the party making it
,
in order
to constitute a binding promise; in others it has been considered
as a rule springing from the peculiar nature of the contract of
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\
n
of the guarantor, and as one of its incidents, that notice should
be given of the intention of the guarantee to act under it as a
condition of the promise of the guarantor.
The former is the sense in which the rule is to be under
stood as having been applied in the decisions of this court. This
appears very plainly, not only from a particular consideration of
the cases themselves, but was formally declared to be so by Mr.
Justice NELSON, speaking for the court in delivering its opinion
in the case of Manufacturing Co. v. Welch, 10 How. 475, where
he uses this language:
“He (the guarantor) has already had notice of the accept
ance of the guaranty and of the intention of the party to act under
it. The rule requiring this notice within a reasonable time after
the acceptance is absolute and imperative in this court, according
to all the cases; it is decmed essential to an incr.'ption of the con
tract; he is, therefore, advised of his accruing liabilities upon the
guaranty, and may very well anticipate or be charged with notice
of an amount of indebtedness to the extent of the credit pledged.”
And in W -ilds v. Savage, I Story, 22, Mr. Justice STORY, who
had delivered the opinion in the case of Douglass v. Reynolds, 7
Pet. 113, after stating the rule requiring notice by the guarantee
of his acceptance, said: “This doctrine, however, is inapplicable
to the circumstances of the present case; for the agreement to
accept was contemporaneous with the guaranty, and, indeed, con
stituted the consideration and basis thereof.”
The agreement to accept is a transaction between the guar
antee and guarantor, and completes that mutual assent necessary
to a valid contract between them. It was, in the case cited,
the consideration for the promise of the guarantor. And where
ever a sufficient consideration of any description passes directly
between them, it operates in the same manner and with like effect.
It establishes a privity between them and creates an obligation.
The rule in question proceeds upon the ground that the case in
which it applies is an offer or proposal on the part of the guar
antor, which does not become effective and binding as an obliga
tion until accepted by the party to whom it is made: that until
then it is inchoate and incomplete and may be withdrawn by the
proposer. Frequently the only consideration contemplated is, that
the guarantee shall extend the credit and make the advances to the
third person, for whose performance of his obligation on that ac
count, the guarantor undertakes. But a guaranty may as well be
for an existing debt, or it may be supported by some consideration -
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from the guarantee to the guarantor. In the case of the guaranty
of an existing debt, such a consideration is necessary to support
the undertaking as a binding obligation, In both these cases, no
notice of assent, other than the performance of the consideration,
is necessary to perfect the agreement; for, as Professor Langdell
has pointed out in his Summary of the Law of Contracts (Lang
dell Cas. on Cont., 987), “Though the acceptance of an offer and
the performance of the consideration are different things, and
though the former does not imply the latter, yet the latter does
necessarily imply the former; and as thewant of either is fatal to
the promise, the question whether an offer has been accepted can
never, in strictness, become material in those cases. in which a
consideration is necessary; and for all practical purposes it may
be said that the offer is acceptetl in such cases by giving or per
forming the consideration.”
If the guaranty is made at the request of the guarantee, it
then becomes the answer of the guarantor to a proposal made to
him, and its delivery to or for the use of the guarantee completes
the communication between them and constitutes a contract. The
same result follows, as declared in Wilds v. Savage, supra, where
the agreement to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty,
and constitutes its consideration and basis. It must be so wherever
there is a valuable consideration, other than the expected advances
to be made to the principal debtor, which at the time the
undertaking is given from the guarantee to the guarantor, and
equally so where the instrument is in the form of a bilateral con
tract, in which the guarantee binds himself to make the contem
plated advances, or which otherwise creates, by its recitals, a
privity between the guarantee and the guarantor. For in each of
these cases, the mutual assent of the parties to the obligation is
either expressed or necessarily implied.
The view we have taken of the rule under consideration, as .
requiring notice of acceptance and of the intention to act under
the guaranty, only when the legal effect of the instrument is that I
of an offer or proposal, and for the purpose of completing its .
obligation as a contract. is the one urged upon us by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff in error, who says, in his printed brief:
“For the ground of the doctrine is not that the operation of the
writing is conditional upon notice, but it is, that until it is accepted
and notice of its acceptance given to the guarantor, there is no
contract between the guarantor and the guarantee; the reason
being that the writing is merely an offer to guaranty the debt of









































































































































178 D.-\vlS v. WELLS, FARGO & co. [Chap. I
party offering himself as security before the minds meet and he
becomes bound. Until the notice is given, there is a want of mu
tuality; the case is not that of an obligation on condition, but of
an offer to become bound not accepted; that is
,
there is not a con
ditional contract, but no contract whatever.”
It is thence argued that the words in the instrument which is
the foundation of the present action—“we hereby guarantee unto
them, the said Wells, Fargo & Co., unconditioually, at all times,
etc.”—cannot have the effect of waiving the notice of acceptance,
because they can have no effect at all except as the words of a
contract, and there can be no contract without notice of acceptance.
And on the supposition that the terms of the instrument constitute
a mere offer to guaranty the debt of Gordon & Co., we accept the
conclusion as entirely just.
But we are unable to agree to that supposition. We think
that the instrument sued on is not a mere unaccepted proposal. It
carries upon its face conclusive evidence that it had been accepted
by \Vells, Fargo & Co., and that it was understood and intended to
be, on delivery to them, as it took place, a complete and perfect
obligation of guaranty. That evidence we find in the words—“for
and in consideration of one dollar, to us paid by Wells, Fargo &
Co., the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, we hereby guar
antee,” etc. How can that recital be true, unless the covenant of
guaranty had been made with the assent of Wells, Fargo & Co.,
communicated to the guarantors? Wells, Fargo & Co. had not
only assented to it
,
but had paid value for it
,
and that into the very
hands of the guarantors, as they by the instrument itself acknowl
edge.
It is not material that the expressed consideration is nominal.
That point was made, as to a guarantee, substantially the same as
this, in the case of Lawrence v. McAlmont, 2 How. 452, and was
overruled. Mr. Justice STQRY said:
“The guarantor acknowledged the receipt of the one dollar
and is now estopped to deny it. If she has not received it, she
would now be entitled to recover it. A valuable consideration,
however small or nominal, if given or stipulated for in good faith,
is
,
in the absence of fraud, sufficient to support an action on any
parol contract; and this is equally true as to contracts of guaran
tee as to other contracts. A stipulation in consideration of one
dollar is just as effectual and valuable a consideration as a larger
sum stipulated for or paid. The very point arose in Dutehman v.
Tooth, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 577, where the guarantor gave a guaranty
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consigned to his brother, and also all future shipments the guar
antee might make in consideration of two shillings and sixpence,
paid him, the guarantor. And the court held the guaranty good,
and the consideration sufficient.”
It is worthy of note that in the case from which this extract
is taken the guaranty was substantially the same as that in the
present case, and that no question was made as to a notice of
acceptance. It seems to have been treated as a complete contract
by force of its terms.
It does not affect the conclusion, based on these views, that
the present guaranty was for future advances as well as an exist
ing debt. It cannot, therefore, be treated as if it were an engage
ment, in which the only consideration was the future credit solic
ited and expected. The recital of the consideration paid by the
guarantee to the guarantor shows a completed contract, based
upon a mutual assent of the parties; and if it is a contract at all,
it is one for all the purposes expressed in it. It is an entirety and
cannot be separated into distinct parts. The covenant is single
and cannot be subjected in its interpretation to the operation of
two diverse rules.
Of course the instrument takes effect only upon delivery.
But in this case no question was or could be made upon that. It
was admitted that it was delivered to Gordon for delivery to the
plaintiffs below, and that he delivered it to them.
But if we should consider that, notwithstanding the com
pleteness of the contract as such, the guaranty of future advances
was subject to a condition implied by law that notice should be
given to the guarantor that the guarantee either would or had
acted upon the faith of it
,
we are led to inquire, what effect is to
be given to the use of the words which declare that the guarantors
thereby “Guarantee unto them, the said Wells, Fargo & Co., un
conditionally, at all times, any indebtedness of Gordon & Co.,
.etc., to the extent and not exceeding the sum of $10,000, for any
overdrafts now made, or that hereafter may be made, at the bank
of said Wells, Fargo & Co.”
Upon the supposition now made, the notice alleged to be
necessary arises from the nature of such a guaranty. It is not,
and cannot be claimed that such a condition is so essential to the
obligation that it cannot be waived. We do not see, therefore.
what less effect can be ascribed to the words quoted than that all
conditions that otherwise would qualify the obligation are by
agreement expunged from it and made void. The obligation be
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whatever. This is the natural, obvious and ordinary meaning of
the terms employed, and we cannot doubt that they express the
real meaning of the parties. It was their manifest intention to
make it unambiguous that Wells, Fargo & Co., for any indebted
ness that might arise to them in consequence of overdrafts by
Gordon & Co., might securely look to the guarantors without the
performance on their part of any conditions precedent thereto
whatever.
It has always been held in this court that, notwithstanding
the contract of guaranty is the obligation of a surety, it is to be
construed as a mercantile instrument in furtherance of its spirit
and liberally to promote the use and convenience of commercial
intercourse.
This view applies with equal force to the exceptions to the
other charges and refusals to charge of the court below. These
exceptions are based on the propositions:
1. That if Wells, Fargo & Co. neglected to notify the defend
ants below of the amount of the overdraft within a reasonable
time after closing the account of Gordon & Co.; and
2. That if they failed within a reasonable time after demand
of payment made upon Gordon & Co., to notify the defendants of
the default, the plaintiffs could not recover upon the guaranty.
For, if the necessity in either or both of these contingencies
existed, to give the notice specified, it was because the duty to do
so was, by construction of law, made conditions of the contract.
But by its terms, as we have shown, the contract was made
absolute, and all conditions were waived.
It is undoubtedly true, that if the guarantee fails to give rea
sonable notice to the guarantor of the default of the principal
debtor, and loss or damage thereby ensues to the guarantor, to
that extent the latter is discharged; but both the laches of the
plaintiff and the loss of the defendant must concur to constitute a
defense.
If any intermediate notice, at the expiration of the credit, of
the extent of the liability incurred is requisite, the same- rule
applies. Such was the expressed decision of this court in the case
of Manufacturing Co. v. Weleli (supra). An unreasonable delay
in giving notice, or a failure to give it altogether, is not, of itself,
a bar.
There was a question made at the trial, as to the meaning of
the word “overdrafts,” as used in the guaranty; it was con
tended that it would not include the debit balance of accounts









































































































































Sect. 4] CLARK v. KELLOGG 181
their successors, before the guaranty was made, nor charges of
interest accrued upon the balances of Gordon & Co.’s account,
which were entered to the debit of the account. The reason alleged
was, that no formal checks were given for these amounts. The
point was not urged in argument at the bar, and was very prop
erly abandoned. The charges were legitimate and°correct, and
the balance of the account to the debit of Gordon & Co. was the
overdraft for which they were liable. There could be no doubt
that it was embraced in the guaranty.
\\i’e find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
\s
55. CLARK, et al. v. KELLOGG, 96 1\lich. 171, 55 N. W. 676.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1893.
Guaranty of collection. Due diligence to collect from [Irin
cipal a condition precedent to guarantor’s liability.
Assumpsit. Plaintiffs bring error. The facts are stated in
the opinion.
Thomas A. VVilson, for appellants.
Blair 65’ l/Vilson and Parkinson 6' Day, for defendant.
l\'l0N'l‘GOMERY, J. The plaintiffs sued the defendant, counting
upon a breach of an agreement given on the occasion, and in con
sideration, of the purchase by the plaintiffs from the defendant of
a stock of goods and a quantity of notes and accounts. That por
tion of the agreement material to be considered in determining the
questions involved reads as follows:
“The said party of the first part “‘ * * does covenant and agree * * "‘
that the annexed invoice is a true statement of the amount and value of
stock, merchandise, and property, and also guarantee, represent, and war
rant that there is in said stock, goods to the value of $14,709.68; also that
the amount of $29,702.54 net shall be realized, without charging for the
personal services of the parties of the second part, nor other charges of
second parties, except incurred in suits, by the parties of the second part,
upon the accounts and notes herein conveyed. The parties of the second
part shall use due diligence in their collections.”
The declaration counted upon this agreement, and set out no
subsequent modification or waiver of its terms. On the trial the
plaintiffs sought to recover by showing that they had dealt with
the accounts as men of ordinary business judgment would, and
also sought to show that the defendant had, as to a large portion
of the accounts, directed the plaintiffs as to what he would require
as evidence of due diligence, and that the plaintiffs‘ had complied









































































































































182 CLARK V. KELLOGG [Chap. 1
I. The circuit judge construed the original contract as
amounting to a guaranty of collection, and held that no showing
of diligence was sufficient which did not include proof that the
accounts had each been put in judgment, and execution had been
taken out, and returned unsatisfied. This ruling was unquestiona
bly right, if the proper construction was placed on the contract.
Bosman v. Akeley, 39 Mich. 7 Io; Schermerhorn v. Conner, 41
Id. 374.
It is contended, however, that the contract in question should
not be construed as a guaranty of collection of each individual ac
count, requiring resort to legal process in the collection of each,
but amounted to a warranty and representation that there should
be realized $29,702.54 from the total of the accounts and that the
fact that the amount guaranteed to be realized was much less than
the face of the accounts negatives the idea that resort should be
had to suit upon each account. The infirmity of this construction
is that it ignores the subsequent language, “The parties of the
second part shall use due diligence in their collection,” or accords
to this language a meaning at variance with the settled signifi
cance of the terms employed. What constitutes due diligence is
settled by the cases of Bosman v. Akeley and Schemerhorn v.
Conner, supra.
In the case of Ralph v. Eldredge, 58 Hun 203, a similar ques
tion was presented. Plaintiff and defendant were co-partners.
Defendant conveyed his interest to the plaintiff in the notes, ac
counts and demands owing to the firm. The defendant at the
same time executed to the plaintiff a bond with the condition that
defendant should pay to the plaintiff one-half of the amount of
the notes, accounts, and claims of the late firm assigned by de
fendant to plaintiff that should prove to be uncollectible, if any
such there should be. The court say:
“It seems to be settled in this state that a guaranty of collec
tion is an undertaking to pay the sum of money guaranteed, pro
vided the principal debtor is prosecuted to judgment and execution
with due diligence, and the same cannot be collected of him. * * *
The plaintiff urges that the bond does not guarantee the collection
of these claims, but is only a contract to pay plaintiff one-half of
the amount of those which should turn out bad. But the bond
uses the word 'uncollectible, and the question must be, what is
the legal meaning of that word? That word has a definite mean
ing, as decided in the cases above cited; and that meaning should
be here enforced.”









































































































































Sect. 4] MC MURRAY V. NOYES 183
to a guaranteed note or account, is well understood, and the parties
must be assumed to have contracted with reference to that mean
1ng.
2. The court rightly held that the alleged subsequent waiver
could not be shown under the pleadings in this cause. The con
tract itself having fixed upon the plaintiffs a specific duty, the
averment in the declaration that the plaintiffs did use due dili
gence amounted, in effect, to an averment that they had pursued
the course which the law imposes upon them in order to charge
the guarantor. If they relied on any excuse for failing to use due
diligence, this should have been counted upon in the declaration.
Aldrich v. Chubb, 35 Mich. 350.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
The other Justices concurred.
56. McMURRAY, et al
.
v




f Appeals, New York, 1878.
Conditional guaranty, guaranty o
f collection; conditions pre
cedent to liability o
f guarantor; laches sufficient to discharge guar
(11:tor.
Appeal from judgment o
f
the General Term o
f
the Supreme
Court in the third judicial department, affirming a judgment in
favor o
f plaintiff entered upon the report o
f
a referee.
This action was upon a guaranty, which is set forth in the
opinion, wherein the material facts are also stated.
Esek Cowen, for appellant.
Irving Browne, for respondent.
RAPPALLO, J. The guaranty on which this action is brought
is contained in an assignment o
f
a bond and mortgage, and is in
the following form:
“I hereby covenant * * * that in case of foreclosure and sale of the
mortgaged premises described in said mortgage, if the proceeds of such
sale shall be insufficient to satisfy the same, with the costs of foreclosure,
I will pay the amount of such deficiency to the said party of the second
part, or its assigns, on demand.”
> On the part of the appellants, it is contended that this guar
anty is subject to the rules applicable to guaranties o
f collection,
and thus laches in foreclosing the mortgage, after default, is a
defense. The respondents insist that it is a guaranty o
f payment,
and that they were under n
o obligation to use diligence in endeav











































































































































184 MC .\1L‘RR.-\Y v. NOYES [Chap. I
The fundamental distinction between a guaranty of payment
and one of collection is
,
that in the first case the guarantor under
takes unconditionally that the debtor will pay, and the creditor
may, upon default, proceed directly against the guarantor, without
taking any steps to collect of the principal debtor, and the omis
sion or neglect to proceed against him is not (except under spec
ial circumstances) any defense to the guarantor; while in the sec
‘ ond case the undertaking is that if the demand cannot be collected
by legal proceedings the guarantor will pay, and consequently
legal proceedings against the principal debtor, and a failure to col
lect of him by those means are conditions precedent to the liability
of the guarantor; and to these the law, as established by numer
ous decisions, attaches the further condition that due diligence be
exercised by the creditor in enforcing his legal remedies against
the debtor.
These rules are well settled and are not controverted, and the
only question is to which class of guaranties the one now before
us belongs.
It is apparent upon the face of the instrument that the under
taking of the defendant was not an unconditional one that the
mortgagor should pay, or that the guarantor would pay on default
of the mortgagor, but only that the guarantor would pay, in case
of a deficiency arising on a foreclosure and sale. The foreclosure
and sale were consequently conditions precedent, and the general
principle is, that wherever a condition precedent is to be performed
for the purpose of establishing the liability of a surety or guaran
tor, such condition must be performed in good faith and with due
diligence. It is upon this principle that, in case of a guaranty of
collection, diligence is required of the creditor.
I am unable to see why this principle is not applicable to the
guaranty now in controversy. The respondents claim that it is
an undertaking to pay any deficiency which may arise, and is,
therefore, a guaranty of payment of the mortgage debt to that
extent, and to be governed by the same rules as if it had been a
guaranty of payment of the whole mortgage. But the fallacy of
this reasoning is that it is not an unconditional guaranty that the
mortgagor will pay the mortgage debt, or any part of it
,
but only
that after the remedy against the land has been exhausted, and the
deficiency ascertained by foreclosure and sale, the guarantor will
pay such deficiency. The only difference between this and an or
dinary guaranty of collection is, that in the latter case the under
taking is that after it has been ascertained by all such legal pro
ceedings as the case admits of, that the demand cannot be col









































































































































Sect. 4] STARR v. MILLIKIN 185
lected, the guarantor will pay; while in the present case the only
proceedings which the creditor is bound to adopt are a foreclosure
of the mortgage and sale of the mortgaged lands. To that extent
the condition precedent exists alike in both cases, and the duty of
exercising due diligence attaches, there being nothing in the in
strument qualifying or dispensing with it.
The case of Goldsmith v. Brown (35 Barb. 484) is relied
upon by the respondents as sustaining their position. In that case
the covenant was, as construed by the court, to pay the deficiency
upon the mortgage debt whenever the remedy against the lands
mortgaged should have been exhausted and the deficiency ascer
tained. The decision in that case cat; only be sustained by con
struing the covenant as waiving diligence in foreclosing, and bind
ing the covenanter to pay the deficiency without regard to the
time of the foreclosure. Nothing in the covenant now under ex
amination has any relation to the time of the foreclosure, or can
be construed as waiving diligence required by the general rules of
law in performing the condition.
The delay in foreclosing in the present case was fourteen
months after the mortgage debt became due. During upward of
ten months of this time the property was a sufficient security, but
afterward the buildings thereon were destroyed by fire, and the
value was reduced below the amount of the mortgage debt. It
cannot be questioned that this delay was sufficient to constitute
Iarhes. In Craig v. Parkis, 40 N. Y. 181, a delay of six months
in foreclosing a bond and mortgage was held to be laches which
discharged a guaranty of its collection.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered
with costs to abide the event. All concur.
Judgment reversed.
57. STARR, et al. v. MILLIKIN, 180 Ill. 458, 54 N. E. 328.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1899.
Guaranty conditional; construction of contract.
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District :—
heard in that oourt on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon
county; the Hon. Emvnnn P. V.-UL, J., presiding.
I.eForgee 6' Lee, and Mills Bros., for appellants.
I . A. Buckingham and Hugh Crea, for appellee.
Mr. Justice PHILLIPS delivered the opinion of the court:









































































































































186 STARR V. MILLIKIN [Chap. I
William H. Starr and Isaac R. Mills, for the use of William H.
Starr, against James Millikin, upon the following contract:
. . “Whereas, Murray G. Millikin has purchased of Starr & Mills lot
sixteen (16) and fifteen feet off of the east side of lot fifteen (15), in
block three (3), in Starr & Mills' addition to the city of Decatur, for
the sum of $800; and whereas, the said Murray G. Millikin has given to
the said Starr & Mills his certain promissory notes to secure the payment
of said consideration, together with a mortgage upon said premises; and
whereas, the said Murray G. Millikin is a minor under the age of twenty
one years but is desirous of having the deed to said lots so purchased
made to him:
“Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and in considera
tion of the making of the deed direct to the said Murray G. Millikin, I,
James Millikin, do hereby guarantee that the said Murray G. Millikin
will ratify said purchase and the giving of said notes upon his arrival at
the age of twenty-one years, in such manner as will make him personally
liable on said notes so given for said purchase money, and in the event
that said Murray G. Millikin shall repudiate or refuse to pay said notes
I hereby agree to pay the same to the said Starr & Mills, or their assigns.
“Dated at Decatur, Illinois, this 26th day of June, A. D. 1893.
“JAMES MILLIKIN.”
A verdict was returned in the trial court against appellee for
$1076.88. Judgment was rendered on this verdict, but on appeal
to the Appellate Court for the Third District the judgment was
reversed without remanding, the Appellate Court at the same time
making a finding of facts to be recited in its final order.
The Appellate Court found from the evidence in the case
that James Millikin undertook, in the contract above mentioned,
to pay the sum of money therein mentioned upon condition, only,
that Murray G. Millikin, a minor, upon his arrival at the age of
twenty-one years, would fail to ratify the notes in controversy
in such manner as would make him personally liable, or if the
minor should repudiate or refuse to pay the notes on acount of
their having been executed during his minority. This finding of
facts was the result of the legal construction given the contract
by the Appellate Court. That court also found as a fact arising
out of the evidence, that upon his arrival at the age of majority
Murray G. Millikin did ratify the notes made by him, thus making
himself personally liable, and that he did not repudiate or refuse
to pay them on account of their having been executed during his
minority. As this record is presented to us, therefore, only one
question is involved. This is conceded by counsel for appellants,
as they say that the construction to be placed upon this contract is
the only real question involved in the litigation in this court, and
that this question, when determined, ends the controversy.
The finding by the Appellate Court as to the legal construc









































































































































Sect. 4] STARR v. MILLIKIN - 187
binding upon this court. The construction to be given a contract
is one of law, rather than of fact. However, that is not material
in this case, as we in nowise differ from the Appellate Court as to
the legal construction to be given the contract. Starr & Mills
were conveying some property to Murray G. Millikin, a minor.
From the fact that upon his arrival at his majority he would have
the right, in law, to repudiate the notes or refuse payment on ac
count of their having been executed during his minority, this
separate contract was executed to guarantee there should be no
such refusal or repudiation. The entire controversy occurs over
the last clause of the contract, which reads: “In the event that
said Murray G. Millikin shall repudiate o£_r_e_fu_sg_t9_p_g said
notes I hereby agree to pay the same t
'
Mil or
their assigps.” This clause, however, when taken in connection
with all the circumstances of the case and the recitals in the con
tract preceding this clause, to the effect that Murray G. Millikin
was a minor under the age of twenty-one years and that he was
desirous of having the deeds to the lots made to him, and that ap
pellee guaranteed Murray G. Millikin would ratify such purchase
and the giving of said notes upon his arrival at the age of twenty
one years, tends to establish, without question, that the only pur
pose of the execution of this contract was that the notes should
not be repudiated or payment refused on account of the age of
the maker. It is evident that there was no intention on the part
of James Millikin to personally guarantee the payment of this in
debtedness. The parties connected with the transaction were all
business men,—one a banker, another a lawyer,—and if the inten
tion had been to personally guarantee this indebtedness such guar
anty would have been on the back of the note, or as a joint maker,
or in some other manner much less cumbersome than as shown
by this record.
The construction given this contract by the Appellate Court












































































































































REQUISITES OF THE CO.\'TRACT.“
SECTION 1. COMPETENT PARTIES"
58. GOSMAN, et al., appellants, v. CRUGER, ct al., respondents,
69 N. Y. 87.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1877.
Under the Married Woman's Act, a married a‘oman’s con
tract as surety on a guardianship bond, not expressed to be bind
ing on her separate estate, is void, even though ordered by court
decree.
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the second judicial department affirming so much of the
judgment herein as dismissed the complaint, as to defendant
Eliza L. C. Cruger. (Reported below, 7 Hun 60.)
This action was brought upon a bond executed by defendants
as sureties for one Edward R. Olcott, since deceased, condi 'oned
for the faithful performance of his duties as guardian of plai 'ffs.
The complaint alleged that said defendant Eliza was, a e
time of the execution of the bond, a married woman, havin a
separate estate, and it was asked that the amount of the recovery
be adjudged a charge upon her separate estate.
Attached to the bond was an affidavit, signed by the sureties,
to the effect that they were each worth the sum of $1o.0oo, over
and above all debts and liabilities. The bond was presented and
filed with the petition for the appointment of said guardian, and
upon them he was duly appointed, and received as such, in pur
" “To constitute the contract of suretyship or guaranty the same things
are necessary as to constitute any other contract, viz.: That the parties
be competent to contract; that they actually do contract; and that the
contract, if not under seal, be supported by a sufficient consideration.”
Brandt on Sure-tyship (2 ed.), vol. 1, p. 5.
“Infant’s contract as surety is voidable, not void. Harner v. Dibble,
31 Oh. St. 72, and cases cited.
Insane person not liable on note signed as surety. VanPatton, et al.,









































































































































Sect. 1] GOSMAN v. CRUGER 189
suance of an order of the court, moneys belonging to plaintiffs,
which he converted to his own use.
The court directed judgment against defendant, John P.
Cruger, but directed a dismissal of the complaint as to defendant,
Eliza. Judgment was entered accordingly.
Elihu Root, for the appellants.
C. Frost, for the respondent).
FOLGER, J. A married woman is bound by her contracts
made in her separate business, or relating to her separate estate,
as provided in the married woman’s acts of 1848, 1849, 1860 and
1862; and they may be enforced against her at law or in equity.
If her contracts are not thus made, or do not thus relate, they
are void at law, and may not be enforced in equity against her
separate estate, unless the intention of charging that estate is ex
pressed in the contract, or implied from its terms; Yale v. Ded
erer, 22 I\'. Y., 450.
The bond sued upon in this action is not a contract made by
Mrs, Cruger in her separate business, nor does it relate to her
separate estate, nor is there expressed in it an intention of charg
ing that estate. It seems, therefore, that the plaintiffs cannot re
cover against her.
The appellants seek to go outside the bond, and to find the
requisite expression of intention in the other circumstances, acts
and papers in the proceeding. Authorities are cited, to the effect
that bond given in pursuance of a decree, is to be construed with
the gcree, and that the terms of the latter enter into and form
a part of the contract. But there is nothing to be found in the
proceedings which led to the execution of this bond, which shows
a purpose on the part of the court to compel Mrs. Cruger to bind
her separate estate, even if there was the power to compel a mar
ried woman so to execute a bond. It does not appear, indeed, that
it was known that she was a married woman. The reference
made to the rules of the Supreme Court (rule 65), of chancery
(rule 148), and to the statute_which authorized those rules (2
R. S., 175, sec. 46), is no more than to say, that the law required
two sufficient sureties. If one of the sureties had been an infant,
he would not, because of the rules and the statute, have been held
to have made a valid contract. And though Mrs. Cruger might
have made a valid contract had she put it in the requisite form.
she is not to be held to have done so merely for the reason that
the law was not complied with when she di_d otherwise. Nor









































































































































190 GOSMAN V. CRUGER [Chap. II
estate to make her a sufficient surety, incorporate into the contract
of suretyship the expression of an intention to bind that estate, if
it was separate. That it was a statement in writing makes it no
more efficient than if by parol (Maron v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247), so
far as the expression of an intention is concerned. It might be
demanded in writing to meet the Statute of Frauds. But it was,
though in writing, outside of the written contract, as much as
such a statement in parol aliunde, would be outside of a contract
valid by parol. Parties may struggle against the rule, but it is
the rule, that the intention to charge the separate estate must be
expressed in the contract, or implied in the terms of it. The affi







terms. It is but a state
ment in legal form that the person named in the contract is o
f
sufficient estate to be a proper party to it
.
It is claimed that the reason of the rule declared in Yale V.
Dederer does not apply to this case, and that, therefore, the rule
ceases. That reason is said to be this: That a contract made by
a married woman is void a
t law; that it may be enforced in equity
under some circumstances, but not when it is a contract o
f surety
ship, for there is no equity springing out o
f
the consideration. It
is then claimed, that surety ship for a guardian is an exception to
this rule, as equity will enforce against persons, sui juris, who
become sureties, their obligations, the same as if they made them
a
s principals. The authorities in this state, cited b
y
the appellants,
do not sustain the proposition. What was substantially held in
Wiser v. Blackly (1 J. Ch. R., 607), was that one signing a bond
a
s surety was, as well as one signing as principal, liable to a suit
to reform the contract so as to conform it to the intention of the
parties, and as the defendant's answer admitted that the surety
intended to bind himself for the guardian, a mistake in the form
of the bond was corrected or treated as so. So it was in Prior v.
Williams (2 Keyes 530), which was not the case o
f guardianship.
The case from Jones' Reports (Sikes v. Truitt, 4 Jones Eq.





the precedent. That from
Iredell (Armistead v. Bozman, 1 Ired. Eq. 117), is to the same
effect a
s Wiser v. Blackly (supra); that the instrument may be
corrected in form to agree with the intention o
f
the surety as ad
mitted o
r proven.
It is then claimed that Mrs. Cruger, by not making known




. It is claimed that, either as a mistake or as a fraud, the
court will take hold o
f it
,









































































































































Sect. 1] HOUSER v. FARMERS" SUPPLY co. 191
need only be said, as to this, that the intention to charge the sep
arate estate is made an issue by the pleadings and found against
the plaintiffs; and that fraud is not found nor alleged.
The judgment must be affirmed.
All concur.
59. HOUSER v. FARMERS’ SUPPLY COMPANY, 6 Ga. App. 102,
64 S. E. 293.
Court of Appeals, Georgia, 1909.
A contract of guaranty or suretyship entered into by an ordi
nary commereial or industrial corporation not in direct furtherance
of authorised corporate purposes is not ‘valid.
Action on contract, from city court of Dublin—Judge JOR
1).\N presiding. December 21, 1908.
Peyton L. ‘Wade, for plaintiff in error.
I. S. Adams, W. C. Dozis, contra.
POWELL, J. Houser sued the Farmers’ Supply Company, a .
mercantile corporation, alleging, that the corporation had agreed
with him if he would enter its employment and would become a
stockholder therein, it would, in addition to paying him a salary,
indorse his note at the bank for a sum necessary to pay for the
stock, continuing the indorsement from time to time, and from
year to year, for five years, at the end of which period there was to
be a division of profits, through the declaration of an accumu
lated dividend: that at the end of the first year (December, 1902),
the corporation refused to continue toindorse the note given for
the procurement of the money under the circumstances just
stated, whereupon it became necessary for him to make a new
arrangement to get the money, by which the person from whom
he got the funds was to obtain four per cent. interest in addition
to one-half of the profits to be earned by his stock ; that on account
of the prosperity of the business, the profits amounted to a con
siderable sum in excess of what the legal interest on the loan
would have been. The alleged contract with the corporation was
made through the persons who on its organization became presi- -
dent and general manager. The plaintiff was himself a director
and vice-president. No express power appeared in the charter
authorizing the corporation to enter into any contract of surety
ship and guaranty. The court granted a nonsuit, and the plain
tiff excepts. ‘











































































































































BXCKI-‘ORD v. o11ms [Chap. II
prohibited from making contracts of guaranty and suretyship,
such contracts are closely scrutinized, and are not valid unless it
appears that they were in direct furtherance of authorized cor
porate purposes. Ordinarily the officers of a corporation have no
power to make a contract in its behalf guaranteeing a private debt
of one of its stockholders. Brandt on Suretyship (3d ed.), sec.
I2 and note. The contract in the present case seems to have been
ultra. vires and not binding on the corporation. * * * The plaintiff
seems to have suffered a hardship, but the law is against him on
the facts of his case as developed at the trial.
Judgment affirmed.
SECTION 2. CONSIDERATION
WHI:N PRINCIPAL AND ASSURING CONTRACTS ARE EXECUTED
CONCURRENTLY.
60. BICKFORD v. GIBBS, et al., 8 Cush. 154.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1851.
. Consideration—no proof of 01 distinct consideration to sup
port a guaranty is necessary when the guaranty is made simul
taneously ‘with the principal contract.
This was an action of assumpsit on the following note:
“July 26th, 1845. $100. For value received, I promise to pay on
demand to Joseph Bickford, or order, one hundred dollars with interest.
“GeoizoI-: MAY.”
On the back of the note was the following agreement, signed
by the defendants: “We guarantee the payment of the within,
waiving demand and notice.”
R. B. Caverly, for the defendants.
B. F. Butler, for the plaintiff.
SHAW, C.J. Assumpsit to recover the amount of a note given
by one May, and guaranteed by the defendants.
An exception is now taken, that this guaranty should have
been specially declared on. No such exception was taken at the
trial; had it been, an amendment might have been made; the ob
jection comes too late.
'
The exception is also taken, that as the guaranty was a con









































































































































Sect. 2] BICKFORD v. o11ms 193
proved. There would be force in this objection, had the guaranty
been made after the note had been made, delivered and received
as a complete contract. But when the guaranty is made on the
note before its delivery by the maker to the promisee, it must be
deemed to be done for the benefit of the maker, to add to the
strength of the note and to induce the promisee to take it and ad
vance his money on it; and no other consideration is necessary
than the credit thus given to the maker. And the guaranty be
ing without date, and there being no direct proof of any time at
which it was made, we think the court were right in leaving it to
the jury, to find that the guaranty was simultaneous with the note
itself. Benthall v. Judkins, 13 Met. 265.
Supposing, then, that the defendants were regularly bound
as guarantors, and thereby assumed an obligation somewhat dif
fering from that of either sureties or indorsers, what was that
obligation? This question has been much discussed, especially
since the leading case of Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 8 Pick. 423.
The principle to be deduced from that case, and the Pennsylvania _
case of Gibbs v. Cannon, 9 S. & R. 202, there cited with appro
bation and relied on, is this’: That in order to maintain an action
against a guarantor, a demand of payment must be made in a
reasonable time of the principal, and notice of non-payment given
to the guarantor; and if in consequence of want of such notice,
the guarantor suffers loss, he is exonerated. Dole v. Young, 24
Pick. 250. The same prompt demand and notice, as are required
to charge an indorser, are not necessary; and if the circumstances
of parties remain the same, and the guarantor suffers no loss by
delay, demand and notice at any time before action brought, will
be sufficient. Bubcock v. Bryant, 12 Pick. I 33. Such being the
obligation of the defendants, as guarantors, they would not be
liable by the general law, without proof of demand and notice.
But they have expressly agreed to waive demand and notice, and
conventio legem z'‘incit. The effect of that waiver is, to put the
plaintiff in the same situation as if he had proved that he season
ably demanded the money of the promisor, who did not pay it
,
and
gave reasonable notice thereof to the defendants. In the absence
of all proof on the part of the defendants, that they have suffered
any loss by the laches of the plaintiff, the court are of opinion that










































































































































194 'l‘ENNF.Y v. PRINCE [Chap. II
Vt/Hi»: PRINCIPAL AND ASSUnmo CONTRACTS ARE EXECUTED
.-\T DIFFERENT TIMES.
61. TENNEY v. PRINCE, 4 Pick. 385.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1826.
Ne"w considerartion is required to support guaranty made af
tor execution and delivery of principal contract.
This was assumpsit upon an indorsement by the defendant
on a negotiable promissory note given by L. Pierce to the plain
tiff. dated December 1, 1820, payable in twelve months, with inter
est after six months. The indorsement was made in blank, about
three months before the note became due, and was filled up by the
plaintiff as follows: “Eastport, Dec. 1, 1820. For value received
I promise to pay Perley Tenney or order the within sum, being
24 dollars, 65 cents, in twelve months from date, with interest
after ‘six months.” A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, sub
ject, &c.
Moseley, for the defendant, objected that this was a collat
eral promise, being made subsequently to the original promise and
independently of the credit given to the principal debtor, and that
it was void for want of a consideration. If there was any con
sideration beyond that which originally passed between the plain
tifi‘ and Pierce, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show it. He
referred to Josselyn v. Ames, 3 Mass. 274; Uten v. Kittredge, 7
Mass. 233;Moies v. Bird, 11 Mass. 436 * * *
I. Pickering and Mmrston, for the plaintiff.
PARKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case
presents a question which has not yet been decided in this com
monwealth, nor does it appear that the researches of counsel have
discovered any precedent for us in the reports of any other court.
By the facts agreed it appears that the defendant put his
name on the back of the note about nine months after its date,
and three months before it became due. There is no evidence of
the intent and purpose of this act of the defendant, nor of any
consideration which moved him to it. The writing made by the
plaintiff over the signature would make it an original promise,
of the same date with the note, to pay the contents of the note ac
cording to its tenor. We do not think there was any authority
in the plaintiff to make this use of the signature, because it is
inconsistent with the circumstances under which the signature was









































































































































Sect. 2] T1£.\'.\'Y \'. PRINCE 195
note, coeval with its date, from a signature put upon it nine
'
months after. The case of Ulen v. Kittredgc is no authority for
it; for in that case Kittredge was charged as guarantor, and
there was a consideration in forbearance towards the promisor,
and the Court inferred from the act and declarations of Kittredge
an authority to make him thus liable, the note being due when the
indorsement was made. Nor does the case of Moies v. Bird sup
port it
,
for though the signing of Bird was two or three days
after the note was made, there were facts from which an agree
ment to be responsible from the beginning was justly inferred.
These two cases approached nearer to the one before us than
any which have been cited from our books, but they do not reach
the present case, for this is a naked indorsement without any ac
companying facts or declarations tending to explain the act. The
principle by which all our decisions have been regulated, from
the case of losselyn v. Ames downwards, is, that where the in
dorsement is made at the time of making the note, the person
indorsing the note is to be treated as an original promisor, and
this because he is supposed to participate in the consideration,
that is, the payee is supposed to haveparted with something val
uable upon the strength of the liability of the party who puts his
name on the note, and as such party cannot be answerable as an
indorser, he shall be answerable as an original promisor. This
is well understood to be the law of this commonwealth, and we
do not feel disposed to change it. No authority has been produced
from this or any other state or country, which would justify us
in extending the liability of these anomalous indorsers. W’ e can
not yield to the suggestion of counsel, that the blank signature
gives authority in this case to refer the effect of the signature to
the date of the note, because it is proved that that signature was
given nine months afterwards, and we have no facts to justify
such a reference.
But this signature is not without effect; it was intended as
security to the plaintiff, and it ought to avail as intended. The
only form of engagement which is consistent with the time and
circumstances under which the signature was made, is a guaranty
of the payment of the note when it should become due, and that
is a contract which may be enforced, if it was made on legal con
sideration, and not otherwise. If within the statute of frauds, it
is sufficiently in writing, with the engagement to that effect which
the plaintiff is authorized to place over the signature, to be sus
tained. But whether within the statute or ot, it cannot avail
the plaintiff without proof of consideration,$ecause i









































































































































196 SIMMANG v. FARNSWORTH [Chap. II
lateral, not an original undertaking. We think the signature con
veys the authority to superscribe this engagement, as was decided
in 1801, in a case reported in a note to Precedents of Declarations
(2d ed.), 150, afterwards in Iosselyn v. Ames, Ulei1 v. Kittredgc,
and many other subsequent cases.
The action in its present form therefore cannot be main
tained; but if it is supposed that a consideration can be proved,
the plaintiff has leave to amend his declaration and his indorse
ment over the signature, and a new trial is-granted.
W
62. SIMMANG v. FARNSWORTH, 24 S. W. 541.
Court of Civil Appeals, Texas, 1893.
(Not officially reported).
Nature of consideration required.
Appeal from district court, Bexar county, W. W. KING,
Judge.
Action by Tom Farnsworth against William Simmang on a
promissory note. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defend
ant appeals. Reversed.
Otto Stafiel and L. N. Walthall, for appellant.
T. F. Shields, for appellee.
FLY, J. Appellee, who was plaintiff below, sued appellant
on a note for $200, signed by him and one John Cavanaugh. Ap
pellant answered that he had signed the note as a surety some time
after the consideration had passed between appellee and Cava
naugh, and that there was no consideration passed to him for
signing said note. The evidence shows that the note was executed
on December 19, 1888, and was at that time only signed by Cav
anaugh, and thus signed, was delivered to appellee. Appellant
was not present at this time. The note was given for a one-third
interest in machinery, the other interests being owned by appellee
and one Charles Simmang. Appellant did not sign the note until
in January, 1889, after the machinery was in running order. It
was handed to appellant by Cavanaugh, who requested him to
sign it. There is but one point to consider in order to arrive at a
conclusion. If the consideration had not passed between Cava
naugh and Farnsworth at the time that the note was signed by
appellant, then the appellant is responsible, and the judgment of
the lower court is correct, and should not be disturbed; if
,
how
ever, the consideration had passed and become executed before the









































































































































Sect. 2] s11\1zv1.\1~:o \'. 1-2-\.nnswORrn 197
ducement to the creation of the original debt as evidenced by the
note, and appellant is not responsible. I Brandt, Sur. ( 2d ed.),
p. 20, sec. 17; Baker v. Wahrmund, 23 S. W. 1023, (decided by
this court at this term.) There must be some consideration mov
ing to the principal alone, contemporaneous with or subsequent
to the promise of the surety. If
,
after the original consideration
has moved between the principal and creditor, the surety signs
upon a new consideration moving from the creditor to the prin
cipal, this is sufficient. Also where a promise is made at the
time the note is executed by the ‘principal that the name of the
surety will be obtained to the note, and the surety afterwards signs
the note, the consideration would be legal and valid. But where
the consideration between the creditor and principal had passed
and become executed before the contract of the surety is made,
and such contract was no part of the inducement to the creation
of the original debt, the surety would not be bound. Jackson v.
Jackson, 7 Ala. 791 ; 1 Brandt, Sur. (2d ed.), p. 20, sec. 17. The
note was executed by Cavanaugh on December 19, 1888, at the
time of the delivery of the machinery at- the depot in San Antonio,
and the note was delivered to Farnsworth, who put it in his pock
et. The note was given for one-third interest in the machinery,
and the putting up of the machinery did not seem to be a part of
the consideration; but if it was, it was in complete running order
when appellant signed the note. The note shows that the consid
eration for its execution was an interest in machinery furnished
by Farnsworth. There was no agreement at the time that Cava
naugh signed the note that appellant’s name would be secured to
the note, and when he signed it the consideration was fully exe
cuted, and the debt had been created without the inducement of
appellant's suretyship. There was no consideration for his signa
ture. Judgrnent in the lower court was for appellee as against
appellant and Cavanaugh, and over against Cavanaugh in favor
of appellant. The judgment of the lower court is here reversed,
and rendered in favor of appellee against John Cavanaugh for
the amount of the note and all costs, and in favor of appellant










































































































































198 ESTATE OF RAMSAY V. WHITBECK [Chap. II
WHEN TAINTED BY ILLEGALITY OF TRANSACTION.
63. ESTATE OF RAMSAY, deceased, v. WHITBECK, et al., 183 Ill. 550.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1900.
A contract of indemnity made in furtherance of an unlawful
scheme is illegal and void.
- Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District—
heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Clinton
county; the Hon. SAMUEL L. Dwig HT, Judge, presiding.
M. P. Murray (G. Van Hoorebeke, John G. Irwin, T. E. Ford,
John J. McGaffigan, and D. Kingsbury, of counsel) for appellant.
R. L. Tatham and Follansbee & Follansbee, for appellees.
Mr. Chief Justice CARTwRIGHT delivered the opinion of the
court:
On November 8, 1892, Rufus N. Ramsay was elected Treas
urer of the State of Illinois for two years from the second Tues
day of January, 1893. On December 20, 1892, he, with ten sure
ties, executed a bond in the sum of $500,000 to the State of Illi
nois, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties as such
treasurer. He entered upon the duties of his office January 10,
1893, and died during his term, on November 11, 1894. At that
time there should have been in the treasury $1,510,383.14, and an
examination showed that there was but $1,031,843.62, leaving a
deficit of $478,539.52. This deficit was paid, on behalf of the
sureties, by check drawn by F. M. Blount upon the Chicago Nat
ional Bank, of which he was cashier. The bank was reimbursed
by the sureties. After making up the deficit the sureties received
$115,000 thereon by the collection of notes of individuals and se
curities found in the vault of the treasury. For the balance,
$363,539.52, the sureties filed a claim in the county court of Clin
ton county against the estate of Ramsay, and applied to the court
to be subrogated to the rights of the State of Illinois and to have
the claim allowed as a preferred claim of the sixth class. The
estate being insolvent, the general creditors of the seventh class,
with the administrator, objected to the claim and resisted its al
lowance. The defense made was, that by reason of an unlawful
consideration moving to the claimants for becoming sureties upon
the bond, the transaction as between them and Ramsay was vit
iated, and in consequence thereof they had no right to reimburse
ment which the law would recognize or enforce. This illegality









































































































































Sect. 2] ESTATE OF RAMSAY V. WHITBECK I99
and his sureties for the unlawful use of the money of the State
for the benefit of the Treasurer and certain banks, of which the
sureties were officers and representatives, contrary to the public
policy of the State and in contravention of it
s
statutes. The county
court decided in favor o
f






the sixth class, and ordered it paid
in due course o
f
administration. From that judgment an appeal
was taken to the circuit court, and there was a hearing which re




the county court and a disal
lowance o
f
the claim. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the
Fourth District the judgment o
f
the circuit court was reversed,
and the cause was remanded generally for further proceedings.
A petition for rehearing was filed and granted. A change had
taken place in the membership o
f
the court, and the cause was
re-considered by the present members o
f
that court, but the judg
ment was adhered to and the opinion re-filed. The case was re
docketed in the circuit court and additional testimony was taken.
On the first trial certain officers o
f
the bank testified, by deposi
tion, and under advice o
f
counsel refused to answer whether there
was any arrangement between Ramsay and the sureties by which





which he was to receive any benefit, directly o
r
indirectly, from the banks. In the additional evidence they tes
tified to the circumstances under which the bond was given. The
case was again heard on the original testimony and the additional
evidence, and the claim was allowed as o
f
the sixth class. The
amount was reduced somewhat b
y
credits and the allowance was
for $351,948.41. The judge filed a written opinion in the case,
stating that the Appellate Court had held there were two con
tracts, one lawful and the other unlawful—two considerations,
one lawful, the other unlawful,—for executing the bond, and that
the unlawful contract and consideration did not taint the one which
was lawful, and this conclusion he felt bound to follow from the
obedience due to the superior court. He stated that but for the
opinion o
f
the Appellate Court on substantially the same evidence
h
e should adopt a different view, but was constrained to accept
the conclusion o
f
the Appellate Court, which he would not do if
free to act otherwise. The death of Edson Keith and William A.
Hammond, two o
f
the claimants, was suggested, and judgment
was entered in favor o
f
the surviving claimants for the amount
o
f
the claim. An appeal was again taken to the Appellate Court
for the Fourth District and the judgment was affirmed. This











































































































































2oo ESTATE 01-‘ R.-\1\'[S.\Y v. WHITBECK [Chap. II
Appellate Court. * * * The unlawful agreement, the existence of
which is affirmed on the one hand and denied on the other, is
,
that the sureties 0n the bond, who were officers of five banks in
the city of Chicago, representing said banks and in their interest,
became sureties because of an agreement that the Treasurer should
loan to said banks a large amount of the State funds, upon which
they were to allow and pay him interest monthly, at the rate of
‘two and one-half per cent per annum, and that pursuant to such
an agreement over $1,500,000 was loaned to said bai1ks about the
time the Treasurer went into office, and substantially that sum
remained in said banks until his death, and the stipulated interest
was regularly paid to him according to the agreement. * * *
This agreement which was made and executed was in direct
and palpable violation of section 81 of the Criminal Code, which
prohibits any State officer from using, by way of investment or
loan, for his own use, except as authorized by law, with or with
out interest, any portion of the money entrusted to him for safe
keeping, disbursement, transfer or any other purpose. (Rev. Stat.
p
.
363). It was also against the public policy of the State. Sec
tion 23 of article 5 of the constitution provides as follows: “The
officers named in this'article shall receive for their services a
salary to be established by law, which shall not be increased or
diminished during their official terms, and they shall not, after
the expiration of the terms of those in office at the adoption of
this constitution, receive to their own use any fees, costs, per
quisites or office, or other compensation. And all fees that may
hereafter be payable by law for any service performed by any offi
cer provided for in this article of the constitution, shall be paid in
advance into the State treasury.” Section I of chapter 53 of the
Revised Statutes, (p. 500), entitled “Fees and Salaries,” provides:
“That there shall be allowed and paid in annual salary, in lieu of
all other salary, fees, perquisite, benefit or compensation, in any
form whatsoever, to each of the officers herein named, the fol
lowing sums respectively: * * * Treasurer, the sum of $3,500.”
Nothing is better settled in the law of contracts than that if
any part of the consideration upon which a promise rests is
illegal the entire promise fails. (Nash v. Monheimer, 20 Ill. 215;
Henderson v. Palmer, 71 id. 579; Tenney v. Foote, 95 id. 99;
Tobey v. Robinson, 99 id. 222). No one can gain any right by
obtaining a promise founded upon considerations in violation of
the law, and the courts will not destroy the respect due to the law
by enforcing such a promise, but will leave the parties where they









































































































































Sect. 2] ESTATE OF RAMSAY V. WHITBECK 2OI
and it is agreed by all the counsel in the case that where parties are
engaged in illegal agreements or transactions courts will not en
force their promises. But while the rule of law is not questioned by
appellees, they insist that there was no illegal contract by the
sureties, but that the agreement is divisible as to parties between
them and the banks. The supposed division is
,
that the illegal
transaction was between Ramsay and the banks and not between
him and the sureties; that he never agreed a
t any time with the
sureties that if they signed the bond he would deposit State
money with them; that whatever Ramsay agreed to do in the way
o
f loaning State funds was with the banks, which were entities in
law, and not with the individuals who signed the bond; that there
was no agreement o
f
the banks themselves prior to January 12,
1803, when the certificates were issued, that they were not cer
tificates o
f
the bondsmen; that the banks and not the bondsmen,
paid the interest and paid back the principal. This is a refine
ment in separating the parties to the transaction that we are not
able to appreciate o
r approve. The sureties signed the bond as rep
resentatives o
f
the banks, and they all understood it in that way.
A bank cannot, as such, become a surety upon a bond, and it can
not have any understanding o
r
make a contract except as its





the Metropolitan National Bank he was
asked if the banks were not the real sureties and not the individu
als, and if the benefits which the banks received from the State
funds were not the consideration for becoming sureties, and his
answer was, “There is no way o
f
a national bank becoming surety
on a bond.” Again, he was asked if it was not the understanding
that the officers would not have to pay anything, and answered,
“We could not make such an agreement—it would not be legal.”
The president o
f
the Chicago National Bank testifies that when
he drew his check to make good the deficit he drew it with the
expectation that he would be reimbursed, because the profits that
would have accrued from the use o
f
the money would have bene
fited the bank and he expected the bank to stand the loss. The
officers signed the bond for the benefit o
f
the banks, as their
officers and representatives, and at least three o
f
the banks have
reimbursed them. This suit is being prosecuted for the benefit o
f
the banks, and what the officers did in signing the bond and are




their official relations as agents o
f
the
banks. We cannot say that the banks are guilty, and that their
officers, who made the bargain and did the business, are innocent.
Another division o
f









































































































































202 ESTATE oF RA)/lS.\Y v. WHITBECK [Chap. II
is insisted upon for the purpose of bringing the claim within the
rule that if there is a single legal consideration for two promises,
one of which is legal and the other illegal, the lawful promise
may be enforced. The rule has been stated as follows: “A dis
tinction must be taken between the cases in which the consider
ation is illegal in part and those in which the promise founded
on the consideration is illegal in part. If any part of a consider
ation is illegal the whole consideration is void, because public
policy will not permit a party to enforce a promise which he has
obtained by an illegal act or an illegal promise, although he may
have connected with this act or promise another which is legal.
But if one gives a good and valid consideration, and thereupon
another promises to do two things, one legal and the other illegal,
he shall be held to do that which is legal, unless the two are so
mingled and bound together that they cannot be separated, in
which case the whole promise is void.” (Parsons on Contracts,
457). \'Vhen a surety signs a bond the law raises an implied
promise by the principal to reimburse the surety for any loss
which he may sustain, and when a loss occurs this implied contract
of indemnity relates back and takes effect from the time when the
surety became responsible. (Chateau v. Jones, 11 Ill. 300).
Under this rule, when the sureties signed the bond of Ramsay
the law implied a promise on his part to indemnify and save them
harmless from all loss which they might sustain by reason of
such signing, and when they made up the deficit this implied
promise related back to the date of bond. This implied promise
was perfectly lawful and legal. and it is said that if there was a
separate promise on the part of Ramsay to keep the money in the
banks it would not prevent a recovery by the sureties upon the
lawful promise to reimburse them. This argument loses sight
entirely of the consideration upon which Ramsay’s promise rested.
On the one side there was the implied promise of indemnity and
the promise to deposit the money with the banks. The consider
ation on the other side was that the sureties would execute the
bond and the banks which they represented would pay the inter
est. The consideration upon which the implied promise now
sought to be enforced was made was the signing of the bond and
the payment of interest to the Treasurer. The consideration mov
ing from the sureties was not the single one, free from unlawful
taint, but included pecuniary gain and advantage to the Treasurer
by an unlawful agreement, under which they paid interest to him.
Ramsay would not have wanted the sureties to sign the bond or











































































































































ESTATE oF RAMSAY v. WIIITBECK 20$
own pecuniary advantage. The arrangement, whether it resulted
in gain for the banks or not, was made for that purpose and upon
that consideration, and the transaction on the part of Ramsay,
on the other hand, was for his benefit, and it involved a violation
of the criminal law and the public policy of the state. The
promises are connected and so mingled and bound together that
they are not separable. The claim cannot be brought within the
exception stated. The law will not enforce the lawful implied
promise of indemnity resting upon the illegal consideration that
the banks would borrow money and pay interest on it. The
parties were all engaged in the illegal enterprise and all are
equally involved. '
It is especially urged that we should adopt the view of the
appellees that they did not enter into a contract forbidden by law,
but that, at most, they had a mere hope or expectation that the
law would be violated by deposits of money with their banks,
which did not amount to an agreement to that effect, and it was
this hope or expectation which was afterwards realized. It is
said that they occupy honorable positions in the business world,
and presumption against them should not be lightly indulged.
We are slow to impute to any person a violation of the law un
less the evidence requires,—and this rule applies to all persons,
whether distinguished in the ranks of business life or not. The
law is the same for all, and we cannot find these parties guiltless
when the facts show the contrary. The whole evidence on the
subject of the agreement came from them. They were called
as witnesses by the defendant, and the facts we have stated are
found in their testimony. We have given the case our best at
tention, both upon the original argument and the re-argument
which was allowed, and are unable to reach any other conclu
sion.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and the circuit court
of Clinton County are reversed and the cause is remanded to the












































































































































2O4 CHIT WOOD V. HATFIELD [Chap. II
SECTION 3. EXECUTION AND DELIVERY
64. CHITWOOD v. HATFIELD, et al., 136 Mo. App. 688.
Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1909.
Assurer's contract is not binding unless and until it is de
livered.
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court.—Hon. HUGH DABBS,
Judge.
Thomas Dolan, for appellant.
Cole, Burnett & Williams, for respondents.
JoHNSON, J.—This is an action on a negotiable promissory
note brought by plaintiff against defendants Hatfield, Long, Ro
zelle and Lortz. Hatfield was the principal maker. The other
defendants signed the note as sureties. Among other defenses,
the sureties alleged that the note was without a consideration,
that it was not delivered to the payee and that it was not endorsed
by the payee to plaintiff “for value received.”
The cause was tried to the court without the aid of a jury.
No declarations of law were asked or given. Judgment was ren
dered for plaintiff against Hatfield, but in favor of defendant
sureties. Plaintiff appealed.
There is no substantial controversy over the facts of the case.
Plaintiff was a banker at Carl Junction, a town about nine miles
from Joplin. Hatfield was a customer of plaintiff and was in
debted to him on a note and overdraft. He applied to plaintiff
for an additional loan of $700, and was referred to T. W. Cun
ningham, a banker at Joplin, with whom plaintiff kept an account.
He went to Cunningham's bank, obtained a blank note, filled it
out, signed it and procured the signatures of defendants, Long
and Rozelle, and of three other sureties, viz., H. S. Bowman, J.
W. Jameson and Joseph Story. Afterward, he presented the
note to Cunningham, who refused to accept it on the ground that
the security was insufficient. A day or two later, Hatfield saw
plaintiff at Carl Junction and told him of the refusal of Cunning
ham to take the note. Plaintiff advised Hatfield to procure de
fendant Lortz as a surety and said that he “would see that defend
ant got the money on it.” Hatfield induced Lortz to sign the note
and then returned to plaintiff who cashed the note which was
made payable to the order of Cunningham and would become due
six months after it
s
date. At no time did Cunningham promise to
lend any money to Hatfield nor had he authorized plaintiff to









































































































































Sect. 3] HAY WOOD V. TOWNSEND 2O5
took it to Cunningham who endorsed it without recourse at plain
tiff's request. It is a general as well as a statutory rule of law
that “every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and
revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giv
ing effect thereto.” By the terms of the note, the sureties under
took to enter into contractual relations with Cunningham, the
payee named therein. They did not propose to contract with
plaintiff, and it would seem to be too clear for serious discussion
that they could become bound only in the event of a delivery of
the note to Cunningham and his acceptance thereof. Until he
should bring himself into a contractual relation with them and
their principal, the contract necessarily remained incomplete and
in fact and law, was no contract at all. Plaintiff, who did not act
as the agent of Cunningham, did not make him a party to the
contract by voluntarily cashing the note, nor could he make him
self an original party without the consent of the sureties. We
think he could not give life to the contract by subsequently ob
taining the indorsement of Cunningham without recourse. Al
ready he had voluntarily parted with his money on his own re
sponsibility. At no time did Cunningham assume any contractual
obligations to the makers of the note. There was no delivery of
the instrument to him, no acceptance thereof by him, and no con
sideration from him to the makers. Since he never became a
party to the contract, his indorsement without recourse which im
posed no obligation on him did not constitute him a party and was
ineffective for any purpose.
We conclude that the learned trial judge was right in dis
charging the sureties. Accordingly the judgment is affirmed.
All concur.
65. HAYWOOD, Adm'r., etc., respondent, v. TOWNSEND, et al.,
appellants, 4 App. Div. 246.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, New York, 1896.
Delivery of bond by sureties to principal sufficient to make
their obligation complete. Verified copy of bond may be delivered
in lieu of original, lost or destroyed; intention governs.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
W. J. Palmer, for the appellants.
F. L. Michael, for the respondent.
HERRICK, J.—In the year 1863, one Cynthia Lane made her









































































































































206 H.wwooo v. TOWNSEND [Chap. ll
and bequeathed to Cynthia _l
. Haywood the sum of $500, and to
Alice Haywood the sum of $300, to be paid to them by her execu
tor on their arriving at full age, but until that time to be kept at
interest for their benefit, and further directed that said executor
should “execute good and sufficient surety for the benefit of said
children before he shall enter upon the discharge of his trust,
conditioned for the safe investment of said money, and the pay
ment thereof, to said children, with interest, on their arriving at
full age.”
Robert M. Townsend was designated by her as the executor
of said last will and testament. Said Cynthia Lane died on or
about the 25th day of June, 1864, and letters testamentary were
issued to Robert M. Townsend on the 12th day of December, 1864.
On the 15th day of March, 1865, Robert M. Townsend, prin
cipal, and the defendants, John J. Townsend and Enoch L. Town
send, as sureties, executed a bond under their hands and seals,
conditioned that the said Robert M. Townsend should well and
truly discharge the duties of his trust, and keep the said legacies
invested for and pay the same to Cynthia J. and Alice Haywood,
their attorneys, administrators, executors or assigns, with inter
est, on their becoming of age, according to the requirements of
the said last will and testament.’
This bond appears to have remained with Robert M. Town
send, or, if it was ever filed in the surrogate’s office, was subse
quently taken therefrom. For some two or three years afterwards
it was in the possession of Robert M. Townsend, and was taken
from him by the defendant John J. Townsend and burned.
After the execution of the bond, and on the 16th day of
March, 1865, the said Robert M. Townsend delivered a copy of it
to the plaintiff, attached to which was an affidavit stating that the
same was a copy of the original bond filed in the office of the sur
rogate of Otsego county, and received from the plaintiff (the
father of Cynthia J. and Alice Haywood) the sum of $800 upon
said trust.
The said Robert M. Townsend has not paid over the full
amount of said legacies as required under the will, and as pro
vided by his bond. The legatee Cynthia J. Miller, nee Haywood,
died intestate in the year 1878, and the plaintiff was appointed
administrator of her estate. In 1894 an accounting by the said
Robert M. Townsend as trustee was had upon the petition of the
plaintiff as administrator of the estate of Cynthia J. Miller before
the surrogate of Otsego county, and a decree was made by the









































































































































Sect. 3] H.-wwooo v. ToyvnsuNn 207
was adjudged that the said trustee, Robert M. Townsend, was in
debted to the plaintiff as administrator on account of the said
legacy and interest belonging to the estate of Cynthia J. Miller,
in the sum of $2,324.80; an execution therefor has been issued and
returned unsatisfied to the amount of $1,755.09. * * *
* * * The most serious objection made is
,
that the bond was
‘never delivered. \/Ve are not cited to any authority as to what is ,
necessary to a delivery in a case such as this. Delivery is always H
a question of intention which must be that the instrument shall be
operative. (2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 458).
The same strict rules do not apply to bonds and undertakings
as to deeds.
The defendants, it appears from the testimony, knew what
the bond was for; that without it the trustee, Robert M. Town
send, could not acquire possession of the money that was left by
the testatrix for the benefit of the legatees: they signed and exe
cuted the bond for the purpose of enabling him to get that money;
when they delivered it to him and left it with him, after having
_executed i
t, it was, so far as any act of theirs necessarv to be done
to fix their liability upon the bond. complete. ‘T’/5’0<D/7);,
Their obligation was something more than that of an.indor
ser upon a note of a guarantor of the payment of money; they
became responsible for the fidelity of the trustee, his integrity.
(Douglass v. Ferris, 63 Hun, 413).
Before he could commence the duties of his trust his faith
fulness must be guaranteed; when they placed in his hands the
bond signed by them their act was finished; they had guaranteed
his fidelity and became responsible for any breach; so far as they
were concerned the delivery was complete; they had delivered
the instrument to him with the intention that their guaranty
should be operative, that it should enable him to enter upon the
duties of his trust. At the time he delivered a sworn copy of it
as a voucher of his authority and right to receive the trust fund
the bond executed by the defendants was in existence, and its
subsequent destruction after the trustee, upon the faith of its exe
cution and existence, had secured the legacies, cannot alter the
liability of the defendants. If at that time the plaintiff, instead of
John J. Townsend, had secured possession of the bond and kept
it until this time instead of burning it
,
can there be any question
but that he could recover upon it? Does the fact that after it had
partially fulfilled its office, but while its most important function
remained unperformed, it was taken and destroyed by one of its









































































































































2O8 HAY WOOD V. TOWNSEND [Chap. II
to whether such an instrument ever existed? It seems to me not.
It is claimed by both parties that the bond should have been
filed in the surrogate's office; I assume that to be the law of the
case; that was then the only additional delivery that the bond
was capable of; it could not be given to the infant legatees or to
their guardians, or to any other persons for them; it was to be
left with the surrogate. It was not a thing necessary to be done
by the sureties.
The requirement that it should be filed with the surrogate
was for the benefit of the legatees, not for the benefit of the prin
cipal upon the bond or his sureties; and the fact that it was not
filed, that their principal did not do his duty in that respect, can
not be asserted by them as a defense to the bond. Their signing
the bond was not conditional upon it
s being filed; as above stated,
the requirement that it should be filed was not for their benefit.
It has been held that the requirement that a bond should be
approved by the surrogate is not one for the benefit of the sure
ties, but o
f
the creditors and legatees, and that the sureties cannot
raise the objection that it has not been so approved; that such an
objection is in the nature o
f
a
n objection to their own act, o
r




Having, by signing the bond and giving it to the principal,
placed it in the power o
f
the principal to secure the money, and
h
e having done so, it has, so far as the principal and sureties are
concerned, served its purpose, and the defendants should not be
permitted to repudiate the bond to the detriment o
f
the parties
it was apparently given to secure. (Russell v. Freer, 56 N. Y
.
67).
The defendants were bound b
y
the judgment and decree o
f
the surrogate as to the amount due from Robert M. Townsend,
the trustee, to the plaintiff.
When sureties go upon the bond o
f
a testamentary trustee,
they make themselves privy to a
ll proceedings against the prin
cipal, and when he, without fraud o
r collusion, is concluded, they





Douglass v. Ferris, 138 id
.
192-2OI).
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.









































































































































Sect. 3] RUSSELL. V. FREER 209-
66. RUSSELL, Adm'r, etc., respondent, v. FREER, et al., appellants,
56 N. Y. 67.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1874.
A surety who signs upon a condi 6%hors his written con
tract and empowers his principal to make delivery, is bound there
by, even though the condition be not performed; unless the obligee
is put on notice.
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the third judicial department, affirming a judgment in
favor of plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee. . . .
This action was brought upon an official bond given by de
fendant, Charles J. Dolson, upon his appointment as deputy col
lector of internal revenue.
William Masten, plaintiff's, intestate, was collector; propos
ing to appoint said Dolson as his deputy, he required of him a





him as such. Two o
f
the obligors,




f signing by them, the name o
f
James Dolson ap
peared in the body o
f
the bond, and that they executed with the
expectation that he would also execute it before delivery, but that
his name was subsequently erased without their knowledge o
r
consent. * * * Further facts appear in the opinion.
M. Schoonmaker, for the appellants.
P
. Cantine, for the respondent.









States, and proposed to appoint the defendant, Charles J. Dolson,
a deputy collector, and required-security from him to account for
and pay over the money received b
y
him as such deputy. Fo:
this purpose the bond in question was prepared for execution; as
to which the referee finds the following facts: That at the time
the bond was executed by the parties, one James Dolson was named
in the bond as one o
f
the obligors therein. Before the defend
ants, Hasbrouck and Freer (the appellants) signed the bond,
they were told b
y
the defendant, Charles J. Dolson, that the said
James Dolson was to sign the bond; and at the time they signed
said bond they expected that the said James Dolson would sign
the bond; that after they signed the bond the name o
f
James
Dolson was struck out o
f
the bond, without their knowledge and
consent. That the plaintiff's intestate was not present at the time










































































































































210 RUSSELL v. I-‘REER [Chap. II
the time the bond was delivered to him he knew or had any infor
mation of the above facts; that a few days after its execution it
was delivered to the intestate by the defendant Charles J. Dolson;
that after the bond was executed it was left with the defendant
Charles J. Dolson, without any direction by the defendants, Has
brouck and Freer, or any of the parties to the bond that it was
not to be delivered to the intestate until it should be signed by
James Dolson.
The only inference that can be drawn from these facts is
that the bond was executed by Charles J. Dolson as principal
and by the others as his sureties, and left by the latter with the
former, to be delivered to the intestate for the purposes intended,
but that the sureties expected that before such delivery it would
be executed by James Dolson as co-obligor and co-surety with
them. It is clear upon these facts, both upon principle and author
ity, that the bond was a valid obligation upon those who executed
it. Upon principle, for the reason that the sureties knew the pur
pose of making the bond was the protection of the intestate from
loss from the acts of Charles J. Dolson as deputy collector. They
left the bond in his hands for delivery to the intestate for that pur
pose, expecting that he would, before that, procure its execution
by James Dolson. The intestate knew nothing of this expectation ;
he relied upon the bond, and so relying appointed the principal
deputy collector; and thus became himself responsible for his acts
as such. The appellants by executing the bond and leaving it
with Dolson, the principal, placed it in his power to deliver it as
a valid and complete instrument. He did so deliver it
,
and there
by the intestate was induced to appoint him deputy and incur the
responsibility consequent upon the appointment. It is a case for
the application of the maxim that when one of two innocent par
ties must sustain a loss from the wrongful act of a third, the
loss must be borne by the one who has enabled the wrong-doer to
commit the act.
It is insisted by the counsel for the appellant that the bond,
upon its face, showed that the name of James Dolson had been
inserted in the body as an obligor, and erased therefrom, and that
this should have put the intestate upon inquiry to ascertain why
it was not executed by him. The case shows that all the names
in the body of the bond were written by the justice who took
the acknowledgments of those who executed it and by whom
the oath to the justification was administered. Under these cir
cumstances the erasure of a name of a person who did not execute,









































































































































Sect. 3] RUSSELL v. FREER 211
if it would in the absence of these facts. The authorities are con
clusive against the defence upon the facts found. (Dair v. The
United States, 16 Wallace I ; State v. Peck, 53 Maine 284; State
v. Pepper, 3I Indiana 76; McC ormick v. Bay City, 23 Michigan
457)
Chouteau v. Suydam (21 N. Y. 179), cited by counsel for the
appellants, has no application to this case. The facts do not bring
the case within the principle of The People v. Bostwick (32 N. Y.
445), assuming that that case was well decided; which may well
be questioned. (See Dair v. United States, and other cases,
supra.) But in that case stress was laid and the judgment was
based upon the fact that the agent of the principal was directed
by the sureties executing the bond, not to deliver it to the auditor
unless it should first be executed by Dickerson as co-surety, and
that he did deliver it without doing this. No such fact is found
in this case.











































































































































CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT
67. STROUGHTON v. DAY, Aleyn Io".
Court of King's Bench, Paschal Term, 1647.
At common law the contract of the surety was construed
most strongly against the obligee.
In debt upon a Bond with Condition, That whereas the Plain
tiff is Sheriff of Surry, and hath made Cornelius Trapp his Bailiff
of the Hundred of Brixto, if he should execute his Office, &c., and
make true returns of all Warrants directed to him, then, &c.
The Defendant upon oyer pleads particularly performance to
all; the Plaintiff replies, that process was directed to him to
levy Issues upon J. S. and that he made his Warrant to Trapp
to execute the same, which Warrant he did not return; and
upon a Demurrer Judgment was given against the Plaintiff,
because he did not shew that the Issues were to be levied within
the Hundred of Brixto; for it was resolved, that though the words
of the Condition were general to make return of al
l
Warrants di
rected to him, yet it was to be understood o
f
such only as were to
be executed within the Hundred of which he was made Bailiff.
68. RUSSELL v. CLARK'S EXECUTORS, et al., 7 Cranch 69.
Supreme Court, United States, 1812.
To charge one person with the debt of another the under
taking must be clear and explicit.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island,
in a suit in equity, brought b
y Russell, against Clark in his life





to recover from him the amount o




one Jonathan Russell, for the use o
f
Robert Murray &
Co. whose agent he was, upon James B
. Murray, in London, and









































































































































Chap. III] RUSSELL v. CLARK's ExECUTORS 2I 3
indorsed by the complainant, Nathaniel Russell, upon the faith
of two letters written to him by Clark and Nightingale, in the
following words:
PROVIDENCE, 20th January, 1796.
“NATHANIEL RUSSELL, ESQ.
Dear Sir: Our friends, Messrs. Robert Murray & Co., merchants
in New York, having determined to enter largely into the purchase of
rice, and other articles of your produce in Charleston, but being entire
strangers there, they have applied to us for letters of introduction to
our friend. In consequence of which, we do ourselves the pleasure of
introducing them to your correspondence as a house on whose integrity
and punctuality the utmost dependence may be placed; they will write
you the nature of their intentions, and you may be assured of their com
plying fully with any contract or engagements they may enter into with
you.—The friendship we have for these gentlemen, induces us to wish you
will render them every service in your power; at the same time, we flatter
ourselves the correspondence will prove a mutual benefit.
“We are, with sentiments of esteem, dear sir,
“Your most obedient servants,
“CLARK & NIGHTINGALE.'
PROVIDENCE, 21st January, 1796.
“NATHANIEL RUSSELL, ESQ.
Dear Sir: We wrote you yesterday, a letter of recommendation in
favor of Messrs. Robert Murray & Co.—We have now to request that
you will render them every assistance in your power. * * *
“We are, dear sir, -
“Your most obedient servants,
“CLARK & NIGHTINGALE.”




the judges being present, MARSHALL, ch. jus
tice, delivered the following opinion:-
This is a suit in chancery instituted for the purpose o
f ob






Jonathan Russell, an agent o
f
Robert Murray & Co. and
indorsed by Nathaniel Russell; which bills were protested for





plaintiff contends that the house o
f
Clark & Nightingale had
rendered itself responsible for these bills by two letters addressed
to him, one o
f








which his indorsements, as he says, were made.
The letters are in these words—(See the preceding statement
o
f
the case). * * * The court will proceed to inquire how far
Clark & Nightingale were liable to the plaintiff for the debt due
to him from Robert Murray & Co.
•
* ,
The law will subject a man, having no interest in the tran
saction, to pay the debt o











































































































































2r_4 Russ1:i.L v. cL.-uu<'s EXECUTORS [Chap. III
manifests a clear intention to bind himself for that debt. Words
of doubtful import ought not, it is conceived, to receive that con
struction. It is the duty of the individual, who contracts with
one man on the credit of another, not to trust to ambiguous
phrases and strained constructions, but to require an explicit and
plain declaration of the obligation he is about to assume. In
their letter of the 20th, Clark & Nightingale indicate no intention
to take any responsibility on themselves, but say that Mr. Russell
may be assured Robert Murray & Co. will comply fully with their
engagements. In their letter of the 21st they speak of the letter
of the preceding day as a letter of recommeudation, and add “we
have now to request that you will endeavor to render them every
assistance in your power.”
How far ought this request to have influenced the plaintiff?
Ought he to have considered it as a request that he would advance
credit or funds for Robert Murray & Co. on the responsibility of
Clark and Nightingale, or simply as a strong manifestation of the
friendship of Clark and Nightingale for Murray & Co., and of
their solicitude that N. Russell should aid their operations as far
as his own view of his interests would induce him to embark in
the commercial transactions of a house of high character, posses
sing the particular good wishes of Clark and Nightingale?
' It is certain that merchants are in the habit of recommending
correspondents to each other without meaning to become sureties
for the person recommended; and that, generally speaking, such
acts are deemed advantageous to the person to whom the party
is introduced, as well as to him who obtains the recommendation.
These letters are strong, but they contain no intimation of
any intention of Clark & Nightingale to become answerable for
Robert Murray & Co., and they are not destitute of expressions
alluding to that reciprocity of benefit which results from the in
tercourse of merchants with each other. “The friendship,” say
they, in their letter of the 20th, “we have for these gentlemen, in
duces us to wish you will render them every service in your power,
at the same time we flatter ourselves this correspondence will
prove a mutual benefit.”
Mr. Russell appears to have contemplated the transaction as
one from which a fair advantage was to be derived. He received
a commission on his indorsements.
The court cannot consider these letters as constituting a
contract by which Clark and Nightingale undertook to render
themselves liable for the engagements of Robert Murray & Co.









































































































































Chap. III] GATES V. MC KEE 2 I 5
f • *
of ~
tainly have been the duty of the plaintiff to have given immediate
notice to the defendants of the extent of his engagements. * * *
Cause remanded.
69. GATES v. McKEE, 13 N. Y. 232.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1855.
The contract of the assurer is to be construed according to
the rules that apply to all contracts.
The action was upon an instrument of which the following
is a copy:
“MIDDLEPORT, Feb. 6, 1844.
MR. GATEs.—Sir: I will be responsible for what stock M. E. McKee
has had or may want hereafter to the amount of five hundred dollars.
CHAUNCEY McKEE.”
The cause was tried at the Orleans county circuit, before
Justice Mullett, without a jury. The plaintiff read in evidence the





admitted; and proved that a
t
the time it was executed and thence
ensuing, the plaintiff was a tanner and currier, and dealer in
leather and stock for the shoemaking business a
t Barre, in the
county o
f Orleans, and that M. E
.
McKee was a shoemaker and
carried on business at Middleport in the county o
f Niagara. At
the time the instrument was executed b
y
the defendant, there was
due from M. E
.
McKee $60,44 for stock, previously sold and de
livered to him b
y
the plaintiff. After the instrument was delivered
to the plaintiff and prior to January, 1850, he sold and delivered
to M. E
.
McKee stock for the shoemaking business, to the amount
o
f $1,045,65. Prior to the date last mentioned, M. E
.
McKee
paid to the plaintiff the amount due him at the time the irst3rument
was executed, and also sundry amounts from time to time on
account o
f
the stock sold after its execution, amounting in all to




1850, from M. E
.
McKee o
f $520, for which he then executed to
the plaintiff his due bill. Subsequently and before the commence
ment o
f
the action M. E
.
McKee made further payments to the
plaintiff, reducing the amount due the latter to $408.89. The
plaintiff claimed to recover o
f
the defendant this amount.
Upon these facts the counsel for the defendant insisted that
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because: 1. The instru
ment signed b
y
the defendant did not express, nor did the evidence









































































































































216 GATES V. MC KEE [Chap. III
an absolute contract for the purchase of goods by the defendant
to the amount of $500 and not a contract of guarantee; 3. If it
was to be regarded as a contract of guarantee, it was not a con
tinuing guarantee; 4. That M. E. McKee having paid more than
$500 on the account, which accrued for property sold after the exe
cution of the contract by the defendant, the latter was thereby
discharged. The court overruled each of said objections, and
decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the balance due,
being $408.89, and ordered judgment for this amount. The
counsel for the defendant excepted. The judgment was affirmed
at a general term of the court in the 8th district. The defendant
appealed to this court.
Nathan Dayton, for the appellant.
S. E. Church, for the respondent.
DENIO. J. If this were the first time that an instrument of
this character had been before a court, and we were now called
upon to construe it without the light of adjudged cases, the first
inquiry would naturally be whether the limit of $500 related to
the amount of purchases to be made by M. E. McKee or to
the defendant's ultimate liability; and I think it clearly qualifies the
responsibility of the defendant and not the amount-of-M.-E. Mc
Kee's future transaction with the plaintiff. It is as if he had said
“I will be responsible to the amount of $500 for what stock M. E.
McKee has had or may want hereafter,” &c. I also think that
the words “what stock” in their relation to future purchases, have
the force of whatever stock or whatever amount of stock he may
want hereafter; and the word “stock” alone denotes the supply of
materials for the business of the party spoken of. The word
“hereafter” seems to be used in an indefinite sense. It is not at
any particular time in the future, but as if it were written at any
time hereafter. The words “may want” are significant as to the
character of the future dealings in contemplation, and they mean
the same thing as may need or require or may have occasion for.
M. E. McKee was a shoemaker, and the plaintiff was a leather
manufacturer; and reading of the paper as relating to their re
spective occupations and giving the language the interpretation
which I have suggested and leaving out what is said of past in
debtedness as immaterial, the following paraphrase would appear
to me to express it
s
true meaning: “Sir, I will be responsible to
the amount of five hundred dollars for whatever amount of ma
terials in his line M. E
.
McKee may, at any time hereafter re









































































































































Chap. III] ouss v. MC REF. 217
what the plaintiff or any other person to whom such a paper might
be addressed. would naturally, and in my opinion, unavoidably
understand from it. If this is the meaning which the paper
naturally conveys, it is the sense which the court is bound to apply
to it. The cases areinot entirely harmonious as to the principles
‘of construction which ought to govern in this class of cases, but
the weight of authority is altogether in favor of construing guar
antees by rules at least as favorable to the creditor as those which
courts apply to other written contracts, irrespective of the con
sideration that the guarantor is a surety. In Mason \-'. Pritehard
(12 East 227), the court said the words were to be taken as
strongly against the party giving the guarantee as the sense of
them would admit., The same remark is found in the opinion of
the supreme court of the United States in Drummond v. Prestmtm
(12 Wheat. 515), which was_ the case of a guarantee. In Doug
lass v. Reynolds (7'Peters, 113, 122), Judge Story said, speaking
of guarantees, “as these instruments are of extensive use in the
commercial world, upon the faith of which large credits and ad
vances are made, care should be taken to hold the party bound
to the full extent of what appears to be his engagement.” In
Lawrence v. McCa1mont (2 Howard 426), the attention of the
same learned judge was directed particularly to this ‘question of
construction. After remarking that a question had been made on
the argument whether the letters of guarantee under considera
tion should receive a strict or a liberal construction, he said: “We
have no difficulty whatsoever in saying that instruments of this
sort ought to receive a liberal interpretation. By a liberal inter
pretation we do not mean that the words should be forced out of
their natural meaning, but simply that the words should receive
a fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the objects
for which the instrument is designed and the purposes to which
it is applied. We should never forget that letters of guarantee are
commercial instruments, generally drawn up by merchants in
brief language, sometimes inartificial, and often loose in their
structure and aim; and to construe the words of such instruments
with a nice and technical care would not only defeat the intention
of the parties, but render them too unsafe a basis to rely on for
extensive credits, so often sought in the present active business of
commerce throughout the world.” Further on he says: “If the
language used be ambiguous and admits of two fair interpreta
tions, and the guarantee has advanced his money upon the faith
of the interpretation most favorable to his rights, that interpre









































































































































218 c..\rEs v. MC KEE [Chap. III
the guarantor to say that he may, without peril, scatter ambigu
ous words, by which the other party is misled to his injury.”
These extracts express so happily my notion of the rules of con
struction, which ought to prevail in this class of cases, that I
need only add, that the same general principle will be found as
serted with more or less distinctness in Bell v. Bruen (1 How.
169, 186) ;Ha-ight v. Brooks (10 Adolph. and Ellis, 309) ; Mayer -
v. Isaac (6 Mees. and \-Velsb. 605-) ; Dobbin v. Bradley (17 I/Vend.
422) ; Hargreiwe v. Smee (6 Bing. 244). In the last case C. J.
TISDALE said: “There is no reason for putting on a guarantee a
construction different from what the court put on any other in
strument. With regard to other instruments, the rule is that if
the party executing them leaves anything ambiguous in his ex
pressions, such ambiguity must be taken most strongly against
himself.” And BRONSON, J., in the case referred to from 17 Wen
dell, remarks that commercial guarantees are in extensive use,
and that he can perceive no reason why they should not receive the
same liberal construction for advancing the end which the parties
had in view, as is given to other contracts. I am aware that
judges have in some few instances spoken of the construction
strietissimi jnris as the one to be applied to all contracts where
sureties are sought to be charged, and that Judge Story himself,
in an earlier case than the one_from which I have quoted, ex
pressed the opinion that where it was doubtful whether a guaran
tee created a continuing obligation, the presumption should be
against it. (Cremer v. Higginson, I Mason 336). There is a
sense undoubtedly, in which it may be said that these obligations
are to be strictly construed; and it is this: That the surety is not
to be held beyond the very precise stipulations of his contract. He
is not liable on an implied engagement where a party contracting
for his own interest might be, and he has a right to insist upon
the exact performance of any condition for which he has stipu
lated, whether others would consider it material or not. But
where the question is as to the meaning of the written language
in which he has contracted, there is no difference, and there ought
not to be any, between the contract of a surety and that of any
other party. I feel no difficulty, therefore, in reading the short
instrument which we are called upon to construe in the sense
which every person, when informed of the situation of the parties
and who had considered the nature of the business it was designed
to facilitate, would naturally place upon it. If I am right in the
meaning which I have attributed to the several expressions con
tained in it
,









































































































































Chap. III] o.\rF.s v. me KEF. 219
tween the parties to a particular amount and its purposes were not
fully accomplished when the person whose credit was intended to
be aided, had once contracted a debt to the plaintiff to the amount of
$500, and had paid that debt. It contemplated a continuous
business and a standing credit to the amount mentioned. If I am
right in this (and the question is merely one of construction),
there is no case or dictum which I have met with, which will
exonerate the defendant. The adjudications are very numerous,
and although I have examined more than I can conveniently refer
to, I will mention the following only, each of which contains
principles which will uphold the conclusion which I have arrived
at, that this contract is a continuing guarantee. (Fellows v.
Prentiss, 3 Denio 518; Clark v. Burditt, 2 Hall 197; Doug
lass v. Reynolds, 7 Peters 113; Bent v. Harrtshorn, I Metc.
2.4: Barstow v. Bennett, 3 Camp. 290; Rapelye v. Bailey, 5
Conn. 149; Mayer v. Isaac, supra: Hargreave v. Smee, 6 Bing.
244; Allan v. Kerming, 9 id. 618; Hitehock v. Hnmfrey, 5 Mann.
and Gr. 560; Martin v. Wright, 6 Adolph. and Ellis, N. S. 917).
In several of these cases the intention to guarantee a continuous
trading was much more distinctly expressed than in the present
case; but in others, such as Mason v. Pritehard, which has re
peatedly received the sanction of the courts in this country and
has never been disapproved of in any court, and in Matrtin v.
Wright, which was decided quite recently, the same liberal, or I
may rather say natural and reasonable intendment was made,
which I have supposed ought to be applied to the instrument
under consideration.
The objection that the consideration was not sufficiently ex
pressed to satisfy the requirement of the Revised Statute of
Frauds is answered by the judgment of this court in The Union
Bank v. Costefs Exrs., (3 Comst. 204).
I am in favor of affirming the judgment of the supreme court.










































































































































22o PEOPLE v. BACKUS [Chap. III
70. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NE.\/V YORK, respondent, v.
BACKUS, et al., appellants, II7 N. Y., 196, 22 N. E. 759.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1889.
Promise to answer for default of (mother. C'onstruction. of
contract. Change of principal contract.
APPEAL from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the Third Judicial Department, entered upon an order
made February 5, 1889, which affirmed a judgment in favor of
plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee.
This action was brought by the people against the defend
ants as guarantors upon the following bond or contract of the
National Bank of Auburn, to-wit:
“Whereas certain moneys of the State of New York have been and
are proposed to be deposited in the First National Bank of Auburn, under
the direction of the comptroller of the state, by the agent and warden of
Auburn prison, to the credit of the treasury of the state, for safekeeping
and for interest.
“Now therefore, the said First National Bank of Auburn, in consider
ation of such deposits and for value received, does hereby agree to pay on
demand, to the order of the state treasurer, or other officer of the state
having lawful authority to demand the same, such deposits, and any and
all parts thereof, together with interest on daily balance, at the rate of
three per cent. _ _ _
“Witness the seal of said Bank and the signature of its president and
cashier, this 14th day of June, 1880.”
The guaranty was as follows:
“In consideration of the making the deposits by the people of the
State of New York in the First National Bank of Auburn, in the agree
ment mentioned, and for value received, we, the undersigned, Clinton T.
Backus, Manson F. Backus, James Kerr and William E. Hughitt, do
hereby jointly and severally guarantee the full and punctual performance
of the condition of said agreement on the part of said bank, and that all
such deposits and interest shall be fully paid on legal demand. The said
guarantors may serve upon the comptroller a written 'notice, terminating
or limiting their liability under this guaranty, after a date to be specified
in said notice, which shall not be less than ten days after the service of
said notice.”
The agent and warden was by law the official manager of
the state prison at Auburn, and was requested to deposit all moneys
received by him each week to the credit of the treasurer of the
state, in a bank located at Auburn, and send to the comptroller
weekly a statement showing the amount so received, and from
whom or where received and deposited. and the days on which
such deposits were made, such statement to be certified by the
proper officer of the bank receiving such deposits. The agent and









































































































































Chap. III] PEOPLE v. nxcxus 221
posited was all the money received by him from whatever source
of prison income during the week and up to the time of the deposit,
and all moneys so deposited by him were subject to the quarterly
drafts of the treasurer of the state. The law required that any
bank in which deposits should be made should, before receiving
any such deposit, file a bond with the comptroller of the state,
subject to his approval, for such sum as he should deem neces
sary. § 50, Chap. 460, Laws of 1847, as amended by Chap. 58,
Laws of 1854, and Chap. 599, Laws of 1860. By section 6 of
Chapter 177 of the Laws of 1877, it was provided that “The
system of labor in the state prisons shall be by contract or by the
state or partly by one system and partly by the other, as shall in
the discretion of the superintendent be deemed best.” From the
time of the execution of the bond until December, 1884, the busi
ness of the Auburn state prison was carried on under what was
known as the contract system. By chapter 21 of the Laws of that
year, the renewal of the then existing contracts, or the making of
new contracts for convict labor, was prohibited and after that the
prisoners were employed in manufacturing on state account.
The bank was incorporated under the National Bank Act of 1863.
on the 31st day of December of that year, and by its articles of
association it was provided that it should continue until the 25th
day of February, 1883, unless sooner dissolved by the act of a
majority of the stockholders thereof. By the Act of Congress,
passed July 12, 1882, (U. S. Stats. at Large, Vol. 22, p. 162),
National Banks were authorized to extend their corporate exis
tence; and in January, 1883, such proceedings were taken under
that act as to extend the charter of the bank and its corporate exis
tence until the 24th day of February, 1903. By section 4 of that
act it is provided that “any association so extending the period of
its existence shall continue to‘enjoy all the rights and privileges
and immunities granted, and shall continue to be subject to all
the duties, liabilities and restrictions imposed by the Revised
Statutes of the United States, and other acts having reference to
national banking associations, and it shall continue to be in all
respects the identical association it was before the extension of its
period of existence.”
After the giving of the bond by the bank and the guaranty
by the defendants, the agent and warden of the prison made
deposits in the bank, from time to time. down to February, 1888,
on which day there was upwards of $65,000 on deposit in the bank,
which it refused and neglected to pay upon the draft of the State









































































































































222 PEOPLE v. nxcxus [Chap. III
against the defendants, as sureties, to recover the amount remain
ing on deposit.
William F. Cogs-well, for appellant.
Charles F. Tabor, attorney-general, for respondent.
EARL, J.—No citation of authorities is needed to show that
the contracts of sureties are to be construed like other contracts
so as to give effect to the intention of the parties. In ascertain
ing that intention we are to read the language used by the parties
in the light of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument, and when we have thus ascertained their meaning
we are to give it effect. But when the meaning of the language
used has been thus ascertained, the responsibility of the surety is
not to be extended or enlarged by implication or construction,
and is strictissimi juris.
After the contract system in the state prisons was abolished,
and manufacturing therein could be done only on state account,
the amount of money deposited in this bank by the agent and
warden largely increased, and it is now claimed on behalf of the
defendants that their responsibility as sureties was largely ex
tended beyond what was contemplated at the time of the execu
tion of their giiaranty, and that they are therefore discharged.
By the statutes in force at the time of the execution of the
bond and guaranty, the agent and warden of the prison was re
quired to deposit all the moneys received by him from any source
in the bank. It is not reasonable to suppose that the sureties,
when they signed their guaranty, had in mind the particular source
from which the agent and warden received the money. They
must have known that they became responsible for all the moneys,
from whatever source, coming into his hands to be deposited. It
cannot be supposed that they had in mind that the system of labor
then in force at the prison would remain unchanged for an indefi
nite time, or that they cared anything about it. Much stress is laid
upon the words in the bond, “certain moneys,” which had been
and were proposed to be deposited. We think those words have
reference to the moneys to be deposited by the agent and warden
of the prison, as distinguished from other moneys of the state.‘
They were intended to point out the source from which the moneys
of the state to be deposited should come; and the words “such
deposits,” used later in the bond, have reference to the deposits
to be made by the agent and warden of the prison. So, the bond,
in the most general terms, covers and applies to all the money









































































































































Chap. III] PEOPLE v. n.\CKL'S 223
of'the state, by the agent and warden of the prison. The words
“certain moneys” and “such deposits” do not indicate that the
parties then had in mind the source from which the agent and
warden should receive his money, or the particular moneys which
he had theretofore deposited. But they manifestly have reference
to all the moneys which, under the direction of the Comptroller,
he might deposit in the bank. The bank desired to get all the
deposits it could, and the defendants, who were directors and
officers of the bank, desired to secure all the deposits. It cannot
be supposed that they contemplated, at the time they signed their
guaranty, that their liability was to be limited or restricted to
the amounts which had been previously deposited, or that those
amounts had any influence whatever upon their action. They
must therefore be held to the plain language of their guaranty,
and in holding that it covers moneys deposited subsequently to
1884, we do not extend their responsibility by implication or
construction, but simply hold them to the responsibility plainly
expressed in the language of the bond and the guaranty.
It is still further claimed, on the part of the defendants, that
they are discharged from any liability on their guaranty on
account of the extension of the existence of the corporation in
1883, before any default on the part of the bank, and for this
contention the learned counsel for the defendants cites Thompson
v. Young, 2 Ohio, 334; Union Bank v. Ridgeley, I H. & G. 324;
Bank of Washington v. Barrington, 2 Pa. 27; Brown v. Latimore,
17 Cal. 93. None of those cases are precisely like this in their
circumstances, but so far as they uphold the contention of the
defendants we are quite unwilling to follow them. The contrary
doctrine was held in E4-cter Bank v. Rogers, 7 N. H. 21; and
we think our decision in National Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Phelps,
97 N. Y. 44, is ample authority for the maintenance of this re
covery, notwithstanding the extension of the corporate existence of
the bank. In the latter case, under the provisions of the National
Banking Act and of chapter 97 of _the Laws of 1865, the state
bank was transformed into a national bank. and it was held to be
but a continuance of the same body under a changed jurisdiction;
that between it and those who had contracted with it
,
it retained
its indentity and might, as a national bank, enforce contracts made
with it as a state bank; that where a state bank, at the time of its
change to a national bank, held a continuing guaranty of loans
made by it upon the strength of which it had made loans, and
after the change had made further advances, an action was main









































































































































224 SMITH v. MOLLESON [Chap. III
guarantor was liable for the loans made, both before and after the
change. Here a new corporation was not formed; but there was
a mere prolongation of the existence of the same corporation
whose corporate identity was not changed or lost. The bank
which defaulted was the same bank for which the defendants be
came bound. There were not two banks in succession, but all
the time one bank. Its charter was amended so as to extend its
existence; and in the original national banking act (§ 67), it was
provided that Congress could, at any time, “amend, alter or repeal
this act.” It would certainly be a very inconvenient rule to hold
that all the contracts of sureties to the bank, and of sureties by
the bank, to other persons should be destroyed by every material
change or alteration in its charter. The contract was entered into
by the sureties with knowledge of this law, and it became a part
of their contract as if they had stipulated that the changes or al
terations might be made. The act of 1882 was a mere amend
ment or alteration of the previous banking act.
We do not deem it important to consider the effect that should
be given to the fact that these various defendants, as officers of
the bank, procured the extension of its existence, of which they
now seek to take advantage.
For the reasons we have already given, and those so well ex
pressed in the opinion of the learned referee before whom the




71. SMITH, respondent, v. MOLLESON, appellant, 148 N. Y., 241,
42 N. E. 669.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1896.
Construct-ion of contracts of suretyship. Same rules applied
as in construction of contracts in general.
Strictissimi juris—mean-ing of term as applied to contracts
of suretyship. _
Ambiguous language employed by the surety, effect of.
Appeal from Supreme Court, general term. First department.
IVilliarn C. Beecher, for appellant.
Jacob F. Miller, for respondent.
O’BR1EN, J. The defendant has been held liable as surety









































































































































Chap. III] SMITH v. monnF.sou 225
of a building contract, dated November 1, 1888, in which they
agreed to furnish, cut, set and clean all the new granite work
for the enlargement of a public building in the City of New York.
The plaintiff agreed to pay the contractors for this work the sum
of $30,000, in monthly payments of not to exceed 80% of “the
estimated value of the work performed on the building,” the bal
ance, or final payment, to be made when the work was completed.
The work was to be done according to drawings and specifications
referred to in the contract, and the payments made upon the cer
tificate of the plaintiff’s superintendent. The rights and obliga
tions of the parties are specified in the contract with minute detail,
and, among other things, it was stipulated that, in case the con
tractors failed to perform, the plaintiff might take possession of
the work and complete it at the contractors’ expense. It is con
ceded that they failed to perform and that the plaintiff was obliged
to complete the work himself at an expense of several thousand
dollars more than the contract price. It was agreed between the
plaintiff and the contractors that the latter should give to him a
bond to insure the faithful performance of the contract, and, in
pursuance of this agreement, the defendant, in behalf of the con
tractors, executed, under seal, and delivered, the instrument upon
which this action was brought. It bears date Dec. 27, 1888, and
was executed subsequent to the contract, and one of the conditions,_
is that the contractors should well and truly perform the contract
referred to, according to its terms, in which case the instrument
should be void and of no effect, but in case they failed to so
perform, the defendant would pay to the plaintiff his damages sus
tained by reason of such non-performance, not exceeding a sum
named. It is conceded that the plaintiff sustained damages by
reason of the failure of the contractors to perform their contract,
and the recovery is within the limits of the bond. T~ is
that the bond was given without consideration, and that the de
fendant became released from its obligations by reason of changes j‘
in and departures from the contract guaranteed, without the de
fendant's consent, by the parties thereto. At the trial a verdict
was directed for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff entered into the contract and bound himself,
according to its terms, upon the faith of the promise of the con
tractors to give the bond, and it is admitted that if this was con
current with the execution and delivery of the instrument, it would
constitute a sufficient consideration. But, since the bond was









































































































































226 SMITH V. MOLLESON [Chap. III
/ "
U”
time that the contractors had entered upon the actual performance
of the contract, it is insisted that it required some new considera
tion. If it be true that the evidence in the case would warrant a
finding by the jury that the contractors were engaged in the per
formance of the contract when the bond was given, it would also
be true that this was by the grace and pleasure of the plaintiff,
and not by virtue of any right under the contract.' right
to insist upon performance, as against the plaintiff, and to receive
the benefit of the contract, was not perfected until the bond was
given.
)whatever the contractors
may have assumed to do before,
it was only upon the delivery of the bond that the contract became
complete and binding upon the plaintiff, and hence the mutual ob
ligations imposed upon the contractors at one time, and upon the
plaintiff at another, furnished a consideration for the bond. Bank
v. Coit, IO4 N.Y. 532, II N. E. 54.
The other defense rests mainly upon a construction of the
contract which the defendant claims to be the correct one. It
should be observed at the outset that the contract guaranteed is
,
by reference, made a part o
f
the bond, and therefore, in order to
determine the scope o
f
the defendant's undertaking, the two in
struments must be read together. It is true, as the learned coun
se
l
for the defendant contends, that the liability o
f
a surety is
strictissimi juris. But that does not mean that a different rule




than that which is to be applied in the construction o
f
contracts
in general. Like al
l
other contracts, the undertaking o
f
a surety
/ must be construed fairly and reasonably, and according to the in
tention o
f
the parties. If the surety has used ambiguous language,





interpretation most favorable to his rights, that will, ordinarily,
prevail, if the instrument is open, reasonably, to such interpreta
tion. It means that a surety shall not be held beyond the precise
stipulations o
f
his contract. He is not liable on any implied en
gagement, where a party contracting for his own interest might
be, and he has the right to insist on the strict performance o
f any
condition for which he has stipulated, whether others would con
sider it material o
r
not. But where the question is as to the mean
'' ing of the written language in which he has contracted, there is
no difference, and there ought not to be any, between the contract
o
f
a surety and that o
f any other party. In this respect they are
ordinary commercial obligations standing upon the same footing
a









































































































































Chap. III] SMITH v. MOLLESON 227
Draper, 139 N. Y. 266, 34 N .E. 791. When the terms of the con
tract guaranteed have been changed, or the contract, as finally
made. is not the one upon which the surety agreed to become
bound, he will be released. Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y. 307, 33
N. E. 311. But in this case there is no claim that the terms of
the building contract to which the defendant's bond related, have
in any respect been changed by the parties to it. The most that
is claimed is that, in its performance, the parties have so far de
parted from its terms as to change the defendant's condition, to
her prejudice, and to deprive her of rights and benefits under the
contract, which, otherwise, she would be entitled to by subroga-
tion. Where the party secured does some act which changes the
position of the surety to his injury or prejudice, the latter is no
longer bound. Phelps v. Borland, 103 N. Y. 406, 9 N. E. 307;
Bank v. Streeter, 106 N. Y. 186, 12 N. E. 706: Lynch v. Rey
nolds, I6 Johns. 41; Brown v. -Williams, 4 Wend. 360; Naviga
tion Co. v. Roll, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 550; Calvert v. Dock Co., 2
Keen 638; Warre v. Calvert, 7 Adol & E. 143.
The learned counsel for the defendant insists upon his con
struction of the contract, that the plaintiff paid or advanced to the
contractors a larger portion of the contract price than he was re
quired to by the contract, and that it was so paid without any cer
tificate. The contention rests upon the defendant's construction of
the building contract, which, in substance, is that the provision
for “monthly payments,” not to exceed eighty per cent of the esti
mated value of the work performed on the building,” required the
estimate to be based only upon the work when actually set in the
building, whereas it was in fact based upon the work actually
done under or in pursuance of the contract, whether the granite
was actually placed in the building or not. This is the alleged
departure from the terms of the contract, which constitutes the
principal ground of the defense. Before the conclusion of the
learned counsel for the defendant can be adopted, we must assent
to the premise from which it is sought to be deduced, and that
requires us to ascertain and determine the true meaning and in
tention of the clause of the contract above quoted. It must be
given a fair and reasonable constrtftflon, and the general situa
tion will throw some light upon -the meaning of the written words.
It appears that the granite required was to be quarried in Nova
Scotia, transported from the quarry to a place in Connecticut,
where it was to be dressed, and then transported to New York,
and set in the building. The work involved in the preparation














































































































































of the contract, and it appears that the contractors had no means
to meet this outlay, except the monthly payments, so that if they
could realize nothing until the stone was placed in the building,
they would be practically unable to perform the contract at all.
This would be an unreasonable construction, and would, if acted
upon, operate so oppressively as to place the contractors at the
mercy of the owner, a view that is always to be avoided when
possible. Russell v. Allerton, 108 N. Y. 292, 15 N. E. 391. It
would deprive them of all right to monthly payments except when
and to the extent that granite had actually been placed in the walls,
however large their outlay for procuring and preparing the ma
terial may have been during the month.\The parties had the right
tolgive to the expression “work performed on the building” a
broader meaning, which could very properly include the value of
any work done or materials procured under the contract toward
its erection, although the granite procured and prepared had not
yet been placed. Since no payments were made in excess of 80%
of the value of the work performed in setting the stone, and in
procuring and preparing them, and as all the material so procured
and prepared actually went into the building, no advances were
made by the plaintiff o the contractors beyond the fair require
ments of the contract It is said that it cannot be supposed that
the plaintiff contracted to pay any part of the contract price for
material at the quarry, and at the place where it was to be pre
pared, or for the work performed in preparing the same for use,
before it could be known that it would ever actually reach the
building. \But since the monthly payments were stipulated for the
purpose of enabling the contractors to prosecute the work, and as
the operation of placing the granite in place when prepared was
the least part of it
,
we do not think that this view would be un
reasonable or improbable. \It gave to the plaintiff reasonable as
surance and protection against loss, and at the same time enabled
the contractors to prosecute the work. While the plaintiff is de
scribed in the contract as owner, he in fact had no interest what
ever in the building, but was the general and immediate contractor
from the city for the erection of the whole building, and the de
fendant's principals were his sub-contractors for a particular
and specific part of the work, namely, the granite work. The
plaintiff was not entitled to his contract price from the city until
the building was completed, though the officers representing it
had discretion to make advances. Moreover, by a clause in the









































































































































Chap. III] SMITH V. MOLLESON 229
work or failed to perform, could terminate the contract and go on
with the work himself, and in that event the material in process of
preparation should belong to him for the purpose of completing
the work, whether such material was at the building, at the quar
ry, or at some other place. (So that the plaintiff, in stipulating for
monthly payments, estimated upon the work actually performed,
whether in the building or not, assumed nothing more than the
ordinary and usual risks incident to all contracts of that character.
We do not think, therefore, that the meaning of the contract
should be made to depend upon the use of the words, “on the
building,” when we can see, from the situation of the parties, the
nature of the work and other provisions of the instrument, that
the intention was to make the advances as the work progressed.
To give to it the other construction would, in practice, disable
the contractors at the very outset from performance, and impose
upon the defendant a liability, inevitable from the beginning, and
possibly in a much larger amount than has followed the construc
tion adopted by the parties themselves.
The objection that the payments were made without the cer
tificate may be answered in the same way. The owner could dis
pense with it if he so elected, under the terms of the contract, if
not upon general principles, and since the payments made without
it were not greater in amount than, upon the true construction of
the contract, they should have been if it had been exacted, the
omission of the owner to insist upon it did not prejudice the sure
ty
.
We are not dealing, now, with any actual change in the terms
o
f




the plaintiff in the
performance, which, in order to operate to release the surety,
must be o
f
such a character that it can be said that her position
was changed to her prejudice. It should also be observed that




s follows: “Should the owner, at any time during the progress
o
f
said work, request any alterations, deviations, additions o
r
omissions from the said contract, he shall be at liberty to do so,
and the same shall in no way affect o
r
make void the contract.”
The defendant, having, b
y
reference, in effect made the contract
a part o
f
the bond, must be deemed to have assented to this pro
vision, and to any changes o
r
deviations in performance from the
building contract made under it
.
She has, in effect, guaranteed
the performance o
f



















































































































































230 SMITH v. MOLLESON [Chap. III
since we prefer to dispose of the questions in the case upon the
ground that there was no material departure from the contract,
when properly construed, it should be noted that sheconsented
in advance to changes of some character which are permitted by
the contract in language quite broad and comprehensive. It
would not be difficult to show that the plaintiff might, under this
provision at least, dispense with the formality of a certificate when
called upon by the contractors, from time- to time, for some por
tion of the contract price, without discharging the surety, even
though it was more important to the defendant’s interest and
protection than it appears to be. It is manifest that the provision
as intended for the benefi_t_ofw_tl_)e owner alone, and he could
~b&'t“rmnfi§ the defendant's liability.
The contractors having failed to complete the work, the plain
tiff gave the notice required by the contract in order to terminate
it. The contract provides when and upon what contingencies the
plaintiff could terminate, and the manner of proceeding for that
purpose. The final act which was to put an end to the contract
was taking possession of the premises by the plaintiff. The notice
may have been a necessary step or formality in that direction, but,
of itself, it did not operate to bring the contract to an end. It
was clearly within the power of the plaintiff to recall it
,
after giv
en, if not upon general principles, then under the pennission con
tained in the contract. It appears that he was induced, subse
quently. to allow the contractors to go on, and they again attempted
to complete the work, and again failed. It is said that the loss
which the plaintiff sustained, and for which the recovery was had,
occurred under this permission, and the defendant’s counsel treats
this last effort at performance as a new contract in regard to
which the surety was not bound. It was manifestly nothing more
than a mere waiver or recall of the notice for the termination of
the contract, and the work was performed and payment made,
not upon a new contract, but upon the old one, up to the time that
the final notice was given, when the plaintiff was obliged to take
possession of the work. The case was very fully considered in
the court below, and, as we have sufficiently indicated the ground
of our concurrence in the decision upon points that are controlling,
it is unnecessary to notice other and minor questions in the case.












































































































































SURETY SHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW.17
72. SMITH v. SHELDEN, et al., 35 Mich. 42, 24 Am. Rep. 529."
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1876.
A surety is a person who being liable to pay a debt or per
form an obligation, is entitled, if it is enforced against him to be
indemnified by some other person who ought himself to have
made payment or performed before the surety was compelled to
do so.
C. & W. N. Draper & C. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error.
Mcddaugh & Driggs, for defendants in error.
CoolEY, Ch.J. The legal questions in this case arise upon
the following facts:
Prior to June, 1867, Eldad Smith, Isaac Place, and Francis
B. Owen were partners in trade under the firm name of Place,
Smith & Owen, and as such became indebted to defendants in
error in the sum of $969 on book account:
In the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual
consent, Place purchasing the assets of his copartners and agree
ing to pay off the partnership liabilities, including that to the
defendants in error. On the second day of the following month
Place informed the defendants in error of this arrangement, and
that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabilities of the firm,
and they, without the consent or knowledge of Smith and Owen,
took from Place a note for the amount of the firm indebtedness
to them, payable at one day with ten per centum interest. They
did not agree to receive this note in payment of the partnership
indebtedness, but they kept it and continued their dealings with
” “An obligation in surety ship will not be implied, and never arises
by act of the parties except by express contract. Yet the law will some
times place persons in the situation of a surety or guarantor, not by im
posing the liabilities of these undertakings without their assent, but by
extending to persons already bound upon some other contract, the privi
leges of these relations.”—Stearns on Suretyship, page 24.









































































































































232 SMITH v. SHELDEN [Chap. IV
Place, who made payments upon it. The payments, however, did
not keep down the interest. Place, in 1872, became insolvent and
made an assignment, and Smith was then called upon to make
payment of the note. This was the first notice he had that he was
looked to for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit
was brought on the original indebtedness and judgment recov
ered.
The position taken by the plaintiffs below was, that as they
had never received payment of their bill for merchandise they
were entitled to recover it of those who made the debt, the giving
of the note which still remained unpaid being immaterial.
On behalf of Smith it was contended that, by the arrange
ment between Place and his copartners, the latter, as between the
three, became the principal debtor, and that from the time when
the creditors were informed of this arrangement they were bound
to regard Place as principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sure
ties, and that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the
injury of the sureties would have the effect to release them from
liability. And it is further contended that the taking of the note
from Place, and thereby giving him time, however short, was in
law presumptively injurious.
Upon this state of facts the following questions have been
argued in this court:
1. Was the note given by Place in the copartnership name
for the copartnership indebtedness, but given after the dissolu
tion, binding upon Smith and Owen?
2. If Smith and Owen were not bound by the note, were
they entitled to the rights of sureties? And
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith
and Owen from their former liability?
On the first point it is argued in support of the judgment
that when a copartnership is dissolved the partner who is entrusted
with the settlement of the concern should be held to have implied
authority to give notes in settlement. On the other hand it is
insisted that in law he- has no such authority, and that if he
assumes. as was done in this case, to give a note in the partner
ship name, it will in law be his individual note only.
Whatever might be the case if the obligation which was given
had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount due, in the form
of a due bill or I O U, we are satisfied that there is no good rea
son for recognizing in the partner who is to adjust the business
of the concern any implied authority to execute such a note as was









































































































































Chap. IV] SMITH v. SHELDEN 233
acknowledgment of indebtedness; and it bor interest at a large
rate. It was in every respect a new contract. The liability of the
parties upon their indebtedness would be increased by it if valid,
and their rights might be seriously compromised by the execution
of paper payable at a considerable time in the future if the partner -
entrusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized
to make new contracts. It was assumed in F. 6' M. Bank v. Ker
cheval, 2 Mich. 506-519, that the law was well settled that no such
implied authority existed, and we are not aware that this has be
fore been questioned in this state. See Pennoyer v. David, 8 Mich.
407. \7Ve think it ‘much safer to require express authority when
such obligations are contemplated, than to leave one party at lib
erty to execute at discretion new contracts of this nature, which
may postpone for an indefinite period the settlement of their con
cerns, when a settlement is the very purpose for which he is to act
at all. _
For a determination of the question whether Smith and Owen
were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only necessary to
point out the relative position of the several parties as regards
the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement, had agreed to
pay this debt, and as between himself and Smith and Owen, he
was legally bound to do so. But Smith and Owen were also liable
to the creditors equally with Place, and the latter might look to
all three together. Had they done so and made collections from
Smith and Owen, these parties would have been entitled to de
mand indemnity from Place. This we believe to be a correct state
ment of the relative rights and obligations of all.
Now a surety, as we understand it
,
is a person who, being
liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it is
enforced against him, to be indemnified by some other person,
who ought himself to have made payment or performed before the
surety was compelled to do so. It is immaterial in what form
the relation of principal and surety is established, or whether the
creditor is or is not contracted with in the two capacities, as is
often the case when notes are given or bonds taken; the relation
is fixed by the arrangement and equities between the debtors or
obligors, and may be known to the creditor, or wholly unknown.
If it is unknown to him, his rights are in no manner affected by
it; but if he knows that one party is surety merely, it is only just
to require of him that in any subsequent action he may take
regarding the debt, he shall not lose sight of the surety’s equities.
That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the latter










































































































































234 SMITH v. SHELDEN [Chap. IV
seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of Place .to pay
this debt and save them from being called upon for the amount.
But if the creditors, having a right to proceed against them all,
should take steps for that purpose, the duty of Place to indemnify,
\\and the right of Smith and Owen to demand indemnity, were
clear. Every element of suretyship is here present, as much as if,
in contracting an original indebtedness, the contract itself had
been made to show on its face that one of the obligors was surety
merely. As already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is estab
lished, or whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrange
ment which establishes it.
This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the
right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities of
sureties. The cases which have held that retiring partners thus
situated are to be treated as sureties merely, have attempted no
change in the law, but are entirely in harmony with older author
ities which have only applied the like principle to different states
of facts, where the relative position of the parties as regards the
debt was precisely the same. We do not regard them as working
any innovation whatever. The cases we particularly refer to are
Oakeley v. Pasheller, 4 Cl. & Fin., 207; Wilson v. Lloyd, Law R.,
16 Eq. Cas., 60; and Millerd v. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402.
And it follows as a necessary result from what has been
stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrangement
'made by the creditors with Place. They took his note on time, with
knowledge that Place had become the principal debtor, and with
out the consent or knowledge of the sureties. They thereby en
dangered the security of the sureties, and as the event has proved,
indulged Place until the security became of no value. True, they
gave but very short time in the first instance; but, as was remarked
by the vice chancellor in Wilson v. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60, 71,
“the length of time makes no kind of difference.” The time was
the same in Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Denio, 512, where the surety
was also held discharged. And see Okie v. Spencer, 2 Whart.,
253. But that indulgence beyond the time fixed was contemplated
wlzen the note was given is manifest from the fact that it was made
payable with interest. In a legal point of view this would be im
material, but it has a bearing on the equities, and it shows that
the creditors received or bargained for a consideration for the
very indulgence which was granted, and which ended in the in
solvency of Place. \\/"hen they thus bargain for an advantage
which the sureties are not to share with them, it is neither right









































































































































Chap. IV.] WILCOX V. CAMPBELL 235
is the legal view of such a transaction, and in most cases it works
substantial justice.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial
ordered. The other Justices concurred.
73. WILCOX, respondent, v. CAMPBELL, appellant, 106 N. Y. 325.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1887.
Vendor of land subject to mortgage which the vendee agrees
to pay is in the position of a surety.
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the fifth judicial department, entered upon an order made
the first Tuesday of January, 1885, which affirmed a judgment
in favor of plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee. (Re
ported below, 35 Hun 254.)
The nature of the action and the material facts are stated in
the opinion.
J. A. Stull for appellant.
Mr. Quincy for respondent.
EARL, J. Prior to the 9th day of November, 1874, Barton J.
Conklin owned a parcel of land in the city of Rochester, being 187
feet front on North St. Paul street and 420 feet deep; and he had
executed a mortgage thereon to a savings bank to secure the pay
ment of $3,000 and interest. On that day he conveyed the land
to Jane E. Wilcox, subject to the mortgage to the savings bank,
which she assumed and agreed to pay, and at the same time she
executed to Conklin a mortgage for $2,000 upon the land to se
cure a part of the purchase-price. On the 12th day of February,
1877, Mrs. Wilcox executed to the defendant a deed of the north
erly 107 feet of the land, she retaining the remaining eighty feet
thereof. The deed was subject to the two mortgages which the




f August, 1878, Mrs. Wilcox b
y
a quit
claim deed, making no mention o
f
the mortgages and expressing
a consideration o
f $1, conveyed the eighty feet o
f
the land so re
tained b
y
her to Lucius C
. Bingham. Some time in 1878, the sav
ings bank commenced a foreclosure o
f
it
s mortgage for $3,000
upon the entire parcel o
f land, and on February 12, 1879, the fore
closure proceedings resulted in the sale o
f
the whole parcel o
f
land, including the eighty feet deeded to Bingham and the 107
















































































































































236 w1Lcox v. CAMPBELL _ [Chap. IV
ten instrument, for a valuable consideration, assigned to the plain
tiff all his claim for damages and all his causes of action against
the defendant by reason of his failure to pay the mortgages. This
action was subsequently commenced by the plaintiff to recover
damages against the defendant because his assignor’s land was
sold in consequence of the failure of the defendant to keep his
covenant to pay the mortgages; and upon the trial judgment was
given for the plaintiff which has been affirmed by the General
Term.
After the conveyance by Mrs. Wilcox to the defendant, he
became the principal debtor to the mortgagees and she remained
simply surety for him, and every one having notice of the relation
between them was bound to respect it. The parcel of land con
veyed to the defendant was primarily liable for the payment of
the two mortgages, and the parcel of eighty feet was secondarily
liable and simply remained security for the payment of the de
fendant's obligations. (I/Vadsworth v. Lyon, 93 N. Y. 201.) He,
as principal debtor, was bound to protect both her and her land
from any liability on account of his debts. After her conveyance
of the parcel of land to Bingham, it was still simply security for
the defendant's debts, and Bingham obtained the entire title there
to simply encumbered by a mortgage to secure obligations which
the defendant was primarily liable to pay. The duty rested upon
him, as principal debtor, to protect that land from sale, and when
it was sold in consequence of his default, and its value applied in
discharge of his obligations, he became liable to Bingham for the
damages thus caused to him. That cause of action, by assignment,
became vested in the plaintiff, and it does not depend upon any
principle of subrogation. It was a direct liability to Bingham
growing out of the defendant’s default, and of a breach of dutv
which he owed. Bingham was brought into relations with the de
fendant by the conveyance to him and the ownership by him of the
land bound as surety for the defendant.
Bingham, if aware of the foreclosure action, could have ap
peared therein and procured a sale of that portion of the land
which was conveyed to the defendant first in discharge of the
mortgages; and if that portion did not sell for enough, then he
could have paid the balance due upon the mortgages to save his
land, and the sum thus paid would have been the measure of his
damages. Instead of paying such balance, he could have per
mitted his land to be sold, and certainly to the extent of its pro
ceeds applied in discharge of the foreclosure judgment, he would









































































































































Chap. IV] w1Lc0x v. CAMPBELL , 237
But, under the circumstances of this ease, both mortgages
being liens upon the land, Bingham was not under any obligation
to the defendant to take any steps in the foreclosure action; and
if
,
by the default of the defendant, he was deprived of his land,
the value of the land is the fair measure of his claim against the
defendant. He must have been a party to the foreclosure action,
and it was his duty to appear therein to protect his own interests
as well as those of his surety.
The rule which requires a party exposed to injury or damage
to make his loss as small as he reasonably can, did not impose upon
Bingham the obligation to raise $5,000 for the payment of the two
mortgages for the purpose of protecting himself and his land from
the consequences of the dcfendant's default. * * *
Upon the whole case we see no reason to doubt that the judg













































































































































SECTION 1. THE RIGHT OF INDEM, NITY
74. SCOT v. STEPHENSON, I Keble 346.
Court of King's Bench, Mich. Term, 1662.
The promise to indemnify is implied.
In action upon the case upon promise if plaintiff would
forbear to sue him, being administrator of J. S. for whom the
plaintiff was security, the defendant would pay, &c. Weston in
arrest of judgment, that this is no cause of action, the intestate
being not bound, the administrator is not. But by Windham, the
testator being a surety, it is a sufficient consideration; and by
Twisden, being co-obligor, there might be cause of action against
him, and the particulars need not be shewed. My Lord St. Paul's
Case, Rivers' Case, the heir promised on forbearance to pay bond
made by the testator, wherein it appeared not the heir was bound,
yet (which, per curiam, was hard) judgment was against the heir.
Jordan against Clerke, and Rosier against Langdale, Stiles 248,
Pl. 566. Promise made by the wife in consideration of forbear
ance against her, to pay debt of her husband, is void; contra, if
that the promise be for general forbearance, for that is against
all persons; and though there be no cause of action, yet there is
sufficient remedy in chancery, of which our law will take notice.
| Also, here it doth appear the plaintiff had paid the debt, which per
* \curiam, is good cause of suit. Adjornatur.
75. KONITZKY, et al., respondents, v. MEYER, appellant, 49 N. Y. 571.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1872.
The law implies a promise on the part of the principal debtor
to indemnify the surety.
Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of the city of
New York, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered









































































































































Sect. I] KONITZKY v. MEYER 239
This action was brought to recover the amount of a judgment
obtained against plaintiffs in the upper or superior Court of Ap
peals of the four free cities of Germany, in an action brought
against them by the firm of J. C. Grundmun & Co., upon a con
tract made with that firm by plaintiffs, by which they agreed to
accept and pay, as sureties for defendants, bills for the purchase
price of a quantity of chicory, and chicory mixed with acorns, and
which contract was broken by plaintiffs under direction of de
fendant.
Erastus Cooke for the appellant.
John H. Reynolds for the respondents.
GROVER, J. *** The proof showed that the plaintiffs, at th
request of the defendant had entered into a valid contract to ac
cept and pay bills as surety for him. That they had failed to per
form this contract by direction of the defendant. That for this
breach a suit was commenced against them in the Tribunal of Com
merce of Bremen, in which, upon appeal to the Superior Court of
Appeals of the four free German cities, the court of last resort,
judgment was given in favor of Grundmun & Co. against the plain
tifs, and they were thereby compelled to and did pay for the fifty
barrels of mixture. When one party, at the request of another, en
ters into a contract as his surety, the law implies a promise of in
demnity. The plaintiffs gave the defendant notice of the suit of
Grundmun & Co. against them. The record under these facts
was competent evidence against the defendant in favor of the
plaintiffs. A foreign judgment has the same effect in this respect
as one of our own courts. ) (Note to Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cow.
52O.) The position of the counsel, that an underwriter is not
bound by a suit brought against the party he is bound to indem
nify, in the absence of a provision in his contract to that effect,
cannot be sustained either upon principle or authority. The law
is otherwise. (Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 34 N.Y. 275). * * * The










































































































































240 RICE v. SOUTHGATE ‘[Chap. V
76. RICE v. SOUTHGATE, 16 Gray 142.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1860.
Indemnity—The contract of a principal ‘with his surety to
indemnify hi-in takes effect from the time when the surety becomes
responsible for the debt of the principal.
Writ of entry by the tenant’s assignee in insolvency to re
cover a lot of land in Worcester, which the tenant claimed to
hold as 11 homestead.
The case was submitted to the judgment of the court upon
the following facts: The lot was bought by the tenant in 1846,
and has been since occupied by him with his family as a residence,
and is worth at least two thousand dollars above a mortgage
thereon. On the 16th of May, 1853, the tenant, with Charles
VVhite and Eli Thayer, made a joint and several promissory note
for $1,000, which was paid by Vtlhite on the 14th of May, 1859,
and on the 16th of November, 1854 made a note for $1,166.66,
which was signed by 'White and Thayer as sureties, and paid,
with interest, by White on the 21st of July, 1859; and White
proved the sums so paid, amounting to $1,821.94, against the
tenant's estate in insolvency.
T. L. Nelson, for the demandant.
P. C. Bacon, for the tenant.
BIGELOW, C.J. The question in this case is
,
whether, on the
facts stated, there are any debts proved against the estate of the
tenant in insolvency to the amount of eight hundred dollars, which
were contracted prior to the passage of St. 1855, c. 238, under
which he claims to hold the demanded premises as a homestead.
If there are, then it is clear that he cannot avail himself of the
exemption secured by that statute; because by the third section
it is provided that no property shall be exempted from levy on
execution for a debt contracted previously to the passage of the
act; and all the estate of the debtor, which might have been taken
on execution against him at the time of the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency, vested in his assignee under St. 1838,
c. 163, § 5. Woods v. Sanford, 9 Gray, 16.
Upon well settled principles, it is clear that the contract of
a principal with his surety to indemnify him for any payment
which the latter may make to the creditor in consequence of the
liability assumed takes effect from the time when .the surety be
comes responsible for the debt of the principal. It is then that









































































































































Sect. 1] THAYER v. DANIELS 241
new contract is made when the money is paid by thelsurety, butV
the payment relates back to the time when the contract was en
tered into by which the liability to pay was incurred. The pay
ment only fixes the amount of damages for which the principal is
liable under his original agreement to indemnify the surety.
Gibbs v. Bryant, I Pick. 121. Appleton v. Bascom, 3 Met. I69.
The same principle is adopted in our insolvent law, in which it is
provided that, in case of the payment of any sum by any surety
of a debtor in any contract whatsoever, the debt shall be consid
ered as contracted at the time when the contract on which such
payment has been made was originally entered into. St. 1838,
c. 163, § 3. Gen. Sts. c. 118, § 25.
It follows that the real estate occupied by the insolvent debt
or was not exempted from levy on execution at the suit of his
surety who entered into the contract on which he has been held
liable to an amount exceeding eight hundred dollars prior to the
passage of the act under which the tenant now claims a homestead
right. It therefore vests in his assignee.
Judgment for the demandant.
%~
77. THAYER v. DANIELS, no Mass. 345.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1872.
A surety who has paid the debt of the principal has a elaim
upon the principal for indemru'ty. Against such claim the statute
o
/’ limitations rims from the time when the surety paid it
,
not from
the time when the debt was due.
CONTRACT. The declaration alleged that the defendant as
principal, and the plaintiff as surety, signed a note for $500,
dated September 28, 1861, and payable on demand to Nathan
George or order, with interest; that the plaintiff signed as surety
without consideration, and for the accommodation of the defend
ant; that the defendant failed to pay the note; and that the plain
tilt had to pay to George the principal of the note to take it up.
The answer denied the allegations of the declaration, and also
set up the statute of limitations, and a discharge of the defendant
in insolvency.
At the trial in the superior court, before B.\co.\I, J., it ap
peared that the plaintiff executed the note without any considera
tion, and for the accommodation of the defendant; that the de
fendant on February 111, 1862, filed his petition for the benefit of









































































































































242 THAYER v. DANIELS [Chap. V
third meeting of the creditors George proved the note against
the defendant's estate; that a small dividend was then declared;
that afterwards, in August, 1862, the defendant was duly dis-J
charged from his debts; and that on May 1, 1865, the plaintiff
paid to George on the note $500, which was less than the amount
then due upon it
,
and took it up.(The defendant asked the judge
to rule that the statute of limitations began to run against the
plaintiff’s cause of action from the time the note fell due; and
that the discharge in bankruptcy was a bar to the action; but the
judge refused so to rule, and ruled that on the foregoing facts the
plaintiff was entitled to recover. j The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.
P. E. Aldrich, (S. A. Burgess with him,) for the defendant.
T. G. Kent, for the plaintiff.
AMES, J. There was an implied promise, on the part of the
defendant, as principal, to indemnify the surety, and to repay to
him all the money that he might be compelled, in consequence of
his liability as surety, to pay to the creditor. Until the surety
has been compelled to make such payment, there is no breach of
this implied promise. The cause of action accrues then for the
first time, and the statute of limitations then begins to run. Of
course the exception that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by
that statute cannot be maintained. Appleton v. Bascom, 3 Met.
169; Hall v. Thayer, 12 Met. 130.
At the time when the defendant petitioned for the benefit of
the insolvent law, the plaintiff’s cause of action against him had
not accrued. Nothing was due at that time from the insolvent to
the plaintiff, and whether anything would become due depended
upon the contingency of his being compelled to pay, and actually
paying, the note, in whole or in part. If the plaintiff had taken
up the note, or made a payment upon it
,
at any time before the
making of the first dividend, his claim for the money so paid
would have been provable against the estate of the insolvent, un
der the Gen. Sts. c. 118, § 25, and would therefore have been
barred by the discharge. But it appears from the report that no
money was paid by the plaintiff as surety, and no cause of action
accrued to him against the insolvent, until long after the first and
only dividend was paid from his estate.
The case of Mace v. WelIs, 7 How. 272, which is relied upon
by the defendant, arose under the bankrupt act of 1841, a statute
which differed from our insolvent law. in allowing sureties and









































































































































Sect. 1] WESLEY cnuncn v. MOORE 243
liabilities as claims upon the estate, and “when their debts and
claims become absolute,” to have them allowed.
The defendants also insist that the debt itself was provable
and was therefore discharged; but this is not true as to the con
tingent claim of the surety. He had no claim that was provable
under the statute, at the date of the discharge.
Two other cases relied upon by the defendant, (Wood v.
Dodgson, 2 M. & S. 195, and Vansandan v. Corsbie, 8 Taunt. 550,)
were decided under English statutes which in express terms make
the contingent liability of a surety a provable claim against the
bankrupt's estate. In the first of these cases the court say that
the statute was intended to benefit the sureties, by allowing them
to share in the dividend before the estate is all gone, and before
the actual payment of their liabilities. Neither of these decisions
is applicable to a case under our insolvent laws.
Exceptions overruled.
78. WESLEY CHURCH v. MOORE, et al., 10 Pa. St. 273.
Supreme Court, Pennsylvania, 1849.
A contract of indemnity given to the surety by a third per
son does not relieve ma principal of liability.
Appeal from the Common Pleas of Philadelphia—in equity.
The case, as it appeared upon the pleadings and evidence,
was this. Samuel Curtis and several others having united to erect
a church edifice, and needing money for the purpose, the associa
tion requested Curtis to borrow $1,000 from the Benezet Society,
the association or church agreeing to pay the interest, and the
principal when required. Curtis borrowed the money, and gave
his own bond and mortgage for it in 1820. Scott and two others,
being members of the association, also gave Curtis their mortgage
as an indemnitys
In 1824, Curtis died, having devised certain land to the com
plainants. The land on which the mortgage was given was sold
by the sheriff, and the proceeds being insufficient to discharge that
debt, the land devised to the complainants was sold under the
judgment entered on the bond.
At the time Curtis borrowed the money, he was one of the
trustees of the land on which the church was erected. In 1827,
the association obtained a charter, and the surviving trustees con
veyed the church and the land on which it stood to the corpora









































































































































244 wrssuav cnuncn v. MOORE [Chap. V
praying that the corporation of the church might be compelled to
pay so much as would compensate them for the sale of their prop
erty by the sheriff.
The bill also prayed a discovery, among other things, of the
entries in the books of the corporation, and of receipts in their
possession. These were produced, and showed the request to
Curtis and others to borrow money of the Benezet Society; that
he had applied it to the purposes of the church, and that the church
had paid the interest for a long time, and that it was stated on
their books as a debt due by the church to the Benezet Society.
The court below decreed for the complainants.




GIBsoN, C.J. The proofs show that the money for which
this bill is filed, was borrowed by ‘Curtis at the instance of the
congregation and for its use; and that it was laid out by the
building committee in the erection of its church. They further
show that he mortgaged the property, which he devised to the
complainants, as a security for the loan; and, that the congrega
tion, having kept down the interest while he lived, suffered it to
be sold at the end of a -few years, for the principal and unpaid in
terest, on a judgment obtained on the bond which accompanied
the mortgage, and that being inadequate, the property devised to
the complainants was sold to satisfy the debt.
It appears, also, that Curtis took, as counter-security, from
some of the congregation’s trustees, a mortgage of their individ
ual property, which his executors, or the survivor of them, neg
lected or refused to put in suit; and one of the questions in the
cause is, whether this counter-security was exclusive or cumu
lative. The law is
,
that a creditor may take as many securities as
he can get, the presumption being, in the first instance, that they
are cumulative; and here there is no evidence to rebut it. * * *
The statute of limitations did not begin to run till the prop
erty of the complainants had been sold; and, as the proper period
had not elapsed before the filing of the bill, that point of defence
also fails.
‘
The rest involves a question of jurisdiction ; and a subordinate
branch of it is, whether the complainants have a remedy at law.
Had Curtis paid the money in the first instance, he might have
maintained indebtitatus assumpsit against the congregation, strict
ly at law, and debt against Nicholas, Weeks, and Scott, on their










































































































































Sect. 2] MATHEWS V. AIKIN 245
are strangers to them, could have neither, and this is conclusive,
that, unless they are restricted by the scantiness of the legislative
grant of equity powers to the common-law courts, they are en
titled to maintain this bill.
Had they, indeed, paid the money before the land was sold,
they might have maintained indebitatus assumpsit without privity,
just as a stranger, who has paid rent to extricate his property
from a distress, may maintain it against the tenant. But, it has
not been ruled that the action lies for property lost, as an equiv
alent for money paid. In England, this bill would, consequently,
be entertained without hesitation. Here an action would have for
merly been maintainable, and would, perhaps, still be; but that is
not a consideration to deprive a party of his election. * * *
Decree affirmed.
SECTION 2. THE RIGHT OF SUBROGATION
79. MATHEWS, et al., appellants, v. AIKIN, respondent, I N. Y. 595.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1848.
The right of a surety to be subrogated, on payment of the
debt, to the securities held by the creditor, does not depend upon
contract, but rests upon principles of justice and equity.
Appeal from the supreme court in equity. Abraham Aiken
filed his bill in the court of chancery before the vice chancellor
of the seventh circuit, against John Mathews and Oliver Orcutt,
who appeared and defended, and against Edward Aikin, who suf
fered the bill to be taken as confessed. The case, so far as mater
ia
l
to be stated, upon pleadings and proofs was as follows: On
o
r
before the 22d o
f November, 1837, Edward Aikin, who was the
son o
f
the complainant, executed to James Hasbrook a bond se
cured b
y mortgage on certain real estate, bearing date December
6
,
1836, conditioned for the payment o
f $1,300 in six equal annual
instalments. At the time of the execution of the bond and mort
gage, Edward Aikin was indebted to one Theodore Wood in the
amount thereof, and Wood being also indebted to Hasbrook, pro
cured the bond and mortgage to be executed directly to him. At
the time o
r





said Wood and Hasbrook, exe
cuted upon the bond a sealed guaranty o
f
the payment thereof.















































































































































246 MATHEWS V. AIKIN [Chap. V
ward Aikin was examined as a witness for the complainant, and
on cross-examination testified that he advised his father not to
sign the guaranty, informing him that he was under no obligation
to procure a guaranty.
On the 27th of August, 1841, the said Edward Aikin executed
to the defendant John Mathews a mortgage upon the same prem
ises, conditioned to pay the sum of $663.36. The mortgage to
Hasbrook had been previously recorded, and Mathews had also
actual notice of the existence thereof. On the 11th of February,
1843, Mathews having caused his mortgage to be foreclosed in
chancery, purchased the premises at master's sale under the de
cree for the sum of $500, and procured the master's deed to him
self. After such purchase, and on the 26th day of April, 1843.
the personal representatives of James Hasbrook (who had died)
assigned the bond and mortgage first above mentioned to the de
fendant Oliver Orcutt. The consideration for this assignment was
paid by Mathews, and such assignment was made in trust for him
and for his benefit only. (Immediate afterwards, Mathews caused
an action at law to be commenced, in the name of TTäsbrook's rep
resentatives, against the complainant upon the aforesaid guaranty
and recovered judgment against him for the sum of $370.76, the
amount of the last instalment due upon the bond and mortgage,
the other instalments having been previously paid. (The complain
ant thereupon tendered the amount recovered against him and
demanded that Orcutt assign the bond and mortgage to him.) This
was refused; and the complainant then paid absolutely the sum,
and demanded an assignment. This was also refused. At the
commencement of this suit the defendant Mathews was in posses
sion of the premises under his purchase at the master's sale above
mentioned. Edward Aikin was insolvent. The complainant
claimed by the bill to be subrogated to the rights of Orcutt or
Mathews as the holder of the bond and mortgage for the purpose
of reimbursing to himself the sum collected of him by suit on the
guaranty; and the prayer of the bill was that such right of subro
ation might be declared, and that the premises might be sold, &c.
The vice chancellor decreed in favor of the complainant ac
cording to the prayer of the bill. The defendants appealed to the
chancellor, and the cause then became vested in the supreme court
organized under the new constitution; and that court sitting in the
fifth district affirmed the decree of the vice chancellor. The de
fendants appealed to this court.
B. D. Noron, for the appellants.











































































































































Sect. 2] MATHEWS V. AIKIN 247
JoHNSON, J. It is a general and well established principle\ .
of equity, that a surety, or a party who stands in the situation of
a surety, is entitled to be subrogated to a
ll
the rights and remedie
o
f
the creditor whose debt he is compelled to pay, as to any fund," 42-4
lien, o





such debt. "The general doctrine, as a
rule o
f equity, is not controverted on the part o
f
the appellants,
but is fully conceded. It is insisted, however, b
y
their counsel,





the debtor; that as to the debtor, he was a mere volun- a-6 -
teer, having n
o remedy over against him, and never acquiring the
character o
f
a surety so as to be entitled to subrogation to the
rights and remedies of the creditor.
The objection seems somewhat narrow and technical when
addressed to a court o
f equity whose peculiar province is to mete
out substantial justice where the more restricted powers o
f
the
common law fail in its administration. But it leads us to exam
ine carefully into the grounds and principles upon which the right
o
f subrogation rests. Does it rest upon the foundation o
f
a con
tract binding in a court o
f
law between the debtor and his surety?
In other words: does it turn substantially upon the question
whether o
r
not the surety who has paid the debt to the creditor
has a remedy over, on his contract, against the principal debtor
for money paid in an action at law? or does it not rest rather upon
the broader and deeper foundations o
f
natural justice and moral
obligation, Chancellor KENT says, in Hays v. Ward, (4 John.
Ch. 130,)". This doctrine does not belong merely to the civil law
system. It is equally a well settled principle in the English law
that a surety will be entitled to every remedy which the principal 4
debtor has, to enforce every security, and to stand in the place o
f
the creditor, and have those securities transferred to him and
to avail himself o
f
those securities against the debtor.) This
right stands not upon contract, but upon the same principle o
f
.
natural justice upon which one surety is entitled to contribution
against another.” Lord BROUGHAM, in Hodgson v. Shaw, (3
Mylne & Keene 183,) said: “The rule here is undoubted, and is
founded on the plainest principles o
f
natural reason and justice,
that the surety paying off a debt shall stand in the place o
f
the
creditor, and have all the rights which he has for the purpose o
f
obtaining his reimbursement. It is scarcely possible to put this
right o
f
substitution too high; and the right results more from
equity than from contract o
r quasi contract unless in so far as the









































































































































248 MATHEWS v. AIKIN [Chap. V
tion, and so to raise a contract by implication.” Sir SAMUEL
ROMILLY, in his argument in Craythorne v. Swinburne, ( 14 Ves.
159,) stated the rule to be, that “a surety will be entitled to every
remedy which the creditor has against the principal debtor to en
force every security by all means of payment, to stand in the place
of the creditor not only through the medium of contract but even
by means of securities entered into without the knowledge of the
surety, having a right to have those securities transferred to him,
though there was no stipulation for that, and to avail himself of
all those securities against the debtor.” And this exposition of
the rule was fully sanctioned by Lord ELDON in giving judgment
in that case.
The equity is certainly as strong, and it seems to me some
what stronger in favor of substitution, as against the creditor at
least, than it is between sureties for contribution where one has
paid the whole debt, and it has been likened to the case of con
tribution between sureties. As between them the rule in equity
is clear that the ground of relief does not stand upon any notion
of mutual contract express or implied, but arises from principles
of equity independent of contract. Story’s Eq. sec. 493, and notes,
where the authorities are all collected. This is also substantially
the rule in courts of law. (Norton v. Coons, 3 Denio 130.) In
that case the circumstances under which the defendant became
co-surety were such as to repel the presumption of any promise
to make contribution. But the court held that his being a surety
on the same contract without qualification in terms was sufficient
to fix his obligation to contribute, and that for the purposes of
giving the plaintiffs a remedy the court would presume a promise.
A promise was therefore imputed where none confessedly existed,
in order to provide a remedy for the party where there was no
doubt as to the legal liability; and the legal liability in such
cases springs from the equitable obligation; the law courts hav
ing borrowed their jurisdiction in these particular cases from the
courts of equity. In the present case it seems to me, if it were
necessary, a court of equity ought to imply a promise on the part
of the creditor to subrogate the surety to all his rights and reme
dies, in case he resorted to the latter for payment of the debt upon
his guarantee. The equitable obligation resting upon him t
do so seems to me most manifest.
It is true the case shows that the principal debtor informed
the guarantor that he was under no promise or obligation to give
security, which seems to have been insisted upon by the creditor,










































































































































] MATHEWS V. AIKIN 249
nothing, however, in the case to show that the debtor did not sub




the time the guaranty was executed,
o
r
that the money was not paid at his express request afterwards.
But the case does not show that the guaranty was executed at the
repeated and urgent solicitations o
f
Wood the original creditor, and
o
f
Hasbrook to whom Wood proposed to transfer the debt, and
to whom, b
y arrangement between them, the bond and mortgage
were executed. As to the creditor Mathews, therefore, who now
stands in the place o
f Hasbrook, Abraham Aikin was not a volun
tary surety for the debt o
f







the mortgagee under whom he claims, and it£ment and fixed his liability as surety for his son in a court of law,
it does not lie with him to turn round and say he is a mere vol
unteer in assuming the obligation and paying the money, and
therefore not entitled to the rights and privileges o
f
a surety.
The creditor should not be permitted in a court o
f equity to ques-"
tion the rights o
f
the surety after the obligation has been incurred
a
t
his request, and he has fixed the character upon him by suit
and judgment in a court o
f
law. As to him at least, Aikin, the
father, was surety for the debt o
f
the son, and was compelled to





and it is immaterial as to the










principal debtor and th
e
surety. There is no reason
why the creditor should set u
p
a defence for the (IGEtor. It is





create the obligation o
n
his part to surrender to the surety the
securities in his hands. He is not to litigate the rights o
f
the
debtor, and set u
p
defences for the latter which he, peradventure,
might be too honest and conscientious to set up against the secur
ities in the hands o
f
a surety who had paid his debt for him.
It might be different if the debtor himself was here urging
this defence, and ty
entered into the obligation, not only against his wish o
r request,





to make him his
debtor against his will, or, as suggested by the appellant's coun
sel, to compel him to pay a debt to which, as between him and the
creditor, he had a good defence a
t
Taw. In Such cases a court of
equity would not lend the surety it
s aid, as h
e
would not come
before it with clean hands. But this is no such case. The prin
cipal debtor is here made a party, and suffers the bill to be taken
a
s
confessed against him. He sets up no such defence, nor does













































































































































250 MATHEWS V. AIKIN [Chap. V
legal and a moral obligation to his surety to repay the money which
the latter has advanced for him. Indeed, he expressly swears that
his father was a mere security for him for the payment of the
bond, without receiving any consideration for becoming such sure
ty. It is true he also testifies that he advised his father not to
sign the guaranty, but it is obvious to my mind that this was in
reference to a claim made by the creditor upon the debtor, that he
was under some obligation to give some additional security. This
appears to me quite evident from the appellant's answer and the
course of the examination. It is sufficient, however, as I appre
hend, that the debtor sets up no defence of the kind, and, although
a party, admits the validity of the respondent's claim and would
not afterwards be heard to allege it was illegal or invalid. Could
the appellant Mathews be permitted to set up a defence so ungra
cious as against a surety whom he has compelled to pay his debt,
he would be bound in order- to make it complete to show, as I
think, that the principal £ resisted the surety's claim, and that
the securities in the hands of the latter would be worthless, inas
much as he could never enforce them against such principal. Oth
erwise the court would intend that the principal was willing to
do what equity required him to perform.
But in addition to the general reasons against the creditor's
resisting the claim of the surety to be subrogated, especially when
the debtor makes no objection, there is I think in this case a par
ticular reason why the appellant Mathews should not be heard
to interpose such an objection. (The case shows that he held a
junior mortgage upon the same premises which he took with full
knowledge of the existence of the present mortgage as an incum
brance upon the premises and subject to it; and that before he
became the purchaser of the mortgage in question through Or
cutt, his trustee, he had foreclosed such junior mortgage and
become himself the purchaser of the equity of redemption. At the£gage he was the owner of the premises subject to this mortgage,
and held them as a fund for the payment of this debt. (McKin





248; Tice v. Annin, 2 John. Ch. 125.) It presents,
therefore, the case o
f
a creditor with the fund pledged for the pay
ment o
f
the debt in his hand, under circumstances which make it
an equitable satisfaction o
f
the debt, collecting the debt over again
out o
f
the surety, and then refusing to surrender the fund to him
The legal-presumption is that Mathews, when he purchased the
premises a
t









































































































































Sect. 2] MATHEWS V. AIKIN 25 I
value of the equity of redemption, and he must be adjudged to
hoIT them subsequently as a fund for the satisfaction of the prior
incumbrance. And he might have been restrained in equity from
proceeding to collect the debt afterwards from the mortgagor, or
in case the latter had paid it
,
h
e would have been entitled to have
the mortgage foreclosed upon the premises for his benefit—within
the principle o
f
the cases last above cited.
At the time Abraham Aikin was sued upon his guaranty he
was ignorant that the assignment o
f
the securities had been made
to Orcutt as a mere trustee for Mathews, who was already the
owner o
f
the premises. And unless I greatly mistake the case, it













Abraham Aikin. It seems to me quite clear, from
the facts o
f
this case, that the defence ought not to prevail.
But upon the general doctrine o
f subrogation, I agree fully
with the learned judge who delivered the opinion o
f
the supreme
court that the right o
f
the surety to demand o
f
the creditor,
whose debt he has paid, the securities he holds against the prin
cipal debtor o
r
to stand in his shoes does not depend a
t
all upon
aIVTequest OF GOntract on the part o
f
the (ICEtor with The surety,
but gröWS rather out o
f
the relations existing between the Surety
and the creditor, and is founded not upon any contract, express o
r
implied, but Springs from the most obvious principles o
f
natural





law against his principal for the
money paid, I agree with the supreme court that it would furnish
a still stronger case for subrogation. A court of equity would
never presume that the principal would interpose such a defence.
If the creditor has insisted upon the surety's discharging his obli





cannot after receiving from him his debt,
turn round and deny him the rights o
f
a surety. The creditor
must then fulfil his obligation to the surety, and leave the latter
and his principal to adjust o
r litigate their rights or claims as they
may see fit. There is n
o hardship in this. The surety might have
filed his bill and compelled Mathews to collect the debt out o
f
his
principal through the mortgage before resorting to him. And in
such a proceeding Mathews might with the same propriety have
set up as a defence that the surety was a mere volunteer and
could have no redress against his principal, and ought not to in
sist upon his proceeding against the principal in the first instance.
The injustice o
f









































































































































252 MILLER V. STOUT [Chap. V
that case, but none the more real. Had Abraham Aikin owned
the mortgage and assigned it to Mathews or to his trustee with
his guaranty upon it at his request, no one, I apprehend, would
pretend that Aikin, upon payment on his guarantee, would not
be entitled to have the mortgage again from the creditor. How is
his equity weakened by the consideration that to enable Wood
the mortgagee to sell it to Hasbrook he, at the request of both
Hasbrook and Wood, became the guarantor? It seems to me to
be considerably strengthened by the fact that he derived no bene
fi
t
from the transfer—especially as a doubt has been raised as to
his remedy over at law for money paid against the mortgagor.
If Hasbrook would have been bound to surrender to Wood, had
h
e
been the guarantor and made payment, I do not see why he
is not, to the representative o
f Aikin, who became guarantor for




both Wood and Hasbrook.
Decree affirmed.
80. MILLER v. STOUT, et al., 5 Del. Ch'y. 259.
Court o
f Chancery, Delaware, 1878.
Subrogation does not rest in contract, but is an equity result
ing from the circumstances o
f
the particular case. It is enforce
able in equity tribunals because it is a matter resting in conscience
and not in consent.
Bill for subrogation. The facts and questions presented are
fully stated in the opinion.
George V
. Massey, for the complainant.
J. Alexander Fulton, for the defendants.
THE CHANCELLOR. The complainant is the holder of two
several mortgages against Todd,—the first dated September 12,
1860, being for $3,000; and the second dated April 19, 1870, be
ing also for the sum o
f $3,000.
The premises mentioned in the first mortgage have been sold
by the sheriff for the sum o
f $3,825, and the premises mentioned
in the second mortgage have also been sold by the sheriff for the
sum o
f $2,035. Besides the lien o
f
these two mortgages, there was
a judgment in the Superior Court in and for Kent County, in
favor o
f
Emanuel J. Stout, against William A. Atkinson and
Henry Todd, dated September 27, 1866, the real debt whereof was










































































































































Sect. 2] MILLER v. srour 253
The amount realized from the sale of the premises mentioned
in the first mortgage satisfied the said mortgage, leaving an ex
cess of proceeds of sale in the hands of the sheriff. of $224.71, ap
plicable, according to priority of lien, to the judgment against At
kinson and Todd ; still leaving a balance of said judgment, unpaid,
of $1,159.23. This amount, together with other payments men- /
tioned in fhe of complaint, to which the proceeds of the sale
of the premises mentioned in the second mortgage are subject,
leaves only a sum of $2,263.18 applicable to the said second mort
gage of the complainant; so that there will remain due upon the
said second mortgage the sum of $1,162.81. It thus appears that
but for the application by the sheriff of the said sum of $1,159.23
to the judgment against Atkinson and Todd, the complainant
would have received that amount towards satisfaction of his said \second mortgage.
The complainant, by his bill, asks that he may be subrogated
to all the rights under and in the said judgment against Atkinson
and Todd, in which Todd was only a surety, for the reason that
said judgment was paid out of the proceeds of the sale of land
upon which the complainant had a specific mortgage lien.
It appears, from the written admission of the parties, that
Atkinson, after the giving of the Emanuel J. Stout judgment bond
mentioned in the bill, became surety for the said Henry ‘Todd at
the dates and for the amounts following, respectively, to-wit:
To the Farmers Bank, April 1, 1869, for $1,000, int. from
April 1, 1869.
To the Citizens Building & Loan Association, April 12, 1873,
for $500.
To the Citizens Building & Loan Association, Oct. 111, 1873,
for $1,100.
To the Citizens Building & Loan Association, Dec. 13, 1873,
for $400.
It is also admitted that Todd is insolvent, and was when the
sheriff’s sale mentioned in the original bill took place; and that
none of the liabilities in which the said Atkinson is surety for Todd
have been paid; and that the Farmers’ Bank l1as issued a scire
facias upon their judgment, against Todd and Atkinson.
Upon this statement of facts, ought the prayer of the com
plainant to be subrogated to the judgment of Stout against At
kinson and Todd be granted?
When a surety or guarantor pays a debt of a principal, equity ‘/
substitutes him in the place of a creditor, as a matter of course,









































































































































254 _ MILLER v. srour [Chap. V
Subrogation does not rest in contract, but is an equity result
ing from the circumstances of the particular case.
It is enforceable in equity tribunals, because it is a matter
resting in conscience, and not in consent.
Upon the performance, by the surety, of his contract of sure
tyship, he is entitled to the original evidences of debt held by the
creditor, and to any judgment into which the debt has been
merged, as well as to all collateral securities held by the creditor.
By performing the contract of suretyship, the principal obli
gation is discharged as respects the creditor but is kept alive be
tween the creditor, the debtor, and the surety, for the purpose of
enforcing the rights of the surety.
Subrogation is a mode which equity adopts to compel the ulti
mate discharge of a debt by him who, in good conscience, ought
to pay it
,
and to relieve him whom none but the creditor could
ask to pay.
Being purely an equitable right, it is limited only by equitable
considerations. It is not available or enforceable when there are
subsisting and countervailing equities which forbid it.
He who asks it must work out his equities through those of
the party to whose equities he seeks to be substituted. He can
have no_ equity i
f such party has no equity. His equity must be
clear, and not doubtful. While, as between him and the person
to whose rights and equities he would be subrogated,—as in the
case of Huston’s Appeal, Pa. 485, referred to in the argument,
—there may be priority of right or claim or equity, there can be
none against the party against whom he seeks subrogation, unless
it is equitable as between that party and the party through whom
he seeks to be subrogated. In other words, if the equity he seeks
would not be enforceable in equity tribunals by the party through
whom he seeks its enforcement against the party against whom it
is sought to be enforced, then it is not enforceable by him as a
party entitled to be substituted to an original equity.
If, but for the superior equity of Miller as against Todd, he,
Todd, from the particular circumstances of this case and the sub
sisting equities between him and Atkinson, could not be subro
gated to the judgment of Stout against Atkinson and_Todd, so
as to enforce its collection from Atkinson, neither can Miller,
working out his equites through those of Todd, be subrogated to
said judgment so as to enforce its collection from Atkinson. We
have seen that. after Todd became surety for Atkinson to Stout,
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the sheriff, Atkinson became surety for Todd to a much larger
am0unt—to the amount of $3,o00—to the Farmers Bank and the
Citizens Building & Loan Association. These suretyships were as
follows: April 1, 1869, for $1,000; April 12, 1873, for $500; Oc
tober 11, 1873, $1,100; and December 13, 1873, $400.
Now, when Todd became surety for Atkinson, a certain re
lation arose between him and Atkinson incident to which certain
obligations were imposed on Atkinson and certain rights secured
to Todd; and when Atkinson became surety for Todd, the same
obligations were imposed on Todd, and the same rights were se
cured to Atkinson. What were those obligations and those rights?
Indemnity and reimbursement in case of loss.
The principle applicable to the relation of principal and sure
ty is this: Although the surety cannot, in the absence of ex
pressed contract, sue the principal for indemnity before he actually
pays the debt, yet the implied contract for indemnity arises im
mediately upon the surety becoming bound. In the case of Ap
pleton v. Bascom, 3 Met. 169, it was said to be well settled that
when a surety becomes bound for his principal and at his request
the law implies a promise of indemnity by the principal to the
surety, to pay the latter all the money he may be compelled to pay
the creditor in consequence of his assumed liability. It was fur
ther said that the implied promise of indemnity must be considered
as made at the time when the surety became responsible to the
creditor on the bond.
The surety’s liability was the consideration of the principal’s
implied promise of indemnity, and the promise must be considered
as made at the time when the liability was assumed. * * *
Another principle applicable to suretyship, but originally
re
-\
sulting from the foregoing, is this: After a debt for which a
l
surety is liable has become due, he may without paying the debt:
and without being called upon by the creditor, file a bill in equity l
to compel the principal to pay the debt; it being unreasonable that
l
he should always be subject to a liability to pay, even though not
molested for the debt.
The rule upon this subject, laid down by Lord REDESDALE,
and cited with approval by Vice-Chancellor GIFFARD in the case
of Wooldridge v. Norris, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 413, is this: “A court
of equity will also prevent injury in some cases by interposing
before any actual injury has been suffered, by a bill which has
been sometimes called a bill quia timet, in analogy to proceedings









































































































































256 MILLER V. STOUT [Chap. V
before any molestation, distress, or impleading. Thus, a surety
may file a bill to compel the debtor on a bond in which he has
joined, to pay the debt when due, whether the surety has been
actually sued for it or not; and, upon a covenant to save harmless,
a bill may be filed to relieve the covenantee under similar circum
stances.”
-
Now, to apply these principles to the facts of the case before
me. Todd was surety for Atkinson in the judgment to Stout.
Upon becoming such surety, there was an implied contract be
tween them that Atkinson should pay the debt, and indemnify
Todd against loss by reason of the suretyship; and when the debt
became due, Todd had a right to file a bill in equity to compel
Atkinson to pay it
.
Atkinson afterwards, in 1869, became surety to the bank for
Todd; and in 1873 he became surety for Todd in the three several
debts hereinbefore stated, to the Citizens Building & Loan Asso
ciation. On becoming such surety there was an implied contract
between Todd and Atkinson that Todd would pay the several
debts, and indemnify Atkinson from loss on account o
f
the said
several surety ships; and Atkinson had the right, when the said sev
eral debts became due, to file a bill in equity to compel Todd to
pay them. Neither Todd nor Atkinson filed such bills. Several
years elapsed, and the farm and millsite o
f Todd, upón which
complainant held the mortgage, and upon which the judgment
against Atkinson and Todd was a lien, were sold b
y
the sheriff,
and $1,159, a part o
f
the proceeds o
f sale, was applied b
y
the
sheriff to satisfy the judgment o
f
Stout against Atkinson and







the premises to pay the
mortgage o
f
the complainant thereon, b
y
about the sum o
f $1,162.
Now, it is clear, if there were no countervailing equities on
the part o
f
Atkinson to prevent it
,
and if the complainant's mort
gage had been satisfied, Todd would have had an equity against
Atkinson to be substituted in subrogation to the judgment o
f
Stout against Atkinson; or he would have been entitled to an as
signment o
f
such judgment, under the Act o
f Assembly, to en
able him to collect the amount thereof from Atkinson. The mort
gage o
f





sale and the deficiency owing b
y
Todd to the
complainant, the complainant's equity to be subrogated to the
judgment o
f
Stout against Atkinson would, in accordance with the
decision o
f










































































































































Sect. 2] MILLER v. srour 257
would he available as against Atkinson, unless there were coun
tervailing equities on the part of Atkinson, as between him and
Todd, through whose equities the complainant must work out his
equity.
VVere there such countervailing equities? Suppose the com-1
plainant's mortgage had been satisfied, or the complainant had
been silent, not asserting any equity to subrogate, and Todd ha
filed a bill in equity against Atkinson to compel Atkinson to pa
him the amount of the judgment against Atkinson and himsel
which had been paid out of the proceeds of the sale of his land;
and suppose, in answer to such bill, that Atkinson had show
to the court that, long before such payment by sale of Todd’s
lands, he had become bound as surety for Todd in three times the
amount of such payment; that Todd was insolvent; that he would
be compelled to pay the amount of such suretyship for Todd; a
that Todd's creditor was in the process of collecting the amou t
of such suretyship from him,—would it be equitable, under su
circumstances, that Todd, by being subrogated to the judgme t
of Stout, should collect the amount of such judgment from Atki -
sou? If not, it must be for. the want of equity in Todd, under
the circumstances, as against Atkinson.
Again, suppose Todd had taken an assignment, under the
Act of Assembly, from the plaintiff therein, of the judgment of
Stout against Atkinson and himself, after it had been paid out
of the proceeds of the sale of his laud, and had proceeded to col
lect the amount of said judgment upon execution against Atkin
son, and Atkinson had filed a bill of equity to restrain the execu
tion, because of his suretyship for Todd, Todd’s insolvency, and
the proceedings against him, Atkinson, to compel the payment by
him of the amount of his said suretyship,—would not a court of
equity under such circumstances have enjoined Todd from collect
ing the amount of the judgment so assigned to him, until Tod
should pay the debt for which Atkinson was his surety? If so,
why? Simply for the reason that, under such circumstances, it
would be inequitable that Todd should collect from Atkinson the
amount of the said judgment until he paid the debts in which At
kinson was his surety.
It is true Atkinson has not paid Todd’s debts for which he is
surety, but it is equally true, in the light of the admission in this
cause. that he will be compelled to pav them; and this fact would
be sufi‘icient to prevent the enforcement by Todd of the collection









































































































































258 MILLER V. STOUT [Chap. V
kinson, from Atkinson, and to prevent his subrogation to said
judgment with a view to such collection.
Now, the complainant has no equity, as against Atkinson,
other than that which he must work out through the equity of
Todd against Atkinson; and Todd having no such equity enforce
able in this court, the complainant can have none.
This opinion is not in conflict with any of the authorities
cited by the complainant's solicitor. Huston's Appeal, 69 Pa. 485,
mainly relied on, does not conflict with, but, so far as it goes, is
confirmatory of, the views here presented.
That case was as follows: On the 7th day of May, 1868,
a judgment by confession upon warrant of attorney for $271.67
was entered in favor of Conrad Sylvas, against Adam Tithering
ton and F. Hollen,—Hollen being surety for Titherington. On
the 17th of October, 1868, Harvey J. Huston and Samuel M.
Huston obtained a judgment against Hollen for $2,235. The
First National Bank of Indiana, at the April Term, 1869, obtained
a judgment against one Clawson, who was indorser on a note for
Hollen, for about $1,200, and Clawson's property was levied upon
in satisfaction of the judgment. On the 2d of April, 1869, Hol
len's real estate was sold by the sheriff. Out of the proceeds of
the judgment, the sheriff, on the 17th of April, paid to the attor
neys of Sylvas $302.79, in full of his judgment and interest.
It will be observed that this was a case where the lands of a
surety were sold by the sheriff to pay the debts of a principal in
a judgment. In , respect it was like the present case. There
was a conflict of claims between the Hustons—who had the first
judgment lien against the lands of Hollen, which had been sold
subsequent to that of Sylvas—and Clawson, who had no judgment
lien against Hollen's real estate, but who claimed to be entitled
to subrogation to the judgment of Sylvas, because Hollen had as
signed his equity therein to him so as to defeat the right of sub
rogation of the Hustons. The court decided that Hollen was en
titled to be subrogated to the judgment of Sylvas as against Tith
erington, for whom he was surety. It will be further observed in
this case, as distinguishing it from the one before me, that Tith
erington had himself no equities against any of the claimants,—
the Hustons, Clawsons, or Hollen; and in this respect it very ma
terially differs from the present, where Atkinson has equities to
a much larger amount against Todd than Todd had against him.
The court, in the case referred to, said that Hollen was entitled









































































































































Sect. 2] MILLER v. srour 259
mere personal right which could pass to Clawson by the assign
ment, but a right which in equity passed to the judgment creditors
of Hollen ; and that as between Hollen and his judgment creditors,
who had a judgment lien, their equity was superior to his.
This doubtless is perfectly right; for it would have been
inequitable to allow Hollen to deprive his judgment creditors of
the benefit of their lien upon his real estate, by pocketing the pro
ceeds himself or by assigning the right to receive such proceeds
to another so as to defeat them. _
By allowing the complainant to be subrogated to the judg
ment of Stout against Atkinson and Todd through the supposed
equity of Todd, this effect would result: Atkinson would be de
prived of an equity not to be asserted by a suit, but consummated
and complete in part by law,—the payment and discharge of his
equities against Todd to the extent of $1,159 for the benefit of one
whose right to subrogation as against Todd did not arise until long
after Atkinson’s equities as against Todd commenced ; for we have
already seen that Atkinson’s equities as surety for Todd arose
when he became such surety. But the complainant's equity against
Todd had no existence until Todd’s land was sold and a portion
of the proceeds applied to the judgment of Stout against Atkin
son and Todd.
The complainant asks the active interposition of the court
to compel Atkinson, in his behalf, to surrender the benefit of a
realized equity (although he has still further equities against
Todd) and in effect to pay the amount so realized to the com
plainant, although the complainant’s equity was long subsequent
in date to that of Atkinson. “It is true,” says the court, “that
the appellant's right of subrogation depends on the equity of Hol
len, but as between them their equity is superior to his.” The
meaning of this is that if Hollen had an equity against Tithering
ton, the appellants, as creditors of Hollen, would have a right to
subrogation to the judgment against Titherington; but if Hollen
had no such equity, his creditors could have no such right.
It results, therefore, from the doctrine held in the case of
Huston"s Appeal, when applied to the present case, that the com
plainant's right to subrogation to the judgment of Stout against
Atkinson and Todd depends entirely upon the question whether
Todd himself—not as between him and the complainant, his cred
itor, but between him and Atkinson—has an equity to be subro
gated to said judgment.









































































































































260 EMMERT v. THOMPSON [Chap. V
decree that the injunction in this case be dissolved, and that the
bill of complaint be dismissed, with costs.
81. EMMERT v. THOMPSON, et al., 49 Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 31.
Supreme Court, Minnesota, 1892.
Subrogation is not founded upon contract, but is a, ereation
of equity. It is a mode which equity adopts to compel the ulti
mate payment of a debt by one who, in justice and good conscience,
ought to pay it and is not dependent upon contract, privity or strict
suretyship.
Appeal from district court, Nobles county; Brown, Judge.
Action by Joseph Emmert against Peter Thompson and oth
ers. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Daniel Rohrer, for appellant.
Warner, Richardson :5’ Lawrence, and G. W. Wilson, for
respondents.
COLLINS, J. When the loan of money was made by defend
ant Cornwell to defendant Marr, to secure which, as agreed upon,
the_latter mortgaged his entire farm, consisting of 240 gres, it
was for the stipulated purpose of relieving one tract (I60 acres)
from the trust deed held by Ormsby, the balance (80 acres) from
the Hayes mortgage, and the entire farm from delinquent taxes.
The trust deed, the mortgage last referred to, and the taxes were
represented to be, and in fact were, first liens upon the premises:
and Cornwell believed, and it was implied from what Marr stated
when applying for the loan—there were no other incumbrances,
and that, with these paid off and discharged, his mortgage would
take their place, and become the first and only charge upon the
property. The taxes and the amounts due on the incumbrances,
aggregating $1,434.82, were paid out of the proceeds of the loan,
in accordance with the agreement under which it was made. Prop
er releases and discharges were procured and at once recorded,
in the mistaken belief on the part of Cornwell, and the agents who
transacted the business, that there was no other or prior charge
upon the premises. For some time thereafter they remained in
ignorance of the fact that plaintiff’s mortgage was in existence
and of record when the one in question was executed, and by their
acts had. of record, become the senior lien. As Marr was and is
insolvent, and plaintiffs mortgage, with costs and disbursements










































































































































Sect. 2] EM1\iERT ~v. THOMPSON 261
found by the trial court, the seriousness of the situation is quite
apparent. The court below subordinated the plaintiff’s claim to
that of defendant Cornwell. to the extent of the payments made
for taxes, and to satisfy and extinguish the incumbrances, rein
stating the liens, in effect; and its right and power so to do is the
principal question now before us.
It has been well said that the doctrine of subrogation has been
steadily growing and expanding in importance, and becoming
more general in its application to various subjects and classes of
persons. It is not founded upon contract, but is the creation of
equity—is enforced solely for accomplishing the ends of substan
tial justice; and, being administered upon equitable principles, it
is only when an applicant has an equity to invoke, and where inno
cent persons will not be injured, that a court can interfere. It is
a mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a
debt by one who in justice and good conscience ought to pay
it
,
and is not dependent upon contract, privity, or strict suretyship.
Stevens v. Goodenough, 26 Vt. 676; Harnsberger v. Yancey, 33
Grat. 527; Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244. 7l
‘hat in this way a
court, under a great variety of circumstances, may relieve one who
has acted under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact, is read
ily conceded by appellant; but he invokes and seeks to have ‘ap
plied to respondents’ case the general rule that the doctrine of
subrogation will not be exercised in favor of a volunteer or a
stranger who officiously intermeddles, such as a person who pays
without any obligation so to do, or one who, without any interest
to protect, liquidates the debt of another. )There are a very re
spectable number of cases, several having been cited, in 'which
relief has been refused under circumstances precisely like those
now before us, where one who has loaned and used his money in
good faith, and for the express purpose of relieving a debtor
from a pressing obligation, and his real property from a specific
lien for the amount of the same, under a genuine but excusable
misapprehension as to the rank and position of security taken by .
him on the same property, has been treated and characterized as
a volunteer, a stranger, and an officious intermeddler, and denied
the rights of an equitable assignee. B~ thedevelopment of the principles on whic t e octrine is founded,
the courts have been taking a broader and more commendable
view of the situation of such a party, and at this time very little
is left of the views expressed in the earlier cases. The better









































































































































262 EMMERT v. THOMPSON [Chap. V
curity for the express purpose of taking up and discharging liens
or incumbrances on the same property has thus paid the debt at
the instance, request, and solicitation of the debtor, expecting and
believing, in good faith, that his security will, of record, be sub
stituted, in fact, in place of that which he discharges, is neithet
a volunteer, stranger, nor intermeddler, nor is the debt, lien, or
incumbrance regarded as extinguished, if justice requires that it
should be kept alive for the benefit of the person advancing the
money, who thereby becomes the creditor. Of the many authori
ties on this, we cite Association v. Thompson, 32 N. J. Eq. 133;
Guns v. '1‘h.ieme, 93 N. Y. 225; Sidener v. Pavey, 77 Ind. 241;
1UcKen:ie v. McKenzie, 52 Vt. 271; Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Me. 494;
Lez-y v. Martin, 48 Wis. 198, 4. N. W. Rep. 35; Insurance Co. v.
Aspinwall, 48 Mich. 238, 12 N. W. Rep. 214; Crippen v. Chap
pel. 35 Ran. 495, 11 Pac. Rep. 453; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1212; Har
ris, Subr. 811, 816; Dixon, Subr. 165.
It is contended by appellant that Cornwell must, under the
circumstances, be declared culpably negligent when taking his
security and discharging of record the Ormsby and Hayes liens;
and, further, that, as the plaintiff’s mortgage was then of record,
he had notice of it
,
in contemplation of law, and could not have
been misled or mistaken. Marr’s application for a loan was for
the avowed purpose of taking up and discharging the Ormsby
and Hayes liens, and was well calculated to convey the impression
that these were the only incumbrances. He intentionally or other
wise concealed the truth, omitting to state the existence of a junior
incumbrance in a large amount, a knowledge of which would have
ended at once all negotiations with Cornwell’s agents. It was
misleading, and the persons last named were not negligent because
they, to some extent, relied upon and were misled by it. See
Nen-ell v. Randall, 32 Minn. 171, 19 N. W. Rep. 972. It is a com
mon thing for courts. of equity to relieve parties who have by mis
take discharged mortgages upon the record, and to fully protect
them from the consequences of their acts, when such relief will
not result prejudicially to third or innocent persons. Gerd-ine v.
Jl/Ienagc, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. Rep. 91. Paraphrasing slightly
a remark made in the opinion therein, it may be said that, consid
ering this case as it stands between the appellant and respondent
Cornwell, it is obvious that it would be most unjust and inequita
ble not to place the parties in statu quo with respect to th
amounts paid out upon liens which were superior to that held b
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mistake grew out of an error in the abstract books kept by Corn
well’s agents; but later, when examining the records in the office -
of the register of deeds, the error was unnoticed and the mistake
undiscovered. It was a mistake of fact, and, in our judgment,
not of such a character as to bar the respondents’ claim to equita
ble relief. That, in a proper case of mistake of fact, such relief
may be afforded notwithstanding the intervening mortgage was
of record when the error was committed, is well settled. Geib v
Reynolds, 35 Minn. 331, 28 N. W. Rep. 923. Cornwell misunder
stood, and was justifiably ignorant of, the facts, and acted, through
his agents, upon the assumption that he and they knew the true
state of the title when the liens which his money had discharged
were satisfied of record, and 'plaintiff’s mortgage advanced to the
position of the senior incumbrance, without a single act of his,
and to the very great detriment of the person who had brought
it about. The court was right in applying the principle of subro
gation, or ‘equitable assignment,” as it is frequently called.
Judgment was entered below, directing that the premises be
sold, on foreclosure of plaintiff’s mortgage, as one farm, and that
out of the net proceeds, there be first paid to respondent Cornwell
the sums of money which he paid out as taxes, and to take up and
satisfy the incumbrances before mentioned. The appellant's coun
sel distinctly approves that part of the judgment which requires
a sale of the premises as an entirety, but makes the point, in case
we affirm the action of the trial court on the main question, that
the farm should have been sold subject to the subrogator’s lien for
a specific sum on the 160 and for another specific sum on the 80
acre tract, and thus there would have been avoided the possibility,
which he now suggests, of having shifted over upon one of these
tracts, to some extent, a burden which ought to wholly rest upon
the other. It is evident from the record that the attention of the
trial court was not called to this point, and hence the order that
the sale be of the whole as one body of land. But we are unable
to see how the result now suggested by counsel would have been
avoided by the adoption of his plan without selling the tracts sep
arately, keeping the funds derived from each distinct, and apply
ing the same to the liquidation of the liens, so far as they might
go. Counsel does not contend that the two tracts of land should
have been sold separately, but, as before stated, indorses the judg
ment directing a sale en masse. He is concluded on this point by










































































































































264 BEAvER v. SLANKER [Chap. V
82. BEAVER v. SLANKER, Admr., etc., 94 Ill. 175.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1879.
A ':/olunteer cannot, by paying a debt for which another is
bound, be subrogated to the ereditor’s rights in respect to the se
curity _given by theireal debtor; but, if the person who pays the
debt was compelled to do so, for the protection of his own inter
esls and rights, the substitution should be made.
Writ of error to the Appellate Court of the Fourth District.
In the year 1866, Victor Buchanan, as administrator de bonis
non of the estate of John C. Riley, deceased, in pursuance of an
order of the county court of Lawrence county, sold at public sale
divers tracts of lands belonging to the estate of said Riley.
Israel A. Powell became the purchaser for the price of $4,178.
The order of sale made by the county court required notes, with
approved personal security and a mortgage on the lands sold, to
be given to secure the payment of the purchase money. Powell
accordingly, on July 14, 1866, gave to Buchanan, administrator,
his note for the purchase price named, with Johnson and Aber
nathy as sureties, and also a mortgage on the lands purchased, to
secure the payment of the note, the mortgage being duly recorded.
In April, 1869, Buchanan, administrator, obtained a judgment
in the circuit court of Lawrence county on the note for a remain
ing unpaid portion thereof, against Powell, Johnson, and Aber
nathy. Johnson at that time held land upon which the judgment
became a lien.
The judgment was made upon execution out of Powell’s
property, except about $500, which remained unsatisfied until in
1873. In 1870 Johnson sold and conveyed his land, which was
subject to the lien of this judgment, to Gustave Kleinworth, by
deed, with full covenants of warranty. In 1873- an execution is
sued upon the judgment was levied upon this land so sold by John
son to Kleinworth, as the land of Johnson, a co-defendant in the
judgment, bound by the lien of the judgment, and the land was
sold under the execution February 2, 1874, to D. L. Gold, for
$603.40, and the execution was returned March 1, 1874, as satis
fied in full by such sale. Gold was the administrator of the estate
of Henrietta Riley, one of the two children and heirs of John C.
Riley. On April 20, 1860, Buchanan, administrator of John C.
Riley. in settlement of the latter’s estate, turned over and assigned
to Gold, administrator of the estate of Henrietta Riley, the un









































































































































Sect. 2] BEAVER. V. SLAN KER 265
Gold the mortgage which had been given by Powell to Buchanan
at the administrator's sale by the latter.
In January, 1875, Kleinworth, the previous purchaser from
Johnson of the land sold under the execution, bought of Gold his
certificate of purchase of the land under the execution, paying
him therefor $659, and Gold assigned to Kleinworth the certifi
cate of purchase, as also the said mortgage.
The bill in this case was filed by Kleinworth, asking to be
subrogated to the rights of Victor Buchanan, administrator, as
the same stood before the said sale of said land under execution,Q. for the foreclosure of the aforesaid mortgage. Kleinworth
died during the progress of the cause, and in his place Gideon
Slanker, his administrator, was substituted as a party.
Powell had made sale and conveyance of the several tracts
of land described in the mortgage, at different tunes to different
purchasers, Beaver being the last, on May 2, 1868.
The circuit court decreed in favor of the complainant to the
extent of the amount he paid Gold for his certificate of purchase
of complainant's land, and that the mortgaged lands be sold
for satisfaction of such amount in the inverse order of their alien
ation by Powell. On appeal by Beaver to the Appellate Court
for the Fourth District, the decree was affirmed, and Beaver brings
the case here on writ of error to the Appellate Court.
Mr. S. W. Short, for the plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Wilson & Hutchinson, for the defendant in error.
Mr. Justice SHELDON delivered the opinion of the court:
As a mere assignee alone of the mortgage, the complainant
might not be able to sustain this decree in his favor, as the judg
ment for the mortgage debt was satisfied in full by the sale under
execution of Kleinworth's land.
But, upon the doctrine of subrogation, we think there is
sufficient support for the decree.





when the obligation o
f
the principal and surety is given, a mort
gage also is made b
y
the principal to the creditor, as an additional
security for the debt, then, if the surety pays the debt, he will be
entitled to have a
n assignment o
f
the mortgage and to stand in
the place o
f
the mortgagee, and that the mortgage will remain a
valid and effectual security in favor o
f
the surety for the purpose
o
f obtaining his reimbursement, notwithstanding the obligation
is paid. The mortgage is regarded as not only for the creditor's
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§ 499; Rogers v. School Trustees, 46 Ill. 428; Pharcs v. Barbour,
49 id. 370; Jacques v .Fackney, 64 id. 87; City National Bank of
Ottpwa
\-'. Dudgeou, 65 id. 12; Bishop v. O'Connor, 69 id. 431.
~T here can be no question, in the case of Johnson himself, the
surety, had the land been sold while he owned it
,
in satisfaction of
the judgment, that he would have been entitled to maintain such
a bill as the present. [The only doubt is, whether the principle in
question, of subrogation, applies in favor of a purchaser of the
land from Johnson, the judgment against the latter being a lien
upon the land purchased. We are of the opinion it does. Klein
worth did not make the payment which he did for the certificat
of purchase of his land, as a mere stranger or volunteer, but h
made it standing in privity with Johnson, the surety, as his a
signee of land incumbered with the lien of the judgment again
Johnson as surety; and he made it compulsorily, to save to hin
self his land which had been sold as being bound by this judgment
lien. In Hough v. Aetniz Life Insurance Co., 57 Ill. 318, and
Young v. Morgan, 89.id. 199, this court recognized the doctrine
that a mere stranger or volunteer could not, by paying a debt for
which another is bound, be subrogated to the creditor’s rights in
respect to the security given by the real debtor; but that if the
person who paid the debt was compelled to pay, for the protection
of his own interests and rights, then the substitution should be
made.
Further, the present proceeding is in the interest of the sure
ty, Johnson, it being in the indirect assertion of his right of in
demnity from the mortgaged premises. Johnson sold and con
veyed to Kleinworth with covenant of warranty, and so was re
sponsible to the latter for the goodness of the title. Kleinworth,
instead of resorting to Johnson, on the latter’s covenant of war
ranty, and leaving Johnson to have recourse over to the mortgage,
proceeds directly against the mortgaged property, which is ulti
mately liable for the mortgage debt, and in obtaining satisfaction
therefrom for the portion of the mortgage debt the sale of his
land discharged, secures full indemnity for the surety, Johnson,
and thus avoiding circuity of action.
And this meets the suggestion, that, in relief of the appellant
and other purchasers from Powell, the recourse of Kleinworth
should have been against Johnson on his covenant of warranty.
If that had been done, then Johnson himself would have been sub
rogated to the rights under the mortgage, so that, in the end, the









































































































































Sect. 2] BEAvER v. SL.\NKI:R 267
the mortgaged premises. There is
,
besides, reason to believe that
suit upon the covenant of warranty would have been unavailing.
Johnson has deceased, and the records of the probate court show
his estate to be insolvent. To be sure, this showing is in respect
of personalty alone, and there is a possibility of the decedent hav
ing left lands which might respond upon the covenant of warran
ty; nothing appears as to this.
i
The circumstance of Powell having sold the mortgaged lands,
and they now being in the hands of purchasers from him, should
make no difference. Such purchasers occupy no better position
than Powell himself. The mortgage was upon record, and they
bought with notice that the lands were mortgaged; that they
stood as security for the payment of this mortgage indebtedness,
and as indemnity to the sureties against its payment, and that they
were liable to be resorted to and sold for the purpose of such se
curity and indemnity.
They are now proceeded against but for such purpose, and
these purchasers have no equitable cause of complaint.
If it be regarded important that they should have had notice
that Johnson and Abernathy were sureties only, we think they
were chargeable with such notice. The proceedings of the county
court under whose order of sale the administrator’s sale of these
lands of Riley was made, were a link in the chain of title of the
mortgaged lands, and purchasers from Powell must be held as hav
ing notice of them. These proceedings show that the sale was to be
on a credit, and that the purchaser was to give a mortgage on the
land purchased, and a note with personal security; they show the
sale of the lands to Powell, and Powell alone gives the mortgage
on the lands purchased. These circumstances, we think, afford
notice that Powell was the principal in the transaction, and John
son and Abernathy but his sureties. The answer of Beaver, too,
admits such suretyship.
There are some minor questions made, which remain to be
considered.
The bill alleges, under a videlicct, that the judgment was ob
tained against Powell, Johnson and Abernathy about the
day of November, 1872. The proof shows it was rendered in
April, 1869. It is insisted that in this respect there is a fatal var
iance between the allegations and proof.
The bill alleges the events correctly: that the judgment be
came a lien upon this land of Johnson, which he then owned, and









































































































































268 BEAvER v. SLANKER [Chap. V
The allegations of the bill and the proofs show that the judg
ment became a lien upon the land while owned by Johnson, and
before his conveyance of it to Kleinworth. The allegation as to
the time of obtaining the judgment is not one of a descriptive
character as respects the judgment, and does not purport to state
with exactness the time when _i
t was recovered. We find no
merit in this objection.
A further objection is, in respect of a mistake in the mort
gage from Powell to Buchanan. In the body of the mortgage,
in the granting part, the name of the mortgagor appears written
in the blank left for the name of the mortgagee, and the name of
the mortgagee in the blank left for the mortgagor, the mortgage
in all other respects being correct. It is urged that, although as
between the parties to the mortgage, this was a mistake that might
have been corrected, yet, as against Beaver, an innocent subse
quent purchaser from Powell of the mortgaged land, he not know
ing of the mistake, the mortgage could not be reformed; that he,
not having such knowledge, would be entitled to hold the land
unaffected by the mortgage, and so. was not compelled to pay the
mortgage debt, for the protection of his title to the land. We
think Beaver had notice of the mistake from the recording of the
mortgage.
The mortgage was signed by Powell, not Buchanan; it pur
ported to secure a debt from Powell to Buchanan, not one from
Buchanan to Powell; and the certificate of acknowledgment ex
pressed that the mortgage was acknowledged by Powell. The
mistake in the transposition of the names of the mortgagor and
mortgagee was palpable upon the face of the mortgage.
It is objected that there is no prayer in the bill for the re
formation of the mortgage, and no decree made therefor. The
bill does not ask specifically for the correction of the mistake, nor
does the decree by express words order the correction of the mis
take; but the bill alleges the mistake, and contains the general
prayer for relief; and the decree finds the fact of the mistake,
and, if not in terms decreeing its correction, it treats it as cor
rected, in declaring the mortgage to have been made by Powell,
and the mistake in it to be apparent upon reading the whole mort
gage, and ordering the sale of the mortgaged land for the satis
faction of the mortgage debt. We find nothing substantial in this
objection.
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SECTION 3. THE RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
83. LANSDALE’S Admr’s and Heirs v. COX, 7 T. B. Mon. 401.
Court of Appeals, Kentucky, 1828.
T/ic right of a surety to coritribiition from his co-sureties does
not arise out of contract, but is purely equitable in nature and
origin.
The fiction of a promise to contribute is employed by com
mon law courts to obtain jurisdiction.
Mayes <5’ Chapese, for plaintiffs.
Hardin 6' Darby, for defendants.
Opinion of the court by Chief Justice Bn3n.
Richard Lansdale and James Cox were the sureties of Shanks,
in an injunction bond to Summers, who sued Cox, the surviving
obligor, and had judgment for $730.24, beside costs, which was
paid by Cox’s surety in a replevin bond, and afterward paid by
Cox to his surety. These proceedings were in the Nelson circuit
court. _ ,
Cox thereafter, upon motion against the heirs of Shanks
the principal, (stating that there was no executor or administra
tor of Shanks,) had judgment, and execution, upon which the
sheriff made a small part of the judgment, (about $35.19,) and
returned that he could find no estate whereof to satisfy the residue.
Cox then sued his motion against the heirs and administra
tors, jointly, of his co-security, Lansdale, for contribution, and
recovered judgment; to which the defendants prosecute this writ
of error. * * * _
The whole doctrine of contribution between securities origi
nated with courts of equity. There is no express contract for
contribution; the bonds, obligations, bills, or notes, created liabili
ties from the obligors to the obligees. The contribution between
co-securities results from the maxim, that equality is equity. Pro
ceeding on this, a surety is entitled to every remedy which the
creditor has against the principal debtor; to stand in the place of
the creditor; to enforce every security, and all means of payment ;
to have those securities transferred to him, though there was no
stipulation for that. This right of a surety stands upon a prin
ciple of natural justice. The creditor may resort to principal to
either of the securities. for the whole, or to each for his proportion,
and as he has that right. if. he, from partiality to one surety, or
for other cause, will not enforce it
,









































































































































270 LANSDALF. v. cox [Chap. V
same right to the other surety, and enables him to enforce it. Nat
ural justice says that one surety having become so with other
sureties, shall not have the whole debt thrown upon him by the
choice of the creditor, in not resorting to remedies in his power,
without having contribution fro those who entered into the





to contribute to each other, is ot founded in contract between
them, but stood upon a principle of equity, until that principle of
equity had been so universally acknowledged, that courts of law,
in modern times, have assumed jurisdiction. /This jurisdiction of
the courts of common law is based upon the idea, that the equitable
principle had been so long and so generally
acknowledg?
and
enforced, that persons, in placing themselves under circu tances
to which it applies, may be supposed to act under the dominion
of contract, implied from th_e universality of that principle. For
a great length of time, equity exercised its jurisdiction exclusively
and undividedly; the jurisdiction assumed by the courts of law is
,
‘comparatively of very modern date; and is attended with great
difiiculty where there are many sureties; though simple and easy
enough where there are but two sureties, one of whom brings his
action against the other upon the implied assumpsit for a moiety.
The action at law, then, by one surety against his co-security,
arise out of an implied undertaking, not by force of express con
tract, and consequently the heirs can not have been expressly bound
by the ancestor. So that the action at law, by one surety against
the representatives of a deceased co-surety, must, by the principles
of the common law, be against the executor or administrator. To
reach the heirs in a suit at law, the remedy given by our statute
in such cases, must be jointly against the executors or adminis
trators and heirs, not against the heirs alone. The remedy in
equity by substitution of the co-security in place of the creditor,
and so allowing the one surety his redress against his co-surety
or co-sureties for contribution, still remains; the remedy at law,
by a regular action jointly against the heirs and executors or ad
ministrators, by force and operation of the statute of 1792, may
be pursued. * * *









































































































































Sect. 3] - MOORE. V. BRUNER 27 I
84. MOORE v. BRUNER, 31 Ill. App. 400.
Court of Appeals, Illinois, 1889.
At law each co-surety is liable to contribute only his pro
portionate share of the sum paid; in equity the solvent sureties
must divide the loss between them.
Mr. C. L. Mulkey, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Courtney & Helm, for defendant in error.
GREEN, P. J.—It is averred in the declaration in this case
that plaintiff, Bruner, and Moore, the defendant together with
McCammon and Gray, became sureties on the bond of the guard
ian of Barnes; that the guardian died owing his ward, and after
ward judgment was rendered in Massac probate court against
the estate of the guardian in favor of the ward for $500, but the
estate being insolvent no part of this judgment was paid ; that
afterward suit was brought in the Massac circuit court upon the
bond against Bruner and McCammon, and judgment was there
recovered against them for $500 and costs; that McCammon is
insolvent and Gray died insolvent; that plaintiff Bruner dis
charged said judgment in full, wherefore defendant became liable
to pay him $269.45 by way of contribution. A count for money
paid out by, plaintiff for defendant is added. The cause was tried
by the court. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
for $260 and costs, to reverse which defendant sued out this writ
of error.
The cause of action set out in this declaration, is the payment
made by Bruner in satisfaction of the judgment recovered against
himself and McCammon as sureties upon said guardian's bond,
one-half of which amount so paid, instead of one-fourth, Bruner
insists is the proportion plaintiff in error as a co-surety is legally
liable to contribute, because of the insolvency of the two other
co-sureties, McCammon and Gray. This was the view of the
trial court and in accordance therewith the judgment against
plaintiff in error was rendered. The court erred in so holding.
At law the amount of damages which plaintiff was entitled to
recover from defendant as a co-surety was one-fourth of the whole
debt paid, with interest from the time of payment. There were
four sureties, each of whom, as between themselves, became liable
at law to contribute an aliquot portion of the sum paid by Bruner,
and this aliquot portion is to be ascertained upon the basis of the
number of sureties, without regard to their solvency. Such we









































































































































272 MOORE v. BRUNILR [Chap. V
It is said in the opinion in S1oo v. Pool, 15 Ill. 48, “Sureties
are individually liable to the creditor, but one is as much bound
to discharge the debt as another. If the creditor endeavors to
enforce payment from them, it is
,
as between themselves, the
duty of each to pay an aliquot portion of the debt. If that is not
done, and one is compelled to pay the whole, he is entitled to
contribution from the others in the same proportion. The law
implies an agreement between them when they become responsible
to the creditor, that if one shall be compelled to pay the debt
the others will contribute so as to make the burden equal. If
one pays the whole debt he has a cause of action against the others
to recover their just proportion, as so much money paid to their
use. His right to contribution is complete as soon as he pays the
debt, and he may at once call on his co-sureties to bear the common
burden with him. At law he can not sue two or more jointly,
but he must sue each separately, and he can only recover from
one an aliquot portion of the debt, to be ascertained by the num
ber of sureties, without regard to their solvency. In equity, if
one is insolvent the loss is apportioned among the others.” In
I Parsons on Cont., 35, the rule is stated thus: “At law a surety
can recover from his co-surety only that co-surety’s aliquot part,
calculated upon the whole number, without reference to the in
solvency of either of the co-sureties, but in equity it is otherwise.”
VV e have examined the case of Golden v. Brand, 75 Ill. 148, cited
on behalf of appellee, and do not understand the court either did,
or intended to, abrogate or modify the rule announced in S1oo v.
Pool, supra.











































































































































Sect. 3] E.-\STERLY v. BARBER 273
85. EASTERLY v. BARBER, 66 N. Y. 433
Court of Appeals, New York, 1876.
Parol evidence is admissible to prove an agreement to be
liable as co-sureties among parties who, prima facie, have no
right to demand contribution. Distinction between legal and
equitable remedies.
There were two appeals in this case, the one by plaintiff
from an order of the general term of the supreme court in the
fourth judicial department denying motion for a new trial and
directing judgment on a verdict, the other by defendant from
the judgment entered upon such order.
The action was brought by plaintiff as third indorser of a
promissory note to recover’ the amount thereof of the second
indorser.
The n_o_t_e in question was made by the Stevenson Manufac
turing Company, payable to the order of one Knight, who in
dorsed it. Defendant was second indorser, plaintiff third, and
one MacDougall,the fourth. Defendant alleged in his answer
that the note was given and discounted for the benefit of the
maker, in which company all the four indorsers were stockholders ;
that they indorsed for the accommodation of the company under
an agreement that as between themselves they should be co-sure
ties, and share and contribute equally to the amount all or either
should be obliged to pay thereon.
Upon a former trial plaintiff recovered a judgment for one
fourth the amount of the note. It appeared on such trial that the
two other indorsers were insolvent. The general term reversed
the judgment and ordered a new trial on the ground that plaintiff
was entitled to judgment for one-half the amount. 3 N. Y. S. C.
(T. & C.) 421.
Upon the second, parol evidence was received to prove the
allegations of the answer, which was received under objection
and exception. The evidence tended to show that the note in suit
was a renewal of a former note; that the agreement was made in
"reference to the original note, which was renewed from time to
time. The testimony was conflicting as to whether anything
was said in reference to the liability as co-sureties at the time of
the indorsements of the note in suit.
Plaintiff was allowed to prove, under objection and excep
tion, the insolvency of the other two indorsers, Knight and Mac
Dougall. Evidence was given on the part of defendant tending









































































































































274 I-§.\STI:RLY v. BARBER [Chap. V
thereon against plaintiff alone at defendant’s request upon his
iving security to indemnify the bank.
As to the agreement, the court charged, in substance, that
if the jury found that the agreement was made as claimed by
defendant, plaintiff was entitled to judgment for one-half the
amount of the note, to which defendant’s counsel duly excepted.
E. H. A'uer_v, for the plaintiff.
Francis Kernan, for the defendant.
M1LL1~:R, J.—The first question presented upon these appeals
is. whether it is competent in an action by one indorser against
a prior indorser for the defendant to prove by parol an agreement
between all the indorsers that they were, as between themselves,
c0-sureties where they are accommodation indorsers. In Barry v.
Ransom, (12 N. Y. 462) it was held that an agreement made be
tween parties prior to or contemporaneously with their executing a
written obligation as sureties, by which one promises to indemnify
the other from loss, does not contradict or vary the terms or legal
effect of the written obligation, and it may be proved by parol
evidence. It was said by DENIO, J.
,
in the opinion. that an agree
ment among the sureties, arranging their eventual liabilities among
themselves in a manner different from what the law would pre
scribe, in the absence of an express agreement, would not contra
dict any of the terms of the bond. It was also held, that the en
gagement among themselves had no necessary place in the instru
ment between them and the other contracting parties. The case
cited referred to a joint and several bond, where the obligors were
equally liable upon its face. No reason exists, however, why the
same principle is not applicable to notes and bills of exchange.
_ The terms of the contract contained in instruments of this charac
ter, which are within its scope to define and regulate, cannot be
changed by parol; but the understanding between the indorsers
is a distinct and separate subject, an outside matter, which may
be properly proved independent of and without any regard to the
instrument itself. This rule is distinctly established in reference
to joint makers of promissory notes; and although the previous
decisions had been somewhat uncertain it has been recently deter
mined by the decision of this court that where a person signed,
as surety, a joint and several promissory note, and it did not ap
pear by the instrument itself that such relation existed, he might
prove such fact by parol, and that such proof did not tend to alter
the terms of the contract. Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 457. It is









































































































































Sect. 3] EASTERLY \'. BARBER 275
classes of cases which prevents the application of the same prin
ciple to both of them.
An attempted distinction is sought to be maintained because
the relation of indorsers to each other are fixed by law; while
the relations and obligations of sureties and obligors are not fixed.
As between the principal and the sureties they are fixed quite as
much as between indorsers, and can only be settled as between
sureties where the contract does not show the fact by parol proof
of the same. In support of the same views is the case of Philips
v. Preston, (5 How. [U. S.] 278, 292), where the doctrine is laid
down that proof of a collateral contract, by parol, may be given
to show the liability of indorsers as between themselves. See, also,
McDonald v. Magruder, 3 Peters, 470; Aiken \’. Barkley, 2 Speers,
747: Edelen v. il/Vhite, 6 Bush. (Ky.), 408; Davis v. Morgan, 64
N. C. 570. ‘The indorsements upon bills of exchange or promis
sory notes rest upon the theory that the liability of indorsers to
each other is regulated by the position of their names, and that
the paper is transferred from the one to the others by indorse
ment. But this rule has no practical application to accommodation
indorsers, where neither of them has owned the paper and no such "’
transfer has been made. It is easy to see that the application of
the rule contended for, in many cases, would work the most serious
injustice. /Suppose a person sign as accommodation maker of a
promissory note, and the payee for whose benefit it is made in
dorses it and pays the note, and afterwards sues the maker to
recover back the money, would it be seriously contended that
proof could not be given to show that he was merely an accom
modation maker? Clearly not; and yet such evidence would
contradict the written instrument quite as much as it would to
prove an agreement between indorsers in regard to their liability
as between each other. Cases frequently arise where it is com
petent to prove that the indorsement is made for the accommoda
tion of the maker; and a drawee may show, after acceptance, that
he has no funds (3 N. Y. 423) in his hands, and that he was
merely an accommodation accepter. Grifiitli v. Reed, 2i Vl-lend.
502. The cases to which we have been referred by the plaintiffs
counsel do not, we think, sustain the position contended for; that
parol proof cannot be given to show an arrangement between
-
accommodation indorsers different from that which appears by
the legal effect of the instrument, and a particular examination
of them is not required. The uniform practice in this State has









































































































































276 EASTERLY v. BARBER [Chap. V
of this character, and it would be establishing a new rule at this
time to hold that such testimony was incompetent. There was,
therefore, no error committed by the judge in the admission of the
evidence to which objection was taken.
* * * It is claimed that an action at law by a surety for con
tribution must be against each of the sureties separately for his
proportion, and that no more can be recovered, even where one
or more are insolvent. In the latter case, the action must be in
equity against all the co-sureties for contributions, and, upon
proof of the insolvency of one or more of the sureties, the pay
ment of the amount will be adjudged among the solvent parties
in due proportion. The principle stated is fully sustained by the
authorities. It is thus stated, in Parsons on Contracts (vol. 1,
page 34) : “At law, a surety can recover from his co-surety an
aliquot part, calculated upon the whole number, without reference
to the insolvency of others of the co-sureties; but in equity it is
otherwise.” See, also, Browne v. Lee, 6 Barn. & Cress. 689, 13
Eng. C. L. 394; Cowell v. Edwards, 2 B. & Pull. 268; Beaman v.
Blanchard, 4 Wend. 432, 435; Story’s Eq. Juris., § 496; 1 Chitty
on Con. (5th Am. ed.), 597, 598; Willard’s Eq. Juris., 108. There
seems to be a propriety in the rule that where sureties are called
upon to contribute, and some of them are insolvent, that all the
parties should be brought into court and a decree made upon
equitable principles in reference to the alleged insolvency. There
should be a remedy decreed against the insolvent parties, which
may be enforced if they become afterwards able to pay, and this
can only be done in a court of equity and when they are parties to
the action. (The action here was not of this character; nor were all
the proper parties before the court. It was clearly an action at
law, and in that point of view, as we have seen, the plaintiff could
only recover for one-fourth of the debt for which all the sureties
were liable. The distinction between the two classes of actions is
recognized y the decisions.
The remedies, the parties and course of procedure are each
different. In the one, a jury trial is a matter of right; while in
the other the trial is by the court. The costs are also in the dis
cretion of the court. (Code §§ 253, 306; 13 N. Y. [supra],
498). As the judgment could not require each of the parties
to pay his aliquot share and furnish a remedy over against those
who were insolvent and the rights of the parties be finally deter
mined and fixed, it was under the facts proven clearly erroneous.









































































































































Sect. 3] DEERING V. EARL OF WIN CHIELSEA 277
i
sary, may be made to conform to the facts, and the case disposed
of upon the merits, the defects here are so radical as to strike
at the very foundation of the action, and cannot thus be remedied.
Besides, the proper parties are not before us, and cannot be
brought in, except on motion in the court below. As the claim
was alleged in the complaint, there was no such defect of parties
apparent as required the defendant to take the objection by de
nulrrer Or anSWer.
It follows that the judgment must be affirmed upon the plain
tiff's appeal, with costs of appeal to be paid by the plaintiff upon
the final termination of the action, if the defendant succeeds; and
if the plaintiff succeeds, to be set off against the plaintiff's costs.
And the judgment must be reversed upon the defendant's appeal,
with costs of the appeal in this court, and costs in the supreme
court to abide the event.




86. DEERING v. EARL OF WINCHELSEA, 1 Cox Chy. Cas. 318.
In the Exchequer, 1787.
Contribution among co-sureties is not founded on contract,
but is the result o
f
a general equity on the ground o
f equality o
f
burden and benefit. Sureties bound on distinct and separate obli
gations for the same transaction are co-sureties.
-




the duties belonging to the customs, it became necessary
upon such appointment for him to enter into bonds to the crown
with three securities for the due performance o
f
this office. Sir
Edward Deering, his brother, the Earl o
f Winchelsea, and Sir
John Rous, having agreed to become sureties for him, a joint and
several bond was executed b
y
Thomas Deering and Sir Edward
Deering to the crown in the penalty o
f 4000l., another joint and
several bond b
y




Thomas Deering and Sir John Rous in the same penalty
o
f 4000l., all conditioned alike for the due performance o
f
Thomas
Deering's duty as collector. Mr. Deering being in arrear to the
crown to the amount o
f
3883l. 14s, the crown put the first bond
in suit against Sir Edward Deering, and judgment was obtained
thereon for that sum: whereupon Sir Edward filed this bill against
the Earl o
f
Winchelsea and Sir John Rous, claiming from them a









































































































































278 DEERING v. EARL oF WINCHELSEA [Chap V
The cause had been argued at length, in Michaelmas Term
last, and now stood for judgment.
LoRD CHIFF B.\RoN.—This bill is brought by one surety
against his two co-sureties, under the circumstances above men
tioned. Mr. Deering’s appointment, the three bonds, and the
judgment against the plaintiff, are in proof in the cause; the
original balance due, and the present state of it
,
are admitted. The
demand is resisted on two grounds: 1st, that there is no founda
tion for the demand in the nature of the contract: and 2ndly, that
the conduct of Sir Edward Deering has been such as to disable
him from claiming the benefit of the contract, though it did other
wise exist. There is also a formal objection which I shall take
notice of hereafter. I shall consider the second ground of objec
tion first, in order to lay it out of the case. The misconduct im
puted to Sir Edward is, that he encouraged his brother in gaming
and other irregularities; that he knew his brother had no fortune
of his own. and must necessarily be making useiof the public mon
ey, and that Sir Edward was privy to his brother's breaking the or
dcrs of the Lords of the Treasury, to keep the money in a particu
lar box, and in a particular manner, &c. This may all be true, and
such a representation of Sir Edward’s conduct certainly places
him in a bad point of view; and perhaps it is not a very decorous
proceeding in Sir Edward to come into this court under these
circumstances: be might possibly have involved his brother in some
measure, but yet it is not made out to the satisfaction of the
court. but these facts will constitute a defence. It is argued that
the author of the loss shall not have the benefit of a contribution:
but no cases have been cited to this point, nor any principle which
applies to this case. It is not laying down any principle to say
that his ill conduct disables him from having any relief in this
court. If this can be founded on any principle, it must be, that a
man must come into a Court of Equity with clean hands; but when
this is said, it does not mean a general depravity; it must have
an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it
must be a depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense. In a mor
al sense. the companion, and perhaps the conductor, of Mr. Deer
ing. may be said to be the author of the loss, but to legal purposes,
Mr. Deering himself is the author of it; and if the evil example
of Sir Edward led him on, this is not what the court can take
cognizance of. Cases indeed might be put in which the propo
sition would be true. If a contribution‘ were demanded from a









































































































































Sect. 3] DEERING v. EARL oF wn~:cneLsF..-\ 279
the plaintiff had actually bored a hole in the ship, he would in
that case be certainly author of the loss, and would not be entitled
to any contribution. But speaking of the author of the loss is a
mere figure of speech as applied to Sir Edward Deering in this
case. The real point is whether a contribution can be demanded
between the obligors of distinct and separate obligations under the
circumstances of this case. It is admitted that if there had been only
one bond in which the three sureties had joined for 12.oo0l. there
must have been a contribution amongst them to the extent of any
loss sustained; but it is said that that case proceeds on the contract
and privity subsisting amongst the sureties, which this case ex
cludes; that this case admits of the supposition that the three
sureties are perfect strangers to each other,l and each of them
might be ignorant of the other sureties, and that it would be
strange to imply any contract as amongst the sureties in this
situation; that these are perfectly distinct undertakings without
connection with each other, and it is added, that the contribution
can never be eodem modo, as in the three joining in one bond
for 12,oo0l., for there, if one of them became insolvent, the two
others would be liable to contribute in moieties to the amount of
6,0001. each, whereas here it is impossible to make them contribute
beyond the penalty of the bond. Mr. Maddocks has stated what
is decisive, if true, that nobody is liable to contribute who does
not appear on the face of the bond: if this means only that there
is no contract, then it comes back to the question, whether the
right of contribution is founded on contract. If we take a-view
of the cases both in law and equity, we shall -find that contribu
tion is bottomed and fixed on general principles of justice, and
does not spring from contract; though contract may qualify it
,
as in Swain v. Wall, I Ch. Rep. I49. In the Register, 176 b
. there
arc two writs of contributions, one inter-cohaeredes, the other
inter-cofeoffatos; these are founded on the statute of Marlbridge;
the great object of the statute is to protect the inheritance from
more suits than are necessary. Though contribution is a part of
the provision of the statute, yet in Fitz. ;\'. B. 338, there is a
writ of contribution at common law amongst tenants in common,
as for a mill falling to decay. In the same page Fitsherbert
takes notice of contribution between co-heirs and co-feoffees, and
as between co-feoffees he supposes there shall be no contribution
without an agreement, and the words of the writ countenance
such an idea, for the words are “ex eorum assensu,” and yet this









































































































































280 DFIERING v. E.-\RL oF WINCHELSEA [Chap. V
co-heirs the statute is express; it does not say so as to feoffees,
but it gives contribution in the same manner. In Sir Williaim
Harberfs case, 3 Co. 11 b., many cases of contribution are put;
and the reason given in the books is
,
that in equali jure the law
requires equality; one shall not bear the burthen in ease of the
rest, and the law is grounded in great equity. Contract is never
mentioned. Now the doctrine of equality operates more effectu
ally in this court than in a court of law. The difficulty in Cake’s
Cases was how to make them contribute; they were put to their
audita querela, or scire /acias. In equity there is a string of cases
in I Eq. Ca. Abr. tit._ “Contribution and average.” Another case
occurs in Harg. Law Tracts on the right of the King on the pris
age of wine. The King is entitled to one ton before the mast, and
one ton behind, and in that case a right of contribution accrues;
for the King may take by his prerogative any two tons of wine
he thinks fit, by which one man might suffer solely; but the con
tribution is given of course on general principles which govern
all these cases. Now to come to the particular case of sureties;
it is clear that one surety may compel a contribution from another,
towards payment of a debt to which they are jointly bound. On
what principle? Can it be necessary to resort to the circum
stance of a joint bond? What, if they are jointly and severally
bound? What difference will it make if they are severally bound,
and by difiererit instruments, but for the same principal, and the
same engagement? In all these cases the sureties have a common
interest, and a common burthen; they are joined by the common
end and purpose of their several obligations, as much as if they
were joined in one instrument, with this difference only, that the
penalties will ascertain the proportion in which they are to con
tribute, whereas if they had joined in one bond, it must have
depended on other circumstances. In this case the three sureties
are all bound that Mr. Deering shall account for the moneys he
receives; this is a common burthen; all the bonds are forfeited
at law; and in this court, as far as the balance due: the balance
might have been so great as to have exhausted all the penalties,
and then the obligee forces them all to pay: but here the balance
is something less than one of the penalties. Now who ought to
pay this? The one who is sued must pay it to the crown, as in
the case of prisage, but, as between themselves, there shall be a
contribution, for they are in cquali jure. This is carried a great
way, where they are joined in one obligation. for if one should
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shall contribute a moiety, though he certainly never meant to be
liable for more than a third: this circumstance, and the possibility
of one being liable for the whole, if the other two should prove in
solvent, suggested the mode of entering into separate bonds; but
this does not vary the reason for contribution, for there is the
same principal and the same engagement; all are equally liable to
,the obligee to the extent of the penalty of the bonds when they
are not all exhausted: if
,
as in the common case of a joint bond, no
distinction is to be made, why shall not the same rule govern here?
As in the case of average of cargo in a court of law, qui sentit
commodum sentire debet et onus. This principle has a direct
application here, for the charging one surety, discharges the other,
and each therefore ought to contribute to the onus. In questions
of average there is no contract or privity in ordinary cases, but
it is the result of general justice from the equality of burthen and
benefit: then there is no difficulty or absurdity in making a con
tribution take place in this case, if not founded on contract, nor
any difficulty in adjusting the proportions in which they are to
contribute; for the penalties will necessarily determine this.
The objection in point of form, which I before mentioned,
is
,
that the bill cannot be sustained, inasmuch as it has not
charged the insolvency of the principal debtor, and that such a
charge is absolutely necessary. As a question of form, it ought
to have been brought on by demurrer; but in substance the insol
vency of Mr. Deering may be collected from the whole proceed
ings, which strongly imply it; for the plaintiff appears to have
submitted to the judgment, and the defendants have made their
defence on other grounds.
On the whole, therefore, we think that the plaintiff is entitled
to the relief he prays, and declare that the balance due from
Thomas Deering being admitted on all hands to amount to the
sum of 38831. 14s. 8%d. the plaintiff Sir Edward Deering, and
the two defendants the Earl of Vtlinchelsea and Sir John Rous
ought to contribute in _equa1 shares to the payment of that sum,
and direct that the said plaintiff and defendants do pay in dis
charge thereof each of them the sum of 12941. 11s. 7d. And that
on payment thereof the Attorney-General shall acknowledge satis
faction on the record of the said judgment, and that the two
bonds entered into by the Earl of Winchelsea and Sir John Rous,
be delivered up to them respectively. But this not being a very
favorable case to the plaintiff, and the equity he asks being doubt
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87. . CITY OF DEERING v. MOORE, 86 Me. 181, 29 Atl. 988.
Supreme Judicial Court, Maine, 1893.
Sureties bound severally for the payment of the same debt
_ are liable to contribution so that all shall fare alike.
Geo. C. Hopkins, for plaintiff.
C. P. Mattacks and L. Barton, for defendants. ~
. ( .H.\sKELL, J.—Debt by an'(’)bl1gee agamst a surety upon two
bonds, given by a collector of taxes for the years 1884 and 1885,
respectively. The last bond was not signed by the principal. Each
surety bound himself severally, and not jointly, in the sum of
$5,000. The obligee received from two sureties a sum of money,
“in full discharge from liability upon each bond.” Two questions
are presented: * * *
II. Did the discharge of two sureties release the defendant,
another surety? No. The defendant was one of six sureties,
who bound themselves severally and not jointly, each in the sum
of $5.000. Their relations to each other are precisely the same as
if each one had executed a separate bond. They are neither neces
sarily joint debtors, nor joint sureties. Had the principal executed
the bond, he would have bound himself in the sum of $30,000. The
sureties, instead of standing in jointly for that amount, divided it
equally among them, and each one became severally bound for his
aliquot share. They are sureties for the principal, and may or may
not be called upon to bear a common burden, as circumstances may
require. If they are, (that is, if the whole liability be less than
the aggregate amount assumed by all of them, it becomes a com
mon burden, not by reason of any contract or engagement to in
dcmnify each other, but on the principle of equity, that a common
burden shall be equally borne by all), they become co-sureties, and
stand in relation to each other as joint debtors, and are bound to
contribute to each other, so that they shall all fare alike. In cases
of this sort, of course, none can be charged beyond the amount that
he has stipulated for. Warner v. Morrison, 3 Allen, 567. It fol
lows, therefore, that the release of one would work the release of
all. That is based upon the presumption of payment, the seal
being conclusive evidence of complete and ample consideration. .
To work the discharge of a debtor, the agreement must be made
upon sufficient consideration, and that pays the debt.. At common
law, the part payment of a debt is not sufficient consideration for
its discharge. Ba-iley v. Day, 26 Maine, 88; Potter v. Green, 6









































































































































Sect. 3] CITY oF DEERING v. MOORE 283
consequence what the actual consideration may be, for the seal
is conclusive evidence of sufficient consideration. By the statute
of this State, passed in 1851, c. 213, R. S., c. 82, § 45, the settle
ment of a demand upon the receipt of money or other valuable
consideration, however small, will bar an action upon it. It
should be observed that the demand must be settled, in order to
effectuate that result. The discharge of a debtor from liability
upon a demand that is to remain outstanding will not so operate.
This distinction applies where one or two joint debtors is dis
charged upon the consideration of part payment, leaving the
demand outstanding against the other, Such discharge will not
bar an action against both; nor can it be pleaded by the_ other in an
action against him, if the liability be served. Bank v. Marshall, 73
Maine. 79; Drinkwater v. Jordan, 46 Maine, 432; McAllester v.
Sprague, 34 Maine, 296. .
jln the case at bar, the attempted discharge of some of the
sureties is not pretended to have been by a sealed instrument. Had
it been, it would have worked a discharge of all the sureties, for
they stand in the relation to each other of joint debtors, being co
sureties for the payment of the same debt. Nor does it pretend to
have discharged the whole debt, as provided for by statute. It
simply presumes to discharge some sureties from a liability or debt
that was to remain outstanding, and, therefore, not being upon
sufficient consideration that would have paid the debt, or so much
of it as they had engaged to pay by their covenant, nor evidenced
by a sealed instrument, it was ineffectual to discharge any one.
The result is, damages upon the last bond should be assessed
in a sum equal to the existing default of the principal, with inter
est from the time it accrued, leaving the defendant to such claims
for contribution as shall prove just.
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SECTION 4. THE RIGHT OF EXONERATION
88. DOBIE v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO., 95 Wis. 540,
70 N. W. 482.
Supreme Court, Wisconsin, 1897.
A surety can, in equity, compel his principal to exonerate him
from liability, by extinguishing the obligation, without having
first paid it himself.
Suit by David Dobie against the Fidelity & Casualty Company
of New York to compel defendant to exonerate plaintiff from lia
bility on an appeal bond. From a judgment for plaintiff on the
pleadings, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
One Knute Anderson obtained a judgment against M. C.
Burke and John Burke. The action was for personal injuries.
The Fidelity & Casualty Company was an insurer of the Burkes
against such claims, and was defending the action. It procured
Dobie and Tennis to become sureties on the appeal, and gave them
its own bond in the sum of $7,000 to indemnify them, conditioned
to “answer for all damages, interest and costs, if any, that shall be
adjudged” against the defendant, and “to save said Tennis and
Dobie harmless from all costs and damages on account of their
obligation as sureties.” Judgment went against the defendant on
the appeal, and Tennis and Dobie became liable on their under
taking. No part of the judgment has been paid. The plaintiff
brings this action to compel the defendant, the Fidelity & Casualty
Company, to pay the judgment, and so exonerate the plaintiff
from liability. The plaintiff had judgment upon the pleadings,
according to the demand of his complaint, and the defendant
appeals.
Ross, Dwyer 6' Haniteh, for appellant.
Thorson 6' Crazeford, for respondent.
NEWMAN, J.—(After stating the facts). The question pre
sented is whether the complaint states a cause of action. The
action is by a surety to compel his principal to pay the debt for
which both are liable, for the exone ation of the surety. It is
ultimately the defendant’s liability. hat party is the principal
debtor, who is ultimately liable for the debt. The question is
whether a surety can, in equity, compel his principal to exonerate
him from liability, by extinguishing the obligation. without having
first paid it himself. fit seems to be well settled that a surety









































































































































Sect. 4] LOOSEMORE V. RADFORD 285
payment himself, proceed in equity against his principal to subject
the estate of the latter to the payment of the debt, in exoneration
of the surety. 2 Beach, Eq. Jur. § 903; 3 Pom. Eq. § 1417; Will.
Eq. Jur. IIo; United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Co. v. Long
Dock Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 142; Beaver v. Beaver, 23 Pa. St. 167;
Gibbs v. Mennard, 6 Paige, 258; Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend.
194; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 486, cases in note. The judgment
of the Circuit court of Douglas county is affirmed. -
—t
&-* 80. LOOSEMORE v. RADFORD, 9 Meeson & Welsby 657.
Court of Exchequer, 1842.
In an action for breach of a covenant whereby the principal
covenanted with the surety to pay the amount of a note on a given
day, the surety is entitled to recover the full amount of the note,
although he had not paid the note.
*
CovENANT.—The declaration stated, that whereas the defend
ant, before and at the time of the making of the indenture herein
after mentioned, was indebted to H. D. and G. B. in the sum of
400l., secured to them by a promissory note made by the de
fendant, and by the plaintiff as the defendant's surety, and in
95l. 5s. 9d. for interest thereon; and thereupon, by a certain en
dorsement bearing date, &c., made between the defendant of the
one part, and the plaintiff of the other part, the defendant cove
nanted with the plaintiff, that he the defendant would well and
truly pay to the said H. D. and G. B. the sum of 400l., with inter
est as aforesaid, on the 13th day of August then next. Breach,
that the defendant did not pay to the said H. D. and G. B., or
either of them, the said sum of 400l. and interest, or any part
thereof, on the said 13th day of August, or at any other time.
The defendant pleaded payment into Court of ls
.
and no




At the trial before Lord Abinger, C
. B., at the Middlesex
sittings after Hilary term, it appeared that the defendant being
in embarrassed circumstances, the payees had informed the plain
tiff that they should hold him liable upon the note, whereupon he
obtained from the defendant the deed mentioned in the declara
tion. The note was still unpaid at the time o
f
the trial: and it was
objected that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover nominal
damages only. The Lord Chief Baron overruled the objection,









































































































































286 LOO-SEMORE v. RADFORD [Chap. V
Erie now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirec
tion. The plaintiff, not having actually paid any money on the
note, has suffered no substantial injury, and is entitled to nominal
damages only. The money might have been paid by the defendant
after the day of payment mentioned in the covenant. The action
is prematurely brought. In Hmnbleton v. Veere, 2 Saund. 169,
where the plaintiff declared for an injury in procuring his appren
tice to depart from his service, and for the loss of his service for
the whole residue of his term of apprenticeship, and the jury
assessed the damages generally, the judgment was arrested on the
ground that the term had not expired when the action was brought.
Here the plaintiff had no substantial cause of action until after
payment of the note by him. There is nothing to prevent the
payees of the note from suing the defendant, in which case he
will have to pay the money twice over.
Parke, B.—I think there ought to be no rule. This is an ab
Solute~ f
monev on ' c rtam. Th mone' was not paid on ay,
nor has it been paid since. Under these circumstances, I think
the jury were warranted in giving the plaintiff the full amount
of the money due upon the covenant. If any money had been paid
in respect of the note since the day fixed for the payment, that
would relieve the plaintiff pro tanto from his responsibility.
The defendant may perhaps have an equity that the money he may
pay to the plaintiff shall be applied in discharge of his debt; but
at law the plaintiff is entitled to be placed in the same situation
under this agreement, as if he had paid the money to the payees
of the bill.
Alderson, B.—The question is, to what extent has the plain
tiff been injured by the defendant's default? Certainly to the
amount of the money that the defendant ought to have paid ac
cording to his covenant. The case resembles that of an action
of trover for title-deeds, where the jury may give the full value
of the estate to which they belong by way of damages, although
they are generally reduced to 40$. on the deeds being given up.
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90. WOLMERSHAUSEN v. GULLICK, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 514.
Court of Chancery, 1893.
A surety whose liability to pay more than his proportion of
the debt has been fired, may, in equity, compel the co-sureties to
e.voncrate him to the cartent of their aliquot shares.
The plaintiff was the widow and executrix of George Wol
mershausen, whose estate was being administered by the court,
and this action was brought by leave of the court against Thomas
Gullick and John Patton as co-sureties with the deceased for
contribution. The facts appear in the opinion.
Farwell, Q.C., and Birrell, for the Plaintiff.
Haldane, Q.C., and Curtis Price, for the Defendant Gullick.








the arguments, dismissed the
action as against the Defendant Patton with costs, but reserved
judgment as between the Plaintiff and the Defendant Gullick:
WRIGHT, J. This case raises an important question with
respect to which there is a remarkable absence o
f express author
ity. The Plaintiff is the executrix o
f
a person who became
surety with four others for a large sum o
f money advanced b
y
a
bank to a company. The surety's estate is being administered in
the Court, and the bankers put in a claim as creditors for the
whole amount o
f
the guarantee. The Plaintiff resisted the claim
and succeeded in reducing it from £6OOO, buy it has been
finally allowed for a sum o
f
about £4500. [The Plaintiff
is now called upon to pay that sum, and brings this action against
co-sureties for contribution. YThe Plaintiff has not yet paid any
thing. \One Defendant I have dismissed from the action on the
ground that he is discharged b
y
a composition under sect. 18 o
f
the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, inasmuch as it appears to me that his









in the claims o





f bankruptcy could have been sustained, was a





the Act, and therefore
a debt provable in the bankruptcy: Hardy v. Fothergill, 13 App.
Cas. 351.
The principal defence o
f
the other Defendant is that the
Plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action until she has
paid more than her proportion, o
r
a









































































































































288 wot.MERsn.\usEn v. GULLICK [Chap. V
her proportion. The Plaintiff is willing to pay her proportion,
but she insists that the actual payment of it is not a condition
precedent to her right to sue, and says that at any rate she is
not obliged to pay the whole in the first instance and then sue for
reimbursement. If she is obliged to pay the whole before actual
contribution from the co-surety, the business in which the tes
tat0r’s assets are invested will be embarrassed by the withdrawal
of so much of the capital even for a short time. Obviously if
a man were surety with nine others for £10,000, it might be a
ruinous hardship if he were compelled to raise the whole £10,000
at once and perhaps to pay interest on the £9000 until he could
recover the £9000 by actions or debtor summonses against his co
sureties.
The questions are whether the action can be maintained, and
what is the precise extent of the relief (if any) which can be
given. By the Roman law, as- it stood in the time of Justinian,
sureties had, generally speaking, a right to compel the creditor to
enforce payment against them pro raita only. The superior Courts
of common law in this country have never entertained any action
for contribution by a surety against his co-surety, except the
action for money paid, and from the time of Davies v. H 1m1phreys,
6 M. & W. 153. which was decided in the year 1840, it has been
treated as settled law that the surety cannot maintain this action
until he has actually paid more than his own proportion, because
this action assumes a debt due and payable to the Plaintiff, and
. there is no legal debt due and payable, and the creditor may yet en
force payment of the whole balance from the co-surety. Nor did the
Courts of common law ever give in the case of co-sureties the
equitable relief which they were accustomed to give in many
other cases of joint or common liability, by compelling contribu
tion after judgment and before execution by means of a writ of
auditzi querelzi or scire facias to limit the creditor’s execution to
the proper share payable by the particular defendant. This will
be seen from the collection of ancient cases in 3 Rep. pages 12 and
following.
By the custom of the City of London an equitable action lay
in the City Courts by a surety before he had paid anything to have
it ordered that he and his co-sureties should be charged jro rate‘:
0nly—“ut uterque eorum oneretur pro rata”. Offley and John
.ron’s Case, (26 Eliz.), 2 Leon. 166. * * *
In 1868. in Wooldridge v. Norris, L. R. 6 Eq. 410, executors
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son who had covenanted to indemnify the testator against his lia
bility as surety, although the executors had not paid or been sued.
The judgment, however, proceeded on the particular terms of the
covenant.
In the same year, in Cruse v. Paine, L. R. 6 Eq. 641; 4 Ch.
441, where a vendor of shares was entitled to be indemnified by
his vendee against calls, Lord Hatherley declared the liability of
the vendee for future calls, and ordered him to indemnify the
vendor’s estate, and to procure its release or discharge “either
by payment of the calls or otherwise, with liberty to apply in
Chambers, &c.” _
In 1872, in Beclleri’aise v. Lewis, L. R. 7 C. P. 372, 377,
W1i.i.F.S, J., said :—“'I‘he surety, * * * as soon as his obligation
to pay is become absolute, has a right in equity to be exonerated
by his principal.”
In 1874, in Lacey v. Hill, L. R. 18 Eq. 182, 191, upon a cred
itor’s claim in an administration, Jessel, M. R., said :—
“Whatever may be the case at law * * "‘ it is quite
plain that in this Court any one having a right to be indemnified
has a right to have a sufficient sum set apart for that indemnity.
It is not very material to consider whether he is entitled to have
that sum paid to him, or whether it must be paid direct over to
the creditor. If the creditor is not a party, I believe that it has
been decided that the party seeking indemnity may be entitled
to have the money paid over to him. * * *
'
The preceding cases from Cruse v. Pain, supra, downwards
have been referred to, not as having any direct bearing on the
rights of co-sureties, but as throwing some light on the nature and
extent of the relief which can be given in equity in analogous
matters. There are only two remaining authorities. In 1881, in
Ex parte Snowden, 17 Ch. D. 44, 46, 47, a surety who had paid his
own share and no more, and who had not been called upon to pay
more, issued a debtor’s summons against his co-surety for. half
of what had been paid, and he obtained an adjudication of bank
ruptcy, which the Court of Appeal annulled on the ground that,
until a surety had paid more than his share, there is no legal or
equitable debt to sustain bankruptcy proceedings. Lord Justice
JAMES is reported to have said :—“I think your proper remedy is
to call on Snowden to pay the bank £541
* * * I believe the
proper course when a surety is called upon to pay a part of the
whole debt for which he is liable would be to bring an action









































































































































290 WOLMERSHAUSEN v. c.oLL1cx [Chap. V
debt to the creditor, just as he would be entitled to call on them
for contribution if he had been sued by the creditor, asking that he
should be indemnified by his co-sureties against paying the whole
debt, or whatever risk he ran.” The report in the Law Journal
is as follows :—“The proper course when a surety is called upon
to pay the whole debt, for which he is liable with his co-surety,
is to call upon his co-surety for contribution and to indemnify
him against paying the whole; and the only mode in which in
equity you can compel a co-surety to pay his proportion of the
debt is to show that you have paid your proportion, or more than
your proportion, of the debt, and are liable for the residue.” In
the. ll/eekly Reporter it is, “The proper course when a surety is
called upon to pay the whole debt for which he is liable would
be to call upon his co-sureties for contribution, just as he would be
entitled to have done if a bill had been filed against him by the
principal creditor, asking that he should be indemnified against
paying the whole.” In 1883, in Macdonald v. Whitfield, 8 App.
Cas. 733, 750, Lord VV-atson, pro cur., declared the right to
contribution of a surety who had not paid, but had had judg
ment against him. in this form—“Entitled and liable to equal
contribution inter se.” In' Lord Justice L1NDLEY’s work on
Partnership, 5th Edition, page 374, it is observed that “before
the passing of the Judicature Acts, a right to contribution
or indemnity, arising otherwise than by special agreement, was
only enforceable at law by a person who could prove that he had
already sustained a loss. But in equity it was very reasonably
held, that even in the absence of any special agreement, a person
who was entitled to contribution or indemnity from another
could enforce his right before he had sustained actual loss, pro
vided loss was imminent; and this principle will now prevail in all
divisions of the High Court. \Theref0re a person who is entitled
to be thus indemnified against loss is not obliged to wait until he
has suffered, and perhaps been ruined, before having recourse to
judicial aid. Thus, in the ordinary case of principal and surety,
as soon as th creditor has acquired a right to immediate payment
from the surety, the,latter is entitled to call upon the principal
debtor to pay the amount of the debt guaranteed, so as to relieve
the surety from his obligation: and where one person has cov
enanted to indemnify another, an action for specific performance
may be sustained before the plaintiff has actually been indemni
fied; and the limit _of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff is
the full amount for which he is liable; or if he is dead or insolvent
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amount of dividend which such estate can pay. In strict conform
ity with these principles, partners and directors who are indi
vidually liable to be sued on bonds and notes, which as between
them and their co-partners are to be regarded as the bonds and
notes of the firm or company, are entitled to call for contribution
before these bonds or notes have been actually paid. So a trustee
of shares liable to calls is entitled to be-indemnified by his cestn/i
qne trust against them before they are paid.” This statement of
law is an authority in favour of the view that some relief can be
given, but it does not specify the form or limit of the relief; nor
do any of the authorities cited in the notes throw any further
light on the matter. Nor have I been able to obtain assistance
from English or American writers on equity or on the law of
suretyship. The Plaintiff's difficulties have been increased by
this, that an application by her for leave to use the third party
procedure ordinarily applicable in cases of contribution or indem
nity was refused in the administration action on the ground that
the procedure is not available in an administration action. And
even if the question had arisen upon third party procedure,
nearly the same difficulties would have occurred. _
In this state of the authorities I think that,(if the Plaintiff
had made the creditor a Defendant to the present action, I ought
to have held that the allowance of the principal creditor's claim
in the administration action was equivalent to a judgment against
the Plaintiff for the whole amount of the guarantee and that
on the precedents of Morgan v. Seymour, I Ch. R. 120,
and Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox 318, the Plaintiff
would have been entitled to a declaration of her right
to contribution and to an order upon the solvent co
surety to pay his proportion to the principal creditor. (The princi
pal creditor not being a party, I think that I cannot order pay
ment to him or directly prevent him from enforcing his judgment
against the Plaintiff alone. Nor can I at present order the co
surety to pay his half to the Plaintiff, for the Plaintiff cannot give
him a discharge as against the principal creditor, and this case
is not like the case of a Plaintiff who merely claims indemnity, as
in the cases referred to by IESSEL, M.R., in Lace v. Hill, supra, in
which no question arises as to any other party. But I think that
I can declare the Plaintiff’s ri ht, and make a ros ctive order
under which, whenever she has paid any sum beyond her share,
she can get it back, and I therefore declare the Plaintiffs right
to contribution, and direct that, upon the Plaintiff paying her own









































































































































292 WOLMERSHAUSEN v. GULLICK [Chap. V
payment or liability, and is
,
by payment to her or to the principal
creditor or otherwise, to exonerate the Plaintiff from liability
beyond the extent of her own share. The Plaintiff must have
liberty to apply in Chambers and generally to apply.
A point was made as to the .S‘tatu_tes of Limitations. The
principal creditor’s claim was put in 1879. But I think that I
must hold that, even if the statute can begin to run before the
surety has paid more than his proportion, at any rate it does not
run until his liability is ascertained, and that did not occur
until 1890.
There was another point made that the Plaintiff ought to
have proved against the estate of the co-surety Patton, but if that
were so, so might the Defendant Gullick_ It is agreed that, if
such proof could have been and had been made, it is to be taken
that £200 would have been received. I think that the Plaintiff
and Defendant should each bear half of this, and the Defendant’s
liability to the Plaintiff will be reduced accordingly by £100.
I think that the Plaintiff acted reasonably and in the interest
of all parties in resisting and reducing the principal creditor’s
claim, and that the Defendant ought in equity to contribute half
the costs of those proceedings: see Kemp v. Finden, I2 M. & W.
421 ; Lawson v. Wright, I Cox 275; Hole v. Harrison, 1 Ch. Ca.












































































































































SECTION 1. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON A MATERIAL ALTERA
TION OF THE CONTRACT
OF THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.
9I. WHITCHER v. HALL, 5 B. & C. 269, 11 E. C. L. 458.
Court of King's Bench, Hilary Term, 1826.
Any material alteration of the principal contract without the
consent of the assurer is sufficient to discharge him. The question
is not whether the alteration is slight, but whether the contract
performed is the original contract which the surety undertook
should be performed.
Assumpsit for the recovery of a quarter's rent for the milking
of thirty cows, which by the terms of the agreement had become
due.
Plaintiff had verdict for 40l., but liberty was reserved to de
fendant to move to enter nonsuit. A rule nisi for that purpose
having been entered at last Michaelmas term."
Merewether & E. Lawes now showed cause,
C. F. Williams and J. Bagley contra.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinions.
BAYLEY, J.—I think that the rule for entering a nonsuit
ought to be made absolute. By the agreement which is set
out in the declaration, the plaintiff agreed to let, and Joseph Hall
agreed to take, the milking of thirty cows, (not more nor less,)
for the sum of 7l. and Ios. per cow per annum, to commence on
the 14th of February, 1824, and on the conditions therein men
tioned. The agreement was, that Joseph Hall was to have the
milking of thirty cows, and the benefit was to enure to Joseph not
to James, but the latter stipulated that he would pay the whole
rent. One question is
,
whether that is a
n
entire contract as to the—1–









































































































































294 WHITCHER v. HALL [Chap. VI
number of cows. If it he, Joseph was entitled to have the milking
of thirty cows (hiring the continuance of the term. If it was not
an entire contract, but a contract to pay for so many cows as the
plaintiff should supply, and the plaintiff supplied twenty-nine
or any other number, he would be entitled to payment for so
many. I am of opinion that this was an entire contract for the
purchase of thirty cows; and if at the commencement of the term
the plaintiff could not insist that this was a divisible contract, it
must follow that it continued an entire contract during the term.
I do not enter into the question whether there was a performance




to say that there was a new agreement, without the nowledge o
James; that Joseph was to have the milking of twenty-eight cow
during one part of the year, and thirty-two during the other par
That, as it seems to me, was not a continuance of the origina
bargain, which was for the milking of thirty cows, but a new
agreement. The new agreement was binding only on those persons
who were parties to it.- If it had been intended to bind James by
it
,
he should have been consulted; he had a right to insist upon
a literal performance of the original bargain. If a new bargain
was made, he had a right to exercise his judgment whether he
would become a party to it. There may, perhaps, be very little
difference between the two contracts, but the question does not
turn on the amount of the difference; but the question is
,
whether
the contract performed by the plaintiff is the original contract to
which the defendant was a party. If it is, then James is bound
by it. otherwise he is not. There is no hardship upon the plain
tiff, for he knew that James stipulated to pay the rent upon his,
the plaintiff’s, fulfilling the terms of the original bargain, and
that he, James, was not bound to consent to the substitution of a
new contract. In Heard v. Wadham, I East, 619, and Campbell v.
"reu(‘l‘L, 2 H. Black, 163 ; 6 T. R. 200, it was held that the per
‘
formance of a contract, substantially the same as that originally
made, did not give a right of action against a surety who had not
consented to the alteration. Here the plaintiff attempts to main
tain his action by proving the performance not of the contract
declared on, but of a subsequent agreement. But he has averred,
and was bound to prove performance of the original agreement.
That he has not proved; and, upon that ground, I am of opinion
that he was not entitled to recover, and that the rule for entering
a nonsuit ought to be made absolute.
i










































































































































‘ WHITCHER v. H.-\LL 295
maintainable, and that the rule for entering the nonsuit should be
made absolute. The defendant stands in the situation of a surety.
inasmuch as the plaintiff agrees to let, and Joseph Hall to take.
If the agreement had stopped here, Joseph Hall would be liable
to pay the rent, but then there is an additional agreement that
James also should pay rent. Joseph still, however, continues liable
for the rent, and James is liable only by reason of his special
agreement. This seems to me an entire agreement for the letting
of the entire number of thirty cows, neither more nor less. The
term at so much per cow is introduced only to measure the rent
payable. Supposing there was no stipulation that the rent should
be paid in advance, it would be incumbent on the plaintiff, if he
sought to recover rent, to aver and prove that the rent had
accrued due; and that could only be done by-showing that Joseph
Hall had had the milking of thirty cows during the period in
respect of which the rent was claimed. It is stipulated in this
case, indeed, that the rent should be paid before the quarter
commenced. But still the plaintiff would be bound to avef and
prove that he was ready at all times, during the time that the
contract continued, to perform his part of the contract. It seems
to me that the original agreement was at an end, and that a new
agreement was substituted in its stead, and that James, not being
a party to it
,
is not liable for the breach of it. This is very
similar to the case of a surrender of a lease by operation of law.
In Comyn’s Dig. tit. Surrender, (I. 1,) it is laid down, if a lessee
for years accepts a new lease by parol when the first lease
was by indenture, it operates as a surrender in law. So here, the
new agreement by parol varying from the first entered into by the
plaintiff and Joseph Hall, operated as an abandonment of the
first agreement. The first agreement having been put an end to
by the principal parties, the surety is discharged. For these
reasons I am of the opinion that the rule for entering a nonsuit
ought to be made absolute.”
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92. CAMBRIDGE SAVINGS BANK v. HYDE, et al, executors,
I31 Mass. 77.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1881.
Alteration—If the change in the original contract from it
s
nature is beneficial to the surety, o
r if it is self-evident that it
cannot prejudice him, the surety is not discharged.
MORTON, J.—This is a suit against the executors of one of
the sureties upon a promissory note held b
y
the plaintiff. By the
note, which is dated October 16, 1871, the maker promises to pay
to the plaintiff $6000 on demand, with interest at the rate o
f
seven
and one-half per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually. At the
trial, it appeared that the treasurer o
f
the plaintiff, some years after
the date o
f
the note, having authority to do so, wrote upon the
back o
f
the note the memorandum, “Rate o
f
interest to be 6%
per cent. from Oct. 10, 1876.” The defendants asked the court





whether made on the face o
f
the note o
r by a memorandum in
the margin o
r upon the back o
f
the note, was a change in the
terms o
f
the contract, and a material alteration o
f
the note such as
would discharge the defendant's testator, if made without his
consent, and that the indorsement upon the back o
f
the note in
suit was such an alteration;” which ruling the court refused.
The defendants contend, in the first place, that this memoran









ll parties not consenting to
it





other contract avoids it
,
there has been some change
by erasure o
r
interlineation in the paper writing constituting the
evidence o
f
the contract, so as to make it another and different
instrument, and no longer evidence o
f
the contract which the
parties made. (£ ground of the decisions is that the identity
o
f
the contract is destroyed. Wade v. Withington, I Allen, 561.





North America, IOO Mass. 376. Hewins v.
Cargill, 67 Maine, 554. But in the case at bar it is clear that, using
the word in this sense, there has been no alteration o
f
the note.
The original note remains intact . It is in no respect altered or
made different. The memorandum on the back is evidence of an
independent collateral agreement, and has no more effect than if
it had been written on a separate paper. Stone v. White, 8 Gray,
589. -










































































































































Sect. 1] CAMBRIDGE SAVINGS BANK V. HYDE 297
be treated as an independent collateral agreement, yet it makes
such a change in the terms of the contract as to discharge the
sureties, who did not consent to it
. It is clear that, if a creditor
makes any agreement with the principal debtor, o
r
does any other
act which is prejudicial to the rights o
f
the surety, the surety is
discharged from his liability. Thus, if the creditor, b
y
a valid




the debt, the surety is discharged. The
reason is
,
that such an agreement materially affects the rights
o
f
the surety, since it prevents him from paying the debt and
having an immediate remedy against the principal debtor.
Hunt v. Bridgham, 2 Pick. 581. Agricultural Bank v. Bishop,
6 Gray, 317. Mr. Justice STORY states the rule to be, “that
if a creditor does any act injurious to the surety, or incon
sistent with his rights; or if he omits to do any act, when required
b
y
the surety, which his duty enjoins him to do, and the omission
proves injurious to the surety; in all such cases the latter will be
discharged.” I Story Eq. Jur. Sec. 325. The surety is discharged
because the act o
f
the creditor is injurious to him and is inconsis
tent with the duty which the creditor owes to him. Where the
act o
f





the original agreement, we think the true
rule is
,
that, if such new agreement is or may be injurious to the
surety, o
r if it amounts to a substitution of the new agreement
for the old, so as to discharge and put an end to the latter, the
surety is discharged. But if the change in the original contract
from it
s
nature is beneficial to the surety, o
r if it is self-evident
that it cannot prejudice him, the surety is not discharged. Smith
v
.
United States, 2 Wall. 219. Appleton v. Parker, 15 Gray, 173.
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Rolt, 6 C
.
B
. (N. S.) 550.





In the case at bar, the new agreement was, that, after a day






six and a half instead o
f
seven and a half per cent.
QIt was clearly not the intention o
f
the parties to discharge the
note and substitute a new contract in it
s place.) The agreement
presupposes that the note is to remain in force as a promise to pay
the principal debt. The parties did not intend to release the
principal debtor o
r
the sureties from their obligation to pay the
note, but only to remit a portion o
f
the interest payable under it
for the use o
f





requires us to defeat the intention o
f









































































































































298 NAT. MECII. BANKING ASS'N. V. CONKLING [Chap. VI
this operated to discharge the original contract in whole. It is
also clear that the change in the original contract, by reducing the
rate of interest, could not be prejudicial to the sureties. It is to
be borne in mind that there was no contract by the plaintiff
giving time to the principal debtor, and no contract by the debtor
that the amount of the note should remain on interest at the
new rate for any time. The plaintiff could at any time have sued
on the note, and the sureties could at any time have paid the note
and have had a right to sue their principal at£ agreement
was merely a stipulation to remit a part of the sum which the
plaintiff might claim under the note. Nt did not tie the hands of
the creditor, or alter unfavorably the condition of the surety. If
there was any consideration for it
,
so that it had any validity, it
could not operate to the injury o
f
the sureties, any more than an
indorsement of, or a receipt for, a part o
f
the principal would.
The change made in the terms o
f
the note was necessarily bene
ficial to a
ll parties bound by it
.
We are o
f opinion that the
sureties were not discharged, even if they had no knowledge of
the change; and that the ruling o
f
the Superior Court to that
effect was correct. -
Judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff.
A1. F. Dickinson, Jr., & H
.
R




. Hale, (C. F. Walcott with him) for the plaintiff.
93. THE NATIONAL MECHANICS BANKING ASS'N., appellant,
v
. CONKLING, et al., respondents, 90 N. Y. 116.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1882.
Sureties on the bond o
f
the obligee's employe are released by




f surety's engagement. Liability o
f surety is strictissimi
juris.
APPEAL from order o
f
the General Term o
f
the Supreme
Court, in the second judicial department, made May 10, 1881,
which reversed a judgment in favor o
f plaintiff, entered upon a
verdict. (Reported below, 24 Hun, 496.)
This action was upon a bond executed b
y
the defendants,
the material portion o
f
which is set forth in the opinion, wherein




John H. Bergen for respondents.









































































































































Sect. I] NAT. MECH. BANKING ASS N. V. CONKLING 299
defendant Joseph C. Conkling as a book-keeper in its bank, at a
salary o
f
$400. At the time of his employment, and to secure
his fidelity, a bond in the penalty o
f $10,000 was executed to the
plaintiff, which contained the following recitals and conditions:
“Whereas, the above-named, the Mechanics' Banking Associa
tion, have appointed the above-named Joseph C





the said association, and the said Joseph
C
. Conkling hath accepted the same and consented to perform the
duties thereof, now the condition o
f
this obligation is such that
if the above-named Joseph C. Conkling shall faithfully fulfill and
discharge the duties committed to and the trusts reposed in him
a
s such book-keeper and shall also faithfully fulfill and discharge
the duties o
f any other office, trust or employment relating to the
business o
f
the said association which may be assigned to him,
o
r
which he shall undertake to perform, and shall also, without
neglect o




f any embezzlement o
f
the money, property o
r goods
belonging to, and o
f any fraud whatever committed upon, the
said association, o
f any false entry, error, mistake or difference
o
f
accounts in the books thereof which he may discover, o
r
which
shall come to his knowledge as such book-keeper as aforesaid,
o
r
whilst engaged in any other office, duty o
r employment rela
tive to the business thereof, and which he may discover, o
r
which
shall come to his knowledge, in any matter o
r thing whatever





the said association; then the above obligation to be void, other
wise to remain in full force and virtue.”
The salary o
f Joseph as book-keeper was subsequently in
creased and h
e continued to be book-keeper until 1870. In that






creased salary, and he continued to be and to act as such teller until
October 10, 1879, when he resigned. After his resignation it





the bank. This action was brought against all
the obligors upon the bond to recover the amount thus em
bezzled. The respondents are the sureties upon the bond and they
alone defended.
There was no breach of the condition of the bond while
Joseph held the employment o
f book-keeper, and the question to
be determined is whether, according to the conditions o
f
the bond,
the sureties are liable for the embezzlement committed by their
principal while acting as teller. We have come to the conclusion,









































































































































300 NAT. MECH. BANKING ASSN. v. CONKLING [Chap. \#'I
The recital in the condition of the bond shows that Joseph
had been appointed to the office of book-keeper; that he had ac
cepted that office and consented to perform the duties thereof.
That was the office brought to the attention of the sureties and
which they had in mind when they executed the bond. The recital
in such bonds, undertaking to express the precise intent of the
parties, controls the condition or obligation which follows, and
does not allow it any operation more extensive than the recital
which is its key, and so it has been held in many cases. In London
Assmance Co. v. Bold (6 Ad. & El. [N. S.] 514), VVIGHTMAN, J.,
said: “In truth the recital is the proper key to the meaning of the
condition.” In Hassell v. Long, (2 M. & S. 363) ELLENBOROUGH,
Ch. J., said that the words of the recital of a bond afforded the
best ground for gathering the meaning of the parties. In Pearsall
v. Summersett (4 Taunt. 593), it was held, as expressed in the
headnote, that “the extent of the condition of an indemnity bond
may be restrained by the recitals, though the words of the condi
tion import a larger liability than the recitals contemplate.” (See,
also, Pepp-in v. Cooper, 2 B. & A. 431 ; Barker v. Parker, I T. R.
287; Liverpool Water-works Co. v. Atkinson, 6 East, 507; The
Trademerfs Bank v. Woodward, Anthon’s N. P. [2d ed.] 300).
Here the sureties undertook for the fidelity of their principal
only while he was book-keeper; but if while book-keeper the duties
of any other office, trust or employment relating to the business of
the bank were assigned to him, their obligation was also to extend
to the discharge of those duties. While book-keeper he might
temporarily act as teller or discharge the duties of any other
officer during his temporary illness or absence, or he might dis
charge any other special duty assigned to him, and while he was
thus engaged the bank was to have the protection of the bond.
There are no words binding the sureties in case of the appoint
ment of their principal to any other office. They might have been
willing to be bound for him while he was book-keeper or tem
porarily assigned to the discharge of other duties, but yet not
willing to be bound if he should be appointed teller or cashier,
and as such placed in the possession or control of all the funds
of the bank. This is a case where the general words subsequently
used must be controlled and limited by the recital. A surety is
never to he implicated beyond his specific engagement, and his
liability is always strictissimi juris and must not be extended by
construction. His contract must be construed by the same rules
which are used in the construction of other contracts. The extent









































































































































Sect. 1] sure v. SWINNEY 301
read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
But when the intention of the parties has thus been ascertained,
then the courts carefully‘ guard the rights of the surety and pro
tect him against a liability not strictly within the precise terms of
his contract. (Ludlow v. Simona, 2 Cains’ Cases, I ; Crist v. Bur
linga/me, 62 Barb. 351; McCloskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593;
Gates v. McKee, 13 id. 232; Rochester City Bank v. El-wood, 21 id.
88; Pybus v. Gibb, 38 Eng. L. & Eq. 57).
The order should be affirmed and judgment absolute entered
against the plaintiff with costs.
All concur.
Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.
94. THE STATE, use of Holmes County, v. SWINNEY, ct al.,
60
wss. 39.
Supreme Court, Mississippi, 1882.
The surety is not released by the enactment, subsequent to the
hulking of his contract, of a stamte altering the contract of the
principal.
Appeal from the circuit court of Holmes county.
Hon. C. H. CAMPBELL, J. On the 13th day of March, 1882,
an action was brought in the name of the State, suing for the use
of Holmes County, against J. S. Hoskins and his sureties, on his
bond as tax collector of that county, for two several sums of
money, for the years 1876 and 1877 respectively, which, it was
declared, he had collected and failed to pay over to the treasurer
of the county as the law required of him and as he was bound by
the terms of his bond to do.
The third plea set up the defense that, “after the signing of
said bond by said defendants, the said plaintiff, without the con
sent of the said defendants, on the twelfth day of January, 1877,
by an act of the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, approved
on said day and entitled ‘An act to provide for the collection of
the outstanding revenue for the fiscal year 1876,’ altered, changed
and extended the time for the collection of taxes due the State of
Mississippi and the county of Holmes, and the time for the pay
ment thereof by the said Hoskins to the State and county treas
uries ; whereby said defendants were released as sureties on said
bond.”\ The fourth plea contained the same defence as the third, ex









































































































































3O2 MC CONNELL V. POOR [Chap. VI
releasing the defendants as sureties on the bond was an act en
titled: “An act in relation to the public revenue and for other pur
poses,” approved February 1, 1877. To the third and fourth
pleas demurrers were filed and they, too, were overruled. The
plaintiff declined to plead over and appealed to this court.
C. V. Gwin, for the appellant.
H. S. Hooker, for the appellees.
CAMPBELL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
We decline to follow the courts of Illinois, Tennessee and
Missouri, in their views that sureties on the bond of a tax col
lector are discharged by an act of the legislature passed after the
execution of the bond, without their consent, giving further time
for the collection of taxes and settlement by the officer, and
we embrace and declare the more just and politic doctrine of
the courts of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, and hold
that the official bond of the tax collector is given with a full
knowledge of the right of the legislature to alter the dates fixed
by law for the collection of taxes and the settlement of the col
lector, and subject to the exercise of that right at the pleasure of
the legislature, without the assent of the sureties. The Common
wealth v. Holmes, 25 Gratt. 771; Smith v. The Commonwealth,
25 Gratt. 780; The State v. Carleton, I Gill, 249; Prairie v.
II’orth, 78 N. C. 169. See also Smith v. Peoria, 59 Ill. 412:
Bennett v. The Auditor, 2 W. Va. 441; Cooley on Tax. 502.
The demurrer to the third and fourth pleas should have been
sustained.
95. McCONNELL v. POOR, 113 Iowa 133, 84 N.W. 968, 52 L.R.A. 312.
Supreme Court, Iowa, 1901.
Alterations specifically provided for by the contract, if made,
do not release the surety.
Statement by LADD, J. Evans entered into a contract with
plaintiff, July 14, 1891, to construct a dwelling house for him, and
on the same day executed a bond with defendant as surety con
ditioned “that, if the said Evan F. Evans shall duly perform said
contract, then this obligation is to be void, but, if otherwise, the
same to be and remain in full force and virtue.” The house was
built and in 1892 Evans began an action against the plaintiff for
a balance due. McConnell filed a cross petition in which he
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The result was a judgment against Evans for $943, to recover
which this action was brought against the defendant as surety on
the bond. By way of defense, he pleaded alterations in the con
tract in four particulars: (I) That the work was done under the
direction of McConnell, instead of Sunderland, the architect, as
agreed; (2) the broken ashlar work was constructed with close
joints, instead of being tuck pointed, as stipulated; (3) the in
increased cost occasioned by this change was not estimated at the
rate at which the work was taken, and added to the amount to be
paid as exacted by the terms of the contract; and (4) other
changes were made without estimating the increased cost, as re
quired in the agreement. To these defenses the plaintiff pleaded
adjudication in Evans against McConnell as an estoppel. The
defendant also answered that he had advanced, in payment of
labor and material, with McConnell’s knowledge and consent, a_
large amount of money, and was released from liability on the
bond to that extent. Trial to jury and from judgment on a verdict
against him, the plaintiff appeals.
Kelley <5‘ Cooper and Blake 6' Blake, for appellant.
A. M. Antrobus and Seerley 6’ Clark with C. L. Poor, in
propria persona for appellee.
LADD, _l., delivered the opinion of the court:
* * * The appellant insists the contract permitted changes,
and this is true. But the manner of making them is specifically
pointed out. “The value of such changes or alterations, without
additions or deductions, will be estimated according to the rate at
which the work has been taken, and the amount added to or de
ducted from the amount hereinafter specified.” (This precluded
the parties from entering into arrangements for additional work,
or that of~a different character, without compensation correspond
ing relatively to the contract price. )If this were not so, an entirely
different building from that stipulated might have been erected
at the surety's cost. Thus, the alleged change in the broken
ashlar work alone occasioned an additiona1 expense of $1600 or
more,—more than the balance claimed. While the plaintiff had
the option of making alterations, he might not do so without pay
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96. MORRISON, et al., v. ARONS, et al., 65 Minn. 321, 68 N. W. 33.
Supreme Court, Minnesota, 1896.
Non compliance with or departure from the essential terms
of the principal contract constitutes an alteration of such contract,
zwhereby the surety is released from his undertaking.
Action in the district court for Ramsey county. The case
was tried before Kelly, J.
,
who ordered judgment against defend
ant Arons for $SOI.43, and against defendants Williams and Hall
for $559.50, with interest. From an order denying a motion for






Hutson and Warner, Richardson & Lawrence, for
respondents.
-
CoLLINS, J. Plaintiffs entered into business as co-partners,
and employed defendant Arons as general manager, salesman, and
collector. According to the written contract, the employment was
to continue as long as mutually agreeable. Arons was to receive
a
s compensation for his services a sum equal to one-half the net
profits o
f
the business, and these profits were to be ascertained as
follows:







part, once each month, commencing with December 1
,
1892, a just and
true inventory o
f
the assets and liabilities o
f
said firm shall be taken, and
all accounts which are considered bad shall be charged to profit and loss,
and from the residue of the accounts due said firm shall be deducted five
per cent o
f
the aggregate amount thereof as a reserve to cover bad debts,
and the excess o
f
the assets over the liabilities and the capital stock o
f
said
firm shall be determined and agreed upon as the net profits o
f
said busi
ness, and a sum equal to one-half o
f
such excess shall then and there be
credited to said party o
f
the second part as and for his compensation,
and b
e considered an expense o
f
said business. That when the relation
between said firm and said party o
f
the second part is extinguished, then
the actual amount o
f profit o
r loss, as the case may be, o
f
the business of
said firm, shall be determined, and, if there has been a net profit, a sum
equal to one-half thereof shall be allowed said party o
f
the second part,
and any errors in estimating the net profits at the previous stated periods
shall then and there be rectified, and, if said party of the second part shall
have withdrawn more money from said firm than he is entitled to, he shall
then and there forthwith repay the same; and, if there is any amount due
him on account o
f
his compensation, it shall then and there forthwith be
paid him.”
*
Arons, as principal, and defendants Williams and Hall, as
sureties, entered into a bond, in which plaintiffs were obligees,
which, after reciting that Arons was about to enter plaintiffs'
employ as general manager, salesman, and collector, provided,









































































































































Sect. I] l\l0I{RlSON \'. .\Ro.\'s 305
“lf the said Charles T. Arons shall faithfully and honestly perform
all the duties of his said employment, and shall keep just and true accounts
of all moneys received and expended and all property bought and sold for
or on account of said firm by him or under his direction, and shall faith
fully and fully, and as often as required, account for and pay over to said
firm any and all moneys belonging thereto collected or received by him,
or which in any manner come into his hands in the course of his employ
ment by said firm; and shall forthwith and on demand repay to said firm
any and all moneys he shall have withdrawn therefrom for his own use
in excess of the compensation due him for his services under the terms of
his agreement with said firm in that behalf (whether such moneys shall
have been so withdrawn with the consent of said firm or otherwise), as
often as it shall be determined that such overdraft has been made, then
the above obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and
virtue.”
This action was brought to recover an amount of money said
to be due onthe bond, and the trial was by the court. No evidence
was introduced tending to show any other settlement or account
ing than that had when Arons’ term of employment ended. In
fact plaintiffs admitted that they never ascertained, and could not,
at the time of the trial ascertain, what the respective monthly
profits of the business had been.\At the conclusion of the plain
tiff's case and again at the conclusion of the entire case, the defend
ant sureties moved the court to dismiss the same as to them upon
the ground that, as it affirmatively appeared from the evidence
and admissions that no monthly settlements or accounting had
been had as provided for in the contract of employment, the sure
ties upon the bond had been_released from liability. These mo
tions were denied, and the court made its findings of act and con





court found the allegation in the complaint that no settle
men or accounting was had b tween the parties until after Arons’
employment ceased, to be true. Vi/e agree with the court below in
its construction of the contract but we cannot concur in its hold
ing that the sureties were not discharged by the failure and omis
sion to have monthly accountings and settlements between Arons
and plaintiffs. I The former was to have advanced to him $100 each
month for personal expenses and on account of his compensation
under an agreement that, if this amount, with other sums of
money which came into his possession, exceeded one-half of the
net profits of the business, the excess should be promptly refunded.
What the profits were, and the sum due to plaintiffs, if anything,
were to be provisionally ascertained each month; and, had this
been done, it is quite certain that plaintiffs would have discovered
before the expiration of 13 months that the business was not
profitable, while Arons would have learned that he was far from
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for both parties to terminate their contract relation, and avoid
further loss. It is evident that there would be much less hesita
tion on the part of a person called upon to become a surety upon
a bond given for the faithful performance of a contract with such
conditions than if the real situation was not to be ascertained for
months. The condition in the employment contract whereby
monthly accountings and settlements were agreed upon was an
exceedingly beneficial one for all concerned. It was an essential
feature of the contract whereby Arons agreed to conduct plaintiffs’
business enterprise for an indefinite period of time, his compen
sation to be determined by the net profits. The contract of
suretyship was departed from and varied when this provision was
wholly disregarded, and the case is brought directly within the
rule that, if an essential condition of such a contract is not com
plied with, a surety is not bound. A new trial must be had.
Order reversed.
OF THE Assunmc. CONTRACT.
97. DAVIDSON v. COOPER, et al., 13 Meeson & Welsby 342.
Court Exchequer Chamber, 1844.
Alteration of surety’ s contract by the addition of seals thereto
without surety’s knowledge or consent operates to discharge
surety.
Assumpsit on a guaranty. Defendant had judgment.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Knowles, for the plaintiff in error.
Watson, for the defendant.
Lord DENMAN, C. J.—T his was a declaration in assumpsit
on a written guarantee, to which one defendant pleaded, that,
while the guarantee was in the plaintiffs hands, it was, without
the defendant's consent or knowledge, materially altered by the
addition of two seals opposite the names of the defendant and the
other party to it
,
whereby its apparent nature and effect were
wholly altered. Issue being taken on this plea, the jury found it
was so altered: and judgment has been given by the Court of
Exchequer for the defendant, after having discharged a rule for
judgment, non obstante veredicto, upon argument.









































































































































Sect. 1] ELLESMERE v. cooren 307
ness of the rule on this subject, as laid down in Pigot’s case, can
only be explained on the principle that a party who has the custody
of an instrument made for his benefit, is bound to preserve it in
its original state. It is highly important for preserving the purity
of legal instruments that this principle should be borne in mind,
and the rule adhered to. The party who may suffer has no right
to complain, since there cannot be any alteration except through
fraud or laches on his part. To say that Pigot’s case has been
overruled is a mistake; on the contrary, it has been extended: the
authorities establishing, as common sense requires, that the altera-\
tion of an unsealed paper will vitiate it. Upon the doubt whether
this instrument is altered, because it remains exactly as it was when
signed, but only something is added near to the signatures of the
defendants, we may observe, that that addition gives a different
legal character to the writing, and would, if made with the consent
of all interested, completely change the nature of the relation
towards each other of the parties to it
,
and the remedies upon it
§
The observation that a deed is not made by sealing, but by
delivery, does not appear to touch the argument, for no addition,
erasure, or interlineation, after execution, makes the actual instru
ment different in legal effect from what it was; the original
document may be perfectly visible through the attempt to disguise
it
,
but a different appearance is produced. The truth cannot be
known from inspection, but would require to be established by
evidence, and this through some default of the person to whose
care it was consigned, and who would be possessed of a superior
legal remedy if the altered writing could be imposed on the
contractor as genuine. We are therefore of opinion, both upon
principle and authority, that this judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
D
9& ELLESMERE BREWERY COMPANY v. COOPER, et al.,
[I396] I Q- 13- 75- . .
High Court of Justice, Q. B. D., 1895.
If the obligee accepts an assuring contract which varies in
any material part from that zvhich the obligors consented to exe
cute, the sureties are released from liability.
Appeal from county court judge of Shropshire.
The plaintiff company, having appointed the defendant Joseph
Cooper as their traveller and agent, required him to give security
for the faithful discharge by him of his duties. He accordingly









































































































































3O8 ELLESMERE V. COOPER [Chap. VI
berton, John Pay, and Arnold Bromfield to become sureties for
him, and to join him in making a bond whereby they bound them
selves jointly and severally to the plaintiffs in a sum of 15ol. The£ that if Cooper should duly account for
all moneys received by him as such traveller or agent and faith
fully discharge his duties in such capacities, the bond should be
void; and it was thereby provided that the liability of Nunnerley
and Emberton should be limited to the sum of 5ol. each, and that
of Pay and Bromfield to 25l. each. After Cooper, Emberton, Pay,
and Bromfield had executed the bond, Nunnerley executed it
,
but
when doing so added to his signature the words “25l. only.” The
plaintiffs' manager, who witnessed all the defendants' signatures,
accepted the bond so executed without protest. Subsequently
Cooper failed to account to the plaintiffs for a sum o
f 48l., and
the plaintiffs sued Cooper and his four sureties upon the bond.
The county court judge gave judgment against Cooper; but
he gave judgment for the other four defendants on the
ground that the addition o
f
the words “25l. only” to the
signature o
f Nunnerley was an alteration o
f
the bond which
materially affected the position o
f
the sureties, and that they were
consequently all, including Nunnerley himself, discharged from
liability. The plaintiffs appealed.
A. T. Lawrence, for the plaintiffs.
Hansell, for the defendants.
1895, Dec. 5. The judgment o
f








. J. This was an action
against Cooper and four other defendants who had signed a bond
a
s sureties for Cooper. At the trial before the learned county
judge, judgment was given for the plaintiffs as against Cooper,
and judgment was given for the four remaining defendants as
sureties.
The facts were that Cooper, having become agent and trav
eller for the plaintiffs, was called upon to give them some security.
He accordingly gave the bond in question, in which he was joined
by the four other defendants.
The bond was dated April 30, 1894. By its terms the five
defendants were jointly and severally bound to the plaintiffs
in the sum o
f
15Ol. It then recited that Cooper had been appointed
agent for the company, and stated the condition o
f
the bond to be
that, if Cooper duly accounted for all moneys received by him











































































































































Sect. 1] ELLESMERE v. COOPER 309
agency, the bond should be void. It then provided that the
liability of Nunnerley and Emberton (two of the defendants)
should be limited to 5ol. each, and that of Pay and Bromfield
(two other of the defendants) to 251. each. The effect, there
fore, of the bond, as drawn, was that the principal and the sureties
were jointly and severally bound in the sum of I 5ol., but that
liability could not be enforced against any of the sureties beyond
the limit of the sum specified as to each of them. Nunnerley was
the last to sign, and his signature thus appears on the bond:
“W alter Nunnerley, twenty-five pounds only.” The witness to the
execution of each of the signatures was Mr. Bruce, the plaintiffs’
manager, who, so far as appears, took the bond without making
any objection to the manner of Nunnerley’s execution; nor was it
suggested that Nunnerley had surreptitiously added the qualifica
tion of “twenty-five pounds only” to his signature. As no evi
dence was given on the point, it cannot be assumed that Nunnerley
in bad faith sought by the form of his execution of the bond to
limit any liability he had previously agreed to undertake. The prob
ability is that in giving particulars of his sureties Cooper had erron
eonsly stated that Nunnerley had agreed to undertake liability to
the extent of 5ol., whereas he had done so only to the extent of 251.
Subsequently Cooper, the principal, received moneys of the plain
tifls to the amount of 481. for which he had failed to account; and
judgment was given him at the trial for that amount. The con
tested question was the liability of the other defendants, the
sureties. The learned county court judge held that no one of
them was liable, and gave judgment for them accordingly. The
present appeal is against that judgment.
It was argued for the plaintiffs (I) that the form of Nun
nerley"s execution did not constitute an alteration of the bond so
as to discharge from liability the three prior executing sureties;
( 2) that, if an alteration, it was not a material alteration, and
therefore did not discharge such sureties; and, lastly, ( 3) that
in any case Nunnerley was liable to the extent of 501., or if not of
501., at least to the extent of 251.
In my judgment. no one of these contentions is well founded.
I think the effect of Nunnerley’s mode of execution, on the facts
of this case, is substantially the same as if the proviso in the
body of the bond had been altered by him before execution by
him by striking out 5ol. and inserting instead 251. It was, there
fore, an alteration. Its effect I shall presently discuss.
The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was,









































































































































310 ELLESMERE v. cooman [Chap. \'I
long as each fourth did not exceed the sum for which each
surety had become liable, each of them was bound to pay, and
without any right to contribution from his co-sureties, whether
the fixed limit of his liability was for the greater or the smaller
amounts. Here it was said the one-fourth of the loss was 121., and
as Nunnerley had clearly intended to make himself liable, as also
had Pay and Bromfield, for 251. each, it was immaterial whether
Nunnerley signed for 251. or for 501. Each, it was contended, was
bound to pay 121. ;_and Emberton was bound to bear no more of
the loss than the others. $_
In my judgment, this contention\is founded on a misappre
hension of the law. It renders it necessary ‘to consider the princi
ple upon which liability of sureties inter se rests. I That prin
ciple is
,
that sureties for the same principal and for the same
engagement, even although bound by different instruments and
for different amounts, have a common interest and a common
'
burthen ; so that if one surety who is directly liable to the creditor
pays such creditor, he can claim contribution fro his co-sureties
whose obligation to the creditor he has discharged. But how is the
amount of the claim to be determined? According to the argu
ment of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, it is to be determined
by the number of the sureties. Thus, if there are four sureties and
one of them pays all, he can recover one-fourth, and one-fourth
only, of his payment from each of the other three co-sureties.
But this is not in all cases true, even where each of the sureties
has made himself liable for the same amount. Thus, where four
sureties are jointly and severally bound in a surety bond, and one
of them pays the amount of the bond, but one of the remaining
three sureties is insolvent, the right to contribution against the
two other sureties is for thirds, not for fourths, of the sum paid.
I But how is the amount to be determined, where, although the
sureties are jointly and severally bound, there are different limits
of liability,‘ as in this case ?l It is clear that where the full amount
of the bond is due and payable to the creditor, that liability can
only be enforced against each surety to the limit of the liability
fixed in the instrument. In such case there would be no right of
contribution, for each would have paid to the limit of his liability.
But suppose only half the amount of the bond is due and paya
ble to the creditor, and such amount is paid by one only of the
sureties, who has fixed the limit of his liability at one-half the
amount of his bond. Could it be said that he had no right to any
contribution from his co-sureties? Surely not. The burthen













































































































































Sect. I] ELLESMERE. V. COOPER 3 II
his payment of the loss of one-half the surety has discharged a
liability which might have been enforced against the other sure
ties up to the fixed limit. It would be against al
l
equitable princi
ples that in such a case the other sureties should go free because
it happened that the creditor had enforced payment against one
only. Again, it is clear that one surety cannot keep for his own
sole benefit a security for his suretyship where he is bound with
other sureties for the same principal and the same engagement.
Suppose, then, that one surety, whose limit o
f liability was IOOOl.,
has realized IOool. from such security being bound with three . . . .
other sureties with a limit o
f liability o
f




7000l. It is clear that that Ioool, must be taken into account




such sureties inter se
.
But upon what prin
ciple? Surely upon the only principle which will secure it
s equita
ble division, namely, proportional distribution. Thus the surety
for IOOOl. would benefit to the extent o
f one-seventh, and each
of the others to the extent of two-sevenths each. (The same
principle must apply where the burthen has to be distributed.
Where the claim o
f
the creditor is to the full amount, each
must pay up to the fixed limit o
f
his liability; but w£
the claim is less than such full amount, and is discharged by
one, the claim must be proportionately borne by the others, even






the surety who has paid. ).
-
What I have so far said is, I think, to be gathered from the
principles laid down in Deering v. Winchelsea, 1 Cox. 318; but




(Exch.) 424, Alderson B
.
expressly states the rule thus: “where the same default o
f
the
principal renders all the co-sureties responsible, all are to con
tribute; and then the law superadds that which is not only the
principle, but the equitable mode o
f applying the principle, that
they should a
ll
contribute equally if each is a surety to an equal
amount; and if not equally, then proportionately to the amount
for which each is a surety.” In Steel v. Diron, I Ch. D
.
825, Fry
J. cites with approval the language I have quoted; and, later,
Pearson J.
,
in In re Arcedeckne, 24 Ch. D
.
709, adopts the lan
guage o
f Fry J. (See also Ellis v. Emmanuel, 1 Ex. D
.
157, and
Evans v. Bremridge, 2 K
.
& J. 174.
Apply this principle to the present case. I assume the bond
to have been executed according to it
s original tenor without
qualification o
r
alteration. The total loss being 48l., Emberton,
having subscribed for 5ol out o
f
the total o
f 150l., would be









































































































































312 ELLESMERE v. cooPF.n [Chap. VI
I
cla‘lm for contribution; if he paid to the plaintiff more than one
third, he could claim contribution from his co-sureties in the pro
\v
_,
, portion of their subscription. Stated as a sum in proportion, Em
berton’s liability would be arrived at thus: As 150 is to 50 so is 48
to the result. So worked out, Emberton would be liable for 16l.
only, and if he paid more would have a claim for contribution, In
like manner Pay and Bromfield would be liable for 81. each, and
Nunnerley for 161. Now, to appreciate the materiality of the altera
tion, let us consider itseffect upon the liability of Nunnerley.
He explicitly says, “I execute the bond only on the terms of my
liability being limited to 251.” He could not, therefore, in any
case be made liable for more. VVhether he can be made liable
even for 251. I shall presently consider. W'hat ,then, is the effect
of the altered limitation to 251. by Nunnerley upon the position of
the other three sureties? Take Emberton’s position‘. For sim
plicity, assume that the total liability to the plaintiff company
for 481. has been paid by Emberton. According to the tenor of
the bond without the alteration, Embertoniwould have to bear
two-sixths—equal to one-third of the loss‘; Nunnerley two-sixths
—equal to one-third; and Pay and Bromfield one-sixth each. But
by the alteration it is manifest that Emberton, who has paid,
would not have the same right of contribution against Nun
nerley, and if Nunnerley is not bound at all, would have no right
of contribution against him. The alteration was then clearly
material. It is unnecessary to give similar illustrations as to Pay
and Bromfield. The result, therefore, is that neither Emberton,
Pay, nor Bromfield can be made liable on this bond . Each of
them is entitled to say, The contract into which I entered was
on the basis of Nunnerley being a party to it with a liability of
501. That is not the contract as it now appears from the bond,
and I am, therefore, not bound by it.” Their position would be
still stronger if Nunnerley is not boun by the bond at all. The
remaining question is—is Nunnerley bound at all? I have al
ready intimated, that as he has expressly said, “I shall be liable
only for 251.”, he cannot be made liable for the 501.; but is he
liable even for the 251.? I think he is not. \He. in good faith,
expressly limits his liability to 251. : but he undertakes that liability
not as a separate or independent liability, but as a part of a con
tract in which three other sureties are joining him, against whom
in certain eventualities he will have rights to recourse. between
whom and himself a common burthen is to be borne, although un
equally distributed. But if in fact such sureties are not bound by the









































































































































Sect. 2] swiFT v. BEERs ..
.,
3 I3
entitled to say, “This is not the contract into which I have entered
and I am not bound by it.”
The judgment o
f
the learned county court judge must stand,
and the appeal will therefore be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SECTION-2. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON AN ABSENCE OF LIABIL
ITY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR TO THE CREDITOR
99. SWIFT, et al
.,
v
. BEERS, 3 Denio 70
.
Supreme Court, New York, 1846.
If the principal contract is illegal, the assuring contract is







Assumi PsiT tried a
t
the New-York circuit in February, 1844,
before KENT, late C
. Judge. The plaintiffs gave in evidence a
promissory note with a guaranty written under it
,
signed by the
defendant, in the following words:
-
New York, 30th June, 1841.
“Sixty days after date the North American Trust and Banking Co.
promise to pay to the order o
f
Messrs. Swift & Co. thirty-seven hundred
dollars, for value received, with interest having deposited with them as
collateral security seven bonds o
f
this company, secured under the Yates




“For value received, I guarantee the payment of the above note at the
time mentioned. J. D. Beers.”
It was admitted that the North American Trust and Banking
Company was a banking association, organized under the general
banking law.
The defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit, insisting that
the note and guaranty were illegal and void; and the circuit
judge being o
f
that opinion, directed a nonsuit to be entered.
D. Graham, Jr., for the plaintiffs, now moved to set aside





the 4th section o
f
the act o
f May 14, 1840, amendatory
o
f







n interest, were forbidden to be issued b
y
the banking associa
tions—but only such as were intended to be issued o
r put into












































































































































314 RUSSELL v. ANNABLE [Chap. VI
Satford v. Wychofii, (I Hill, 11;) Smith v. Strong, (2 id. 241;)
and Satford v. -Wychotf, (4 id. 442.) He also insisted that if the
note were void, the guaranty was valid: and that a recovery could
be had against the defendant either as a sole or a joint maker;
and cited 17 Wend. 40; 19 John. 60; 1 Hill, 256; 4 id. 420; I9
Wend. 202; 17 id. 214.
S. Sherwood, for the defendant.
By the Court, BRoNs0N, Ch. J. \/Ve have no doubt about
this case. The note is directly within the terms of the prohibi
tion of the act of 1840; and we do not doubt but that it was
equally within the intention of the legislature. That act has no
reference to the circulation of such notes as money, but was
designed to prohibit them altogether for any purpose.
The guaranty partakes of the character of the principal con
tract. It was intended to reinforce and secure it—and is equally
illegal. The circuit judge was right in nonsuiting the plaintiffs.
New trial denied.
100. RUSSELL v. ANNABLE, 109 Mass. 72
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1871.
The sureties on a bond are not holden, if the instrument is
not executed by the person whose name appears as principal
there-in.
Contract, brought August 3, 1870, against one of the sure
ties ii’fflie'1‘ollowing bond given under the Gen. Sts. c. 123, sec.
104, to dissolve an attachment:
“Know all men by these presents, that Erastus Dennett and Chas. R.
Pottle, of Boston in the county of Suffolk, as principal, and George M.
Stevens, of Cambridge, and John F. Annable, of Somerville, in the county
of Middlesex, as surety, are holden and stand firmly bound and obliged
unto Arthur W. Russell, of Cambridge in said Middlesex, in the full and
just sum of two hundred dollars, to be paid unto the said Russell, his
executors, administrators or assigns, to which payment, well and truly
to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators,
jointly and severally, firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals, dated
the twenty-second day of ]uly in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-nine. The condition of this obligation is such, that,
whereas the said Russell has caused the goods and estate of said Dennett
& Pottle, to the value of two hundred dollars, to be attached on mesne
process in a civil action, by virtue of a writ bearing date the 21st day of
July, A. D. 1869, and returnable to the superior court for civil business
to be holden at said Boston within and for the county of Suffolk on the
first Tuesday of October next, in which said writ the said Arthur W.
Russell is plaintiff, and the said Erastus Dennett and Charles R. Pottle the









































































































































Sect. 2] RUSSELL V. ANNABLE 3I5
attachment according to the provisions of the General Statutes in such
cases made and provided; Now, therefore, if the above bounden Russell
shall pay to the plaintiff in said action the amount, if any, which he shall
recover therein, within thirty days after the final judgment in said action,
then the above written obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to
remain in full force and virtue.
- “DENNETT & Portle, [seal].”
“GEORGE M. STWENs, [seal]."
- “JoHN F. ANNABLE, [seal]?
“Signed, sealed and delivered
in presence of
“EDWARD RAYMoND.”
The declaration alleged that the plaintiff at said October term
1869 of the superior court duly entered the action named in the
bond, and such proceedings were had therein that he obtained
judgment against said Dennett & Pottle at April term 1870 for
SI IO damages and $21.49 costs, and no part of said judgment
had been paid, though the defendant had often been requested to
pay the same, and the defendant owed him the amount of said
judgment and the costs subsequently accrued thereon. The an
swer denied each and every allegation of the plaintiff.







the parties reported the following case before verdict:
“This was an action on a bond, o
f
which a copy is annexed. It
appeared that Erastus Dennett and Charles R
.
Pottle were co
partners, under the firm name o
f
Dennett & Pottle, and that the
execution o
f





It was contended by the defendant that the bond was void upon
its face; also that there was no legal execution o
f
it by the prin
cipals, and therefore it was void as to the defendant. If these
objections are valid, then judgment is to be for the defendant; if
invalid, then judgment for the plaintiff for $138.83, with interest
from June 24, 1870, being the date o
f original judgment and
costs. The officer's return on the original writ and judgment





ant was admitted.” The return o
f
the officer thus referred to,
certified that the property attached b
y
him for dissolution o
f
which
attachment the bond was given, was property o
f
Dennett & Pottle,
and that he took the bond “of said Dennett & Pottle, with George
M. Stevens and John F. Annable as sureties.”




. Read, for the defendant.
AMEs, J. It is well settled that one partner cannot bind his
associates b














































































































































316 RUSSELL \-'. ANNABLE [Chap. VI
binding it must appear that there was either a previous authority,
or a subsequent ratification on the part of the other partners,
adopting the signature as binding upon them. Cady v. Shepherd,
11 Pick. 400; Van Deusen v. Blum, 18 Pick. 229; Swan v. Sted
man, 4 Met. 548; Dillon v. Brown, 11 Gray, 179. The report in
this case presents no evidence of any previous authority or
su
li
sequent ratification, and it follows that the bond is not so ex
cuted as to bind the members of-the firm.
'
The bond purports to be the joint and several contract of cer
tain persons named therein as principals, and the defendant and
George M. Stevens as sureties. The defendant’s undertaking is
only that the principal obligors shall fulfill the obligation which
by the terms of the bond they have assumed. But if the bond
was not binding upon both Dennett and Pottle, (as it was not,
for want of due and proper execution of the instrument on their
part,) they a sumed no obligation, and it was not binding upon
the sureties.
fi
lt was essential to the bond that the principals
should be pa ties to it; it is recited that they are so, and the
instrument is incomplete and void without their signature. The
remedy of sureties against their principals might be greatly em
barrassed, if such an instrument as this should be held binding.
There is nothing to estop any member of the firm, who did not
sign it
,
from denying that he was a party to it
,
and it was no
part of the defendant's contract that he should be surety for one
member of the firm, and not for both. The instrument is incom
plete without the signature of each partner, or proof that the sig
nature affixed had the assent and sanction of each of them. Th
sureties on a bond are not holden. if the instrument is not execute
by the person whose name is stated as the principal therein. I
should be executed by all the intended parties. Bean v. Parker,
17 Mass. 591; Wood v. Washb-urn, 2 Pick. 24. * * *
The instrument, being found incapable of taking effect as
a specialty, cannot operate as a simple contract. Cases have in
deed arisen, in which a bond, duly executed, expressing a contract
which the parties had a right to make, has been held to be valid
at common law, although not made with the formalities, or exe
cuted in the mode, provided by a statute under which it purports to
have been given. See Szveetser v. Hay, 2 Gray, 49, and cases there
cited. But we find no case in which it has been held that a
written instrument, purporting to be a specialty, and plainly in
tended by the parties to have all the incidents and characteristics of
a bond in the strict and technical sense of that word, has ever been









































































































































Sect. 2] WEARE v. SAWYER 317
it has not been properly executed to take effect as a contract under
seal.
It is therefore held by a majority of the court, that there
should be judgment for the defendant.
101. WEARE v. SAWYER, 44 N. H. 198.
Supreme Judicial Court, New Hampshire, 1862.
A surety upon a_ promissory note, given by a school district as
principal, is liable, in the absence of fraud, notwithstanding the
name of the district was signed witlwnt authority.
ASSu1\1Ps1r upon a promissory note of which the following is
a copy: (Wcare \'. School District, 44 N. H. 189.)
“$725
Wzana, Nov. 14, 1855.
For value received, we, John Jepson, prudential committee, and
Paige E. Gove, clerk of School District No. 16 in Weare, duly authorized
to hire money in the name of said district, for the purpose of building a
schoolhouse, and John W. Chase, Moses Sawyer, Allen Sawyer, Daniel
Sawyer, Peter C. Gove, L. W. Gove, Lewis Greenleaf, J. P. Adams, Amos
Chase, M. F. Currier, D. G. Chase, A. H. Emerson, and D. S. Stanley, as
sureties, jointly and severally promise to pay the town of Weare, or order,
seven hundred and twenty-five dollars, on demand, with interest annually,
it being a part of the ministerial fund belonging to said town of Weare,
now in the hands of Hiram Simonds, to take care of said fund in behalf
of the town.
Joan JEPSON, Prudential Committee.
PAIcE E. Govt, Clerk.
JOHN W. Cuaslt (and others), sureties.”
Morrison, Stanley 65' Clark, for defendant.
Fowler <9 Chandler, on same side.
1. W. Smith, for plaintiffs. Perley, on same side.
BELLOWS, J. It has already been decided, in Wcare v. School
District, and Wcare v. Gove, reported in this volume, that the vote
to borrow money was not passed at a meeting duly called for that
purpose; and, therefore, as the agents of the district had no au
thority to put its name to the note, they are themselves bound;
and the remaining ground of defense proposed to be set up is
,
in
substance, that at the time of the making of the note it was agreed
that the defendants’ undertaking should extend no farther than
to insure the performance of such contract as had been legally
entered into by the school district, whereas the defendants’ con
tract to pay the money is on its face absolute.









































































































































318 wF..\RI~: v. SAWYER [Chap. VI
evidence; and we are not aware of any exception by which it
could be admitted.
It is true that parol evidence may be received to prove that
one of the makers is but a surety; although nothing of the kind
appears upon the face of the instrument. Bank v. Kent, 4 N. H.
221. This, however, is not for the purpose of varying the obli
gation as originally entered into, but is admitted in connection
with proof of indulgence to the principal, to show a subsequent
discharge of such surety, by substituting a new contract, to which
he was no party.
'
The case of Hoyt v. French, 24 N. H. 198, is in point. There
it was proposed to sh-ow by parol that when the surety signed the
note it was agreed that the first money paid by the principal
should be applied thereon, and that money had been so paid, but
not applied; and it was held that the evidence was not admissible,
as the effect would be to vary the terms of the note. Of the same
character is Lang v. Johnson, 24 N. H. 302.
It is said, also, that the liability of the surety is coextensive
only with that of the principal, and that the school district must
be regarded as the principal here. As a general proposition it
may be true that, in the contract of guaranty. there must be a
principal who is also liable. It would be true in all cases where
the guarantor stipulated to guaranty the performance of the prin
cipal’s engagement.
But in that large class of cases where the contract is to pa
a specific sum of money, there, we apprehend, the guarantor o
surety is
,
in the absence of fraud, bound by the terms of his
contract, although his principal, by reason of coverture, infancy,;'
or want of authority in the person assuming to act for him, is
not bound.
So it is laid down (Chit. on Cont., 9 Am. Ed. 441) in respect
to infants, married women, and other persons incompetent to
contract; and we see no reason why the same doctrine does not
apply to the case of a want of authority. In fact it appears tq
have been so applied in the case of a surety for a partnership.
where the name of the firm was affixed to the note without au
thority. Stewart v. Boehm, 2 Watts, 356; 3 U. S
. Dig, 496,
sec. 154.
The same principle is recognized in Conn v. Coburn, 7 N. H.
368-373, where a surety for an infant upon a promissory note,
given for necessaries, having paid the note. was permitted to re
cover the amount of the infant: Parker, J.
,
holding, that as the










































































































































Sect. 2] LEE v. YANDELL 319
to do so, and call upon the infant. Such, also, is the doctrine of
St. Albans Bank v. Dillon, 30 Vt. 122, where the principal was
a married woman. Pars. on Cont. 194.
Beside, in the case before us, the agents, who used the name
of the district without authority, are themselves bound as prin
cipals, and it is not competent to show as a defense that the sure
ties supposed the district to be the principal. Had they been
misled by fraudulent representations of the town, a remedy might
be found for them; but as the case stands, they, acting upon their
own understanding of the law and the facts. have promised to pay
the sum loaned, and we think they are bound by it.
lt is suggested, also, that, in case of a mistake in this respect,
it may be shown and corrected, but we think it can not be done
in this form, but only by bill in equity.
In accordance with the agreement of the parties, there must
therefore be
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
102. LEE, appellant, v. YANDELL, et al., appellces, 69 Tex. 34.
Supreme Court, Texas, 1887.
One who signs, as surety, a void contract of an insane person.
is nevertheless bound, unless fraud is shown.
This suit was brought by appellant against Yandell, appellee,
and W. A. Gray and A. M. Waldrup, on a promissory note, joint
and several upon its face, but which it was alleged in the answer
that Gray and Waldrup signed as sureties. The answer alleged
that Yandell was non compos mentis when the note was made and
that there was no consideration therefor.
Charles I. Evans, for appellant
W. H. C'ozt'au-, for appellees.
1\L\LTBIE, J. The third charge is as follows:
“If you find from the evidence that the defendant, Yandell,
at the time he signed the note sued on. was of unsound mind to
such an extend as to be unable to comprehend the nature, meaning
and effect of his act in signing such note, you will return a verdict
for defendants.”
This was also assigned as error; and, being the only instruc
tion given in reference to Yandell’s sanity, it should be considered
in the light of all the facts proven on the trial in reference to that









































































































































320 LEE v. YANDELL [Chap. VI
of the law of the case, as a general proposition it can not be said to
be incorrect; and the plaintiff not having called the attention of
the court to other phases of the question by asking appropriate in
structions, ordinarily there would not be error in the omission.
.(Farquhar v. Dallas, 20 Texas, 200; Gallapher v. Bozvie, 66 Texas,
265.) In this case, however, two other persons signed said note as
sureties, and, under the charge, the jury found in favor of said
sureties as well as the principal, Yandell.
As a general proposition, whenever a principal on a note is
discharged, his sureties will be also; but to this rule there are cer
tain well established exceptions. For instance, the note of a mar
ried woman is generally held to be yoid; but if persons, not them
selves under disability, sign the note of a married woman, without
the payee having been guilty of fraud or deceit in procuring the
signature of such married woman, the sureties would be liable
though the principal be discharged. (2 Daniel on Neg. Inst., par.
1306a; Davis v. Staaps, 43 Ind. 103; Allen v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa
531 ; Hicks v. Randolph, 3 Baxter 352.)
The same principle has been extended to sureties on notes ex
ecuted by infants; and it is believed that no valid reason can be
given why sureties of a person of unsound mind should not be held
liable under like circumstances, though the principal be discharged,
especially so, when the payee of the note is ignorant of the fact
that the principal is a lunatic; as in such case a recovery might be
had even against the lunatic, if the payee acted in good faith.
(Pomeroy’s Equity, volume 2, page 946.) The contract of a surety
is, that if the principal does not pay, he will, and sound policy as
well as the plainest principles o
f. justice demand, that when there
is a valid consideration, and the payee has done nothing to deceive
or mislead either principal or surety, and the principal is held to be
not liable, on account of some disability existing at the time of the
making of the contract, whether such disability be coverture, in
fancy or unsoundness of mind, the surety should be held to the
terms of his contract. The reason given in some of the cases why
the surety of a married woman is held, is that the payee and the
surety knew at the time that the contract was made that the mar
ried woman might refuse to pay, or that the contract was made in
reference thereto, the surety binding himself to pay in case she
should avail herself of her legal rights. In case of a lunatic it
might be presumed that if the payee knew of the disability, the
sureties being his close friends, would also know of it
,
and that
the contract was made in reference to that state of facts. There









































































































































Sect. 2] KIMBALL v. NEWELL 321
or defrauded Yandell in procuring him to sign the note. Hence
we are of opinion that the charge of the court should have been
limited to Yandell, and the question submitted as to the liabilities
of the sureties on the principles herein enunciated. * * *
Reversed and remanded.
Opinion adopted November 1, 1887.
103. KIMBALL v. NEWELL, 7 Hill 116.
Supreme Court, New York, 1845.
A surety is liable on his covenant for the faithful performance
of the print.-ipal's covenant to pay rent, notwithstanding the cov
enant of the principal is void for coverture.
On error from the superior court of the city of New York,
Newell brought an action of covenant against Kimball in the
marine court of the city of New York, claiming to recover certain
rent due on a lease to one Theodosia Knowlton, for whom the
defendant had become surety. On the trial, the plaintiff gave in
evidence the following instruments:
“This is to certify that I have hired and taken from Daniel Newell
the house in Nassau street, etc., for one year, to commence on the first day
of May next, at the yearly rent of four hundred and fifty dollars, payable
quarterly. And I do hereby promise to make punctual payment of the
rent, in manner aforesaid, and quit and surrender the premises, at the
expiration of the term, in as good state and condition as reasonable use
and wear thereof will permit, damages by the elements excepted. Given
under my hand and seal the 3rd day of March, 1840.
Mus. T. KNOWLTON, [L. S.]”
“In consideration of the letting of the premises above described, and
for the sum of one dollar, I hereby become surety for the punctual pay
ment of the rent, and performance of the covenants, in the above written
agreement mentioned, to be paid and performed by Mrs. Theodosia Knowl
ton, and if any default should be made therein, I do hereby promise and
agree to pay unto the said Daniel Newell such sum or sums of money as
will be sufficient to make up such deficiency, and fully satisfy the conditions
of the said agreement, without requiring any notice of non-payment, or
proof of demand being made. Given under my hand and seal the 3rd day
of March, 1840.
“M. T. C. KIMBALL, [L. S.]”
It appeared that Mrs. Knowlton occupied under the lease,i
and that a balance of rent, amounting to $31.94, remained due the
plaintiff. (I
t further appeared that Mrs. Knowlton was a married
woman at the time the lease was executed; and the defendant
contended that, inasmuch as her covenant was void by reason of
coverture, his was also void. .The marine court held otherwise,









































































































































322 Kliun.-\LL v. NEWELL [Chap. VI
was afterwards affirmed by the superior court on certiorari, and
the defendant brought error.
R. H. Shannon, for the plaintiff in error.
Howard 6' Onderdonk, for the defendant in error.
NELSON, Ch. J. The defendant having consented to become
bound as surety for the rent of the premises leased to Mrs. Knowl
ton, it is but reasonable to presume that, if he was not well
acquainted with her situation before, he then made some enquiries
into her circumstances and condition, and thus became fully pos
sessed of the facts which he now sets up as a ground of discharge.
But conceding that the defendant had no knowledge of the
social condition of Mrs. Knowlton, and that he supposed she would
be legally holden for the rent as it accrued, I am still of the opin
ion that he is liable on his contract. The doctrine for which his
counsel contends is thus stated by Theobald: “The obligation of
the surety being accessory to the obligation of some person who is
the principal debtor, it is of its essence that there should be a valid
obligation of a principal debtor. The nullity of the principal
obligation necessarily induces the nullity of the accessory.”
(Theob. Prin. & Sur. 2.) This is undoubtedly correct as a general
rule; but it has its exceptions, and the case before us is one of
them.
Mr. Chitty says: “The rule that a party can not be liable up
on a contract of guarantee, unless the principal has incurred a
legal responsibility, is true, in some instances, in form or words,
rather than in substance.” (Chitty on Contr., 499.) He adds: “In
the case of a guarantee to answer for the price of goods to be sup
plied to a married woman, or goods (not necessaries) to be sold to
an infant, or other persons incompetent to contract, no doubt the
party guaranteeing, though professedly contracting only in the
character of surety, would be responsible.” (Id.) He refers to
the case of Maggs v. Ames (4 Bing. 470), which was an action
against the defendant as surety for a married woman. There the
question was whether the undertaking of the defendant was an
original one, so as not to require it to be in writing. The court
held that it was collateral, and therefore should have been in writ
ing. But neither the counsel nor court supposed that the defend
ant would not have been bound, if the contract had been in writing.
On the contrary, that was assumed. In the case of White v.
(.'u_\'Icr (6 T. R. 176), it was impliedly at least conceded by Lord
Kenyon, that a guarantor or surety for a feme covert would be









































































































































Sect. 2] KIMBALL v. NEWELL 323
Prin. and Surety, 13; Bnchmyr v. Darnall (2 Ld. Raym. I085) :
Harris \'. Hunchback (I Burr. 373) ; Chopin v. Lapham (20 Pick.
467)
The doctrine of the civil law is very clear and satisfactory on
this subject. It is as follows: “Although the obligation of a surety
be only an accessory to that of the principal debtor, yet he who has
bound himself surety for a person who may get himself relieved
from his obligation, such as a minor, or a prodigal who is inter
dicted, is not discharged from his suretyship by the restitution of
the principal debtor: and the obligation subsists in his person;
unless the restitution were grounded upon some fraud, or other
vice which would have the effect to annul the right of the cred
itor.” (Dom. B. 3 tit. 4 § 1, art. IO, Strahan’s ed.) Again: “If the
principal obligation was annulled only because of some personal
exception which the principal debtor had, as if it was a minor,
who, in consideration of his being under age, got himself relieved
from an engagement by which he suffered some prejudice, and
that there had been no fraud on the creditor’s part; the restitution
of the minor would have indeed this effect, that it would annul
his obligation to the creditor, and his engagement to save harmless
his surety, if he desired to be relieved from it. But the said resti
tution of the minor would not in the least invalidate the surety’s
obligation to the creditor. For it was only to make good the
obligation of the minor, in case he should be relieved from it on
account of his age, that the creditor took the additional security
of a surety.” (Id., B. 3, tit. 4 § 5, art. 2; and see I Ev. Poth. on
Obl. 237.)
I am satisfied that the decision of the court below was right,
and that the judgment should be affirmed.
BEARDSLEY, J. |I think the defendant was estopped from
denying the competency of Mrs. Knowlton to bind herself by the
covenant she assumed to execute. The defendant by his covenant
admits she was thus bound, and he shall not be allowed to gainsay
it by alleging her incapacity to make a legal contract. Had she
been induced to enter into this engagement by fraud or imposition,
or upon a usurious consideration, the case might have been other
wise; but the defendant, although a surety, cannot be permitted,
on the ground now set up, to deny the legal existence of a covenant
which is explicitly conceded by his own deed. (Co. Litt. 352, a,
note 306; I Stark. Ev. 302, Am. ed. of 1830; Greenl. Ev. §§ 22
to 26. and the notes.)











































































































































324 HAZARD v. GRISWOLD [Chap. VI
104. HAZARD, et al, v. GRISWOLD, 21 Fed. 178.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 1884.
Duress of the principal is no defense to the surety, unless he
became bound in ignorance of the facts constituting the duress.
Action of Debt on Bond.
Edwin Metealf, for plaintiffs.
Sam’1 R. Honey and Arnold Greene, for defendant.
Before GRAY and COLT, H.
GRAY, Justice. This is an action of debt, commenced in the
Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island, on March 3, 1883,
by four citizens of Rhode Island against a citizen of New York, on
a bond dated August 24, 1868, and executed by Thomas C. Durant
as principal, and the defendant and S. Dexter Bradford as sure
ties, binding them jointly and severally to the plaintiffs in the sum
of $53,735, the condition of which is that Durant “shall on his part
abide and perform the orders and decrees of the Supreme Court of
the State of Rhode Island in the suit in equity of Isaac P. Hazard
and others against Thomas C. Durant and others, now pending
in said court within and for the county of Newport.”
The breach assigned in the declaration is that Durant has not
performed a decree by which that court, on December 2, 1882,
ordered him to pay into its registry the sum of $16,o7I,659.97.
(That part of the opinion preceding consideration of fifth plea
is omitted.)
The fifth plea alleges that Durant, at the time and place of
the making of the supposed writing obligatory, “was unlawfully
imprisoned by the said plaintiffs and others in collusion with them,
and then and there detained in prison, until, by the force and
duress of imprisonment of him, the said Thomas C. Durant. he,
with the said defendant as surety, made the said writing, signed
and sealed and delivered the same to the said plaintiffs as their
deed.” To this plea the plaintiffs have demurred, because it does
not allege that the writing was executed by the defendant under
force and duress of imprisonment of himself, nor that he did not
voluntarily execute it as surety with knowledge that it was exe
cuted by Durant as principal under force and duress of imprison
ment, as alleged in the plea. This plea does not set forth facts
enough to make out a defense. Duress at common law( where no
statute is violated, is a personal defense, which can only be set up
by the person subjected to the duress; and duress to the principal
will not avoid the obligation of a surety; at least, unless the surety,









































































































































Sect. 3] AUCHAMPAUGH V. SCH MIDT 325
stances which render it voidable by the principal. Thompson v.
Lockwood, 15 Johns. 256; Fisher v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252;
Robinson v. Gould, II Cush. 55; Bowman v. Hiller, 130 Mass.
153; Harris v. Carmody, 131 Mass. 51; Griffith v. Sitgreaves, 90
Pa. St. 161. The case of Hawes v. Marchant, 1 Curtis 136, in
this court, was not a case of duress at common law, but of oppres
sion by the illegal exercise of official power in excess of statute
authority, and was decided upon that ground. * * *
Demurrers sustained.
SECTION 3. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON EXTINGUISH MENT OR
SUSPENSION OF LIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL
DEBTOR TO THE CREDITOR
105. AUCHAMPAUGH, Adm'r., v. SCHMIDT, 7o Iowa 642,
27 N. W. 805.
Supreme Court, Iowa, 1886.
A claim barred as against the principal by the statute of limi
tations is barred as against the surety also.
Action upon a promissory note purporting to be executed as
a joint note by one Charles Leipold and the defendant. The note
was executed in Illinois, where Leipold lived, and still lives. It
became due May 23, 1871, and this action was commenced Jan
uary 28, 1885. The defendant pleaded that he signed the note
merely as surety; that under the law of Illinois the note became
barred as against Leipold by the statute of limitations; and that,
being barred as against Leipold, the principal, it was barred as
against his surety, the defendant. There was a trial to a jury, and
a peremptory instruction was given to find for the plaintiff. Verdict
and judgment were rendered accordingly, and the defendant
appeals.
Woodward & Cook, for appellant.
E. E. Hasner and Daniel Smyser, for appellee.
ADAMs, J. The note was executed to one Schneider, the
plaintiff's intestate. The fact that the note was signed by the
defendant as surety was proven only by the defendant's wife. An
objection was raised to her testimony on the ground that she was
an incompetent witness to prove such fact as against an adminis
trator. The court overruled the objection, and the evidence was









































































































































326 AUCHAMPAUGH V. SCH MIDT [Chap. VI
C
principal, would be remediless. NOW... we do not think that a
that ruling. If we should be of the opinion that she was incom
petent, and that there was no proper evidence that the defendant's
relation to the note was that of surety, we could not affirm upon
that ground, because we do not know that the defendant might
not have introduced other evidence upon the point if his wife's
testimony had been excluded.
We come, then, to the question raised by the answer and the
admitted evidence of suretyship, and that is as to whether a claim
which is barred by the statute of limitations, as against the prin
cipal debtor, is by reason thereof barred also as against a surety.
In answer to this question, we have to say that we think that it is
.
No authority has been cited upon either side which is directly in
point. Ordinarily, we may presume that, where the statute has
fully run as against the principal, it would happen that it had fully
run as against the surety. But the case before us has this peculiar
ity: The defendant, when the note was executed, resided in Illi





removed to Iowa, and before the statute o
f
this state had fully
run the action was commenced. If, then, the defendant were a
principal debtor, the note would not be barred as against him, how
ever it might be as against Leipold. He must therefore rely solely
upon the fact that he is surety upon the note, and upon the bar as
against Leipold. Such being the case, it is perhaps not surpris
ing that no authority should be cited that is precisely in point. It
becomes our duty, therefore, to attempt to determine the case on
principle. \It would not be denied that a surety upon a note may
set up any meritorious defense which the principal, if sued, might
set up in his own behalf. Now, when the statute o
f
limitations
has run as against the principal, the law excuses him from setting
up any meritorious defense which he may have, and allows him
to rely upon the technical defense o
f
the statute alone. The theory
is that he was not under obligations to preserve any longer the
evidence o
f
his meritorious defense if he had any, and so the court
will not inquire whether he had such defense or not. The statute
has been very properly denominated the statute o
f repose. As the




any meritorious defense which the prin-_
cipal might have set up, we are not able to see why he should be
equired h defense after the Drin
cipal was not bound to do so. A
it is his right [OTOOK to the principal för TGillibuTSCIII-II Ult a
surety paying a debt, after it had become barred as against the
creditor, by his own dilatoriness, should be allowed to put the









































































































































Sect. 3] VILLARS V. PALMER 327
surety in such position. It is not a full answer to say that a surety
might have protected himself. It may be conceded that he might.
-ButTFactically, sureties often overlook their obligations if their
attention is not called to them, and we do not think that the just
protection of the rights of the creditor requires that we should
hold so strict a rule against them as that for which the plaintiff
contends.
--
It is said, however, that the defendant, if he is allowed to
plead the bar of the statute at al
l
a
s against the principal, should
have averred and shown that no judgment in fact had been ren
dered against the principal. But we think that we would be jus
tified in assuming, from the plea made, that judgment had not





106. VILLARS v. PALMER, Adm'r, et al., 67 Ill. 204.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1873.




tations is not necessarily barred as against the surety.
This was a bill in chancery, b
y
William Villars, against Levin
T
. Palmer, administrator of the estate of Guy Merrill, deceased,
and John G






f Merrill, for the use o
f Leverich,
upon a promissory note, given b
y
one George W. Taylor as prin
cipal, and signed b
y
the complainant as surety, and payable to said
Guy Merrill as master in chancery. The bill showed that the
estate o
f Taylor was, solvent, and that the debt could have been
made if the claim had been presented before it was barred by the
two years limitation. The court below dismissed the bill, and the
complainant appealed.




L. Davis and Mr. J. B. Mann, for the appellees.
SHELDON, J. The claim on the part of the surety in this
case is
,
that, as by the neglect o
f
the creditor to present his claim
against the estate o
f Taylor, the principal, al
l
remedy in respect
to the debt has been lost against the estate o
f
the principal, that
should operate to discharge the surety.
The complaint is o
f
mere delay, not o
f any affirmative act on
the part o
f









































































































































328 VILLARS V. PALMER [Chap. VI
But it is the well established principle, that mere delay on the part
of the creditor to proceed against the Principal does not discharge
the responsibility J -
In cases of this sort, there is not any duty of active diligence
incumbent on the creditor. All that the surety has the right to




affirmative act shall be done that will operate to his preju
dice. It is his business to see that the principal pays.
TThe law furnished the surety here with ample remedies for
his protection. He might have paid the debt according to his un
dertaking, and have sued the principal himself; o
r
he might have
gone into a court o
f equity after the debt became due, and obtained
a decree that the principal should pay it; or he might, under the
statute, have given to the creditor written hotice to put the note
in suit, and thus have compelled him to sue the principal.
If he has seen fit to lie by, and the neglect to proceed against
the principal in his life time, o
r against his estate after his decease,
has been the means o





the loss, and cannot throw it upon the creditor.




. White et al
. II Ill. 342, and Taylor v. Beck, 13 id. 376, where
the subject is fully considered and the authorities cited. In the
former case, the very point made b
y
the surety here is decided
adversely to him.




1869, Sess. Laws 1869, p
.
305,
where the principal maker o
f
a joint note has departed this life,




the note to present the same
against the estate o
f
the decedent for allowance, to the proper





istration. But that statute is too late to affect the present case.
The decree o
f










































































































































Sect. 3] EISING v. ANDREWS 329
107. EISING v. ANDREWS, Executor, 66 Conn. 58, 33 Atl. 585,
50 Am. St. R. 75.
Supreme Court of Errors, Connecticut, 1895.
If the running of the statute of Iimitations is suspended as
to the principal it is suspended as to the surety also.
-
Action on a bond given by the defendant’s testator as surety,
brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county and tried to the
court, THAYER, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the
plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors of the
court. No error.
The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Howard B. Scott, for the appellant (defendant).
Lyman D. Brewster and John H. Perry, for the appellee
(plaintiff).
ANDREWS, C. J. The plaintiff is the only living partner of the
late firm of E. Eising & Co. The defendant is the sole surviving
executor of the will of Thomas F. Fay, late of Danbury, deceased.
In his lifetime, Fay had become obligated in a bond as surety for
one Thomas F. Rowan, as principal, for which he bound himself,
his heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally with
the said Rowan, in the penal sum of two thousand dollars to the
said E. Eising & Co., conditioned that the said Rowan, who had
been employed by the said firm as salesman and collector, “shall
well and faithfully discharge his duties as such collector and agent,
and shall also account for all moneys, property and other things
which may come into his possession or control by reason of his
appointment and employment as such agent and collector.” Fay
died on the 25th day of June, 1892. On the fifth day of July next
thereafter. the Court of Probate for the District of Danbury lim
ited and allowed six months from said date for the presentation of
claims against his estate. After Fay’s death , and between June
25th, 1892, and August 26th, 1893, Rowan received as such col
lector and agent from the customers of E. Eising & Co. more than
two thousand dollars of money which belonged to the plaintiff, but
which he appropriated to his own use—of which amount the sum
of $739.41 was misappropriated by Rowan after May 26th, 1803)
This defalcation of Rowan was by him fraudulently concealed from
the plaintiff, and was not discovered by the plaintiff until the first
day of September, 1893. He then made demand of Rowan that
he should account for and pay over to the plaintiff the said amount









































































































































330 EISING v. ANDREWS [Chap. VI
lected and refused so to do. He was then and at all times since
continues to be wholly insolvent.
The plaintiff notified the defendant of such defalcation on the
26th day of September, 1893, and presented to him, as such ex
ecutor, the claim of said partnership on said bond ; and on the 18th
day of November, 1893, made demand on him for the amount of
the said bond, but the defendant refused to pay it. This suit was
brought on the 21st day of November, 1893.
The defendant claimed as matter of law, that upon these
facts the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations from re
covering in this action for any sums of money misappropriated by
Rowan prior to May 26th, 1893. And that the fraudulent conceal
ment by Rowan of his misappropriation did not prevent the statute
of limitations from running in favor of the defendant,nor postpone
the time of the arising of the cause of action upon the bond until
the plaintiff discovered the misappropriation. The court did not so
hold, but rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of
the‘bond with interest from the date of the demand. The defend
ant appealed to this court.
The bond on which this suit is brought contains two condi
tions: first, that Rowan should faithfully discharge his duty as
agent and collector for the said co-partnership ; and second, that he
should account for all moneys, property, or other thing that should
come into his hands, possession, or control, by reason of his em
ployment as such agent and collector. A breach of each of these
conditions is alleged in the complaint, and the facts found by the
court show that each had been broken by Rowan.
Section 581 of the General Statutes being a statute concern
ing the estates of deceased persons—provides that “when a right
of action shall accrue after the death of the deceased, it shall be ex
hibited within four months after such right of action shall accrue”;
and that unless exhibited within such time the creditor shall be
forever debarred of all right to recover the claim. .
The breach of the second condition named in the bond took
place, and the right of action thereon accrued, not earlier than the
first of September, 1893, and within four months next before the
claim was exhibited to the defendant. The Superior Court might
well have rendered its judgment entirely on the breach of that
condition in the bond. McKim v. Glover, 161 Mass. 418. And
there is nothing in the case to show that it did not. Counsel for
the defendant does not dwell on this part of the case.
Under the statute above recited the defendant admits that the










































































































































Sect. 3] EISING V. ANDREWS 33 I
amount of money misa
- - -- -
Ol11"
s next before the claim was exhibited to him. And he in--
sists that because of that statute the plaintiff cannot recover for
any moneys wrongfully appropriated by Rowan prior to the said
four months. If that statüte stood alone it is more than likely that -
this action would never have been contested. It is another statute
which causes the dispute. Section 1389 enacts that: “If any per
son, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently conceal from
him the exist use of such action, said cause of action
shall be deemed to accrue against said person so liable therefor,
at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first dis
cover it
s
existence.” Applied to a cause o
f action, the term to
accrue means to arrive; to commence; to come into existence; to





that in cases to which it is applicable, the cause o
f
action
does not come into existence until it is discovered by the person
entitled to sue thereon. (: effect of this statute upon the present l–case is that no cause of action came into existence by reason of
Rowan's defalcation until it was discovered b
y
the plaintiff.
It is admitted by the defendant that this is the effect of the
statute, if limited to Rowan himself. But the defendant says that
the fraudulent concealment b
y















limitations only in favor o
f
the very party who
commits the fraudulent concealment. He cites Wood on Limita
tions (2d-Ed.), page 139, and the cases there referred to, as














the last quoted statute suspended, as against Rowan,




action was not suspended against this defendant; that a
s against
mitted the defalcation, and as it appears b
y
the case that all o
f
the defalcation, except the sum-of-S#39-4L was committed more
than four-months before the claim was exhibited to him, he can:





that there is a falacy—or rather it is a fatal
error—in this argument. It conflicts with the most essential fea
ture o
f
the law relating to surety and principal. The plaintiff









the defendant assumes that a cause o
f
action for
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l
. But the law relating totherefor against Rowan had a.
a surety is meaSur_ed_pr_e_cisely y_the_1ia.bility_o£_1he_ principal.
Brandt on Suretyship, § 121 ; .5‘eae'er v. Young, 16 Vt. 658; Boone
County v. Jones, 54 Iowa 709; Patterson’s A ppcal, 48 Pa. St. 345;
McCabe v. Raney, 32 Ind. 309. S0 long as no cause of action ex
isted against Rowan, the principal, no cause of action existed
against the defendant or his surety. And the statute of limitations
does not begin to run in favor of any person, until there is a cause





of a principal debtor, and it is of the essence of this obligation
I that there should be a valid obligation of some principal. Thus,
where one agrees to become responsible for another the former
incurs no obligation as surety, if no valid claim ever arises against
the principal. Chitty on Contracts (11th Ed.), 788. If the prin
cipal is not holden, neither is the surety; for there can be no acces
sory if there is no principal. De Colyar on Principal and Surety,
Amer. Ed. 39; Addison on Contracts, § 11 111. The existence of a
‘principal debtor is a condition precedent to the operation of the
contract of a surety. Ha:a‘rd v. Irwin, 18 Pick. 95 ; Swift v. Beers,
3 Denio 70; Moinitstephen v. Lakeman, L. R. 7 Q. B., 202; Mal
let v. Bateman, L. R. I C. P., 163. This is only in accordance
with the general law of contracts, which prevents a contract from
becoming operative unless and until all conditions precedent are
fulfilled. Brandt on Suretyship, § 214; Farmers and Mcelmnies’
Bank v. Kingsley, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 379. So too, whatever dis
charges the principal debtor discharges the surety. The liability of
a surety on a claim which is good as against the principal, ceases as
soon as the claim is extinguished against the principal. The
nature of the undertaking of a surety is such that there can be no
obligation on his part,.unless there is an obligation on the part of
the principal. “It is correctly laid down, in Chitty on Contracts,
that the contract of a surety is a collateral engagement for an
other, as distinguished from an original and direct agreement for
the party’s own act; and, as stated in Theobald ‘on Principal and
Surety, * * * it is a cofiallary from the very definition of the
contract of suretyship, that the obligation of the surety, being
accessory to the obligation of the principal debtor or obligor, it
is of its essence that there should be a valid obligation of such a
principal, and that the nullity of the principal obligation necessarily









































































































































Sect. 4] MAHURIN V. PEARSON 333
can be no accessory. Nor can the obligation of the surety, as
such, exceed that of the principal. * * * It would be most unjust
and incongruous to hold the surety liable, where the principal is
not bound.” STORRs, J.
,
in Ferry v. Burchard, 21 Conn. 603. The
same general doctrine is held in many other cases in this State.








. Skinner, 40 id. 464.
It follows, then, that the fraudulent concealment b
y
Rowan,
the DFili s from run-_
ning in his favor, also stopped it from running in favor o
f
the
defendant, his surety. Bradford V
. McCormick, 71 Iowa 129:
Boone County v. Jones, 54 id
.
669; Charles v
. Hoskins, 14 id
.
471.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
SECTION 4. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON THE PRINCIPAL
DEBTOR'S RIGHT OF SET-OFF OR COUNTER
CLAIM AGAINST THE CREDITOR.
IO8. MAHURIN v. PEARSON, et al., 8 N. H. 539.
Superior Court o
f Judicature, New Hampshire, 1837.
The surety is entitled to set off against a demand b
y
the cred
itor a cause o
f
action existing in favor o
f
the principal.
Assum PSIT on a note for $100, dated November 3
,
1834, pay
able to the plaintiff, in sixty days, with interest. The defendant,
Bellows, signed the note as surety for Pearson. The defendants







said Pearson. The plaintiff objected to receive said










the defendants only; whereupon the court rejected the
set-off, and the evidence offered. The defendant, Bellows, in
order to show a discharge from any liability on said note, offered
the testimony o
f
a witness, that the last o
f December, 1834, or
the first o
f January, 1835, Bellows and Mahurin had a conversa
tion about a $100 mote which Bellows had signed with Pearson.
Bellows told Mahurin he wished the note sued as soon as it was
out, as he did not wish to stand surety to Pearson any longer.
Mahurin said part o
f









































































































































334 MAHURIN v. PEARSoN [Chap. VI
had been made with Pearson for the remainder. Mahurin also
said that he would not call on Bellows for the note, but the
witness could not tell the words made use of by Mahurin.
On the above evidence the court directed a verdict for the
plaintiff, which the defendants moved to set aside.
Wells, for the defendants.
Young, for the plaintiff.
PARKER, J. The evidence offered is not sufficient to discharge
the surety. Mere delay by the creditor to collect the debt, after a
request to that effect from the surety, will not operate as dis
charge, (3 N. H. R. 231,) and we are of opinion that the
evidence does not show such a renunciation of all claim upon the
surety, as can avail to discharge him without any consideration
paid, or evidence of loss sustained. 2 Stark. Rep. 228, Parker v.
Leigh; ditto 531, Adams v. Gregg; Doug. 247, Dingwall v. Dun
ster; 1 Camp. 35, Whately v. Tricker; 8 Pick. 122, Baker v. Briggs;
2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 557, King v. Baldwin. Whether evidence of
the latter description is admissible in such case may perhaps admit
of question.
But the court erred in rejecting the set-off. It being shown
that Bellows is a mere surety, we are of opinion there is sufficient
mutuality in a debt due from the plaintiff to Pearson, to authorize
it to be allowed in set-off, under our statute. 6 N. H. R. 27,
Woods v. Carlisle; 4 Bing. 423, Bourne v. Bennett; 12 Ves. 349.
er parte Hanson; 18 Ves. 232, S. C. The cases in Vesey are
cited without disapprobation by Chancellor Kent, 4 Johns. Ch. R.
I5, Dale v. Cooke, although he held as a general principle “that
joint and separate debts cannot be set off against each other in
equity any more than at law.”
There are several considerations which show the propriety of
allowing the set-off in this case. If the debt from the plaintiff
to Pearson, which was offered in set-off, was contracted after that
now in suit, it very probably might have been regarded by the
parties as in effect a payment thus far. It is at least but equitable
that it should so operate, whether contracted before or after.
The rule in equity is
,
that if a creditor have security, the surety,
On payment by him, is entitled to be substituted, and to have the
benefit o
f




ārd; 4 Ves. 829, Law v. The East India Company; 7 Wend.
326, Evernghim v. Ensworth. If
,
instead o
f having security, the
creditor owes the principal part o
f
the amount, and the principal









































































































































Sect. 4] GILLESPIE V. TORRANCE 335
should have the benefit of the credit which the creditor has ob
Trained of the Drincipal. And, moreover, it will tend to prevent
multiplicity of actions; for, should the plaintiff collect his debt of
Bellows, the latter must have an action against Pearson to re
cover the amount, and Pearson will have a right of action on the
claim now offered in set-off.
Whether any thing can be set off in this or any other case
beyond the balance due from the plaintiff, on an adjustment of all
demands between the parties which are not comprehended in the
suit, is a question not settled by this decision.
New trial granted. *\C
I09. GILLESPIE, et al., v. TORRANCE, 25 N. Y. 306.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1862.
When sued upon his contract the surety cannot set up, by way
of counterclaim, a cause of action existing in favor of the princi
pal against the plaintiff creditor.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the city of New York.
Action upon a promissory note against the indorser only. De
fense, that the indorsement was for the accommodation of the
maker; that the note was one of several given for oak timber sold
to the maker by the plaintiffs; that the timber was a raft in the
Hudson river, opposite the city of New York, and that, on making
the sale, the plaintiffs produced certificates of inspection showing
that there were 29,441 feet of first quality oak, for which Van Pelt,
the maker of the notes, agreed to pay 27% cents per foot, and
5,523 feet of second quality or refuse oak, for which Van Pelt
agreed to pay 1334 cents per foot; that, by the usage of the timber
trade in New York, the seller is deemed to warrant that the tim
ber sold corresponds in quantity and quality with the description
in such inspection certificates; that Van Pelt gave his notes, in
dorsed by the defendant, for various sums, amounting in the ag
gregate to $9,000, the price of the timber as computed from the
inspection certificates, and a
ll o
f
which notes had been paid except
the one in suit; that after the delivery o
f
the timber it was dis





first quality there was 15,000 feet less than the
certificates stated, and an equal excess in the refuse timber; that
if the prices had been correctly computed according to the fact,
instead o
f being computed according to the certificate, it would









































































































































336 GILLESPIE v. TORRANCE [Chap. VI
fore, been overpaid, and there was no consideration for the note
in suit. On the trial, the judge, under exception by the defendant,
excluded evidence as to the quantity of the timber of the different
qualities: declined to permit an amendment of the answer alleging
an express warranty; and excluded evidence of the usage set up
in the answer, making a sale by certificate equivalent to a warranty.
The other facts stated in the answer were substantially proved or
admitted. The plaintiffs had a verdict and judgment, which hav
ing been affirmed at general term, the defendant appealed to this
court.
Charles A. Rapa./lo, for the appellant.
William A. Stanley, for the respondents.
SE1.1)EN, J. The defense in this case is not founded on a
failure of the consideration of the note, otherwise than by a defect
in the quality of the timber for which it was given. That being
so, if there was neither warranty nor fraud in the sale of the tim
ber, the defect in quality constitutes no defense. Seixas v.
Woods, 2 Cains, 48; Sweet v. Colgate, 20 Johns. 196: Welsh v.
Carter, I Wend. 185, Johnson v. T-it-us, 2 Hill, 606. The answer
does not allege fraud in the transaction, and unless it shows a
warranty of the quality of the timber, it presents no defense to
the note, either partial or total. The argument of the appellant's
counsel, to maintain the position that the defense rested upon a
failure of consideration, and not upon a claim for damages on a
breach of warranty, is very ingenious; but the answer and the
proof show that all the timber contracted to be delivered to Van
Pelt, and for which the notes were given, was in fact delivered.
and the real ground of complaint is
,
that a much larger proportion
of it than was shown by the inspector’s certificates, upon the faith
o
f which the purchase was made, proved to be of inferior quality.
The law being well established that such defect of quality, in the
absence of fraud or warranty, constitutes no defense to the note,
or to any part of it
,
and there being no pretense of fraud, it fol
l0ws that the defense, if there is any, rests upon a breach of war
ranty.
The question then arises, whether the plaintiff, an accommo
dation indorser upon a note given by Van Pelt to the plaintiffs
for the timber, can avail himself of a breach of the contract of
warranty in regard to the quality of the timber, made by the plain
tiffs to Van Pelt, on the sale to him. To decide this question, it is
necessary to ascertain the ground upon which such defenses. by









































































































































Sect. 4] GILLESPIE v. romzauce 337
of the Code, now, partially, if not wholly, merged in the much
broader term, counter-claim, were admitted. If we regard such
defenses as resting upon a failure of the consideration of the con
tract on which the plaintiff's action is founded, then unquestionably
the defendant could avail himself of the breach of warranty in this
case, because an indorser or surety may always, where the con
tract has not been assigned, show a failure, partial or total, of con
sideration of his principal's contract which he is called upon to
perform. But if such defenses are regarded as the setting off of
distinct causes of action, one against the other, then it is clear,
as will be shown hereafter, that this defendant could not avail him
self of such defense.
The subject of the precise ground on which a defendant is
allowed to reduce a recovery against him, in an action upon a
contract, by alleging and proving fraud, or breach of warranty—
whether the contract where there is fraud, is regarded as de
stroyed, and the recovery had on a quantum meruit, or whether the
reduction of the plaintiff’s claim rests upon a partial failure of
consideration, or upon the setting off of distinct claims againsteach
other—has often been discussed, but without any general concur
rence of opinion on the question. Reab \'. McAllister, 4 Wend.
90 et seq., S. C. in error, 8 id. I09; Batterman v. Pieree, 3 Hill
171, 177; Ives v. Van Epps, 22 Wend. 155; Nichols v. Dusen
bury, 2 Comst. 286; Van Epfls v. Harrison, 5 Hill 66; Barber v.
Rose, id. 78; Baston v. Butler, 7 East. 479; Withers v. Greene, 9
How. U. S. 213.
A careful examination of the subject, I think, must lead to the
conclusion, that wherever recoupment, strictly such, is allowed,
distinct causes of action are set off against each other. This would
seem to follow from the right of election, which all the cases admit
the defendant has, to set up his claim for damages by way of de
fense, or to resort to a cross-action to recover them. Ives v. Van
Epps, 22 Wend. 157; Batterman v. Pieree, 3 Hill, 171 ; Britta» v.
Turner, 6 N. H. 481: Halsey v. Carter, I Duer, 667: Barber v.
Ruse 5 Hill, 8I ; Sterer v. Lamoure, Lalor’s Supp. 352, note a.
In many cases the defendant's damages would exceed the
amount of the plaintiffs claim, which shows conclusively that such
damages do not rest upon a mere failure of consideration. \lVhere
there is fraud, the party deceived, on discovering the fraud, may
rescind the contract; but if he does not do that, the contract on
his part remains entire, not broken and not modified, and he is










































































































































338 GILLESPIE v. roruumce [Chap. VI
ever, arising from the fraud a distinct cause of action, the amount
of which he may set off against any liability on his part growing
out of the transaction in which the fraud was perpetrated. As
was said by Bronson, I., in Van Epps v. Harrison: “When sued
~ for the price, the vendee may in general reco-up damages; but while
he retains the property he cannot treat the contract as wholly void.
and refuse to pay anything. By retaining the property he crfi'irms
the validity of the contract, and can be entitled to nothing more
than the damages which he has sustained by reason of the fraud.”
The same principle is applicable to cases of warranty, except that
the breach of warranty gives no right to rescind, unless there is
an express contract to that effect. Street v. Blay, 2 Barn, & Ad.
456; Voorhees \-'. Earl, 2 Hill, 288; Cary v. Gruman, 4 id. 625;
Muller v. Eno, 14 N. Y. 597; Thornton v. Winn, 12 Wheat. 183;
Lattin v. Davis, Lalor’s Supp. 16. In ordinary cases of breach
of warranty, therefore, both contracts remain binding to their full
extent, and where recoupment is allowed, damages for a breach
on one side are set off against like damages on the other side. The
“cross-claims arising out of the same transaction compensate one
another, and the balance is recovered.” 8 Wend. 115; 22 id.
I56; 3 Hill, 174; 2 Comst. 286.
It has always been optional, as is suggested above, since the
doctrine of recoupment has gained a foothold in the courts, with
a party who has sustained damages by fraud or breach of warranty
in the purchase of goods, when sued for their price, to set off or
recoup such damages in that action, or to reserve his claim for a
cross-action; and when he elected to recoup he could not, under
the Revised Statutes, have a balance certified in his favor, nor
could he maintain a subsequent action for such balance. Sickles
v. Pattison, 14 Wend. 257; Battermtm v. Pieree, 3 Hill, 171;
Wilder v. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Stewr v. Lamoure, Lalor's Supp.
352 note, a; Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481.
Under the Code of Procedure, doubtless a balance might be
recovered (Code §§ 150-274; Ogden v. Codd‘ington, 2 E. D.
Smith, 317) ; but theright of election to set up a counter-claim in
defence, or to bring a cross-action for it, still exists. Halsey v.
Carter, 6 Duer, 667; Welch v. Hasleton, 14 How. Pr., 97. Now
it is not easy to reconcile with these established principles, the
right of the defendant in this suit to avail himself of the claim
which Van Pelt may have against the plaintiffs on a breach of war
ranty. 1. Such damages constitute a counter-claim, and not a
mere failure of consideration, and not being due to the defendant,
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How. Pr., 248; 16 id. 576, note . 2. Van Pelt has a right of
election whether the damages shall be claimed by way of recoup- _
ment in the suit on the note, or reserved for a cross-action.
The defendant cannot make this election for him. 3. If the
defendant has a right to set up the counter-claim, and have it
allowed, in this action it must bar any future action by Van Pelt
for the breach of warranty; and as no balance could be found in
defendant's favor, he might thus bar a large claim in canceling a
small one. If the right exists in this case, it would equally exist
if the note was but $100 instead of $1,800. 4. Supposing the
other notes given for the timber to have been indorsed by differ
ent persons, for the accommodation of Van Pelt, and all to re
main unpaid, each of the indorsers would have the same rights as
the defendant. If they were to set up the same defence, how would
the conflicting claims be reconciled?
In the case which was shown on the trial, there would seem
to be a strong equity in favor of the defendant to have the note
cancelled or reduced, by applying towards its satisfaction the dam
ages which appear to be due to Van Pelt for the breach of war
ranty. It is
,
however, an equity, in which Van Pelt is interested
to as great, and possibly to a greater, extent than the defendant.
and cannot be disposed of without having him before the court,
so that his rights, as well as those of the defendant, may be pro
tected. That remedy may be open to the defendant still, notwith
standing the judgment; especially if the insolvency of the parties
renders that course necessary for his protection. 14 Johns., 63,
17 id., 389; 2 Cow., 261; 2 Paige, 581; 6 Dana, 32; 8 id., 164;
2 Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 1446, a, 1437. My conclusion is
,
that the
court below was right in holding that the defendant could not set
up the breach of warranty in defence, partial or total, ‘to the suit
on the note; and as the warranty presented the only ground on
which there could be a claim of defence under the answer, there
is no necessity for considering the other questions presented in
the case.
The judgment should be affirmed.










































































































































340 PEARL v. DEACON [Chap. V I
SECTION 5. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON SURRENDER OR LOSS
OF SECURITIES BY THE CREDITOR.
no. PEARL v. DEACON, 24 Beav. 186.
Chancery, the Rolls Court, 1857.
Release by the ereditor of his lien upon another security dis
charges the surety pro tanto. Lack of knowledge by the surety
of the existence of such other security is immaterial to this de
fense.
Mr. R. Palmer and Mr. Bevir, for plaintiff.
Mr. Selzeyn and Mr. W. R. Ellis, for defendants.
The l\/IASTER oF THE ROLLs:
I retain the opinion expressed by me yesterday. The facts
are shortly these :—Mr. Pearson applied to the defendants, who
are brewers at Windsor, for a loan of 25ol., to enable him to take
a public-house, called the Carpenters’ Arms. They said we will
do so if you will get a good surety for the amount, and assign
'
over your pension and furniture. That was agreed to; Pearson
offered the plaintiff as his surety for half the amount, and Castles
as surety for the other half; the defendants accepted them, and
on the 16th of November,'1852, two joint and several promissory
notes were given to the defendants, one by Pearson and the plain
tiff, and the other by Pearson and Castles. Six days afterwards,
viz., on the 23rd of November, Pearson assigned his pension and
all the goods and chattels to secure this debt of 2501. On this
transaction, the first point which was raised by the plaintiff, in my
opinion, fails. He says that this arrangement was a variation of
the contract of suretyship, and that it discharged the plaintiff, be
cause the money was made payable on the 16th of November,
1858, or six years after the date of the mortgage. If the case
had rested here, the plaintiff would probably have been success
ful, but the deed goes on, “or at such earlier or other time” as the
defendants should appoint for the payment thereof “in and by a
notice in writing.” I do not think that this was such a variation
in the terms of the security as to discharge the surety; but the
question is of little importance, as I am of opinion, on the evi
dence, that the plaintiff had notice of this assignment and of the
terms of it.
The only other facts important to be stated are these :—The
defendants were landlords of The Carpenters’ Arms, and in the









































































































































Sect. 5] PEARL v. DEACON 341
considerably in arrear, the defendants distrained and put a broker
in possession of the furniture under the distress; on this, by
arrangement, instead of selling the goods, they took them at a
valuation for 1161.
The question is this:—The furniture having been expressly
mortgaged for the 2501., was it within the power of the defendants,
to the injury of the surety, to give up the security on the furni
ture for the 2501., and take it in discharge of another and different
debt due to themselves? I am of opinion that they could not do
so. It was said, that this security was not within the scope of the
Plaintifi"s contract, and that a surety cannot go beyond it. That
is a mistake with respect to the relation between a principal and
surety. Lord ELDON expressly stated, in Craythorne v. Swin
burne, 14 Ves. 169, that the rights of a surety depend rather on a
principle of equity than upon contract; there may be a quasi con
tract, but it arises out of the equitable relation between the parties,
to be inferred from the knowledge of an established principle of
equity. The same doctrine is also stated in Mayhe'w v. Crickett, 2
Swan. 191, and it is laid down distinctly that sureties are en
titled to the benefit of every security which e creditor has against
the principal debtor, and that whether the surety knows of the
existence of those securities or not is immaterial. If the creditor
makes availab e any of his securities, the surety is entitled to the
benefit of it.
The case of Capel v. Butler, 2 Sim. & S. 457, is a distinct
authority for this proposition. Mr. Ellis sought to distinguish that
case by saying, that, in that case, there was a recital of all the
securities, but that here there was none. The answer, however, is
this :—That there was notice to the surety of the whole transaction,
and being so, the reciting it is immaterial. Lord ELDON distinctly
laid down in Mayhew v. Crickctt, 2 Swan. 185, that it is a matter
of perfect indifference, whether the surety is aware of another
security having been taken by the creditor or not.
In the judgment of Vice-Chancellor W001) in Newton v.
Charlton, 10 Hare 651, there is a statement, in every word of which
I concur. He says, as regards, the creditor, “He is bound to give
to the surety the benefit of every security which ,he holds at the _
time of the contract,—every security which he then holds; and he
is not allowed, in any way, to vary the position of the surety with
reference to those securities; that has been decided most dis
tinctl_v in Mayhew v. Crickett by Lord EL1)oN, where there was a
warrant of attorney in the hands of a creditor put into operation









































































































































342 PEARL v. m:.\co.\" [Chap. \'I
wards discharged the principal debtor. Lord ELDON held it utterly
immaterial, whether the warrant of attorney was known to the
surety at the time he entered into the contract or not. The surety
had a complete right to the benefit of it
,
and if the benefit were lost
to him, he was at once discharged.”
It is argued that this was a security for a separate and dis
tinct debt; but I am of opinion that it was not taken for a separate
and distinct debt, but for the debt of 2 50/.
I am of opinion, therefore, that if the defendants enforce pay
ment of the rent due to them out of the furniture, and then seek to
compel the plaintiff to pay the debt for which he became surety,
the plaintiff is entitled to say to them, “you must give me the bene
fit of the security on the furniture and pension which were mort
gaged to you for this debt.”
What the defendants have done is this :—They have thought
fit to apply the produce of the furniture to a different and distinct
debt, contrary to the original arrangement, on the terms of which,
it is to be assumed, the surety consented to become liable. I am
therefore of opinion, that whatever the defendants have received
ought to be applied rateably in the discharge of the whole debt, and
that the plaintiff is only liable to pay half of the balance.
If it were otherwise. the result would be this :— That if a man
advanced 1,0001. to another on a mortgage of an estate, and had
the security of ten sureties, each of whom was liable for Io_0l., he
might release or reassign the mortgage, and then sue the ten
sureties. This is a proposition impossible to be sustained.
If the defendants have received anything from Castles. it
must not be taken into account: but with respect to the money
received from Pearson, it ought to be taken as a discharge for the
debt.
As to the pension, either they have received it or they have
not; if they have, it was distinctly applicable to the payment of
their debt; if they have not, they must show why they did not
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111. BOSTON PENNY SAVINGS BANK v. BRADFORD,
181 Mass. 199.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1902.
Release by the ereditor of part of his security ‘discharges the
surety only to the extent of the loss -at-hieh such release causes him.
CONTRACT against a surety for the balance due on a promis
sory note of the Assabet Manufacturing Company, originally for
$25,000. Writ dated January 2, 1900.
At the trial in the Superior Court, AIKEN, J. directed a verdict
for the plaintiff in the sum of $8,145.21, apparently the full amount
claimed ; and the defendant alleged exceptions.
The instrument of release, relied upon by the defendant in
the manner stated by the court, was as follows:
“I hereby acknowledge that I have received from Edward N.
Fenno, Arthur B. Silsbee and Jeremiah Williams, assignees of the
Assabet .\lanufacturing Company, a third dividend, being twelve
per cent of the amount of my claim, as presented to the said as
signees, to-wit: $3,032.08, and in consideration thereof I hereby
release the said a~m, and the estate of the
Assabet Manufacturing ompany in their hands, from all claims
and demands which I have against them or either of them.
“Witness my hand and seal: Provided that this release shall
not affect in any way the claim of the Boston Penny Savings Bank
against the directors or shareholders of the Assabet Mfg. Co., and
that if it shall have such effect it shall be void. Boston Penny
Savings Bank, by its Treasurer, \Nm. H. Durkee.” (Corporate
seal).
F. L. Norton, for the defendant.
P. Keyes, for the plaintiff.
KNOWLTON, J.—The defendant signed the note in suit as a
surety, and his defence is that he has been discharged from lia
bility by the plaintiff’s execution of an instrument under seal run
ning to the assignees of the Assabet Manufacturing Company, the
principal on the note, releasing them from all claims and demands
against them or either of them. The assignees held under a vol
untary assignment of this corporation for the benefit of creditors.
and this release was made and delivered for the payment to the
plaintiff of three dividends, amounting in all to sixty-seven per
cent of the note, and the payment of like dividends to other credi
tors who were parties to the assignment, the whole amount re
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It is not contended that the defendant was discharged from
liability by the plaintiff's becoming a party to the assignment, for
the sixteenth article of the assignment expressly saves all rights
of creditors to any security held by them, and also their rights
against sureties. The defendant treats the release of the trus
tees as if it were a release of the corporation that made the as
signment: but it does not affect the liability of the corporation for
the unpaid balance of the note. It purports only to release the
assignees from liability on account of the property that came into
their hands.| It is not like the release of a principal, which, if made
without reservation, releases the surety also. It is merely an
acknowledgmept of satisfaction as to certain property held by
the trustees for the security of the plaintiff. It cut off the right
of the plaintiff and also of the surety afterward to resort to any
part of that property. If the defendant was prejudiced by the
plaintiff’s giving up of the security which should have been held .
for the payment of the balance of the note, his liability is dim
inished to the extent of the loss from the release of the property,
but it is not affected beyond that. Baker v. Briggs, 8 Pick. 122.
American Bank v. Baker, 4 Met. 164, 177. Guild v. Butler, 127
Mass. 386. This rule of law disposes of the defendant’s requests
for rulings, which were all founded on a different view of the
decisions.
The only remaining question is whether the defendant can
take anything by his exception to the ruling given. The judge
directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. This we
understand to have been for the full amount remaining unpaid.
There was evidence that at the time of making the last dividend
the trustees “retained in their hands about two thousand dollars
to cover such legal and incidental expenses as might come in
closing the accounts.” There was nothing to indicate that this
sum was more than was reasonably necessary for that purpose. It
also appeared that they then had in their hands some
Q
ld claims
which they considered of no value, and that they susequently
received on account of one of these twelve or fifteen dollars.
Beyond this sum it does not appear that there was any valuable
property or assets in their hands which was applicable to the
claims of creditors. The plaintiff might have been entitled to
such proportional part of this sum of twelve or fifteen dollars as
its debt was of the whole indebtedness of about $1,600,000. To
say nothing of the impracticability of making a new dividend
for such a small sum, the plaintiff's share would be insignificant.
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/
jury the question whether the defendant was prejudiced, and if
so how much, by the plaintiff's release of its interest in this prop
erty; but it is obvious that the attention of the judge was not
directed to any such subject, and that the defendant's loss, if any,
from the error, is too trifling to be of consequence. We are of
opinion that the entry should be,
Exceptions overruled.
II2. SALINE COUNTY v. BUIE, et al., 65 Mo. 63.
Supreme Court, Missouri, 1877.
Release by a creditor of part of the land mortgaged to him as
security for payment of a bond, does not discharge a surety in
the bond, though made without his consent, if the remainder of
the land is sufficient to indemnify him against loss.
Error to Saline Circuit Court.—HoN. W.M. T. WooD, Judge.
Samuel Boyd, for plaintiff in error.
Samuel Davis, for defendant in error.
HouGH, J.—On the 15th day of August, 1868, Thomas M.
Smith, as principal with the defendants, D. D. Buie, Samuel Yates
and Zebman Smith, as sureties, executed to the county of Saline,
for the use of the general fund, and the swamp land fund, a bond
for the sum of $1,000, payable on or before the 31st day of
December, 1868. At various times prior to the institution of the
present suit, payments were made on said bond, aggregating the
sum of $864, and this suit was instituted on November 20th, 1873,
to recover of the sureties the balance due thereon. Smith was
not served and Yates made default. The defendant, Buie, filed a
separate answer, alleging that on the same day on which the bond
sued on was executed, Thomas M. Smith, the principal therein,
for the purpose of securing the payment of said bond, executed
and delivered to the County of Saline, a mortgage on two hundred
acres of land, conditioned that, in default of payment of either
principal or interest, the sheriff of the county should, without
suit, proceed to sell the said mortgaged premises. That, on the
Ioth day of February, 1870, the County Court of Saline County,
by an order entered of record, without the knowledge or consent
of said defendant, Buie, released from the operation of said
mortgage, one hundred and twenty acres of said land, and that
said defendant was thereby released and discharged from all
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filed a demurrer, which was sustained by the court, and final
. judgment rendered thereon against said defendant.
We perceive no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court.
The demurrer was properly sustained. Conceding that the Coum
ty Court had authority to release a portion of the mortgaged
premises, which we do not decide. the defendant jcould not com
plain, unless he was injure thereby, and he failed to allege in
his answer any such injury. F9/fijltlght that appears in the plead
ings, the remaining portion oftheland mortgaged may be amply
sufficient to indemnify him. A surety is entitled to the benefit
of all securities held by the creditor for the payment of the debt
of the principal; but when the creditor surrenders or releases a
portion only of such securities, the surety is not absolutely dis
charged, but only to the extent to which he is thereby actually
injured. If the securities retained by the creditor are sufficient
to pay the debt, the surety is not injured and cannot complain.
The judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed. The
other Judges concur, except Judge ‘SHERWOOD, absent.
Affirmed. ~
C/\
I13. HOLT v. BODEY, 18 Pa. St. 207.
Supreme Court, Pennsylvania, 1852.
Release by the ereditor of part of the security’ for the debt
discharges the surety to the extent of the part released zohether the
creditor retains enough to pay the debt or not.
Error to the Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
This was a scire facias to revive the lien of a judgment
entered in favor of Jesse Holt 1. Joseph H. Bodey and Henry
Bodey, Senior. * * *
KR.-wsF., J., instructed the jury—“This action is a sci. fa.
on a judgment entered in this Court for $800, 1st July, 1844, on
bond and warrant of attorney, dated ist April, 1842. The defend
ant has given evidence that Holt released some property from the
lien of his judgment; and that he had other property, which
Joseph H. Bodey sold, and as to which the lien of the judgment
in question was supposed to have run out for the want of sci. fa.
in time to revive it. This neglect to revive it is set up by defend
ant, but the Court instructs the jury that it is no defense in this
action.
“There is evidence that Henry Bodey, sen., was surety in
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and Allen W. Corson, which it is the duty of the jury to consider.
As to Corson’s testimony, however, the jury must see whether
he had facts on which he based his impressions that Henry
Bodey was merely a surety; for naked impressions alone are not
evidence. A witness’s impressions are evidence only where he
has facts on which they may be founded; but where he has no such
facts for a foundation, they are not to be regarded by the jury.
“Joseph H. Bodey is a competent witness. The jury, however,
will take into consideration his credibility, and whatever is dis
closed in the testimony to affect it.
“The Court then instructs the jury, that if Henry Bodey was
not surety in this bond, the defense wholly fails, and there must
be a verdict for plaintiff for the whole of his demand. But if
he was surety merely, then the law is as stated in 9 W. & S. 43,
I\'efT’s Appeal. provided it is found that plaintiff released property
on which his judgment in evidence was a lien. LThe rule of law
in such case is that the surety is discharged in whole or in part,
according to the proof he advances. If the evidence shows to
the satisfaction of the jury, that the plaintiff gave such release,
and Henry Bodey was merely a surety in the bond and judgment
upon it
,
then the next question for the jury is, to what extent did
the release take awa-' property in land, which was necessary to
satisfy the judgment?‘ In other words, if Henry Bodey, as surety,
had paid the judgmerit, and taken an assignment of it from plain
tiff, what deficiency, in virtue of said release, would be found in
Joseph H. Bodey’s real estate, according to its value, and its
liability to the payment of said judgment, in the sum required
to satisfy it? ,If the release swept away all the property on which
the judgment was a lien and Henry Bodey was but surety. he is
wholly discharged; but if but a part of it was released, he is dis
charged to the exfent of such part only, or pro tanto to the amount
it took from the grasp of the judgment.
“It remains to answer points submitted by plaintiff’s counsel.
* * * As to the sixth, the question is, did the release so operate
as to discharge from the lien of the said judgment property which
before such release was available for satisfaction of the judgment,
and to what extent? To the extent that said release did not dis
charge such property, the plaintiff may recover.”
Exceptions were taken on part of plaintiff to the charge.
Verdict was rendered for the defendants.
The case was argued by I. R. Britenbach and T. S. Bell, for
Holt, the plaintiff in error.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered, April 5, by
LOWnn:, J.—T0 get at the principles of this case by the near
est road, it may suffice to state that here was a bond by two,
and a judgment entered upon it
,
and now on a scirc facias to re
vive the judgment, one of them suffers judgment by default, and
the other takes defence on the ground that he was surety in the
bond, and that the plaintiff released from the lien of the judgment,
property of the other defendant of sufficient value to secure the
debt.
Principles of equity are law with us because we receive them
as rules of right, and accommodate our forms of procedure to the
admission of them. They are distinguished from principles of
law elsewhere, because their force is acknowledged only in pe
culiar Courts, and the forms of what are called their common law
Courts do not furnish the means of enforcing them. /W e have
adopted as law the equitable principle, that, where a creditor has
the means of compelling payment from the principal debtor, and
by his own act gives it up, he thereby discharges the surety, and
this even when the debt is secured by a joint mortgage or judg
ment against b0th: NefT’s Appeal, 9 W. & Ser. 36.
It is therefore apparent that this defence must be permitted;
and we must so far change the ordinary rules of this procedure
as to let it in. For this purpose we must allow these defendants
to sever in their defence, so that each may present the case on
his own grounds. But the plea of payment by the surety is
utterly incongruous; for if it be found in his favor, it makes an
absurd record, with a judgment against one defendant, when the
other has proved that the debt was paid. The defence is purely
an equitable one, and it should be pleaded specially, and then,
on the plea being found true, the record will show that, on equita
ble principles, the judgment against one defendant and in favor
of the other is right. This matter has not been assigned for
error, and we mention it only that such blunders may not be re
peated. Such a plea should aver the suretyship, and set out the
facts necessary to show that in equity the surety is released.
The parties having severed, the plea of the surety stands in the
place of a bill in equity to enjoin proceedings as to him, in which
this plaintiff and the other defendant would be the defendants, and
both would be interested to defeat the bill of the surety. Such
are their respective positions, in another forum, on the issue
tendered by this plea. Ioseph Bodey is
,
in effect, a party to the
issue on the opposite side to Henry Bodey’s administrators, and









































































































































Sect. 5] mom v. BODEY 349
position, and on equitable principles, and under our decisions is
a competent witness for them: Mevey v. Matthews, 9 Penn. St.
Rep. 112; Talmage v. Burlingame, Id. 21.
In this adaptation of a common law form to the principles of
equity, we do nothing more than carry out a principle which has
the sanction of innumerable precedents. There should be no forms
of proceeding so inflexible as not to yield to the necessary de
mands of unforeseen circumstances ; otherwise they will often cross
the purposes which they were intended to serve.
There can be no kind of business without its forms, and they
all have two elements of adaptation, that are to be taken into the
account in estimating their value: first, that they may secure the
purposes for which they were designed, without which they
would be in a measure useless: and second, that they be con
formable to the education, habits, and custom of those by whom
the business is to be conducted, without which the business must
suffer by frequent mistakes and delays. Those forms, which are
the product of long experience, and have grown up with a
particular business, are generally the best, in their place, because
they have adapted themselves, by a sort of spontaneous develop
ment, to the business to which they apply, and constitute the
habits of those engaged in it; and great and sudden changes in
such customary forms must always be attended with serious
evllS. 4 '\l
'
On the other hand, such forms may, in the hands of unskillful
and over-methodical practitioners, assume a fixedness of character
that will prevent the improvement and development of the busi
ness to which they belong, in which case they become an encum
brance demanding a sweeping reform. Of this charactevwere_
many of the forms of the English common law. They very early
became fixed to such a degree that they refused to yield to the
demands of common justice, and the rule, that for every wrong
there is a remedy, became a mere mockery; and from this arose
the immense jurisdiction of the English Chancellor, The generous
infusion of equity principles that pervades our law, demands that
our forms should be more flexible, while it does not release us
from the caution, with which all changes should be made, where
the customs and rights of many are concerned.
This bond was originally given by [to] one Samuel Thomas,
and the plaintiff holds it by assignment. and the defendants, Joseph
and Henry Bodey, appear on its face to be both principal debtors.
From these facts the plaintiff raised two questions; first, tha-









































































































































350 HOLT V. BODEY [Chap. VI
to the plaintiff; and second, that, if the fact be so
,
the plaintiff
did not know it
.
As we think there was not sufficient evidence
to justify a finding o
f
these facts against the plaintiff, it becomes
necessary to inquire whether they were material to the defendant's
case. Elsewhere it has been considered material under some cir
cumstances, 3 Paige 650.
The general principle is
,
that a surety, o
n paying the debt, is
entitled to be substituted to all the liens and other securities which
the creditor holds against the principal debtor; a right, which is
enforced, whether the surety is bound in one instrument with the
principal o
r not; which is transmitted to the surety's creditors,
where the claim is used so as to disappoint their liens; and which,










Neimcewicz v. Gahn, 3 Paige, 614; Davenport v. Hardeman, 5




Appeal, 9 W. & Ser. 43; Ebenhardt's Appeal, 8 Id. 327; Neff v.
Miller, 8 Penn. Rep. 348; Moore v. Bray, Io Id. 519; Watts v.
Kinney, 3 Leigh 372.
From the surety's right o
f substitution, his right o
f dis





the creditor, follows as a corollary. We give up our own
right against him, whose countervailing right we have destroyed.
ow it matters not whether the instrument shows that the
debtors stand to each other in the relation o
f principal and surety
Or not) The object o
f
the instrument is to show their relation
to the creditor, and ordinarily it imports no more. The question
o
f
their relation to each other remains a
n open one; and hence,
the admission o
f parol evidence to answer it does not violate the
rule by which such evidence is not allowed to vary the legal import
o
f
a written instrument. It is the fact of this relation, with or
without the creditor's knowledge o
f it
,
that gives the right o
f
substitution. The right is inherent in the transaction, if the rela




and should act accordingly. While the law en
forces the payment o
f
his claim, it does not make his will the
law o
f
the contract, and allow him to shift the burden from the
property o
f





Nor may he blindly act so as to affect the rights o
f others, and




did not know. He should
not in any way discharge one o
f
his joint debtors without the
consent o
f
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The Court below could not properly affirm the sixth point
of the plaintiff; but they instructed the jury that the question
was, did the release so operate as to discharge from the lien of the
judgment, property which was then available for the satisfac
tion of the judgment, and to what extent? This was quite as
favorable as the plaintiff had a right to ask; and, when the
Court added, “to the extent that said release did not discharge
such property, the plaintiff may recover, (when they added this,
they conceded too much to the plaintiff; for it was telling the
jury that, though the property released would have satisfied the
judgment, yet if there is any which can still be made available,
the surety is pro tanto, not discharged.) Such a rule throws all
the risks arising from the plaintiff's act, and the uncertainty
of the evidence and the fallibility of the jury, on the surety, in
stead of on the party whose act gave rise to them. If there be
still enough of the principal's property left, the creditor need
not care that the surety is discharged. If this is doubtful, it was
the creditor that made it so, and he should take the risk of it
.
If he has discharged any of the principal's property, the very




that he should make it




not beyond a certain amount; for, b
y
his act, he has prevented
the application o
f
the certain test afforded b
y judicial process.
Judgment affirmed.
114. JENKINS v. NATIONAL VILLAGE BANK OF BOW
DOINHAM, 58 Me. 275.
Supreme Judicial Court, Maine, 1870.
The creditor is bound to exercise only ordinary care to pre
vent loss o
f




Assumpsit on a receipt, a copy o
f
which may be seen in the
opinion.
The time o
f payment of the note was extended b
y
the de
fendant to Jan. 12, 1867, upon payment o
f
$11.16 interest for
the extension; and on the latter day the note was paid, and a
return of the bonds demanded and refused.
The remaining facts appear in the opinion.
S
. & J. W. May, for the plaintiff.
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KENT, J.—This case is referred to the court, on report of
the evidence, with jury powers. \'V e find the material facts to be
these: The bank discounted a note of the plaintiff for $588 on
four months, on the 9th of May, 1866, and at the same time,
and as part of the transaction, received from the plaintiff as a
pledge or collateral security two United States 10-40 bonds,
amounting to six hundred dollars on their face. This transac
tion was assented to by the directors. The cashier on the same
day gave to the plaintiff a receipt, in his official capacity, of the
following tenor:
“NATIONAL BANK oF BOWnonmam, May 9, 1866.
“Received of Shelden F. Jenkins, United States 10-40 bonds, one of
$500, and one of $100, amounting to six hundred dollars, to be returned
to him on the payment of his note for $558 in four months, dated May 9,
1866. (Signed) R. BUTTERFIELD, Cashier.”
These bonds were kept by the bank, with the other bonds
and papers and valuables of the bank and of depositors, in the
safe, and with the same care as their own, and with reasonable
care and oversight. The bank was entered by burglars on the
night of the 2!st of June, 1866, and the contents of the vault,
including these bonds, removed and carried off. The bank used
reasonable diligence in attempts to recover the property thus re
moved, but without success. The note has since been paid to
the bank. This action is brought against the bank to recover the
value of the bonds. \The declaration does not allege any want
of care on the part of the bank, but is based upon an alleged
promise. in consideration of the delivery of the bonds. to return
the bonds upon payment of the note. It does not set up a liability
of a general nature, arising from the relation of bailor and
bailee, but declares on a sp cial promise to redeliver, at all events,
upon payment of the note.
The counsel invokes the receipt of the cashier to sustain
this action, and claims that it is a special contract, distinct and
different from the one made by the directors. and shown by their
signature on the book of the bank, wherein this note is entered in
the list of “bills offered and discounted,” and under the head of ~
“first surety” is this entry, “Io-40 bonds collateral.”( The receipt
of the cashier, it is contended, is an absolute agreement to keep,
at all events, and to return on payment of the note. In other
words, that thereby the bank became insurers, and bound to keep
and return the bonds, whatever might happen.‘ The counsel
also contends that the cashier had a right thus to bind the bank









































































































































Sect. 5] JENKINS v. N.\r’L BANK 353
The last question is immaterial if the first proposition is
not maintained. And we think it is not. The receipt amounts to
no more than would be implied by law, on the facts which appear
on the discount book. It is the_simple case of a pledge of col
lateral securities, to secure the payment of a particular note, and
that is alT that the receipt imports. The collaterals are to be
given back when the debt is paid. That is all.
The case of Field v. Brackett, 56 l\Iaine 121, is in point.
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant received his
(plaintiff’s) wagon, the same to be kept and used by defendant
for one month, and the defendant promised to return the wagon
to him at the expiration of the month, in good order, but did
not. The defendant admitted the truth of these allegations, but
replied that the wagon, during the month, was stolen, without
any fault or want of due care on his part. It was held by the
court that there was nothing more intended by the promise
than the law implies in such a case of bailment. viz., “to return
at the time appointed in as good order as when received, ordinary
wear and tear and casualties for which no blame could attach to the
hirer excepted.” In these and like contracts, by which property is
delivered under a contract of bailment, without the legal title
passing, the law fixes the liability to keep with proper care, but
does not make the bailee an insurer against robbery or casualties,
when no fault attaches to him. And it does not fix such liability
of an insurer, if in the contract, written or verbal, there are no
words assuming such undertakings.
The bank was held to the common-law liability by the action
of the directors. The receipt of the cashier merely expresses in
more words, what the discount book sets out in a condensed form.
If it had undertaken to do more. and to charge the bank as
insurers, we are by no means ready to say that such a contract
would have come within the powers of a cashier.
The liability of a pledgee is well settled. Mr. Justice Story
(Bailments, 197) defines a pledge as “a bailment of personal
property as security for some debt or engagement.” Kent says,
“In general, the law requires nothing extraordinary of the pawnee.
but only that he shall take ordinary care of the goods; and if they
should happen to be lost, he may, notwithstanding, resort to the
pawnee for his debt.” 2 Kent's Com. 579.
This has been the law ever since the celebrated case of Coggs
v. Bernzwd, 2 Lord Raymond. Indeed it is not denied by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff, who places his claim upon the









































































































































354 SULLIVAN. V. STATE [Chap. VI
ment. And as before stated, the declaration does the same, and is
silent as to any want of care. If it had alleged, as the case is
presented by the proof, we see but little difficulty in sustaining
the proposition that a
ll
due and reasonable care was used b
y
the bank under the circumstances.
According to the agreement o
f
the parties, we must order
Judgment for the defendant.
SECTION 6. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON THE FAILURE OF THE
CREDITOR TO USE MONEY WITH IN HIS CONTROL IN
LAWFUL PAYMENT OF HIS CLAIMS
II.5. SULLIVAN v. STATE, 59 Ark. 47.
Supreme Court, Arkansas, 1894.
Failure o
f
creditor to file for record mortgage given b
y
the
principal debtor until it became worthless as a security by reason
o
f
the prior filing o
f
a second mortgage, cronerates the surety
from liability.






the State for the use o
f
the sixteenth section school
fund against J. O. A. Sullivan. The facts are stated in the
opinion.
The appellant pro se.
James P
. Clarke, Attorney General, for appellee.
BATTLE, J. According to the abstract of appellant, which
is not controverted b
y
the appellee, the facts in this case, are, in
part, as follows:
“On the 9th o
f January, 1885, H. E
.
Collum executed his note
to T
.
M. Evart, treasurer o
f
Scott county, for the sum o
f
one
hundred dollars, payable one year after date, with Io per cent.
interest, with J. O. A. Sullivan as his surety. The money for
which the note was given was part o
f
the sixteenth section school





Digest. On the same day (January 9th, 1885), and at the same
time, Collum, in order to better secure the payment o
f
the note,
and in order to comply with the law, executed his mortgage to










































































































































Sect. 6] SULLIVAN V. STATE 355
“Although the mortgage was executed and delivered to the
treasurer on the 9th day of January, as stated, he failed and re
fused to have the same recorded, or to file the same for record,
until the 25th day of March following.
“On the 17th day of March, 1885, H. E. Collum executed to
George H. Lyman a mortgage on the same property, for the
expressed consideration of five hundred dollars. This mortgage
was filed for record on the 23rd day of March, 1885, two days
previous to the filing of the mortgage executed by Collum to the
county treasurer.
“At the maturity of the second mortgage the land was sold
to Green, in accordance with the terms of the mortgage, for the
sum of five hundred and seventy-five dollars, that being the
amount of interest and principal.”
The value of the property mortgaged to the county treasurer
greatly exceeded the amount due on the note of Collum and Sul
livan.
--
At the commencement of this action Collum was insolvent,
and a non-resident of this State.
A decree was rendered by the court below, in chancery sit
ting, in favor of the plaintiff, the appellee, against Sullivan, the
appellant, for the full amount of the Collum note, and Sullivan
appealed.
When Collum executed the mortgage to secure the note exe
cuted by him, as principal, and Sullivan, as surety, it was the
duty of the county treasurer to file the same for record, in order
to preserve the security which he had thereby acquired. Having
failed to do so until some time after its execution, and until it
had become worthless as a security by reason of a second mort
gage being filed prior to it
,
h
e should suffer the loss occasioned
thereby; and Sullivan should be exonerated from all liability to
pay the note, the value o
f
the land mortgaged exceeding the
amount due on the same. Y Grisard v. Hinson, 5o Ark. 229; Hub
bard v




. 756; Straton v. Rastall, 2 Durn. & East, 366; Teaff v.
Ross, I Ohio St. 469; Capel v. Butler, 2 Sim. & Stu. 457; 2 Brandt
on Suretyship and Guaranty (2nd Ed.), sec. 445.
The decree o
f
the court below is
,
therefore, reversed, and
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I16. O’CONOR as receiver, etc., v. E. W. MORSE, et al., defendants,
J. H. BRALY, appellant, 112 Cal. 31.
Supreme Court, California, 1896.
A surety is relieved of liability if the ereditor refuses a ten
der of the amount of the debt for it-h.ich the surety is liable, and is
not required to keep the tender good.
Appeal from a. judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego
County. George Puterbaugh, Judge.
I. IV. Hughes, for appellant.
V. E. Shaw, for respondent.
BELCHER, C .—This is an action upon a non-negotiable prom
issory note for thirteen hundred and eight dollars and ninety
five cents, bearing interest at the rate of one per cent per month,
compounding monthly.
The case was tried by the court without a jur_v and the
findings were in substance as follows: On October 31, 1890, the
defendants, E. WV. Morse, C. E. Heath, and J. H. Braly, exe
cuted and delivered the said note to one F. \-V. Stewart, to be used
as collateral security for his own note, to be given to the Con
solidated National Bank of San Diego. Thereafter, Stewart exe
cuted his own non-negotiable note for the same sum to the said
bank, and as collateral security for the payment thereof duly
indorsed, assigned and delivered to the bank the said note. On
the day of its date defendant Braly paid on said note one-third
of the amount due thereon, to wit: Four hundred and thirty-six
dollars and thirty-two cents. The interest on the note was paid
up to October 30, 1891, but no other payments on account of
interest or principal were ever made.
On May 11, 1893, the bank was still the owner and holder of
the said note. On that day the defendant Braly, through his duly
authorized agent, J. C. Braly, called at the bank and offered to
pay the said note, but stated that he did not want it stamped
“paid” upon its face, but wanted such an indorsement made
as would show the amount paid, and that it had been paid by J.
H. Braly. In answer to a question by the cashier as to what he
intended to do with the note, he replied that he was instructed to
turn it over to attorneys to bring suit on it. From what was
said the cashier understood that he wanted the note so indorsed
that J. H. Braly could sue upon it
,
and he referred the matter
to Mr. Howard, the president of the bank, and stated to him
that accepting payment “would result in a suit against Heath and









































































































































Sect. 6] o’coNOR v. E. w. MORSE 357
Mr. Braly, “that is a matter we must consider.” He further
said that “the relations of Mr. Morse and Heath to the bank
were such that the matter must be considered before suit could
be allowed.” The cashier then told Mr. Braly to call the next
day, and at that time or later the president stated to the cashier
that he didn’t care to have Mr. Stewart and Mr. Morse sued.
Braly went back to the bank the next day, as requested, and Mr.
Howard, the then president of the bank, stated to him “that they
had concluded to hold the note and make it out of the other
parties.”
Defendant Braly offered to prove by defendants Morse and
Heath that they were solvent at the time he offered to pay the
bank, but that on the twenty-fifth day of August, 1893, they,
and each of them, became insolvent and have continuously since
been insolvent; which offered evidence the court excluded upon
the ground that it was irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial,
to which ruling defendant Braly duly excepted.
And, as conclusions of law, the court found that the effect
of the offer to pay, on May 11th, was to stop the running of
interest and to release said defendant Braly from the obligation
to pay attorney’s fees, but that he was not released from his
obligation to pay the note, and that plaintiff was entitled to judg
ment against the three defendants for the principal due on the
note, with interest thereon to May 11, 1893, amounting to one
thousand and sixty-eight dollars and twenty-five cents.
Judgment was accordingly so entered, from which the de
fendant Braly appeals on the judgment-roll alone.
The Civil Code, section 2831, declares a surety to be “one
who at the request of another, and for the purpose of securing to
him a benefit, becomes responsible for the performance by the
latter of some act in favor of a third person, or hypothecates prop
erty as security therefor.”
In Montgomery v. Sayre, 91 Cal. 206, the action was upon
a promissory note given as collateral security under circumstances
similar to those found here, and it was held that the maker of
the note was, in law. a surety.
The note in suit was executed to be used as collateral secur
ity for the payment of Stewart's note, and was accepted and held
by the bank as such collateral securety. The appellant must,‘
therefore, be regarded as only a surety, and the question is
,
was
\he exonerated from liability on the note by the refusal of the









































































































































358 o’coNOR v.12 w. MORSE [Chap. VI
against the co-makers, and “they had concluded to hold the note,
and make it out of the other parties.”
“A surety is exonerated: 1. In like manner with a guarantor;
2. To the extent to which he is prejudiced by any act of the cred
itor which would naturally prove injurious to the remedies of
the surety, or inconsistent with his rights, or which lessens his
security; or 3. To the extent to which he is prejudiced by an
omission of the creditor to do anything, when required by the
surety, which it is his duty to do.” (Civ. Code, sec. 2840).
-In Hayes v. Josephi, 26 Cal. 535, the action was to recover
from a surety on an undertaking, given for the release of an
attachment, the amount of the judgment subsequently recovered.
The defense was that subsequent to the recovery of the judgment
the surety tendered to the creditor the full amount of the judg
ment and he refused to receive it
,
and that at that time the judg
ment debtor was solvent, but afterward, and before the com
mencement of the action, became, and ever since had been, wholly
insolvent.
At the trial the court refused to admit evidence in support of
the allegations o
f the answer, and gave judgment for the plain
tiff on the pleadings. On appeal it was held that the offered
evidence should have been admitted, and that if the facts alleged
were established the surety was discharged from his obligation
on the undertaking. In the opinion of the court rendered by
SAWYER, J.
,
it is said: “The law requires the creditor to act in
the utmost good faith toward the surety, and will not permit
him to do anything that will unnecessarily tend to prejudice his
interests. The creditor will certainly not be permitted to place
obstacles in the way of the surety, which tend to hinder him in
the pursuit of such remedies as are guaranteed to him by the law.
The suret ' is entitled to a ' the debt, and thereby at once acquire
the
rig~
principal. 5 * 5 lf it IS ffie legal
right of the surety to pay the debt, and at once proceed against
the principal debtor, it necessarily follows that he is entitled to
have the money accepted by the creditor in order that he may
proceed. It is the duty of the creditor to receive it
,
and a gross
violation of duty and good faith on his part to refuse, thereby
interposing an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the pus
suit by the surety of his most prompt and efficient remedy. * * *
If the creditor refuses to receive the money when tendered. he as
effectually prevents the surety from promptly pursuing his most
efficient remedy as he would by entering into a valid contract with










































































































































~ o’coNOR v. E. w. MORSE 359
valid contract between the creditor and principal to extend the
time of payment discharges the surety is, as we have seen. be
cause the creditor by his further contract places an obstacle in the
way of prompt and efficient action on the part of the surety to
protect his interest. The principle applies here with equal force.”
In Sharp v. Miller, 57 Cal. 415, this court said: The plain
tiff “refused to accept the money which was offered. Having
tendered the money the defendants, as sureties, did all they con
tracted to do. The tender made, although it was refused, was
equivalent to a payment by them. (Solomon v. Reese, 34 Cal. 36).
And by it they were discharged from their obligation as sureties
upon the appeal bond. Hayes v. Joseph-i, supra).”
The note in suit was held by the bank as collateral security,
and appellant was liable thereon as principal for one-third which
he paid, and as co-surety with Morse for one-third, and as co
surety with Heath for one-third. (Chipman v. Morrill, 20 Cal.
136). He had a right to pay the balance due on the note, and
to look to his co-makers for their pro rata: shares thereof. The
bank refused to accept the money because it did not want the co
makers sued. But this the bank had no right to do, and, as said
in Hayes v. Jose/>hi, supra, the refusal was a gross violation of
duty and good faith on its part.
It is objected, however, that it does not appear that appel
lant was prejudiced by the refusal, since there is nothing to show
that Morse and Heath subsequently became insolvent, the finding
to the effect that appellant offered to prove their solvency and
subsequent insolvency, which evidence was excluded, having no
place in the record.
It is true that findings should be of the ultimate facts, but
this finding cannot be disregarded on the ground urged. It is
found in the record, and, so far as appears, was made and ac
cepted without objection on either side. It must be assumed,
therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, that the facts were
as appellant offered to prove them to be.
It is further objected that appellant was not discharged from
liability on the note, because he did not comply with the provi
sions of section 1500 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
“An obligation for the payment of money is extinguished by a
due offer of payment, if the amount is immediately deposited in
the name of the creditor with some bank of deposit within this
state of good repute, and notice thereof is given to the creditor.”
A similar objection was made and overruled in Randol v.









































































































































360 NATIONAL BANK v. PECK - [Chap. VI
did not, when plaintiff refused to receive her money in payment
of rents, deposit the same, or any part of it
,
in a bank or else
where, in compliance with the provisions of section 1500 of the
Civil Code.” And, after a full discussion of the question, it is
said at the close of the opinion: “Even if the obligation of de
fendants must be regarded as that of sureties for the payment of
a debt, still I think the tender sufficient to discharge the sureties.”
As the case is presented on the record here, we think it
clearly appears that the appellant was exonerated from liability
on the note, and that the court erred in rendering judgment
against him.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.
VANCLIEF, C., and SEARLS, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment
is reversed and the cause remanded.
1\ICFARLAND, J., TEMPLE, J., HENSI{AW, J.
I17. NATIONAL MAHAIWE BANK v. PECK, 127 Mass. 298.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, I879.
The creditor is not obliged to satisfy his elaim out o
f other
funds o
f the solvent debtor, which he controls, and may, if he
chooses, pursue the surety instead.
Contract on a promissory note for $500, dated December 29,
1875, signed “Jos. A. Benjamin, Treas.” payable to the order of
the defendant in forty-five days after date at the plaintiff bank,
and indorsed by the defendant._ Trial at June term 1878 of the
superior court, without a jury, before ROCKWELL, J., who re
ported the case for the determination of this court, in substance
as follows:
Benjamin kept an ordinary banking account with the plaintiff
bank. At the time of giving the note in suit, he was treasurer
of the town of Egremont, and the bank gave him for this note
a draft to be used for the payment of a tax due from the town.
The note and the proceeds of it were not made a part of his
account with the bank, and the bank regarded the note as an
official or town matter.
On February 15, 1876, when this note matured, all things
necessary to charge the defendant as indorser were done. On
that day, and ever since, the bank held a note. made by Benja-
min, which it had discounted, signed “Jos. A. Benjamin,” dated









































































































































Sect. 6] NATIONAL BANK v. m:cK . 361
date at the plaintiff bank to one Callender, and indorsed by Cal
lender. And on said February 15, there stood to the credit of
Benjamin, as his balance of account, the sum of $381.10, and
the same continued so to stand on the books of the bank until
about six weeks before the trial, when it was indorsed as of
February 16, 1876, on the note for $1500.
On February 16, 1876, the day of the maturity of the note
for $1500, the president of the plaintiff bank and its principal
financial manager, during business hours, told the cashier, if the
$381.10 standing to Benjamin’s credit was not drawn out by his
checks before the close of business hours, to apply it on the
$1500 note; and at the close of the bank for that day, it being
found that Benjamin had drawn no checks on said balance. he
again directed the cashier to apply it on the $1500 note.
On February 19, 1876, during business hours, the defendant
brought to the bank a check of Benjamin, made and handed to
defendant on that day, and which was as follows:
“South Egremont, Mass., Feb. I5, 1876. $381. National Mahaiwe
Bank pay to the order of J. A. B., Treas., note 15th inst., three hundred
and eighty-one dollars. Jos. A. Benjamin.”
The defendant at the same time, acting at the request of
Benjamin, tendered to the cashier of the plaintiff bank this
check and $120 in money in payment of the note in suit, and
demanded the note. The money had been furnished the defend
ant by Benjamin, but it did not appear that he informed the
cashier of the bank of this fact. The cashier declined to receive
the check, and money, and told the defendant he could not accept
the check, because he had been directed to apply the balance of
Benjamin’s account on another claim held by the bank, meaning
the $1500 note. After this refusal, the cashier did, at the request
of the defendant, receive the $120 and indorse the same on the
note in suit, it being at the time understood that neither party
intended thereby to waive his rights in reference to the check.
The $120 have been retained by the bank.
It is not the practice of the bank to charge over-due notes
held by it to the account of a depositor until he has sufficient
credits to pay the note. Benjamin became a bankrupt in the
spring of 1876, and died in July or August of that year.
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant contended, as a
matter of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; and
the judge so ruled, and found for the defendant. If this ruling
{W
was correct, judgment was to be entered for the defendant; but









































































































































362 NATIONAL BANK v. PECK [Chap. V I
for him for the sum of $381.10, and interest from February 16,
1876.
i
I. Dewey, for the plaintiff.
M. .-lVilcox, for the defendant.
GRAY, C. J. I Money deposited in a bank does not remain the
property of the depositor, upon which the bank has a lien only;
but it becomes the absolute property of the bank, and the bank
is merely a debtor to the depositor in an equal amount] Foley v.
Hill, 1 Phillips, 399, and 2 H. L. Cas. 28; Bank of the Republic v.
Millard, 10 Wall. 152; Carr v. National Sec1lrity Bank, 107
Mass. 45. So long as the balance of account to the credit of the
depositor exceeds the amount of any debts due and payable by
him to the bank, the bank is bound to honor his checks, and liable
to an action by him if it does not. \/Vhen he owes to the bank
independent debts, already due and payable, the bank has the
right to apply the balance of his general account to the satis
faction of any such debts of his) But if the bank, instead of so
applying the balance, sees fit to allow him to draw it out, neither
the depositor nor any other person can afterwards insist that it
should have been so applied. The bank, being the absolute owner
of the money deposited, and being a mere debtor to the depositor
for his balance of account, holds no property in which the deposi
tor has any‘ title or right of which a surety on an independent
dcbt from him to the bank can avail himself by way of subroga
tion, as in Baker v. Briggs, 8 Pick. 122, and American Bank v.
Baker, 4 Met. 164, cited for the defendant. The right of the bank
to apply the balance of account to the satisfaction of such a debt
is rather in the nature of a set-off, or of an application of pay
ments, neither of which, in the absence of express agreement or
appropriation, will be required by the law to be so made as to bene
fit the surety. Glazier v. Douglass. 32 Conn. 393; Field v. Hol
land, 6 Cranch. 8, 28; Brewer v. Knapp, 1 Pick. 332; Upham v.
Lefaz‘our, 11 Met. 174; Bank of Bengal v. Radakissen M itter, 4
Moore P. C. 140, 162.
The general rule accordingly is
,
that where moneys drawn
out and moneys paid in, or other debts and credits, are entered.
by the consent of both parties, in the general banking account of
a depositor, a balance may be considered as struck at the date
of each payment or entry on either side of the account; but where
by express agreement, or by a course of dealing,|between the
depositor and the banker, a certain note or bond of the depositor
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banker to the depositor is not to be applied in satisfaction of that
note or bond, even for the benefit of a surety thereon, except at
the election of the £ Clayton's case, I Meriv. 572, 610;
Bodenham v. Purchas, 2 B. & Ald. 39, 45; Simpson v. Ingham, 2
B. &. C. 65; S. C. 3 D. & R. 249; Pemberton v. Oakes, 4 Russ.
154, 168; Pease v. Hirst, 1o B. & C. 122; S.C. 5 Man. & Ryl. 88;
Henniker v. Wigg, Dav. & Meriv. 160, 171; S. C. 4 Q. B. 792,
795; Strong v. Foster, 17 C. B. 201; Martin v. Mechanics Bank, 6
Har. & Johns. 235, 244; State Bank v. Armstrong, 4 Dev. 519;
Commercial Bank v. Hughes, 17 Wend. 94; Allen v. Culver, 3
Denio, 284, 291; Voss v. German American Bank, 83 Ill. 599.
In the decision in McDowell v. Bank of Wilmington & Brandy
wine, I Harringt. (Del.) 369, and in the dicta in Dawson v.
Real Estate Bank, 5 Pike, 283, 298, cited for the defendant, this
distinction was overlooked or disregarded.
In many of the cases, indeed, the money appears to have
been deposited after the debt to the bank matured, so that the
case was analogous to the ordinary one of a payment, which,
not being appropriated by the debtor, might be appropriated by
the creditor. But where the balance of account is in favor of the
depositor when his debt to the bank becomes payable, it is a case
of mutual debts and credits, which, except in proceedings in bank
ruptcy or insolvency, neither the depositor nor his surety has the
right to require to be set off against each other. Judge Low ELL,
in allowing money on deposit to the credit of a bankrupt to be set
off in bankruptcy against the aggregate debt due from him to the
bank, said: “This deposit, though it operates as security and as
payment, was not intended for either, but is made so by the bank
ruptcy of the debtor.” In re North, 2 Lowell, 487. See, also,
Demmon v. Boylston Bank, 5 Cush. 194; Strong v. Foster, 17
C. B. 217.
In Strong v. Foster, a depositor gave to his bankers a prom
issory note with a surety, which was not entered in his general
banking account; and it was held, that the surety, when sued
by the bankers on the note, could not set up, either as payment
or by way of equitable defense, that shortly after the note matured
the balance of account was in favor of the depositor to a greater
amount, and the plaintiff's did not apply that balance in discharge
of the note, or inform the defendant for three years afterwards that
the note remained unpaid. But the reasoning of the court applies
quite as strongly when the balance in favor of the depositor exists
at the time when his debt becomes payable, as when it is created











































































































































NATIONAL BANK V. PECK [Chap. VI
ing balances therefore does not apply.” “[It would be essentially
altering the position of parties, to establish that, because a banker,
who holds a note of a third person for a customer, has a balance
in his hands in the customer's favor at the maturity of the note,
such third person is thereby discharged, if it turns out that the
note was given by him as surety. There is no authority in equity
for any such position, and none certainly in law.” 17 C. B. 216,
217. And Mr. Justice Willes observed: “As to what was said on
the part of the defendant, that, if a set-off arises between the cred
itor and the principal debtor, the liability of the surety on the note
is extinguished; that doctrine would lead to singular results.
These securities are often given to increase credits of bankers to
their customers. If the liability of the maker were to depend upon
the state of the customer's account at any one moment, he might
never undergo the liability contemplated at all. The security is
given without any reference to the other side of the account. This
is the first time, I believe, that it has ever been suggested, that
when a note given under circumstances like these falls due, and
there is a balance in favor of the customer at the time, that balance
must of necessity be applied to the discharge of the note.” 17
C. B. 224. Even the usual inference from the entry of such a note
in the account may be controlled by other circumstances. City
Discount Co. v. McLean, L. R. 9 C. P. 692.
In the case at bar, it appears that the consideration received
by Benjamin from the plaintiff bank for the note in suit was to be
used by him in his official capacity as town treasurer, the note was
regarded by the bank as an official or town matter, and neither the
note nor it
s
consideration was ever made part o
f
his general bank




y Benjamin and presented at the bank, the bank held
a personal note o
f Benjamin, overdue and exceeding in amount
the balance o
f
account in his favor at the time, the president o
f
the bank had directed the cashier to apply this balance to the lat
ter's note, and the cashier so informed the defendant when he
presented the check. Under these circumstances, neither Ben
jamin, the maker, nor the defendant, the indorser, has the righ
note was never entered in the account at \ the rule as to adjust
to insist that this balance o
f
account should be applied to the
satisfaction o
f
the note in suit, rather than o
f
the other note o
f
Benjamin; and, according to the terms o
f
the report, there must be
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SECTION 7. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON THE FAILURE OF THE
CREDITOR TO SU E THE DEBTOR AT
THE SURETY'S REQUEST
I 18. PAIN v. PACKARD, et al., 13 Johns. 174.
Supreme Court, New York, 1816.
If the creditor neglects to sue the principal, upon request to
do so by the surety, the latter is discharged.
This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note made
by Packard & Munson, in which Packard alone was arrested, the
other defendant being returned not found. The defendant, Pack
ard, pleaded: 1. Non assumpsit. 2. That he signed the note
which was for $100, payable on demand, as surety for Munson;
that he urged the plaintiff to proceed immediately in collecting the
money due on the note from Munson who was then solvent; and
that, if the plaintiff had then proceeded immediately to take meas
ures to collect the money of Munson, he might have obtained pay
ment from him; but the plaintiff neglected to proceed against
Munson until he became insolvent, absconded and went away out
of the state, whereby the plaintiff was unable to collect the money
of Munson. 3. The third plea was like the second, except that
the defendant alleged a promise, on the part of the plaintiff, that
he would immediately proceed to collect the money of Munson, and
a breach of that promise, by which the defendant was deceived
and defrauded, and prevented from obtaining the money from
Munson, etc.
There was a demurrer to the second and third pleas and a
joinder in demurrer, which was submitted to the court without
argument.
Per Curiam. The facts set forth in the plea are admitted by
the demurrer. The principles laid down in the case of The Peo
ple v. Jansen (7 Johns. 336) will warrant and support this plea.
We there say a mere delay in calling on the principal will not
discharge the surety. The same principle was fully and explicitly
laid down by the court in the case of Tallmadge v. Brush.
But this is not such a case. Here is a special request, by the
surety, to proceed to collect the money from the principal;
and an averment of a loss of the money as against the principal in
consequence of such neglect. The averments and facts stated in the
plea are not repugnant, or contradictory to the terms of the note.
The suit here is by the payee against the makers. The fact of









































































































































366 INKSTER v. FIRST NAT'L BANK . [Chap. VI
have been known to the plaintiff. He was, in law and equity,
therefore bound to use due diligence against the principal in order
to exonerate the surety. This he has not done. There can be
no substantial objections against such a plea. It may be said, the
surety might have paid the note and prosecuted the principal; but
although he might have done so, he was not bound to do it
. If
h
e had a right to expedite the plaintiff in proceeding against the







Trent Nav. Co. v. Hartley (Io East 34) the plea was similar
to the present and not demurred to.
The defendant must, accordingly, have judgment upon the
demurrer.
Judgment for the defendant.”
119. INKSTER v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARSHALL,
30 Mich. I43.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1874.





the surety's request, to sue the principal debtor.
Error to Wayne Circuit.
Plaintiff in error (who was sued in this case in the Wayne
circuit) signed with C
. H
.
White, the following note:
“3000. MARSHALL, MICH, Oct. 7
,
1871.
“Three months after date, for value received, I promise to pay to
the order o
f
the First National Bank o
f Marshall, three thousand dollars,
a
t
the First National Bank o
f Marshall, Michigan, with interest at ten
per cent. after date.
“C. H. WHITE.
“RoBERT INKSTER, Surety.”








f February, 1872, he made a request in writing of said plaintiff
to proceed and collect the note o
f
said White; that a few months
* In the courts of some states the doctrine of this case is followed
without qualification; in others, with these qualifications:
a
. The request o
f
the creditor that he sue the principal debtor must
be accompanied by notice that the surety will not continue to be liable if
his request be ignored.
-
The request must be accompanied with an offer on the part o
f
the




to indemnify the creditor for such
COStS.



















































































































































Sect. 7] INKSTER v. FIRST .\'.\r’L BANK 367
after, he again, in writing, requested the plaintiff to do so, saying
that it was for \/Vhite to pay the same: that, at the same time of
making the first request, White was solvent, and the amount of
the note could have been collected of him; that afterwards White
was doing business with the bank; that no suit or other proceed
ings had ever been commenced by the bank against White to col
lect the note, and that at the time of the commencement of this
suit White had become utterly insolvent, and no execution could
be collected of him. Evidence was introduced tending to estab
lish these facts, and the defendant’s counsel requested the court
to charge the jury, that, if they found these facts proved, the
defendant was not liable.
This charge was refused, and the court charged that the
facts stated constituted no defense to the action.
To this, exception was taken, and this constituted the only
question in the case.
George V. N. Lothrop, for plaintiff in error.
C. 1. Walker, for defendant in error.
CHRISTIANCY, J.
Without expressing any opinion upon the case of a mere_
guaranty, and without undertaking to decide whether the plain
tiff in error might or might not, in a court of equity. by giving
proper indemnity, have called upon the bank to proceed against
White for the collection of the note; and treating the question
now before us as one of common law only (which it is) we think
the circuit court was right in holding that the facts relied upon
by the defendant below constituted no defense to the action.
As between him and the bank, so far as the right of action
was concerned, he was a maker of the note, and a principal.
As between him and White he was but a surety; and though the
bank was apprised of this by his signature upon the face of the
note as surety, this did not, in reference to the question here in
volved, change the nature of his liability to the payee or holder,
or make it any more the duty of the latter to proceed against
White, at his request, than if he had signed as a principal maker
without adding to his signature the word “surety.”
His liability to the holder was absolute and not conditional,
and his duty was to pay the note; and, though as between himself
and White he was but a surety, he cannot complain of any hard
ship because the holder would not, at his request, proceed to
bring suit against the principal, as it was in his own power, at









































































































































368 RAILTON V. MATHEWS [Chap. VI
himself against his principal for the amount. This was the duty
which his contract imposed upon him by the common law, and
such was the remedy which the common law gave him upon the
performance of that duty. Such we understand to be the well
settled general rule as to the obligation and rights of sureties, and
we see nothing in this case to take it out of the general rule.
The case of Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (which has been
followed in New York, not without some vigorous protests, and
to some extent in some other states), was, we think, a clear depar
ture from the common law; and we find nothing in the English
decisions to warrant the qualifications of a surety's liabilities there
recognized.
The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed, with
COStS.
The other Justices concurred.
SECTION 8. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON NON-DISCLOSURE BY
OBLIGEE OF FACTS WHICH H E OUGHT TO
REVEAL TO THE SURETY.
I2O. RAILTON v. MATHEWS, Io Clark & Finnelly 934.
House of Lords, 1844.
A surety on a bond for the fidelity of an agent to his em
ployer, the obligee, is not bound if the obligee conceal from him
facts materially affecting the trustworthiness of the agent. The
motive inducing the concealment is immaterial.
-
The respondents, Mathews and Leonard, carried on business
in partnership at Bristol: their business extended to Scotland,
and was conducted by their agents in Glasgow. Messrs. Rowley
and Hickes acted as such agents from January, 1832, to Feb
ruary, 1834, when they dissolved partnership, and it became
necessary for the respondents to make a new appointment of
agency. Hickes and Rowley then severally applied for the ap
pointment. The respondents gave it to Hickes. The appointment
was by letter, dated Bristol, 25 January, 1834, in these terms:
“Sir, –We appoint you as our agent for the sale of dye wares,
and to collect a
ll
our monies; you finding u
s security for 3,000l., as
proposed.”
Hickes, upon being so appointed entered upon the agency, o
r









































































































































Sect. 8] RAILTON v. MATHEWS 369
Being afterwards required by the respondents to find the security,
he proposed his brother, who resided in England, and the appel
lant, who was a writer in Glasgow. The respondents agreed to
accept the proposed sureties without any communication with
either of them; and the necessary bond having been prepared and
transmitted to the agent, was subscribed by him and by the appel
lant at Glasgow in September, and by the other surety in October,
1835. The bond was in the English form, and in the penal sum
of 4,ooo1., conditioned that the agent should faithfully conduct
himself as the clerk and commission agent of the respondents, and
satisfactorily account to them for all monies received on their
account.
In May, 1837, the respondents discovered that Hickes had
acted unfaithfully in the agency, and had contrived to apply their
monies to his own use to a large amount. They gave notice of
this discovery to the sureties; and subsequently, by the third
respondent, their mandatory in Scotland, raised an action against
all the obligors in the bond, concluding for count and reckoning
of the whole of the agent’s actings, and for payment of the 4,000l.,
or such part thereof as might be found to be due by the agent.
The appellant alone defended the action; but before any final
judgment was pronounced, he raised an action against the re
spondents for reduction of the bond, upon various grounds, prin
cipally on this: “that the bond was obtained fraudulently by the
respondents, and on the procurement thereof they were guilty of
a fraudulent concealment of material circumstances known to
them, and deeply affecting the credit and trustworthiness of the
said Hickes.” The libel then, after stating various circumstances
importing the respondents’ knowledge of Hickes’ misconduct and
irregularities in the agency during the period of his partnership
with Rowley, summed up the whole statement to this effect:
That although at and prior to the time of receiving the bond, the
respondents had been made acquainted with the misconduct of
Hickes in misapplying the funds of the firm of Rowley & Hickes
to his own private purposes ;'and although, from their own experi
ence of his gross irregularities under their agency, they were per
fectly aware that he was unworthy of trust, they totally failed to
communicate (to the sureties) the said circumstances of either of
them, or the existence of a balance on the agency accounts then
standing against Hickes; on the contrary, while they accepted
and took possession of the bond, they fraudulently suppressed and
concealed the said whole facts and circumstances regarding the









































































































































370 RAILTON v. MATHEWS [Chap. VI
counts, which circumstances were wholly unknown to the appel
lant and the respondents, by their whole conduct in the premises,
deceived and misled the appellant into the belief that Hickes was
in every respect trustworthy, while they well knew the reverse;
whereby the bond was obtained by them through fraud and de
ceit, and the undue concealment of material facts, which they
knew, if communicated, would have prevented the appellant from
undertaking the said obligation or subscribing the bond; or the
respondents were guilty of fraudulent concealment of material
circumstances in obtaining the bond, and the same was therefore
null and void. The two actions were afterwards conjoined. and
issues were directed: the first issue, which was in the appellant's
action and was first tried, being, “Whether the pursuer, E.
Railton, was induced to subscribe the bond by undue concealment
or deception on the part of the defenders, or either of them?
The Lord Justice CLERK, who presided at the trial, in the
course of his charge to the jury, directed them that under this
issue, “the concealment must be, first, of things known to the
defenders, or which they had strong and grave ground to sus
pect; secondly, that the concealment therefore being undue, must
be wilful and intentional, with a view to the advantage they were
thereby to receive.”
The jury found a verdict in favour of the respondents, and,
in effect, sustaining the bond; whereupon the appellant’s counsel
took an exception to the learned judge’s direction to the jury.
The bill of exceptions was argued before the Lords of the
Second Division, who, by an interlocutor of the 31st of January,
184.4, disallowed the same,_and refused to grant a new trial, and
appointed judgment to be entered upon the verdict.
The appeal was against that interlocutor.
Mr. Sergeant Talfourd and Mr. Fleming, for the appellant.
Mr. F. Kelly and Mr. Anderson, for the respondents.
Lord C.-\MPBELL.—Tl‘lis case has been very satisfactorily
argued on both sides; with great brevity, but everything has
been urged which could be for the advantage of the clients or
the assistance of your Lordships; and having listened to all which
has been urged on both sides very attentively, I, without the small
est hesitation, come to the conclusion that the bill of exceptions
ought to be allowed. and that there must be a new trial.
The question really is. what is the issue which the Court
directed in this case? “Whether the pursuer, Edward Railton,









































































































































Sect. 8] R.-\IL'l‘ON v. MATHEWS 371
undue concealment or deception on the part of the defenders, or
either of them?” The material words are, “undue concealment
on the part of the defenders.” What is the meaning of those
words? I apprehend the meaning of those words is, whether
Railton was induced to subscribe the bond by the defenders hav
ing omitted to divulge facts within their knowledge which they
were bound in point of law to divulge. If there were facts within
their knowledge which they were bound in point of law to divulge,
and which they did not divulge, the surety is not bound by the
bond: there are plenty of decisions to that effect, both in the law
of Scotland and the law of England. If the defenders had facts
within their knowledge which it was material the surety should
be acquainted with, and which the defenders did not disclose,
in my opinion the concealment of those facts, the undue conceal
ment of those facts, discharges the surety; and whether they
concealed those facts from one motive or another, I apprehend
is wholly immaterial. It certainly is wholly immaterial to the
interest of the surety, because, to say that his obligations shall
depend upon that which was passing in the mind of the party
requiring the bond, appears to me preposterous: for that would
make the obligation of the surety depend on whether the other
party had a good memory, or whether he was a person of good
sense, or whether he had the motive in his mind, or whether he
was aware that those facts ought to be disclosed. The liability
of a surety must depend upon the situation in which he is placed,
upon the knowledge which is communicated to him of the facts
of the case, and not upon what was passing in the mind of the
other party, or the motive of the other party. If the facts were
such as ought to have been communicated, if it was material to
the surety that they should be communicated, the motive for with
holding them, I apprehend, is wholly immaterial.
Then we come to the direction given by the learned judge.
He says, “The concealment, therefore, being undue, must be wilful
and intentional, with a view” (and that is with reference to the
motive) “to the advantage they were thereby to receive.” Now,
according to my notion of the issue, that is an entire miscon
ception of it: according to this direction, although the parties
acquiring the bond had been aware of the most material facts
which it was their duty to disclose. and the withholding of which
would avoid the bond, if they did not wilfully and intentionally
withhold them, that is to say, if they had forgotten them, or if
they thought by mistake that in point of law or morality they were









































































































































372 SAvINGS BANK v. BODDICKER [Chap. VI
learned judge, it would not be a concealment. But the learned
judge does not stop there; he goes on, “with a view to the
advantage they were thereby to receive ;” introducing those words
conjunctively, and, in effect, saying that it was not an undue
concealment unless they had their own particular advantage in
view. That appears to me a misconception. I will suppose that
their motive was kindness to Hickes; to keep back from those
who, it was material to him, should continue to have a good
opinion of him, the knowledge of those facts; that it was a pure
kindness on their part, to prevent those parties entertaining a bad
opinion of him, and not from any selfishness, this concealment
took place. Although that might be the motive, yet the fact
that he was in arrear and had been guilty of fraudulent conduct,
and that he was a defaulter, were facts which it was most material
for the surety to be acquainted with. If those were held back
merely from a kind motive to Hickes, and not at all from any
selfish motive on the part of those to whom the bond was to be
executed, the effect in point of law would be the same as if the
motive were merely the personal benefit of the parties to receive
the bond. It appears to me, therefore, that the learned judge
has misunderstood the meaning of the issue, and that having told
the jury that a concealment to be undue must be wilful and inten
tional with a view to the advantage which the parties were there
by to receive, that was a misdirection, and that it had a tendency
to mislead the jury; that it was wrong in point of law, and that
the exception to that direction ought to be allowed.
Interlocutor complained of reversed; bill of exception al
lowed; and a new trial directed.“
121. SAVINGS BANK, etc., v. BODDICKER, et al., 105 Ia. 548.
Supreme Court, Iowa, 1898.
If the ereditor witholds information, or knowingly gives false
information, respecting the principal, to the surety, he, and not
the surety, must suffer the resulting loss.
Action at law on a bond given to secure the payment of
money. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. Reversed.
Heins 6' Heins, for appellants.
Tom H. Milner, for appellee.









































































































































Sect. 8] SAVINGS BANK V. BODDICKER * 373
ROBINSON, J.—In January, 1881, the plaintiff was organized
as a corporation by virtue of chapter 60 of the Acts of the
Fifteenth General Assembly, for the purpose of transacting busi
ness as a savings bank at Norway, in Benton county. Its capital
stock, at first but ten thousand dollars, was, in the year 1887,
increased to fifteen thousand dollars. The firm of G. A. Miller
& Sons was engaged at Norway in selling coal, lumber, and
agricultural implements, and borrowed money of the plaintiff.
In the first part of the year 1891 the firm was indebted to the
plaintiff to the amount of about six thousand dollars, and upon
the demand of the plaintiff executed and delivered to it the instru
ment in suit, of which the following is a copy: “Know all men
by these presents that we, G. A. Miller & Sons, as principals, and
Joseph Boddicker and V. A. Thoman, as sureties, of Benton
county, Iowa, are held and firmly bound unto the Benton County
Savings Bank of Norway, Benton county, Iowa, in the sum of five
thousand ($5,000) dollars, to be paid to the said Benton County
Savings Bank or its assigns; to the payment of which we bind
ourselves, and each of us, our heirs and legal representatives,
firmly by these presents. It is the intention and purpose of this
instrument or obligation to fully protect and indemnify the said
Benton County Savings Bank or it
s assigns against any and all






A. Miller & Sons to
pay their indebtedness now owing (or which may be contracted
hereafter) to the said Benton County Savings Bank. The con
dition o
f
the above obligation is such that, if the said G
.
A.
Miller & Sons shall pay in full amount o
f
their indebtedness to
the said Benton County Savings Bank, then this obligation to be
void and o
f










man.” On the thirty-first day o
f January, 1896, the plaintiff




A. Miller & Sons
and it
s
members to recover the amount due o
n
certain promissory
notes, and against the sureties to recover the amount o
f
the bond.
The action was aided b
y
attachment which was issued against the
property o
f
the firm and it
s
members. In April, 1896, judgment
was rendered against a
ll
the defendants excepting the sureties
on the bond, for the sum o
f
fourteen thousand, six hundred and
twenty dollars and fifty-five cents, an attorney's fee, and costs,
and a special execution was ordered against certain town lots.
Thereafter, by order o
f
the court, a separate petition setting out
the claims o
f
the plaintiff upon the bond was filed, and to that









































































































































374 TAPLEY \'. M.\RTI.\I [Chap. VI
and judgment against them were for the full amount of the
bond. * *
The defendants state that, being ignorant of the financial
standing of G. A. Miller & Sons, they applied to the plaintiff,
a short time before this action was commenced, for information,
and were then assured by the plaintiff that the firm was solvent,
and in good financial condition ; that the plaintiff knew that the
statements were false; that the defendants believed them to be
true, and relied upon them, and in consequence refrained from
taking measures to secure themselves which they would have
taken but for the false representations made as stated. In view
of the fact that what evidence will be given on another trial of
this case is uncertain, we content ourselves with saying on this
branch of the case that as the contract of suretyship is, as a rule,
for the benefit of the creditor, he is, in dealing with the surety,
to observe the utmost good faith. and if he fail to do so, without a
sufficient excuse for his neglect, the surety will be discharged
to the extent to which he suffers by reason of the lack of good
faith on the part of the creditor. If the surety applies to the
creditor for information respecting the principal which the cred
itor has, and may properly give, but which he withholds without
sufficient cause, or if he knowingly give false information, he,
and not the surety should suffer the loss occasioned by the wrong.
See Bonk of Monroe v. Anderson Bros. Min. ("9' Ry. Co., 65 Iowa
692; Rowley v. Jewett, 56 Iowa 492; Auchampaugh v. Selunidt,
77 Iowa 13; Wolf v. Madden, 82 Iowa 114; Harris v. Brooks,
21 Pick. 195 ;Brandt on Suretyship, 611. * * *
Judgment reversed.
122. TAPLEY v. MARTIN, 116 Mass. 275.
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts, 1874.
A surety on the bond of an employce who had preziously
defrauded his employer cannot avoid’I_iability on the bond because
of non-communication of the facts, if unknown to the obligee.
Contract on an agreement made by the defendant to indem
nify the plaintiff for any loss or damage sustained by him as
surety on the bond of James D. Martin, as cashier of the Hide
and Leather National Bank, Boston. At the trial, before WELLS,
J., the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant
alleged exceptions. The nature of the case appears in the opinion.
A. A. Ranney, as amicus curiae in support of the exceptions.









































































































































Sect. 8] TAPLEY V. MARTIN 375
MoRTON, J. * * * The court ruled “that there was no evi
dence in the case, as tendered, which showed such knowledge by
the officers of the bank, of frauds or defalcations by Martin before
the date of his bond as cashier, that the failure to communicate
the information to the sureties would discharge them from the
obligation of their bonds;” and the defendants excepted.









the Hide and Leather National Bank, in





his sureties, and the defendant gave the bond in
suit to indemnify him against any loss by reason o
f
his so be
coming surety. Martin had been a bookkeeper in the bank before
he was appointed cashier, and the defendant introduced evidence
tending to show that while he was bookkeeper he was guilty o
f
frauds and defalcations similar to those o
f
which he was guilty
after he became cashier, and for which the plaintiff, as his surety,
was liable. She also introduced evidence tending to show that
while Martin was bookkeeper, the attention o
f
the directors
was called to the fact that there were errors and inaccuracies in
his books. But there was no evidence that the officers of the
bank had knowledge that Martin, while bookkeeper, was guilty
of frauds or defalcations.
The defendant contended at the trial that the officers were
guilty o
f gross negligence in not examining the books, and that
the sureties were thereby discharged. But the court ruled, that




previous fraud, the sureties would not be discharged; that negli
gence in failing to examine, however gross, would not discharge
the sureties, and as before stated, that there was no evidence of





the opinion that these rulings were sufficiently
favorable to the defendant.
Upon examining the evidence reported in the bill o
f excep
tions, it is clear that there is no evidence which would justify
the jury in finding that the officers o
f
the bank had actual knowl
edge o
f
Martin's frauds while he was bookkeeper. We are not,
therefore, called upon to decide whether, if they had such knowl
edge and failed to communicate it to the sureties on Martin's
bond as cashier, the bond would be thereby avoided as to the
sureties. The only question is
,
whether their negligence in failing











































































































































376 TAPLEY v. MARTIN [Chap. VI
We can see no principle upon which it can be held to have this
effect. The object of the bond is to guarantee to the bank the
faithful performance by the cashier of his duties. His duties
and obligations are not affected by the negligence of the other
officers or agents of the bank, and such negligence does not dis
charge his sureties. In Amherst Bank v. Root, 2 Met. 522, which
was similar to the case at bar, Chief Justice SHAW says: “The idea
that the cashier is excused by the act or negligence of the direc
tors arises from considering the board of directors as the corpora
tion, and then applying a very equitable principle, that one ought
not to recover of a surety damages caused by himself. \Ve think
the principle does not apply.” In the case at bar the plaintiff
was not induced to sign the bond by any fraud of the directors.
and the court correctly ruled that he would not be released from
his obligations as surety by their alleged negligence in failing to
examine the books and affairs of the bank. Minor v. Mechxmlcs’
Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46; United Stares v. Kirkpa\trick, 9
Wheat. 720; Franklin Bank v. .S'te2'en.r, 39 Me. 532; Farmington
v. Sta'/nley, 6o Me. 472.
It appeared that the plaintiff paid the amount of his ‘bond
to the bank without a suit; and the court instructed the jury that
if he made this payment without the assent of the defendant, he
must show that he was legally liable; but if he procured her
assent, and made the payment in good faith upon that assent,
she could not put the plaintiff to proof that he was legally liable;
to which the defendant excepted. This ruling was correct, ac
companied, as it was, with the further instruction, that good
faith, in the sense intended in the ruling, required that the plain
tiff should inform the defendant of all facts known to himself
bearing upon his liability. The plaintiff had only a nominal interest
in the question of his liability on the bond. The defendant was the
real party interested in this question. It was her right and duty
to judge whether any defence should be made to the claim of the
bank. After she had requested him to pay, or assented to his
paying, he could not properly defend against the claim. If he
did so, it would be at his own risk and expense, and he could
not recover of the defendant any of the expenses of such unauth
orized defence; he had the right to act upon her assent, and pay
the claim without a suit; such payment was made at her request,
and she is liable for the amount paid, and cannot defend upon the
ground that there was a defence to the claim of the bank which









































































































































Sect. 9] PHILLIPS V. FOXALL 377
We have considered all the questions raised by this bill of
exceptions, although some of them have become immaterial by
the special finding of the jury in the case. In answer to a special
question submitted to them, they have found that the plaintiff
made the payment to the bank with the assent of the defendant
and in good faith. It was within the discretion of the court to
submit this question to them, and their finding upon it is con
clusive, and renders immaterial all questions as to the liability
of the plaintiff on his bond.
Exceptions overruled.
SECTION 9. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON RETENTION OF THE
PRINCIPAL IN SERVICE AFTER KNOWLEDGE
OF HIS DISHONESTY.
I23. PHILLIPS v. FOXALL, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666.
Court of Queen's Bench, Trinity Term, 1872.
On a continuing guaranty for the honesty of a servant, if the
master discovers that the servant has been guilty of dishonesty in
the course of the service, and instead of dismissing the servant,
he chooses to continue him in his employ without the knowledge
and consent of the surety, express or implied, he cannot after
wards have recourse to the surety to make good any loss which
may arise from the dishonesty of the servant during the subse
quent service.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
The judgment of Cockburn, C.J., Lush, and Quain, J.J., was
delivered by
QUAIN, J.—This is an action brought by the plaintiff on a
contract whereby the defendant guaranteed the honesty of one
John Smith, a servant in the employ of the plaintiff, to the extent
of 5ol. The contract is set out in the declaration, and recites the
employment of Smith, and that it was his duty to collect money
for the plaintiff, and account to her for all sums of money so
collected, and that the plaintiff had before the giving of the
guarantee held in her hands a sum of money belonging to Smith
as a security for the proper performance by Smith of his duty,
which sum the plaintiff had agreed to pay back to Smith on









































































































































378 PHILLIPS v. I-‘OXALL [Chap. VI
ceeds to allege that in consideration that the plaintiff would pay
over to Smith the money soheld, and continue him in the service
of the plaintiff in the same capacity as before, the defendant
guaranteed and promised the plaintiff to make good and be
answerable to her for any loss, not exceeding 501., which she
might at any time sustain through any breach by Smith of his
duty during the continuance of such service; and it alleges a
breach, in the usual form, that Smith failed to pay over sums
of money to the amount of 501. which he had collected on behalf
of the plaintiff.
In answer to this declaration the defendant divides the time
during which the service lasted, and during which the loss was
sustained into two periods: first, from the 8th of June, 1869,
when the contract was made, to the 20th of November, 1869:
and, secondly, from the last-mentioned day to the 4th day of
April, 1871, when the service terminated. As to the first period
the defendant admits his liability for loss incurred by the acts
of the servant during that period, and he has paid Iol. into court,
which he alleges is sufficient to reimburse the plaintiff for such
loss. As to the second period he pleads a plea on equitable
grounds, which is to this effect :—that the servant had been guilty
of defalcations in the course of his service between the 8th of
June and the 20th of November, 1869, which the plaintiff had dis
covered on the latter day, and that the plaintiff then, without
communicating such discovery to the defendant, and while the
defendant was ignorant of the servant’s dishonesty, agreed with
the servant to continue him in her employ as before, and the
servant on the other hand agreed to pay the plaintiff 31. a
month on account of the previous defalcations. The plea then
alleges that the servant was continued in the plaintiff's service
accordingly on those terms. The plea then goes on to state, that
the loss in respect of which the plea is pleaded was occasioned by
acts of dishonesty committed by the servant during the continu
ance of the service, as so agreed on, after the 20th of November.
and between that time and the termination of the service, the
defendant during that time being wholly ignorant of the previous
defalcations of the servant; and that by reason of the plaintiff
not having given the defendant notice of such defalcations he was
prevented from revoking the guaranty.
To this plea the plaintiff has demurred, and the question
argued before us was whether the plea afforded a good defence









































































































































Sect. 9] PHILLIPS v. rox.\LL 379
the loss occasioned by the defalcations of the servant committed
between the 20th of November and the end of the service.
We are of opinion that the plea is good.
We think that in a case of a continuing guaranty for the
honesty of a servant, if the master discovers that the servant has
been guilty of acts of dishonesty in the course of the service to
which the guaranty relates, and if instead of dismissing the
servant, as he may do at once and without notice. he chooses to
continue in his employ a dishonest servant, without the knowl
edge and consent of the surety, express or implied, he cannot
afterwards have recourse to the surety to make good any loss
which may arise from the dishonesty of the servant during the
subsequent service.
Suppose that the state of facts, which has arisen here in the
course of the service, had existed before or at the time when the
guaranty was given, in other words, that the servant had pre
viously committed defalcations in the plaintiff's service, and -had
agreed to repay them at the rate of 31. a month. and that this
fact had been concealed by the master from the defendant when he
gave the guaranty, it cannot, we think, be doubted that a fraud
would have been committed on the surety which would have
relieved him from all liability on the contract. This we think
is established by the judgments of the House of Lords in Smith v.
-Bank of Scotland, 1 Dow. 272, 292, and in Raillon v. Mathews,
1o Cl. & F. 934, 943. In the former case Lord Eldon says,
“If a man found that his agent had betrayed his trust, that he
owed him a sum of money, or that it was likely he was in
his debt; if under such circumstances he required sureties for
his fidelity, holding him out as a trustworthy person. knowing,
or having ground to believe, that he was not so, then it was
agreeable to the doctrines of equity, at least in England, that
no one should be permitted to take advantage of such con
duct even with a view to security against future transactions
of the agent.” In the latter case Lord Cottenham cites with ap
probation the opinion of Lord Eldon in Smith v. Bank of Scotland,
and Lord Campbell adds, “If the defenders had facts within their
knowledge which it was material the sureties should be acquainted
with, and which the defenders did not disclose, in my opinion the
concealment of those facts—the undue concealment of those facts
—discharges the surety.”
We do not think that the principles of law as laid down in









































































































































380 PHILLIPS v. FOXALL [Chap. V I
House of Lords in the subsequent case of Hamilton v. H/atson,
12 Cl. & F. I09, or by that of the Court of Exchequer in the North
British Insumnce Co. v. Lloyd, IO Exch. 523, 24 L. I. (Ex.
14.) In the former case the principle above mentioned was not
denied, but the question that arose was as to its application to
the facts of that particular case, and Lord Campbell states
that the criterion for the necessity of voluntarily disclosing any
particular fact in cases of this kind may be whether the fact not
communicated was one that could “not naturally be expected to
have taken place between the parties who were concerned in the
transaction.” In North British Insurance Co. v. Lloyd, the Court
of Exchequer held that the rule, as to the effect of concealment in
marine insurance cases, did not apply to contracts of suretyship,
and that in the latter cases the concealment must be fraudulent in
order to avoid the contract. In Lee v. ./ones, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 482,
506, the majority of the judges in the Exchequer Chamber held
that a concealment by the creditor—that at the time of the contract
the principal debtor was already indebted to the creditor in a con
siderable amount, of which the surety was ignorant—was evidence
to go to the jury of such a fraud on the surety as would discharge
him from liability. It must depend (as observed by Blackburn, J.,
in the case last cited) “upon the nature of the transaction in every
case, whether the fact not disclosed is such that it is impliedly rep
resented not to exist.” We cannot doubt but that previous acts of
dishonesty by the servant in the same service, known to the
master, would be such a fact, and if concealed from the surety
would avoid the contract: vide Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, vol.
i, ss. 215 and 324.
If, therefore, it is correct, as we think it is, on these author
ities, to say that such a concealment as is here pleaded, if it had
been practiced at the time when the contract was first entered into,
would have discharged the surety. we think that in the case of a
continuing guaranty a similar concealment made during the
progress of the contract ought to have a similar effect as regards
the future liability of the surety, unless his assent has been ob
tained, after knowledge of the dishonesty, that his guaranty should
hold good during the subsequent service. One of the reasons
usually given for holding that such a concealment as we are here
considering would discharge the surety from his obligations, is,
that it is only reasonable to suppose that such a fact if known to
him must necessarily have influenced his judgment as to whether
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it seems to us equally reasonable to suppose that it never could.
have entered into the contemplation of the parties that, after the
servant’s dishonesty in the service had been discovered, the
guaranty should continue to apply to his future conduct, when the
master chose for his own purposes to continue the servant in his
employ without the knowledge or assent of the surety. If the
obligation of the surety is continuing, we think the obligation of
the creditor is equally so, and that the representation and under
standing on which the contract was originally founded continue
to apply to it during its continuance and until its termination.
If the guarantv at its inception was founded, as suggested by
Lord Eldon in Smith v. Bank of Scotland, on the trustworthiness
of the servant, so far as that was known to both parties, as soon
as his dishonesty is discovered and becomes known to the master,
the whole foundation for the continuance of the contract as re
gards the surety fails; and it seems to us in accordance with the
plainest principles of equity and fair dealing, that the master
should, on making such discovery, either dismiss the servant, or,
if he chooses to continue him in his employ without the knowledge
or assent of the surety, that he must himself stand the risk
of loss arising from any future dishonesty. “It is the clearest
and most evident equity” (says Lord Loughborough in Rees
v. Berrington, 2 Ves. 540, 543) “not to carry on any trans
action without the knowledge of him (the surety) who must
necessarily have a concern in every transaction with the
principal debtor. You cannot keep him bound and transact
his affairs (for they are as much his as your own), with
out consulting him. You must let him judge whether he will give
that indulgence contrary to the nature of his engagement.” Thus
in the present case, the conduct of the master in retaining the
servant in his employ, when he might have discharged him for
dishonesty, seems, in the words of Lord Loughborough, an in
dulgence granted to the servant without the assent of the surety.
and contrary to the nature of his engagement. The time at which
the surety will be discharged from further liability in cases of
this kind will vary according to the circumstances of each case;
but we intend our judgment to apply only to CaseS like the one
now before the Court, where the master, having the power of
at once discharging the servant for dishonesty, deliberately con
tinues him in his service, after he becomes aware of the dishon
esty and without the assent or knowledge of the surety.
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against it
,
has been cited before us. In Peel v. Tallock, 1 B. & P.
419, 423, a question arose how far the concealment of the servant’s
embezzlement for three years after the termination of the service
would affect the liability of the surety, No decision was, however,
given on that point, and the case contains only a dictum of Eyre,
C.J., that an industrious (by which we presume he meant an inten
tional or fraudulent) concealment might have an effect on the lia
bility of the guarantor. In Smith v. Bank o
f Scotland, there is an
observation of Lord Redesdale made in the course of the argu
ment, which has a closer bearing on the present question. In that
case Paterson, the bank agent, seems to have given security to
the bank, apparently at the commencement of his service; after
wards, and while the service continued, and after his accounts
had been inspected and reported on by an officer of the bank, he
was called on to give additional security, and Smith, the appel
lant, gave a bond as such additional security. Smith raised an
action of reduction of this bond, and in that action insisted on his
right to inspect the above report of the officer of the bank. On
this Lord Redesdale observed, “Supposing the report showed that
Paterson was no longer trustworthy, and the bank had trusted him
notwithstanding, upon decided cases the prior security would be
discharged from all the consequences of subsequent transactions
as contrary to the faith of the contract. And then it might be
a question what bearing this circumstance might have on the
new sureties.” The cases to which Lord Redesdale alludes are
not mentioned, but it seems pretty clearly to have been his opinion
that if the master discovers the dishonesty of his servant during
the service, and afterwards continues to trust him notwithstanding,
the surety for the servant would be discharged from all liability
for subsequent losses. In the case of Shepherd v. Bcccher, 2 P.
V\-"ms. 288, 290, before Lord Chancellor King, a father, on binding
his son apprentice, gave a bond for his fidelity. Some years after
wards the apprentice embezzled 200l. of the master’s money of
which the master gave notice to the father, and demanded the
money. The father paid the amount, but sent a letter request
ing the master not to trust the apprentice with cash in the
future, or at least to do so very sparingly. The apprentice
continued afterwards with the master for several years, and
committed further embezzlements of which the father had
no notice until two years after the expiration of the apprentice
ship. when the bond was put in suit. The. Lord Chan
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the ground of his judgment, “that the father ought not to have
satisfied himself with sending the letter and taking no further
care of the matter, but should have endeavored to make some
end with the master, and to have got up the bond.” This decision
seems to us to rest on the fact that the father, instead of taking
measures to have the bond delivered up, as he might have done,
assented to continue bound after he had notice of the first embez
zlement, and that the other embezzlements were not actually ascer
tained until after the expiration of the apprenticeship.
It is well established that a surety, after he has been dis
charged from his contract by the act of the creditor, may revive his
liability by a subsequent promise or assent: Mayhew v. Crickett,
2 Swan 185; Smith v. Winter, 4 M. & W. 454. In the present
plea it is alleged as a conclusion of law that, by reason of
the concealment, the defendant was prevented from revoking
the guaranty and compelling Smith to pay the money for
which the defendant was liable. The discharge of the surety
in the present case seems to us to arise rather out of the
nature and equity of the contract between the parties, than
upon any assumed right of revocation. We think the surety is
discharged unless he assents or agrees, after he has had knowledge
of the dishonesty, that the guaranty shall hold good for the subse
quent service; but, as a revocation of the guaranty as soon as the
dishonesty has come to his knowledge will be the best evidence
of dissent, whether his discharge from the contract is founded
on express revocation, or want of assent after notice of the dis
honesty, seems rather a question of words than of substance.
In Parsons on Contracts, vol. ii. p
.
31, the rule as to the
right to revoke a guaranty like the present is thus stated: “If





servant, the promise is revocable, providing the circumstances
are such, that when it is revoked, the promisee may dismiss the
servant without injury to himself on his failure to provide new
and adequate sureties.” No judicial authority is cited in support
o
f
this proposition, and therefore it can only be cited as the
opinion o
f
the writer. It will be seen that he confines the right
o
f
the surety to revoke his guaranty to those cases where the
master may, on the revocation being made, dismiss the servant
without injury to himself. The present case is distinctly within
the limitation, and there can be n
o




once to discharge the servant on discovering his
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ingredient in the consideration of the question. * * * For these
reasons we think that the plea is good, and that the defendant is
entitled to our judgment.
BLACKBURN, J.—This was a demurrer to a plea which was
argued before my Lord and my Brothers Lush, Quain, and myself
in last term, the decision of which involves a question of some
difficulty. I have with some hesitation’ come to the same con
clusion as the rest of the court, but as I do not quite agree in
all the reasons given by them, I prefer stating my own reasons.
The declaration is on a contract of guaranty to the plaintiff
to an amount not exceeding 501., as surety for one Smith during
the course and continuance of his employment by the plaintiff.
I must first observe that I think on this declaration the defendant
must be taken to have agreed to be surety during the employment,
and cannot withdraw from his guaranty, unless something new
occurs to give him that right.
The defendant pays money into court to cover Smith’s defal
cations up to a particular date, viz., the 20th of November, 1869:
and as to the defalcations subsequent to that date pleads, on equit
able grounds, that on that date the plaintiff became aware that
Smith had embezzled moneys for which the defendant was respon
sible, that she, without informing the defendant of this, allowed
Smith to continue in her service, and to pay off the amount of his
defalcation, and that the defendant was wholly ignorant of Smith’s
guilt. The plea then states, as conclusions of law, that owing to
the non-disclosure of this fact by the plaintiff, the defendant was
prevented from immediately revoking his guaranty, and in con
sequence is in equity discharged.
i
I think that the first question to be considered is, what would
be the right of the surety on being informed that the servant
had committed a fraud; for, if his knowledge of that fact would
have given him no rights, the concealment could not prejudice
him. I still adhere to the opinion that I expressed in Lee v. Jones,
that if such a transaction as is alleged in the plea had taken place
before the defendant entered into the contract of suretyship, and
had been concealed from him, it would have furnished evidence
of a false representation to the surety that no such thing existed,
made by the plaintiff to the surety for the purpose of inducing him
to enter into the contract of suretyship, and would therefore
afford evidence in support of a plea of fraud. Further than this
I am not prepared at present to go. and it is to be remembered
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Still I act on that as being established law; but I cannot concur
in the conclusion from these premises that therefore there is a
condition implied by law on every contract of suretyship for a
servant that it shall become void if the servant afterwards com
mits a fraud, and the principal on hearing of it does not inform
the surety of it. It is quite clear that misconduct of the servant
does not alone put an end to the contract, for the very object of
the suretyship is to afford protection against the misconduct of
the person whose good conduct is guaranteed. And I find no
authority for saying that there is such an implied condition. Shep
herd v. Beecher is a distinct authority that even in equity the effect
is at most to render the contract voidable at the option of the
surety: for it was there decided that the father, who, on becom
ing aware of the misconduct of his son for whom he was surety,
took no steps to get rid of the suretyship, remained liable.
But there is a ground on which I think he may have a ground
for being discharged in equity, which I will now state. A surety
as soon as his principal makes default. has a right in equity
to require the creditor to use for his benefit all his remedies
against the debtor; and as a consequence, if the creditor has by
any act of his deprived the surety of the benefit of any of those
remedies, the surety is discharged. The authorities for this, as
far as known to me, are collected in the judgment to Barfly v.
Edwards, 4 B. &. S. 770; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 41; and this equita
ble principle has, at least in the case where time has been given to
the principal without the consent of the surety, been adopted to
some extent at least, although whether to its full extent has been
doubted: see Pooley v. Harradinc, 7 E. & B. 431; 26 L. J.
(Q. B.) 156. But it is not now material to decide that.
Now the law gives the master the right to terminate the
employment of a servant on his discovering that the servant
is guilty of fraud. He is not bound to dismiss him, and if he elects,
after knowledge of the fraud, to continue him in his serv
ice, he cannot at any subsequent time dismiss him on account of
that which he has waived or condoned. This right the master
may use for his own protection. If this right [U terminate the
employment is one of those remedies which the surety has a
right to require to have exercised for the surety's protection, it
seems to follow that, by waiving the forfeiture and continuing
the employment without consulting the surety, the principal
has discharged him. It never has been determined, as far as
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There are dicta tending that way. In Shepherd v. Beecher Lord
Chancellor King says the surety “ought not to have satisfied
himself with sending the letter, but should have endeavored to
have made some end with the master, and to have got up the
bond”—expressions which seem to show that the Lord Chancellor
thought he might have got up the bond. In Smith v. Bank of
Scotland Lord Redesdale is reported to have said during the
argument, when considering whether the appellants had, accord
ing to the law of Scotland, a right to inspect a report from the
agent of the bank to the directors, “Supposing the report showed
that Paterson ” (the person for whom the appellants became
sureties) “was no longer trustworthy, and the bank had trusted
him notwithstanding, upon decided cases the prior security would
be discharged from all the consequences of subsequent transac
tions, as contrary to the faith of the contract.” But no such
decided cases are now to be found, and the dictum is not again
noticed in the judgments either of L0rd Eldon or Lord Redes
dale. No other authority was cited during the argument, nor, as
far as we are aware, was there any then in print. And at the
close of the argument I was much inclined to say that no such
equity was established. But, singularly enough, the case of Bur
gess v. Eve, L. R. 13 Eq. 450, 457, has been printed since
the argument, and there Malins, V. C., says: “But if there
is misconduct on the part of the person whose fidelity is g
guaranteed, for instance, if a man guarantees that a collect
ing clerk shall duly account for all moneys received by him,
and that collecting clerk is found to have embezzled his em
ployer’s money, reason requires that the man who entered into
the guaranty because he believed the person to be of good charac
ter. when he finds he is not so, and not to be trusted. should have
the power of saying ‘I now withdraw the guaranty I gave you;
I give you full notice not to trust him any more.’ Notwithstand
ing all that has been said, I am clearly of opinion that a person
who has entered into such a guaranty, and who is therefore
responsible for the person whose fidelity is guaranteed, has a
right to withdraw from that guaranty when that person has been
proved guilty of dishonesty.” He afterwards proceeds: “My
opinion is—and I have no hesitation in expressing it—that a
person who gives a guaranty would have a right to say to the
person taking it
,
‘You will continue at your own peril to employ
the person on whose behalf I gave the guaranty, provided that the
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misconduct, or has turned out to be unworthy of the confidence
reposed in him by the person giving the guaranty for him. If
the employer under such circumstances refused to give the guar
anty up, the person giving it would have a right to file a bill in
this court, and in my opinion would succeed in the contest, be
cause the court would direct the bond to be delivered up to be
cancelled. And I think that is only what good sense, propriety,
and fair dealing between man and man would dictate.” These
expressions are singularly closely in point; they, though by no
means irrelevant to the point then before the Vice-Chancellor, were
not part of his decision. What he says is not therefore, perhaps,
strictly binding upon us as a decision would be. But it seems
to me consistent with justice; and without determining whether
we should have ventured to lay down such an equity ourselves, I
think we should follow the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor on a
subject with which he is so much more conversant than we are. I
therefore agree on this ground, and on this ground only, that
judgment should be given for the defendant.
Judgment for the defendant.
124. AETNA INS CO. v. FOWLER, et al., 108 Mich. 557,66 N.W. 470.
Supreme Court, Michigan, 1896.
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Saginaw, and in December, 1883, executed a bond, with his co
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“The condition of this obligation is such that whereas the above
named Charles G. Fowler has been appointed agent of the Aetna Insur
ance Company in Saginaw, Saginaw county, State of Michigan, who will
receive as such agent sums of money for premiums, payments of losses,
salvages, collections, or otherwise, for goods, chattels, or other property
of the said insurance company, and is to keep true and correct accounts
of the same, pay over such money correctly, and make regular reports of
the business transacted by him, to the said Aetna Insurance Company,
and in every way faithfully perform the duties as agent, in compliance
with the instructions of the company through its proper officers, and at
the end of the agency, by any cause whatever, shall deliver up to the
authorized agent of said company all its money, books, and property due
from or in possession. Now, then, if the aforesaid agent shall faithfully
perform all and singular the duties of the agent of the Aetna Insurance
Company, then this obligation shall be null and void.”
The instructions to agents were to send statements of all busi
ness transacted during the previous month as early as the 12th of
each month. The testimony shows that for three months prior to
September 1, 1893, the defendant Fowler failed to send remit
tances, and it was shown that it was not the custom of the com
pany to insist upon absolute promptness in remittance, but that
after three months’ delay it was the custom of the company to dis
charge the delinquent agent. The testimony further shows that
in the latter part of July or the first of August, 1893, the special
agent of the company, a Mr. Neal, visited Saginaw, and, as he
described it
,
found the agency in a “rocky condition ;” and, while
counsel were disagreed as to the effect of his testimony, we think it
is at least open to the construction that he then learned that Fowler
had misappropriated the funds of the company, and invested them
in realty. The circuit judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
The recovery included a shortage in accounts before August 1st,
and a shortage of $344.16 arising from the August business.
Two contentions are made: First, that it was the duty of the
company to notify the sureties of any delay in the remittance, at
once, and that the continuance of the agent after failure to remit
in accordance with the instructions of the company to agents re
leased the sureties as to future transactions: and, second. that the
company, on the discovery of the misappropriation of funds,
August 1st, was bound to discharge the agent, or, at least, the
sureties were not bound to respond for his future defalcations,
unless, after being informed of his previous acts of dishonesty,
they consented to his retention.
We think that the court below correctly ruled that the mere
fact that the company had knowledge that the agent had failed to
remit did not impose upon it the duty to notify the sureties or
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Mass. 85 (41 Am. Rep. 196) ; Atlantic, ete., Tel. Co. v. Barnes,
64 N. Y. 385 (21 Am. Rep. 621). The duty which the company
owed to the sureties was not a duty of active vigilance, to ascer
tain whether the agent had been guilty of fraud (the sureties’
undertaking was a guaranty of his fidelity), but what was due
from the employer was good faith to the sureties. Just as it would
have been a fraud to withhold knowledge of previous dishonesty
of the agent presumably not known to the sureties, but possessed
by the company, so it would be a breach of good faith for the
company to continue the agent in a place of trust after discovering
his dishonesty or defalcation, which is presumptively and in fact
unknown to the sureties, and without notifying the sureties of the
facts, and giving them an opportunity to elect as to whether they
will continue the risk. This is the doctrine of the leading case of
Phillips v. Foxall, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666. The cases of Waterto'wn
F ire Ins. Co. v. Simmons and Atlantic, ete., Tel. Co. v. Barnes are
not inconsistent with this. The substance of the holding in each of
these cases is that the mere failure of remittance does not neces
sarily amount to notice of dishonesty on his part, and that applies
to the present case as regards the charges occurring before August.
There is no evidence that prior to August the company had actual
notice that Fowler had converted any of the funds to his own use.
or was more than negligent in remitting or collecting the premi
ums; but as to the transactions in August the case is different.
Under section 9191, 2 How. Stat., it is made an offense for an
insurance agent to receive and invest money of the company with
out its assent; and, as we before stated, we think there was testi
mony tending to show notice to the company about the 1st of
August that Fowler had invested the funds of the company in
realty. If the company, through its special agent, then knew this
fact, it cannot be said not to have had notice of the dishonesty of
the agent; and, if it had such notice, it was the duty of the com
pany not to longer trust its funds with the agent until the sureties
had consented, with knowledge of the facts, to be held responsible
for the acts of a dishonest agent. See, further 2 Brandt, Sur.
§ 423; Com1ecticut Mat. Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, 81 Ky. 540.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered.









































































































































390 STONER V. MILLIKIN [Chap. VI
SECTION 10. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON FRAUD OR MISCON
DUCT OF THE PRINCIPAL TOWARD THE SURETY
I25. STONER v. MILLIKIN, et al., 85 Ill. 218.
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1877.
The fraud of the principal in securing the contract of the
surety cannot be set up by the latter as a defense against the
obligee, if he has no notice of the fraud.
Appeal from the circuit court of Macon county, the Hon.
C. B. SMITH, Judge, presiding.
Mr. Harvey Pasco, for the appellant.
Mr.A. B. Bunn, for the appellees.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SHELDoN delivered the opinion of the
Court:
At the February term, 1874, of the county court of Macon
county, a judgment was entered by confession, in favor of Millikin
& Co., against Thomas Lee, John Lee and Andrew J. Stoner, for
$453.33, upon a promissory note with a warrant of attorney
attached, purporting to be executed by the three latter, dated the
24th day of June, 1873, payable ninety days after date to H. Crea,
and£n execution, issued upon the judgment, was levied upon
personal property of John Lee, sufficient in value to satisfy it
.
Afterward, by direction o
f
Millikin & Co., the sheriff released the
property o
f
John Lee from the levy, and levied the execution upon
certain real estate o
f Stoner, and the bill in this case was filed b
y
Stoner to enjoin the sale o
f
his property under the execution.
The court below, upon final hearing on proof, dismissed the
bill, and the complainant appealed.









John Lee to the note is a forgery. The
note is a joint and several one, the signature o
f
Stoner being last
upon the note. He testifies that Thomas Lee applied to him to
sign the note a
s
his security; that he refused to d
o
so unless Lee
would first get his brother, John Lee, to sign the note; that Lee
went away saying he would go and get John to sign it; that the
next day he came back, saying that he had got John to sign it
,
and
presented the note with the signature o
f
John Lee appearing to it
,
and witness then signed it
,




e genuine, knowing him to be responsible, and had he not sup
posed the note to have been signed b
y
John Lee, he would not
have executed it
.









































































































































Sect. Io] STONER V. MILLIKIN 39 I
hand with Millikin & Co., to lend him the money. H. Crea, the
payee of th
e
note, was but nominally such, Millikin & Co., being
the real payees, and o
n presentment o
f






Thomas Lee to Milliken & Co., who were
bankers, they discounted the note, paying the proceeds to Thomas
Lee.
-
The bill alleges, the way John Lee's property came to be re
leased was, that he made an affidavit that he never signed the note
and that his signature to the same was a forgery, and that upon the
making o
f
such affidavit Milliken & Co. caused hi
s
property to be
released from the levy. Although it is this forgery which is mainly
relied o
n for the discharge o
f Stoner, it is yet objected, as against
the release o
f
John Lee's property and the levy on Stoner's, that
there is no proof o
f
the forgery, more than this affidavit. Upon an
examination o
f
the bill, we take that, as alleging the fact o
f
the
forgery; and the answer o
f
Milliken & Co. and the sheriff admits
the same. By the pleadings, the forgery must be considered an
admitted fact in the case. The confession o
f judgment, then,
against John Lee, was unauthorized, and a nullity, and his property
was rightly released from the levy under the execution.
Why should this forgery operate in discharge o
f Stoner, and
entitle him to have his property exempted from sale on the exe
cution ?
It may have been a wrong toward him, and have caused him
to incur a greater extent o








have been the sole condition upon which he signed his name to the
note. Yet, on satisfactory evidence to himself, in that respect, he
did place h
is
name unconditionally to the note as a maker thereof,




f his, Stoner's, promise to repay it
,
they would
part with their money to Thomas Lee. There is no just reason
why this promise to Milliken & Co. should not be kept.
Whatever o
f wrong there was to Stoner, was perpetrated b
y
h
is co-maker, Thomas Lee. Millikin & Co. were wholly innocent
in the matter: they had no notice of anything which had been trans





was it incumbent upon Millikin & Co. to exercise care over the
interest o
f
the surety in the note, look to the inducement which led
him to become such, and see that it should not fail. They had but
to watch over their own interest, and see that the security offered
was a sufficient protection for them. For the lack of the vigilance









































































































































392 BUTLER V. UNITED STATES [Chap. VI
quence in the loss of the security of the name of John Lee. What
ever of fraud and deception the co-makers of the note practiced
toward one another, was their own sole concern, and the conse
quence, so far as may affect them in their relation to each other,£ is no justice in requiring Millikin & Co. to assume the risk of such conduct, and no
sound principle upon which they should be made to suffer loss
because of it
,
not being privy thereto.
York County M. F. Insurance Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506, and
Selser v. Brock, 3 Ohio St. 302, are direct authorities to the point




a prior surety will not discharge
a subsequent surety. See Young et al
.
v
. Ward, 21 Ill. 223.
We regard the language o
f
LORD HoLT, in Hern v. Nichols, 1
Salk. 289, as applicable, that “Seeing that somebody must be a
loser b
y
this deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts
trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser, than a
stranger.”
The case o
f Seeley v. The People, 27 Ill. 173, is departed from
so far as it conflicts with the principle o
f
the present decision.
We are satisfied with the decree, and it is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
126. BUTLER v. UNITED STATES, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 272,
22 L. Ed. 614.
Supreme Court, United States, 1874.






the principal toward the surety, the latter cannot rely
o
n
such misconduct as a defense.
In error to the Circuit Court o
f
the United States for the
Eastern District of Tennessee.
This was an action of debt in the court below, on a joint and






. Butler, Ethan A
. Sawyer and Wil
liam Choppin as sureties, in the sum o
f $15,000. Butler defended
o
n
the ground that, a
t
the time he signed and affixed his seal to the
bond, it was a mere printed form, with blank spaces for the names,
dates and amountsto b
e inserted therein; and that the blanks were
not filled, and there was no signature thereto, except Emery's; that
Emery promised, if Butler would sign the bond, he would fil
l
up
the blanks with the sum o
f $4,000, and would procure two addi
tional securities in the District o











































































































































Sect. Io] BUTLER V. UNITED STATES 393
be worth $5,000; and that the bond was delivered to Emery with
the understanding and agreement that the bond otherwise was not
to be binding on the defendant, but was to be returned to him; that
the defendant never after ratified or acknowledged the validity of
the bond; that the other sureties did not reside in the District of
Columbia, and were wholly insolvent and worthless; and that
Emery obtained the signature by false and fraudulent representa
tions. The circuit judge ruled that this was no defense to the
action; a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, and the defendant
excepted and brought this writ of error.
Messrs. S. Shellabarger, H. Maynard and J. M. Wilson, for
plaintiff in error.
Mr. C. H. Hill, Asst. Atty.-Gen., for defendant in error.
Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of the court:
We cannot distinguish this case in principle from Dair
v. U. S., 16 Wall., I (83 U. S.). The printed form, with its
blank spaces, was signed b
y
Bu and delivered to Emery, with£ tosecure his faithful service in the office of£
Revenue. He was also authorized to present it
,
when perfected,
to the proper officer o
f
the Government for approval and accept
ance. If accepted, it was expected that he would at once be per





to which it referred.
It is true that, according to the plea, this authority was accom
panied by certain private understandings between the parties,
intended to limit its operations, but it was apparently unqualified.
Every blank space in the form was open. To al
l
appearances, any
sum that should be required by the Government might be desig
nated as the penalty, and the names o
f any persons signing as co
sureties might be inserted in the space left for that purpose. It was
easy to have limited this authority b
y filling the blanks, and the
filling of any one was a limitation to that extent. By inserting,









their residences, Butler could have taken away
from Emery the power to bind him otherwise than as thus









the blanks in the paper signed, in such appropriate













































































































































304 FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. TERRY [Chap. VI
of his contemplated official duties. It is not pretended that the
acts of Emery are beyond the scope of his apparent authority.
The bond was accepted in the belief that it had been properly
executed. There is no claim that the officer who accepted it had
any notice of the private agreements. He acted in good faith,




two innocent parties shall
suffer. The doctrine o
f
Dair's case is that it must be Butler,
because h
e confided in Emery he Government did not. He
is, in law Tequity, estopped by his acts from claiming, as






I27. FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. TERRY, 135 Fed. 621.
United States Circuit Court, Eastern District Pennsylvania, 1905.
If the obligee has knowledge that the surety's signature was
secured by the fraud o
f
the principal, the surety is released.








Anderson and Wm. Jay Turner for plaintiff.
Hampton L. Carson for defendant.
HoLLAND, District Judge.—On February 5
,
1901, the Blue
Mountain Iron teel C ny, o
f
which the defendant was a





$12,000, with interest thereon from October 22, 1900, and there
was pending and undetermined in the superior court o
f
Baltimore
City a suit by said plaintiff against said Blue Mountain Iron &£
date a
n agreement in writing was entered into b
y
and between





Elliott and Henry C
. Terry, the defendant, as
parties o
f
the second part, and the plaintiff, as party o
f
the third
part, wherein it was provided that the pleas theretofore filed b
y
said Blue Mountain Iron & Steel Company in said suit in the
superior court o
f
Baltimore City should forthwith be withdrawn,




$500 upon the delivery o
f








0 days until the full
debt, with interest and costs, should have been paid; the parties
o
f









































































































































Sect. Io] FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. TERRY 395
selves jointly and severally to make said payments, and author
izing the plaintiff to enter judgment in said suit upon the failure
of said parties to make said payments or perform the other stipu
lations of said agreement. By November 7, 1901, there was paid
upon this agreement by Elliott $500 and by Terry $4,500. The
balance was $7,000, which, with interest to date, is $7,667.11, after
which date nothing was paid on account of this agreement either
by Elliott or the defendant Terry, except the cost in obtaining
judgment in Baltimore against the steel company, which was
paid by Terry on March 12, 1902. He also paid the interest on
that judgment to April 1, 1903, since which time neither the
defendant nor Elliott nor the steel company has paid anything to
the plaintiff on account of either the judgment in Baltimore or
interest thereon. At the time the agreement was executed by
Elliott and Terry to the plaintiff-III This
•
S Dresident
of the Steel company and Terry was a stockholder. Suit was
brought against Terry on his agreement with plaintiff, and, among
other things, he sets up in his affidavit of defense:
*
"That the defendant was induced to sign the agreement upon
wik '£
R-FIOtt, one of th
e
Parlies to the agreement, said statements
being made in the year 1901, a
t
and before the signing o
f
the
agreement and in the presence o
f
the plaintiff. That said repre
sentations were that th
e
said Blue Mountain Iron & Steel Com
pany was then possessed o
f




in the present action; whereas i
n truth and in fact the said com
pany was not possessed o
f
sufficient assets to pay it
s debts, in
cluding the debt due b
y
it to plaintiff in the present action, but was
insolvent, and utterly unable to pay it
s
debts. That the said
Charles R
.
Elliott knew that the said statements and representa
tions were false and fraudulent at the time that the same were£
ant to sign the agreement; and the defendant, relying upon said
false and fraudulent representations, and believing the same to
b
e true, signed the agreement. That said false and fraudulent
representations were made b
y





their falseness, and were made in the presence o
f
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff well knew at that time that the
said representations were false and fraudulent, and that they were









































































































































396 FIRST N.\rioNAL BANK v. TERRY [Chap. VI
sign the agreement; and that, but for the defendant’s belief in
the truth of the said false and fraudulent representations, the
defendant would not have executed the contract; and the plain
tiff, at the time of the execution of said agreemenf attached to its
statefnent of claim, rau u ent v suppressed and concealed from
the ~?~racter
of sa~iich were made for the purpose of in
ducing the defendant to sign the said agreement, and which said
agreement was for the further advantage and protection of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff knowing full well that, had it informed the
defendant of the false and fraudulent character of the said state
ments, the defendant would not have executed the said agree
ment. That it permitted the said defendant to act upon said
false and fraudulent representations because it would gain an
advantage thereby, in that the defendant would sign the said
agreement.”
The plaintiff in this case stood b in silence and permitted
the the
par of the president of the steel company, to be induce?to sign
an
g~nd
Ffhe time, as alleged in
the affidavit of defense, the plaintiff~ons
to be’ a se. If this e ense e esta is 1e , it is a ar to a recovery.
Among the numerous authorities for this proposition, the case
of Hartranft v. Fussell, 180 Pa. 552, 37 Atl. 1118, is cited as
almost identical with the case at bar.










































































































































Sect. 11] SEWING MACHINE co. v. RICHARDS 397
I
SECTION 11. DEFENSE FOUNDED UPON ABSENCE OF NOTICE
OF ACCEPTANCE OF GUARANTY AND OF
DEFAULT OF PRINCIPAL.
128. DAVIS SEWING MACHINE COMPANY v. RICHARDS, et al.,
115 U. S. 52.4, 29 L. Ed. 480.
Supreme Court, United States, 1885.
Notice—Guarantor /not liable without notice of acceptance by
the guarantee.
In error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Mr. James G. Pa_vne, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. W. A. Cook and Mr. C. C. Cole, for defendants in error.
GRAY, J.—This was an action, brought in the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, upon a guaranty of the performance
by one John W. Poler of a contract under seal, dated December
17, 1872, between him and the plaintiff corporation, by which it
was agreed that all sales of sewing machines which the corporation
should make to him should be upon cerfain terms and conditions,
the principal of which were that Poler should use all reasonable
efforts to introduce, supply and sell the machines of the corpora
tion, at not less than its regular retail prices, throughout the Dis
trict of Columbia and the Counties of Prince George and Mont
gomery, in the State of Maryland, and should pay all indebtedness
by account, note, indorsement or otherwise, which should arise
from him to the corporation under the contract, and should not
engage in the sale of sewing machinesof any other manufacture;
and that the corporation, during the continuance of the agency,
should sell its machines to him at a certain discount, and receive
payment therefor in a certain manner; and that either party might
terminate the agency at pleasure.
The guaranty was upon the same paper with the above con
tract, and was as follows:
“For value received, we hereby guarantee to the Davis Sewing Ma
chine Company, of V\/atertown, New York, the full performance of the
foregoing contract on the part of John W. Poler, and the payment by
said John W. Poler of all indebtedness, by account, note, indorsement of
notes (including renewals and extensions) or otherwise, to the said Davis
Sewing Machine Company, for property sold to said John \V. Poler,
under this contract, to the amount of Three Thousand ($3,000) Dollars.












































































































































398 szwmo MACHINE co v. RICHARDS [Chap. VI
Under the guaranty were these words: “I consider the above
sureties entirely responsible. Washington, Dec. 19, 1872. J. T.
Srr.vsns.”
At the trial the above papers, signed by the parties, were given
in evidence by the plaintiff, and there was proof of the following
facts: On December 17, 1872, at Washington, the contract was
executed by Poler, and the guaranty was signed by the defendants,
and the contract and guaranty, after being so signed, were deliv
ered by the defendants to Poler, and by Poler to Stevens, the
plaintiff's attorney, and by Stevens afterwards forwarded, with
his recommendation of the sureties, to the plaintiff at Watertown
in the State of New York, an~ted by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff afterwards delivered goods to Poler under
the contract, and~m. The defendants had
no ~nc
Oft~Qtiff hadfur~ract or upon the faithof t /eguaranty, until January, 1875, when payment therefor was
demanded by the plaintiff of the defendants and refused. At the
time of the signing of the,guaranty, the plaintiff had furnished no
goods to Poler, and the negotiations then pending between the
plaintiff and Poler related to prospective transactions between
them.
The court instructed the jury as follows: “It appearing, at
the time the defendants signed the guaranty on the back of the
contract between plaintiff and Poler, the plaintiff had not executed
the contract or assented thereto, and that the contract and guar
anty related to prospective dealings between the plaintiff and
Poler, and that subsequently to the signing thereof by the de
fendants the attorney for the plaintiff approved the responsibility
of the guarantors and sent the contract to Watertown, New York,
to the plaintiff, which subsequently signed it
,
and no notice having
been given by the plaintiff to the defendants of the acceptance of
such contract and guaranty, and that it intended to furnish goods
thereon and hold the defendants responsible, the plaintiff cannot
recover, and the jury should find for the defendants.”
A verdict was returned for the defendants, and judgment ren
dered thereon, which on exceptions by the plaintiff was affirmed
at the General Term, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error,
pending which one of the defendants died and his executor was
summoned in.
The decision of this case depends upon the application of the
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JWells, 104 U. S. 159, in which the earlier decisions of this court
upon the subject are reviewed.
Those rules may be summed up as follows: A contract of
mutual assent of the partics. the guaranty is signed by the
guarantor at the request of the other party, or if the latter's agree
ment to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty, or if the
receipt from him of a valuable consideration, however small, is
acknowledged in the guaranty, the mutual assent is proved, and
the delivery of the guaranty to him or for his use completes the
contract. But if the guaranty is signed by the guarantor with
out any previous request of the other party, and in his absence,
for no consideration moving between them except future advances
to be made to the principat-debtor, the guaranty is in Tegal effect
an offer Ör proposat on the part of the guarantor, needing an
acceptance by the Other mplete the contract.
The case at bar belongs to the latter class. There is no evi
dence of any request from the plaintiff corporation to the guaran
tors or of any consideration moving from it and received or ac
knowledged by them at the time of their signing the guaranty.
The general words at the beginning of a guaranty, “value re
ceived,” without stating from whom, are quite as consistent with
a consideration received by the guarantor from the principal debtor
only. The certificate of the sufficiency of the guarantors, written
by the plaintiff's attorney under the guaranty, bears date two days
later than the guaranty itself. The plaintiff's original contract
with the principal debtor was not executed by the plaintiff until
after that. The guarantors had no notice that their sufficiency
had been approved, or that their guaranty had been accepted, or
even that the original contract had been executed or assented to
by the plaintiff, until long afterward, when payment was de











































































































































4oo GANO v. FARMERS, BANK [Chap. VI
129. GANO v. FARMERS’ BANK OF KENTUCKY, 103 Ky. 508,
45 S. W. 51'9.
Court of Appeals, Kentucky, 1898.
Notice of Acceptance.—One who offers his name as gnaw»
tor to zvl1omsocZ-er may accept the offer is entitled to notice, and
' is not bound to inquire as to the acceptance of his proposal.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Scott county.
Ins. Y. Kelly and Geo. E. Prewitt, for appellant. -
Owens 6' Finnell, for appellee.
I—iAZELRlGG, J.—The appellant, Gano, and nine others exe
cuted a writing to the end that one P. T. Pullen might obtain the
sum of $10,000 with which to run a milling business in George
town, Kentucky. The appellee bank, on the strength of this
writing, furnished $5,000, which was used to pay off a debt
then owing the bank by Pullen, and also $5,000 which was used in
the business. After a time, Pullen being insolvent, the bank called
on the obligors in the writing for a discharge of their undertaking.
All seemed to have paid their respective shares demanded by the
writing, except the appellant, who tendered certain issues of law
and fact in defense of the action which followed his refusal to
pay his share. The writing which forms the basis of action is as
follows:
“P. T. Pullen, of Georgetown, Kentucky, contemplating the leasing
of the Thompson mills, and carrying on the milling business, and being in
need of capital with which to buy stock and run the same as it should be
run successfully: Now, in order to aid him, we, W. E. Pullen. George
Carley, George V. Payne, T. T. Hedger, J. M. Penn, ]ames_\V. Craig,
Buford Hall, Daniel Gano, S. B. Triplett, and Warren C. Graves, whose
names are hereto signed, agree to become his surety to an amount not
exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate. After this instrument
of writing has been signed by all of us (ten in number), it may be used by
the said P. T. Pullen in the nature of a collateral for a sum or sums not
exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate. and we, the said signers,
shall be bound jointly and severally as sureties upon any note or notes not
exceeding in the aggregate said sum to which said Pullen shall sign his
name and deposit this as collateral. In case the money is borrowed of more
than one party, the lenders can agree upon who shall hold this writing for
the benefit of all. Said Pullen agrees to mortgage all property he now has
to us in order to secure us by virtue of obligations assumed in this instru
ment, and renew said mortgage from time to time when required, upon
any and all property he may have. This instrument of writing to con
tinue in force for three years from the first day of July, 1891, and no
longer, and if at any time any one or more of the signers hereto should
die or become insolvent, said Pullen is to either pay off his or their por
tion of the money that may be borrowed, or furnish other good and
solvent surety or sureties in his or their stead. Said Pullen agrees to









































































































































Sect. 11] G.-\NO v. FARMERS, BANK 401
surance company for the benefit of the signers hereto, and his books are
at all times to be open ito the inspection of any one or all of the said sign
ers, either in person or by an expert of their selection. Given under our
hands this 15th day of July, 1891.
(Signed) “GEORoE V. PAYNE,”
And others named in the writing.
The paper, as we have already indicated, was taken by Pullen
to the appellee, to whom Pullen was then indebted in the sum of
$5,000, evidenced by Pullen's note with his brother as surety. A
new note was then executed to the bank for $5,000, and this note
was then discounted by the bank, and the proceeds taken to pay
off this pre-existing debt. It is therefore insisted for the appel
lant that the principle announced in Russell v. Ballard, 16 B. Mon.
205. is applicable here and, when applied, the surety stands dis
charged. It was there said: “If a note be purchased by a party,
with notice that one of the obligors is surety merely, and that the
sale and purchase will defeat the purpose for which it was exe
cuted by him, or will violate any understanding or agreements
between him and his principal, then the purchaser will be affected‘
by such notice, and cannot hold the surety liable on the note to
compel him to pay it.” llere the bank had notice that Gano was
‘
surety merely on the writing taken as collateral by the bank to
secure the new note, and it had notice that the sale and purchase
of this new note and application of its proceeds to pay off the
old debt would defeat the sole purpose for which the writing was
executed by the surety, namely, “to raise the sum of ten thousand
dollars, buy stock and run the same.” This would seem snfficient
to bring the case within the principle announced in the cited case,
for it is manifest that, if one-half the capital needed to carry on
the milling business and “run the same successfully” was to be
taken to pay off an old debt, the business must suffer, and likely
not be run successfully. But this is not all. The bank had notice 1.
that the sureties looked to the property which this money—all of
it—would buy as an indemnity by way of mortgage; and by what
ever amount the actual cash furnished Pullen for his business was
lessened, by that amount the value of their indemnity would be
lessened. This is also in line with the general doctrine so often
announced by the textwriter and by this court for the protection
of sureties. We might assume without proof—but the evidence
is conclusive on the point—that appellant would not have entered
into this contract had it been disclosed to him that this “letter of‘;
credit,” as the writing may be termed, was to be used to pay off
the large debt due the bank, and therefore it was incumbent on









































































































































402 G.\NO v. FARMERS‘ BANK [Chap. VI
before it could divert the fund intended to be raised by the col
lateral to purposes of its own, The rule is thus stated by Mr.
Story in his Equity Jurisprudence: “The contract of suretyship
imports entire good faith and confidence between the parties in
regard to the whole transaction. Any concealment of material
facts, or any expressed or implied misrepresentation of facts, or
any undue advantage taken of a surety by his creditor, either by
surprise or by withholding proper information, will undoubtedly
permit sufficient grounds to invalidate the contract.” Section 324.
And further: “Thus if a party taking a guaranty from a surety
conceals from him facts which increase his risk, and suffers him
to enter into the contract under false impressions as to the real
state of facts, such concealment will amount to a fraud, because
the party is bound to make the disclosure, and the omission to
make it under such circumstances is equivalent to an affirmation
that the facts do not exist.” Sections 214, 215. See Com. v.
Berry, 95 Ky. 443, 26 S. W. 7, and cases cited. Other obligors,
who lived in or about Georgetown, the scene of this transaction,
seem either to have had knowledge of these material facts at the
time, or obtained it shortly afterwards, and, having that knowl
edge, still paid off their shares; but the appellant was an old man,
some 85 years of age, living quite a distance from the town, and
visiting there only a few times within a year. There is no doubt
of his entire ignorance of the material facts indicated. He was not
even apprised of the fact that the writing had been used by Pullen
with the bank or anyone else, and money obtained thereby. It
seems to be clear that he was entitled to this notice. He had mere
ly offered his name with that of others as surety to-whomsoever
might accept the offer and loan the money. He was therefore
entitled to notice of acceptance. In Steadman v. Guthrie, 4 Metc.
(Ky.) 148, it was held that: “When the offer is to guaranty a
debt for which another is primarily liable in consideration of some
act to be performed by the creditor, mere performance of the act
is not sufficient to fix the liability of the guarantor; but the credi
tor must notify the guarantor of his acceptance of the offer or of
his intention to act upqn it.” That the guarantor might, by inquiry
from the person in whose favor the guaranty was given, have
learned what had passed between the guarantees and himself, will
not dispense with notice. A person thus proposing to becoiue
surety for another is not bound to inquire as to the acceptance of
his proposal. The creditor who intends to hold him responsible









































































































































Sect. II] CANo v. FARMERS BANK 4O3
tion. See, also, Kincheloe v. Holmes, 7 B. Mon. 5; Lowe v. Beck
with, 14 B. Mon. 189; Thompson v. Glover, 78 Ky. 195. It is
true in this case that the record does not show that the bank's old
debt on Pullen was in danger of being lost. It was secured by the
brother of the debtor, who was solvent, although his property was
in the main covered by mortgages, and he was already indebted
to the bank in a considerable sum. Still it may be said he
was insolvent. We think this, however, makes no difference. It
may show more conclusively—what is already apparent enough—
that there was no actual fraud intended by the bank, or any of it
s
officers, in the transaction; but this does not change the legal
status o
f
the parties on the point involved. It further appears that
the brother o
f




had a mortgage o
n
certain stock and property belonging to the
debtor to indemnify him in his suretyship; and this was released,
and a mortgage taken in favor o
f
the obligors in the writing in
question. But it further appears that the value o
f
this property
was quite insignificant, and that appellant had n
o knowledge even
that this had been done. The writing, the contents o
f
which the
bank had notice of, because they accepted and acted on it
,
entitled
the obligors to have a mortgage on all the property the debtor had
o
r might acquire; and we do not see that, because one was in fact
executed o
f
which no notice whatever was given to the appellant,
can take the place o
f
the notice to which we have said appel
lant was entitled when his offer was accepted and acted o
n b
y
the bank. Actual notice is what the law requires, and notice or
knowledge o
f
this new mortgage might have been sufficient, but
this the appellant did not have. We think the plaintiff's petition
should have been dismissed, and the judgment is reversed for pro
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130. HUNGERFORD v. O'BRIEN, impleaded, etc., 37 ;‘\Iinn. 306,
34 N. W. 161.
Supreme Court, Minnesota, 1887.
Notice of default of the principal is not essential to recovery
from the surety.
The plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Otter
Tail county upon a promissory note made by the defendant
Charles J. Sawbridge, the payment of which was guarantied by
the defendant O'Brien. The action was tried before BAXTER, J.
,
and a jury, and a verdict directed for plaintiff. Defendant O'Brien
appeals from an order refusing a new trial.
Razt'son 6' Honpt, for appellant.
E. E. Corliss, for respondent.
DICKINSON, J.—The defendant Sawbridge made his negotia
ble promissory note, which was indorsed to one Gage, who in
dorsed it in blank to the defendant O’Brien, and he, before matur
ity, transferred it for value to the plaintiff, indorsing upon the note
and signing this guaranty: “For value, I hereby guaranty the pay
ment of the within note to Cassie Hungerford or bearer.” The
note was not paid. Nothing was done by the plaintiff at the ma
turity of the note to fix the liability of the indorser Gage. The
defendant O’Brien had no notice of the non-payment of the note
until more than a year after its maturity. Upon the trial of the
issue raised by the answer of the defendant O'Brien, evidence was
presented tending to show that the maker of the note was solvent
at the time of its maturity, but has since become insolvent; and
that the indorser, Gage, was also solvent. The court directed a
verdict for the plaintiff.
The nature of the obligation of the guarantor is affected by
the character of the principal contract to which the guaranty re
lates. The note expressed the absolute obligation of the maker to
pay the sum named at the specified date of maturity or before. The
guaranty of “the payment of the within note” imported an under
taking, without condition, that, in the event of the note not being
paid according to its terms,—that is, at maturity,—the guarantor
should be responsible. The non-payment of the note at maturity
made absolute the liability of the guarantor, and an action might
at once have been maintained against him without notice or de
mand. Such was the effect of the unqualified guaranty of the pay
ment of an obligation which was in itself absolute and perfect and









































































































































Sect. I 11 HUNGERFORD V. O'BRIEN 405
should be made,—all of which was known to the guarantor, and
appears upon the face of the contract. The liability of the guar
antor thus becoming absolute by the non-payment of the note, the
neglect of the holder to pursue such remedies as he might have
against the maker (the guarantor not having required him to act)
would not discharge the already fixed and absolute obligation of
the guarantor, nor would neglect to notify the guarantor of the
non-payment have such effect. Brown v. Curtiss, 2 N. Y. 225;
Allen v. Rightmere, 20 John. 365, (11 Am. Dec. 288); New
comb v. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326; Read v. Cutts, 7 Greenl. 186, (22
Am. Dec. 184); Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523; Campbell v.
Baker, 46 Pa. St. 243; Roberts v. Riddle, 79 Pa. St. 468; Bank v.
Sinclair, 60 N. H. Ioo; Heaton v. Hulbert, 3 Scam. 489; Dicker
son v. Derrickson, 39 Ill. 574; Penny v. Crane Mfg. Co., 80 Ill.
244; Clay v. Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549; Wright v. Dyer, 48 Mo.
525. See, also, Vinal v. Richardson, 13 Allen 521, modifying
former decisions of the same court.
If follows that the fact that the maker had become insolvent
since maturity, or that a mortgage security had become impaired
by depreciation in the value of the property, was no defence; nor
was it a defence that the guarantor was not notified of the non-pay
ment of the note. We are aware that the position here taken is
opposed by some decisions. No valid agreement was shown be
tween the maker and the plaintiff extending the time of payment.
From the position above taken, it logically follows that the neglect
of the guarantee to take the steps necessary to fix the liability of
the indorser, Gage, did not discharge the guarantor. The latter,
by his unqualified guaranty of the payment of the note, took it
upon himself to see that the note was paid, and was therefore not
entitled to notice of it
s non-payment. (Authorities above cited.)
For the same reason, the plaintiff did not owe to the guarantor the
duty o




demand and notice o
f
dishonor. Philbrooks v. Mc
Ewen, 29 Ind. 347; Lang v. Brevard, 3 Strob. Eq. (So. Car.) 59;
Pickens v
. Finney, 12 Smedes & M. 468; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., notes
to Recs v. Berrington. No such obligation is involved in this con
tract o





t maturity, is under no obligation to his indorser to
give notice o
f
dishonor to prior indorsers o
r parties. The last in
dorser becomes liable when he alone is notified, and he in turn
may fix the liability o










































































































































406 HUNGERFORD v. o’nRn£N [Chap. VI
l\‘lITCHELL, J., (dissenting). I am unable to concur in the
proposition that the plaintiff owed no duty to O’Brien to take
steps, at the maturity of the note, to fix the liability of Gage, the
indorser. It does not seem to me that the fact that O’Brien’s
guaranty of payment was unconditional and absolute is at all deci
sive of the question. As between the parties to this action, O’Brien
occupied the position of surety, who, in case he had to pay the
note, would have recourse against Gage, the indorser, provided
steps were taken to fix the liability of the latter. The question,
therefore, is to be determined by the equitable principles which
govern the relative rights and duties of creditor and surety.
It is a well-settled rule of equity that any laches by the creditor
in the care or management of collateral remedies or secureties, if
loss ensues, will discharge the surety pro ta-nto. Nelson v. Munch,
28 Minn. 314, 322 (9 N. W. Rep. 863). As a surety, on payment
of the debt, is entitled to all the securities of the creditor, if
,
through the negligence of the creditor who has them in his posses
sion and under his control, a security, to the benefit of which the
surety is entitled, is lost or not properly perfected, the surety, to
the extent of such security, will be discharged. l/Vulfi v. Jay, L. R.
7 Q. B. 756. And we can see no difference in this respect whether
the security is chattel or personal. This is not a case of mere pas
siveness by the creditor in not taking steps to enforce collection
of the debt at maturity, but an omission to take steps to perfect
and fix the liability of the indorser, which amounted to positive
negligence. He had possession and control of the note on the day
of its maturity, and consequently was the only person who could
present it for payment, or who would know whether or not it was
paid, and hence was the only person in position to give notice to
the indorser in case of its non-payment. To require him to do this,










































































































































THE CREDITOR’S' RIGHT OF SUBROGATION TO THE
SURETY’S SECURITIES.
'
131. Re WALKER; SHEFFIELD BANKING COMPANY v.
CLAYTON, 66 L. T. (N.S.) 315, L. R. [1892] 1 Ch. 621.
High Court of Judicature, Chancery Division, 1892.
Counter-security given by debtor to surety—right of ereditor
to benefit of such security.
The following are the only facts material to the present
report :—
The testator in the year 1886 gave to the London and York
shire Bank two guarantees for the sum of 10001. each to secure
the overdraft of Arthur Spencer and Reuben Spencer trading as
Spencer Brothers.
At the same time Agnes Spencer, the wife of Arthur Spencer.
gave to the testator as security for anything he might be called
upon to pay under the guarantees, two equitable mortgages created
by memoranda of deposit of title deeds. The memoranda were
dated respectively the 5th July and the 18th Aug., 1886.
Subsequently to these transactions Spencer Brothers trans
ferred their account from the London and Yorkshire Bank to the
Sheffield Banking Company.
On the 9th Sept., 1887, the testator gave to the Shefi'ICld
Banking Company a guarantee to secure the repayment of all
moneys then owing, or which might become owing to them by
Spencer Brothers either on their current account or on any other
account to the extent of 20001.
In the month of May, 1889, Spencer Brothers went into
liquidation.
The testator died on the 4th Nov.. 1888, leaving a will by
which he appointed the defendants his executors. The will was
proved by the defendants on the 24th Jan., 1889.
The plaintiff company then commenced a creditor’s action for
the administration of the testator’s estate. An administration









































































































































408 RF. WALKER [Chap. VII
The testat0r’s estate was insufficient for payment of debts,
including the liability of the testator under the guarantee given
to the plaintiff company.
The plaintiff company now claimed to be entitled to the ben
efit of the equitable mortgages given to the testator by Agnes
Spencer.
The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the plain
tiffs were not so entitled, but could rank only as creditors pari
passu with the other creditors of the estate.
Graham Hastings, Q. C., and Curtis Price for the plaintiffs.
Buckley, Q. C., and Ingle Joyce for the defendants.
STIRLING, J., stated the facts and continued :—The plaintiffs’
contention was founded upon two cases. The first is an old case
of Maure v. Harrison (I Eq. C. Ab. 93). It is reported very
shortly as follows : “A bond creditor shall in the Court of Chancery
have the benefit of all counter-bonds or collateral security given
by the principal to the surety; as if A owes B money and he and
C are bound for it
,
and A gives C a mortgage or bond to
indemnify him, B shall have the benefit of it to recover his
debt.” That case was decided in Michaelmas, I692. The
plaintiff also relied upon a dicfiim of Sir William Grant in Wright
v. Morley (11 Ves. 22) which runs thus: “I conceive that, as
the creditor is entitled to the benefit of all the securities the
principal debtor has given to the surety, the surety has fully
as good an equity to the benefit of all the securities the principal
gives to the creditor.” As to the latter portion of the sentence,
there is no question at all. It is well established at this date
that the surety, on paying the debt, is entitled to stand in the
place of the principal creditor, and to have the benefit of all the
securities which the principal creditor had. I\'ow these two
cases were very much discussed in the well-known case of Ex
parte Waring (2 G. & J. 404), before Lord Eldon. That case
is most fully reported perhaps in Glyn & Jameson’s Reports. It
appears from that report that, in the course of the argument, Lord
Eldon oke somewhat disparagingly of the case of M aure v. Har
rison. He said this: “I have never heard this case relied upon as a
governing case at this day.” l In the judgment as reported in 19
Vesey, p. 348, he puts it thus: “The prayer of the first of these
petitions has been supported upon this ground, t'hat the short bills
and the mortgage * * * having been placed with Brickwood and
Co. as a security against their acceptances. the holders of those









































































































































Chap. VII] RE WALKER 4O9
discharge of those acceptances upon the general ground that, upon
a transaction of this kind, a person holding the bills which are the
subject of indemnity has a right to the benefit of the contract be
tween the principal debtor and the party indemnified, and, though
not himself a party to that contract, to say that he, who has con
tracted for the payment of certain debts out of those pledges, is
liable in equity to the demand upon the part of those whose de
mands are to be so paid for that application, and a case was cited
(Maure v. Harrison) which goes that length. With regard to that
case, or cases in general, I desire it to be understood that I forbear
to give my opinion upon that point.” Then he goes on to say that
he decides not on Er parte Waring but on another ground. The
result of these two cases, namely the dictum of Sir W. Grant in
Wright v. Morley and the judgment and observations of Lord
Eldon in Ex parte Waring, seems to me to be that Sir W. Grant
and Lord Eldon were not of the same mind on the point. Under
these circumstances I was very anxious to discover what was really
done in the case of Maure v. Harrison, which is so shortly reported
in Eq. Cas. Abr. The registrar has been kind enough to make
search for that case. No decree was drawn up, but the entry of
the case has been found in the registrar's book, and the pleadings
have been discovered, and I am indebted to the learned reporter
of this court, Mr. Knox, for having made a summary of them for
my use, the pleadings themselves being somewhat lengthy. From
them and the notes in the registrar's book it is tolerably easy to
discover what the case was. The plaintiff was Thomas Maure, the
defendants were William Harrison and William Morley and Mary
his wife. Thomas Maure was the father of the first wife of Will
iam Harrison, the father of William Harrison the defendant. By
that first marriage William Harrison the father had three children,
viz., William, the defendant, Thomas, and Margaret. The first
wife having died, William Harrison, the father, married his second
wife Mary, the defendant, then the wife of William Maure, and
afterwards he died intestate leaving this widow and three children
by the first wife the persons entitled to his personal estate under
the statute of distribution. Administration was taken out by his
widow, and the shares of the three children in the intestate's prop
erty amounted to 120l. It appears that the plaintiff, Thomas
Maure, the grandfather of William Harrison the defendant, was
very anxious that William Harrison, his grandson, should con
tinue the business of a farmer which had been carried on by Will












































































































































the sum of 1201. which formed the portion of the intestate’s estate
belonging to the three children should be paid over to William
Harrison the son. and that was accordingly done. The two other
children being infants, Thomas Maure the father and the plaintiff
in the action gave a bond to the defendant Mary Morley, the legal
personal representative of the intestate, to indemnify her against
all claims by those children. It appears that at this time William
Harrison, the defendant. was an infant, but the money was paid to
him. He attained twenty-one, and carried on the farm for some
time. After attaining twenty-one he repudiated the transaction
and began to press William Morley_and Mary his wife for pay
ment of his share of his father's estate, which he had already
received in point of fact, though apparently an infant. There
upon \/Villiam Morley gave him a bond for payment of his share,
and William Morley and Mary his wife began to sue the plaintiff
. Thomas Maure in the Court of Exchequer for payment under the
bond which had been given by him. Thereupon the plaintiff insti
tuted this suit in equity to restrain the action, and to obtain delivery
up of the bond which had been given by him. Now, of the other
children who were interested in the intestate’s estate, Thomas had
died an infant and intestate, and Margaret was still an infant, and
was not a party to the suit. The argument is stated in the regis
trar’s book. It is to be observed that the bill is by the person who
gave the bond to be relieved of it
,
and the result is thus stated in
the registrar’s book: “By the Court: Do declare that the defendant
William is well paid, and he must deliver up the bond to the other
defendant.” That is the bond (as I read it) which had been given
by William Morley to the defendant William Harrison for pay
ment of his share. \/‘Vhether that relief ought to have been in
serted in the decree may be a question, because that would be relief
between co-defendants. Then it goes on, “stay all proceedings at
law on the plaintiffs’ 1001. bond”—that is a mistake, for 1201. as
clearly appears from the previous passage in the registrar’s note,
where it is corrected in the margin, but the correction is omitted
here—“till Margaret doth release, and when the plaintiff hath pro
cured Margaret, who is not a party to the action, to release that
bond, then that bond to be delivered up” and so forth “but then
the plaintiff’s bond to be at suit for the recovery of Margaret's
moietv of 120l.” So that all was decided in that action was
that the plaintiff. who had given his bond of indemnity, was not
entitled to have it delivered up to be cancelled till all claims had









































































































































Chap. VII] \‘.\lL v. FOSTER 411
for which it was cited in Eq. Cas. Abr. could not have been decided
in that case, and that at most the reported statement amounts to a
dictum in the course of the argument. It is now nearly two hun
dred years since this case was decided, and the sole authorities on
a point which must have been of frequent occurrence are a dictum
in I692, a dictum early in this century by Sir William Grant in
the year 1805, and what appears to me to be the contrary opinion
of Lord Eldon a little later. Under those circumstances it seems
to me that there is no authority for the proposition in question.
Upon principle I cannot see why a surety who takes from the prin
cipal debtor a bond or indemnity at once becomes a trustee of that
for the principal creditor. That is really the contention of the
plaintiffs. Of course the other doctrine is well established, viz.,
that the surety who pays the debt is entitled to stand in the place
of the principal creditor; but this doctrine rests entirely on those
dicta which I have mentioned. It seems to me that under these
circumstances I cannot give effect to the contention of the plain
tiffs. and that they must simply be left to prove against the estate
of the testator for what is due, without having the exclusive bene
fit of these securities in respect of which payments have been made
to the estate.
Solicitors for the plaintiff company, Pilgrim and Phillips.
Solicitors for the defendants, Few and Co., agents for John
James, Wirksworth.
I
132. VAIL, et al., v. FOSTER. et al., 4 N. Y. 312.
Court of Appeals, New York, 1850.
A ereditor is in equity entitled to the benefit of any collateral
securities which the debtor has given to the surety, or person
standing in the situation of a surety.
Varick 6' Eldridge, for appellants.
W’. I. Street, for respondents.
BRoNsoN, Ch. J.—'I‘he case is shortly this. The plaintiffs
sold land to Morgan, who, instead of giving his bond and mort-
gage to the plaintiffs to secure the purchase money, got Flagler to
give his note to the plaintiffs for the amount. payable in one year;
and Morgan gave a bond and mortgage to Flagler for his indem
nity, for the same amount, and payable at the same time with the
note. Before the credit expired Flagler became insolvent: and the









































































































































4 I2 VAIL V. FOSTER [Chap. VII
the land for the purchase money, or by reaching the mortgage to
Flagler, and having it foreclosed for the payment of the debt.
By taking the security of a third person for the purchase
money the plaintiffs have lost their equitable lien on the land, and
can not have relief in that form, as has been very clearly shown by
the vice-chancellor in his opinion. And I agree in most that he has
said upon the whole case. But there is one point on which I think
the supreme court was right in reversing the vice-chancellor's
decree, and directing a foreclosure of the mortgage for the benefit
of the plaintiffs.
It is a settled rule in equity, that the creditor shall have the
benefit of any counter bonds or collateral securities which the prin
cipal debtor has given to the surety, or person standing in the situ
ation of a surety, for his indemnity. Such securities are regarded
as trusts for the better security of the debt, and chancery will
compel the execution of the trusts for the benefit of the creditor.
Maure v. Harrison, 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 93, K. 5; Curtis v. Tyler, 9
Paige, 432; Wright v. Morley, II Ves. 22; Bank of Auburn, v.
Throop, 18 John. 505; 4 Kent, 307, 6th ed.: I Story's Fq. §§502,
638. This principal covers the case; and the plaintiffs are entitled
to the mortgage which Morgan, the principal debtor, gave to
Flagler, the surety, for his indemnity. -
But it is said that Morgan is not a debtor to the plaintiffs, and
consequently that the relation of principal and surety does not
exist between him and Flagler. It is true that Morgan did not
unite with Flagler in making the note, nor did he come under any
other express obligation to the plaintiffs. But he was originally a
debtor to the plaintiffs for the price of the land; and although the
plaintiffs afterwards took the note of Flagler in lieu of the bond
and mortgage of Morgan, they took it as a security only for the
purchase, money, without agreeing to receive it in satisfaction of
the:\: of a third person for an existing debtis not payment, unless the creditor agrees to receive it in payment;
and I find no such agreement in this case, Morgan is still liable
to the plaintiffs for the purchase money, and must of course be
regarded, as the principal debtor; for it is entirely clear, upon the
pleadings and proofs, that Flagler gave the note at the request, and
as the surety of Morgan, without having any personal interest in
the matter.\ We have then the ordinary case of creditor, principal
and surety, to which the rule in question has been applied; and the
mortgage which the principal debtor has given to the surety must
be considered as a trust for the better security of the debt, which










































































































































Chap. VII] HAMPTON V. PHIPPS 4I 3
Foster & Co. under their creditor's bill, took the effects of
Flagler subject to this equity; and there is no bona fide purchaser
in the case.
I am of opinion that the decree of the supreme court is right,
and should be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
I33. HAM PTON, Adm'r., et al., v. PHIPPS, IoS U. S. 260.
Supreme Court, United States, 1883.
Creditors are not entitled to be subrogated to mortgages given
by co-suretics, each to the other to indemnify him from any claim
beyond his assumed proportion. Such mortgages not being, in
equity, securities for the payment of the principal debt.
Bill in equity by a creditor to obtain the benefit of securities
held by sureties of the principal debtor.
The appellee, who was complainant below, was the holder,
and filed his bill in equity, on behalf of himself and the other
holders of bonds, executed and delivered by Theodore D. Wag
ner and William L. Trenholm, to the amount of $710,000, and
paid to creditors in settlement of the liabilities of two insolvent
firms, in which they were two of the copartners. These bonds
were dated January 1st, 1868. The payment of the principal
and interest of each of these bonds was guaranteed, by writing
indorsed thereon, by George A. Trenholm and James T. Wels
man, who were sureties merely. These sureties entered into a
written agreement each with the other, dated May 3d, 1869,
in which it was recited that, in becoming parties to said guar
anty, they had agreed between themselves that the said George
A. Trenholm should be liable for the sum of $400,000, and
the said Jas. T. Welsman for the sum of $310,000, of the aggre
gate amount of the bonds, and no more, and that each would
be respectively liable to the other for the full discharge of the
said sum and proportion by them respectively undertaken, and
that each would save and keep harmless and indemnify the
other from all claim, by reason of the said guaranty, beyond
the amount or proportion respectively assumed, as stated; and
it was thereby further agreed, that at any time when either of
them should so require, each should, by mortgage of real estate,
secure to the other more perfect indemnity, because of the said









































































































































414 H.-\MPTON v. PHIPPS [Chap. VII
the other a mortgage upon real estate of which they were
respectively the owners, the condition of which was that the
mortgagor should perform on his part the said agreement of
that date. The guarantors, as well as the principal obligors, had
become insolvent before the bill was filed.
It also appeared that, of the sum of $573,300 due on account
of outstanding bonds, George A. Trenholm, one of the guarantors,i
had paid $108,454, leaving still due from his estate to make
good the proportion assumed by him, $214,532; and that the
proportion for which the estate of James T. Welsman, the other
guarantor, was liable, was $250,314, of which nothing had been
paid. The appellees claimed that the mortgages interchanged
between the guarantors inured to their benefit as securities for
the payment of the principal debt, and prayed for a foreclosure
and sale for that purpose.
This was resisted by the appellants, one of whom, Hampton's
administrator, as a judgment creditor of George A. Trenholm
and James T. Welsman, claimed a lien on the mortgaged prem
ises; the others, executrixes of James Welsman, deceased, being
subsequent mortgagees of the same property.
A decree passed in favor of the complainants, according to
the prayer of the bill, from which appeal was taken.
M r. Theodore G. Bwrker and Mr. W. G. De Saussure for
appellants.
Mr. James Lowndes for appellee.
Mr. Iustice MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court.
After reciting the facts in the above language, he continued:
The ground on which the court below proceeded seems to
have been that the mortgages given by the co-sureties, each to
the other, were in equity securities for the payment of the principal
debt, which inured to the benefit of the creditors upon the principle
of subrogation.
The ‘application of the principle of subrogation in favor of
creditors and of sureties, has undoubtedly been frequent in the
courts of equity in England and the United States, and is an
ancient and familiar head of their jurisdiction.
It was distinctly stated, as to creditors, in the early case of
Mmure v. Harrison, I Eq. Ca. Abr- 93, where the whole report
is as follows:
“A bond creditor shall, in this court, have the benefit of all
counter-bonds or collateral security given by the principal to the









































































































































Chap. \'II] H1.\l\IP'l‘ON \'. rnn‘rS 415
gives C a mortgage or bond to indemnify him, B shall have the
benefit of it to recover his debt.”
And the converse of the rule was stated by Sir Wm. Grant,
in .-Wright v. Morley, 11 Vesey, 12, where he said:
“I conceive that as the creditor is entitled to the benefit of all
the securities the principal debtor has given to his surety, the
surety has full as good an equity to the benefit of all the securities
the principal gives to the creditor.”
And it applies equally between sureties, so that securities
placed by the principal in the hands of one, to operate as an
indemnity by payment of the debt, shall inure to the benefit of all.
Many suificient maxims of the law conspire to justify the
rule. To avoid circuity and multiplicity of actions; to prevent
the exercise of one’s right from interfering with the rights of
others; to treat that as done which ought to be done; to require
that the burden shall be borne by him for whose advantage it
has been assumed; and to secure equality among those equally
obliged and benefited, are perhaps not all the familiar adages
which may legitimately be assigned in support of it. It is, in
fact, a natural and necessary equity which flows from the relation
of the parties, and though not the result of contract, is neverthe
less the execution of their intentions. For, when a debtor, who
has given personal guaranties for the performance of his obliga
tion, has further secured it by a pledge in the hands of his creditor,
or an indemnity in those of his surety, it is conformable to the
presumed intent of all the parties to the arrangement, that the
fund so appropriated shall be administered as a trust for all the
purposes, which a payment of the debt will accomplish; and a
court of equity accordingly will give to it this effect. All this, it
is to be observed, as the rule verbally requires, presupposes that
the fund specifically pledged and sought to be primarily applied,
is the property of the debtor, primarily liable for the payment of
the debt; and it is because it is so. that equity impresses upon
it the trust, which requires that it shall be appropriated to the
satisfaction of the creditor, the exoneration of the surety, and
the discharge of the debtor. The implication is, that a pledge
made expressly to one is in trust for another, because the relation
between the parties is such that that construction of the transac
tion best effectuates the express purpose for which it was made.
It follows that the present case cannot be brought within
either the terms or the reason of the rule; for. as the property,









































































































































416 HAMPTON v. PHIPPS [Chap. VII
of the principal debtor, and has never been expressly pledged to
payment of the debt, so no equitable construction can convert
it by implication into a security for the creditor.
It is urged that the logic of the rule would extend it so as to
cover the case of allsecurities held by sureties for purposes of
indemnity of whatsoever character and by whomsoever given.
But this suggestion is founded on a misconception of the scope
of the rule and the rational grounds on which it is established.
Of course, if an express trust is created, no matter by whom,
nor of what, for the payment of the debt, equity will enforce
it
,
according to its terms, for the benefit of the creditor, as a
cestui que trust; but the question concerns the creation of a
trust, by operation of law, in favor of a creditor, in a case where
there was no-duty owing to him, and no intention of bounty. A
stranger might well choose to bestow upon a surety a benefit
and a preference, from considerations purely personal, in order
to make good to him exclusively any loss to which he might
be subjected in consequence of his suretyship for another. In
such a case, neither co-surety nor creditor could, upon any ground
of privity in interest, claim to share in the benefit of such a
benevolence. .
There may be, indeed, cases in which it would not be in
equitable for the debtor himself to make specific pledges of his
own property, limited to the personal indemnity of a single
surety, without benefit of participation or subrogation; as, when
the liability of the surety was contingent upon conditions not
common to his co-sureties, and which may never become absolute.
H opewell v. Cumberland Bank, 10 Leigh, 206.
We are referred by counsel to the case of Curtis v. Tyler, 9
Paige, 432, as an instance in which the rule has been extended
to securities in the hands of a surety not derived from the principal
debtor. But the fact in that case is otherwise. The question
was as to the right of an assignee of a mortgage to the benefit
of the guaranty of one Allen to make good any deficiency in the
mortgaged property to pay the mortgage debt. This bond had
been given to one Murray, a prior holder of the mortgage, who
had assigned it to the complainant. The court say, in the opinion,
p. 436:
“In the case under consideration, Murray had assigned the
bond and mortgage given to him, and had guaranteed the payment
thereof to the assignee. He, therefore, stood in the situation of









































































































































Chap. VII] HAMPTON v. PHIPPS 417
Allen as a collateral security, or as a guaranty of the payment of
his original bond and mortgage. The present holders are, there
fore, in equity entitled to the benefit of this collateral bond, in
the same manner and to the same extent as if it had been given
to Murray before he assigned his bond and mortgage, and had
been expressly assigned by him to Beers, and by Beers to the
complainants.”
It thus distinctly appears that the bond of Allen, which was
the collateral security in controversy, was procured by and de
rived from the original mortgagor, the principal debtor. We
have been referred to no case which forms an exception to the
rule as we have stated it.
But the claim of the complainants fails for another reason.
The right of subrogation, on which they rest it
,
is merely a
right to be substituted in place of each of the co-sureties in re
spect to the other, in order to enforce the mortgages given by
them respectively according to their terms. But the conditions
of these mortgages have not been broken, and the very fact,
which is supposed to confer the right upon the creditor to in
terpose—the insolvency of the sureties—has rendered it impos
sible for either to fasten upon the other a breach of the condi
tion of his mortgage. As neither can pay his own proportion
of the liability they agreed to divide, neither can claim indem
nity against the other-for an over-payment. It is entirely clear,
therefore, that neither of the sureties could be, under the cir
cumstances as they appear, entitled, as mortgagee, to foreclose
the mortgage against the other. The condition of each mort
gage was, that the mortgagor would perform his part of the
agreement and indemnify the mortgagee against consequences
of a failure to do so. Unless one of them had been compelled
to pay, and had in fact paid, an excess beyond his agreed share
of the debt, there could have been no breach of the conditions of
the mortgage, and consequently no right to a foreclosure and
sale of the mortgaged premises. And the amount which the
mortgagor could be required to pay, as a condition of redeeming
the mortgaged premises, in case of foreclosure, would be, not the
amount which the mortgagee, as between himself and the common
creditor, was bound to pay on account of the debt, but the amount
which, as between himself and his co-surety, the mortgagor, he
had paid beyond the proportion which, by the terms of the agree
ment between them, was the limit of his liability. The mortgages
were not created for the security of the principal debt. but as









































































































































418 IIAMPTON v. PHIPPS [Chap. VII
As to which of them has there been as yet any default? Plainly
none as to either. And yet the complainants assert the right to
foreclose them both—a claim that is self-contradictory, for, by the
very nature of the arrangement, it is impossible that there should
be a default as to both. The fact that one mortgagor had failed
to perform his part of the agreement could only be on the sup
position that the other had not only fully performed it on his
part, but had paid that excess against which his co-surety had
agreed to indemnify him. There is, therefore, no right to the
subrogation insisted on, because there is nothing to which it can
apply.
It results, therefore, that the complainants were not entitled
to participate in the benefit of the mortgages in question. nor
to share in the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises;
but that the same should have been applied to the payment of
the other judgment and mortgage liens upon the premises. in
the order of their priority. The decree of May 29th, 1879,
therefore, being the one from which the appeal was taken, is
reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to take such
further proceedings therein, not inconsistent with this opinion,












































































































































SECTION. 1 NATURE AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT.
134. LAKESIDE LAND CO. v. EMPIRE STATE SURETY CO.,
105 Minn. 213, 117 N. W. 431.
Supreme Court, Minnesota, 1908.
Contracts of surety companies are contracts of insurance, and
are to be construed by the rules applicable to such contracts.
Action in the district court for St. Louis county to recover
from defendant as surety on two bonds certain sums of money
paid by plaintiff to protect itself from liens filed against it
s
property. Upon the pleadings and stipulated facts the case was
submitted to DIBELL, J., who found in favor of the plaintiff in the
sum o
f $1,075.79. From a judgment entered pursuant to the





Towne and Edmond Ingals, for appellant.
Stearns & Hunter, for respondent.
LEWIS, J.—Respondent and a contractor entered into agree
ments in writing whereby the contractor agreed to furnish the
necessary material and labor and to construct two dwelling houses,
to be completed within a certain time. Appellant company, as
surety for the contractor, executed a bond to respondent as
obligee, conditoned as follows:
“Now, therefore, the condition o
f
this obligation is such that,
if the said principal shall faithfully perform said contract on his
part according to the terms, convenants, and conditions thereof,
(except as hereinafter provided) then this obligation shall be void;
otherwise, to remain in full force and effect: Provided, however,
and upon the following further express conditions: First, that in
the event o
f any default on the part o
f









contract, written notice thereof with a verified statement o
f
the
particular facts, showing such default and the date thereof,









































































































































420 Lawn co. v. sum:rv co. [Chap. VIII
State Surety Company, at its office, No. 34 Pine street, in the city
of New York, New York.”
The contractor thereupon entered upon the construction of
the houses, but failed to complete them within the time limited
by the contracts, and also failed to pay for a portion of the
material and labor used in the construction of the buildings, and
respondent, in order to protect itself against mechanics’ and ma
terialmen’s liens, which had been filed against the premises, paid
the same and then commenced this action to secure reimburse
ment for the sum so expended.
Appellant concedes that respondent waived all claim ‘of dam
ages for delay in completing the buildings, and concedes its liabil
ity for the amount of the liens paid by respondent, provided it
was not wholly released by the failure to give the notice above
stated. Appellant cites Simonson v. Grant, 36 Minn. 439, 31 N.W.
861; Morrison v. Arons, 65 Minn. 321, 68 N. \/V. 33; and Fidelity
Mutual Life Ass’n. v. Dewey, 83 Minn. 389, 86 N. W. 423, 54 L.
R. A. 945, and relies upon the rule of strict construction there
applied.
The first case bears some resemblance to the one before us,
and yet is essentially different. Simonson and others furnished
building material to contractors to be used in the erection of a
house for the owner, and also became the sureties for faithful
performance by the contractor. The terms of the contract were
departed from, and the owner made payments to various parties ,
on the order of the contractor, and in some instances paid out
money in excess of the instalment due and in anticipation thereof.
‘It was held that the departure in the method of payment from the
terms of the contract so varied its terms as to release the sureties,
although it did not appear that they were directly damaged
by such change. In the other two cases cited the facts were en
tirely different from those under consideration, and there is no
necessity for calling particular attention to the distinction.
Appellant also refers to National Surety Co. v. Long, 125
Fed. 887, 60 C. C. A. 623; and United States F-idel-ity ('5' Guaranty
Co. v. Rice, 148 Fed. 206, 78 C. C. A. 164, both from the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. Those cases are to be dis
tinguished, however, in this particular: In the first it was pro
vided that, if at any time it appeared that the contractor had
abandoned the work, the obligee should immediately notify the
surety company in writing, and the company should have the
right, at its option, to assume such contract and sublet or complete
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the terms of the contract. In the second case the bond provided
that, in event of default on the part of the contractor, the surety
should have the right, if it so desired, to assume, or complete,
or procure the completion of the contract, and be subrogated and
entitled to all the rights and properties of the principal arising
out of the contract.
In the present case there is no such condition, either in the
bond or contract. On the contrary, the contract recites that the
obligee shall retain fifteen per cent, of the money due on estimates,
and, if at any time there should be evidence of any lien or claim
for which the owner might become liable, then the owner should
have the right to retain, out of any payment then due, or there
after to become due, an amount of money sufficient to indemnify
it againt such liens or claims, and if there prove to be any claims
after all payments are made by the owner, the contractor shall
then refund to it al
l
moneys paid in discharging the lien. The
contract also provided that, should the contractor a
t any time
refuse o
r neglect to supply a sufficiency o





the proper quality o
r
fail in any respect to






the agreements therein contained, then the
owner should be a
t liberty, after three days written notice to the
contractor, to provide such material and labor, and also be a
t
liberty to terminate the contract and take possession o
f
the prem
ises and complete the work. There is n
o provision in either the
bond o
r
contract by which the surety is subrogated to the rights
o
f
the contractor, and there is no provision for giving the surety
notice o
f
default by the contractor, except the general one already
quoted.
This particular question, in bonds o
f
this character, has not
often been presented to the courts, but in every instance to which
our attention has been called the rule of strict construction was
not applied. Thus in Monro v. National (Wash.) 92 Pac. 280,





time prescribed for completing the building did not release the
surety from its obligation to pay lien claims for labor and material;
no claim having been made for damages arising out o
f
the delay.





the same subject. The supreme court o
f Okla
homa reached the same conclusion in the case of American v. Scott,
1
8 Okl. 264, 90 Pac. 7. That the strict rule o
f
construction is not
applicable with reference to bonds issued b
y
surety companies











































































































































422 GUARANTY Co. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK [Chap. VIII
A surety company, in the business of issuing bonds of this
character, furnishes its own forms, and is presumed to be acting
advisedly in the selection of the language used, and the intention
of the parties will be ascertained by the rule applicable to insur
ance COntractS.
This rule has been recognized several times in our own court,
for instance: White v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 95
Minn. 77, Io9 N. W. 735: Bader v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., Io2 Minn. 186, 112 N. W. 1065. See also American Surety
Co. v. Pauly, 17o U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 552, 42 L. Ed. 977. When
it fairly appears from the face of the contract what the parties
intended, a strict construction of general statements or of par\: clauses will not be indulged in to vary the evident purposebe accomplished by the instrument.
We regard the omission to serve notice upon the surety com
pany of the failure to complete the buildings within the time
specified to constitute no substantial variance from the terms of
the bond. The contract provided what course should be taken in
such event, and appellant was not prejudiced thereby.
Affirmed.
135. THE UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO.
v. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 233 Ill. 475,
84 N. E. 670. *
Supreme Court, Illinois, 1908.
The contract of the compensated surety is essentially one of
insurance, controlled by the principles of insurance law, and not;
by those of ordinary suretyship. \
Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First Dis- ".
trict;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of
-
Cook county; the Hon. G. A. CARPENTER, Judge, presiding.
We adopt the following statement made by Mr. Justice FREE
MAN in the Appellate Court:
“The bond in question is known as an employer's schedule
bond. In it the guaranty company covenanted and agreed with
the bank, in respect to those of the bank's employees ‘whose name
or names appear in the schedule hereto attached (which is hereby
referred to and made a part of this bond) in respect to whom
the employer requires indemnity of the kind and nature herein
after provided, * * * that it will, at the expiration of three









































































































































Sect. 1] GUARANTY CO V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK 423
-
pany, pay to the employer the amount of any loss or damage that
shall happen to the employer in respect of any funds, property or
estate belonging to or in custody of the employer through the dis
honesty of any of the employees or through any act of omission
or commission of any of the employees done or omitted in bad
faith, and not through mere negligence, incompetency or any error
of judgment, and whether such dishonesty or such act of omission
or commission occurs in the performance of any duty or trust
especially assigned to such employee or occurs otherwise. The
liability, under the terms of the original bond, began January 25,
1001, and terminated one year thereafter unless renewed. is
provided in the bond, among other things, that in case the em






r trustees, or o





a bank, shall be deemed
the knowledge o
f
the employer, unless such officer be in collusion
with the employee through whom the loss occurs. The bond was
subject to renewal from year to year b
y
agreement. The schedule
attached to the bond contained the name o
f
the cashier of the bank,
one Francis B
. Wright, on account o
f
whose defalcation the bank
is seeking to recover on the bond... . . . . . .
“When the term o
f
the original bond was about to expire at
the end o
f
the first year the guaranty company notified the bank,
requesting it to fill in
,
sign and forward a form o
f
certificate
which accompanied the letter, and stating that thereupon a re
newal receipt will be sent to you and remittance for premium can
then b
e made. The certificate which was so signed and forwarded
b
y
the bank was as follows:
“‘To the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company:—
This is to certify that the books and accounts o
f
the persons in





time to time in the regular course o
f business, and we found them
correct in every respect, a
ll moneys handled b
y
them being ac
counted for. They have performed their duties in an acceptable




reason why the guar
anty bond should not be continued.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Delos Dutton, Pres., Employer.
Dated a
t Dundee, Ill., Jan'y 22, 1902.’
“A renewal receipt or agreement was thereupon executed b
y
the guaranty company and forwarded to the bank, which continued









































































































































424 GU.-\R.\NTY co. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK [Chap. VIII
end of the second year, the bond so renewed was about to expire,
the bank was again notified, again executed a certificate as before,
and again received a renewal agreement continuing the bond in
force until January 25, 1904, ‘subject to all the covenants and con
ditions set forth and expressed in said schedule bond heretofore
issuedon the 25th day of January, 1901.-’
“It appears from the evidence, and is not disputed. that the
cashier, W’ right, named in the schedule of the bond, embezzled
the sum of $3000 belonging to the bank during the first year,
while the original bond was in force. During the second year the
sum embezzled was $24,513.75, and the third year, up to the time
of the discovery, the sums misappropriated aggregated $36,050,
making, according to these figures, a total during the three years
of at least $63,563. The discovery was made in November, 1903,
and in August, 1904, the bank brought suit against the guar
anty company, seeking to recover as much of the defalcation as
was covered by the bond, the penalty of which was $10,000. In
April, 1905, while that suit was pending, the guaranty company
filed its bill of complaint now under consideration, on the ground
that its defense to the suit of the bank was not available at law.
Appellee answered and filed a cross-bill, praying that the amount,
due it on the bond be ascertained and for a judgment or decree for\
such amount. The guaranty company offers to pay for so much;
of the defalcation as occurred the first year, while the original
bond was in force, but it seeks to avoid liability for losses which
occurred during the two subsequent years covered by renewals.”
Judah, Willard, I/V o1f 6“ Reichman, for appellant.
Newman, Northrup, L01/inson 6' Becker, and Chester E.
Cleveland, for appellee.
Mr. Justice VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant contends that the two certificates made by the bank
to obtain a renewal contain false representations which render the
certificates void, and that therefore the bond was not in force
except for the first year. The charge of false representations
raises an issue of fact. The burden of proof upon that issue is
upon appellant.
In the two renewal certificates in question, both of which
were alike in form, the president of the bank certifies to the com
\pany that the books and accounts of the cashier “were examined
lb
y
us from time to time in the regular course of business, and we
ifound them correct in every respect, all moneys handled by them











































































































































Sect. 1] GUARANTY CO. V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK 425
statement that the books and accounts of Wright had been exam
ined was not true; that if an examination had been made the
embezzlements of the cashier would have been discovered, and
that the fact that they were not discovered is proof that no exam
inations were made. Appellant further contends that the renewal
certificates extending the original bond for the second and subse
quently for a third year were issued by appellant in reliance upon
the representations contained in the certificates in question.
The bond in question must, we think, be regarded as an
insurance contract ( and as such subject to the rules of construc
| ti' applicable to insurance policies generally, and not the rulesapplied to ordinary sureties for accommodations. (People v. Rose,
174 Ill. 310.) In this case this court, on page 313, said: “Guar
anty insurance is
,
in its practical sense, a guaranty o
r
insurance











r officer, though some
times against the breach o
f
a contract. This branch o
f
insurance
is so much more modern in origin and development than fire,
marine, life and accident insurance that there are few decisions
upon the subject, but the business is gradually increasing and is
doubtless destined to take an important place in the commercial
world. It may be confidently stated, notwithstanding the compara
tive absence o
f specific decisions, that the general printiples applic
able to other classes o
f
insurance are applicable here as well.
Thus, the general doctrine o
f warranty, representation and con
cealment, a
s applied to fire, life and marine insurance, is applic
able also to the subject o
f guaranty insurance.”
Contracts o
f guaranty insurance are made for the purpose o
f
furnishing indemnity to the assured, and they should be liberally
construed to accomplish the purpose for which they were made.
(American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 17o U
.
S
. 133; Guaranty Co. v
.
Mechanics' Savings Bank and Trust Co., 8o Fed. Rep. 766.) The
law is well settled, in it
s application to insurance contracts, that
a misrepresentation o
f
a material fact, in reliance upon which a
contract o
f
insurance is issued, will avoid the contract, and it is
not essential in equity, that such a misrepresentation should be
known to be false. A material misrepresentation, whether made
intentionally and knowingly o
r through mistake and in good faith,
will avoid the policy. (May on Insurance, sec. 181.) We think
there can be no doubt that the representations upon which appel




the president were particularly required b









































































































































426 GUARANTY CO. V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK [Chap. VIII
request of appellant for information upon these points makes the
answer material. (May on Insurance, sec. 185.) The rights of
the parties therefore depend upon whether the representations
were true or false.
By reference to the certificates in question it will be seen that
the statement “that the books and accounts * * * were examined
by us” is followed by the qualifying phrase, “from time to time
in the regular course of business.” There is here no statement
of the character of the examinations or the frequency with which
they were made. There is nothing in the original bond or in the
renewal certificates that required appellee to make examinations
at stated times-or-in-a-particular manner. The character of the
examinations and the frequency with which they were made are
governed by “the regular course of business” of appellee. The
evidence shows that the bank was opened for business about the
first of January, 1901, with a capital stock of $50,000. Soon after
the bank opened it was examined by Mr. Cook, national bank
examiner for Illinois, and he testifies that the bank was duly and
properly organized and that the books of the bank were properly
kept. The examiner testifies, also, that on the occasion of his first
examination he made careful inquiry concerning the character of
the cashier and his fitness for the position, and received nothing
but favorable information. It is shown that the bank was exam
ined, under the direction of the comptroller, subsequently, in the
years 1901, 1902 and 1903. |The bank examiner testifies that he
made a careful and thorough investigation in accordance with
the usual custom and practice of national bank examiners, and
found nothing irregular until the defalcation was discovered, in
the latter part of 1903. \ It was also shown that the bank had a
discount committee, composed of three members of its board of
directors, and that this committee performed the usual duties de
volving upon such committees. The discount committee held
frequent meetings in the bank, examined the books and the notes
and found no irregularities. During the first year the bank dis
counted 739 items that were entered upon the books. All of these
items were bona fide transactions and regularly entered, in due
course of business, on the books of the bank, except one item of
June 6, 1901, which was Wright's personal note, which he dis
counted and entered on the discount register correctly as a note
for $300. The cash book, however, showed that the bank had
paid out on that day $3,000 by a draft on Chicago, payable to the
order of E. Lynn. This was the first embezzlement committed by









































































































































Sect. 1] GUARANTY CO. V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK 427
that the note for $300 was paid in April, 1902, after the first cer
tificate in question was made by the bank. The method adopted
by Wright to conceal his embezzlement in this instance was sub
sequently followed in all of his later embezzlements. He would
make his own note to the bank for a small sum and enter it cor
rectly on the discount register; then he would draw a draft on
Chicago or New York for ten times the amount of the note and
enter the draft on the cash book corresponding to the number
in the discount register of the note discounted. By this method
the cash book would balance correctly and the discrepancy would
not appear unless the cash book and the discount register and
the notes discounted were compared with each other.
The only irregularity in the entire year's business of 1901
consists in one additional cipher being added to the figures
“300" on June 6. Appellant insists that the failure of the bank to
discover this discrepancy is conclusive proof that no examination
was, in fact, made. This conclusion is not warranted by the
facts and circumstances in this record. If it be assumed that an
examination of the bank's books means only such a thorough and
exhaustive examination as would necessarily discover the slightest
irregularity that might exist, however cunningly covered up, then,
of course, appellant's contention would be sound; but this is mani
festly not the meaning of the word “examination” in the certifi
cates in controversy. lf bank officers are to be held to such a
rigid method of examination and supervision over the accounts
of their employees there would be but little necessity, if
,
any,
for purchasing fidelity insurance. When a trusted employee





ployer's money, he a
t
the same time matures his plans for
covering up his wrongdoings. He has many advantages
over his employer, since he knows what the real facts are
and is therefore always on his guard to allay suspicion, while
the employer is ignorant o
f
the real facts and therefore unsuspect
ing. In this case the evidence shows that the defaulting cashier
had an unquestioned reputation for honesty and fidelity, and not
the least suspicion existed that he was not entirely honest and
worthy o
f
the confidence reposed in him. The bank examiner for
the government had examined this bank time and again and found
nothing to arouse his suspicions. Under these circumstances the
fact that the officers of the bank failed to discover the additional
cipher added to the figures “300” among 738 other items on the















































































































































428 GUARANTY Co. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK [Chap. VIII
of this bank within the meaning of the certificates in controversy.
We have so far confined our discussion of this subject to the
conditions as they existed when the first certificate was made,
in January, 1902. If the certificate made at that time contained
no false representations entitling appellant to the relief sought,
it is not necessary to consider the evidence relating to the cer
tificate made in January, 1903. ' the renewal certificate of 1902
is binding upon appellant and had the effect of continuing the
bond in force for that year, then appellant is liable for the full
amount of the decree below, since it is admitted that Wright's
embezzlements during the year 1902 were largely in excess of
the face of the bond. | If appellant's contention as to the con
struction of the certificates be sustained, the result would be that
the making of such a certificate would be an acquittance and
release of the insurance company of all liability that existed on
account of the infidelity of the employee prior to the date of the
certificate. \That such is not the construction put upon these
certificates by the parties is shown by the limitation clause, which
allows one year after the expiration of the bond in which to dis
cover the misconduct of the employee for whose fidelity the in
surance policy is procured. It is probably true that an expert
accountant, in making a thorough and detailed examination into
the affairs of this bank, might have discovered the irregularity of
June 6, 1901; but the officers of this bank were not required by
any clause in the contract to make any such examination as above
supposed, and the certificate to the effect that the books and
accounts of Wright had been examined from time to time, in the
regular course of business, and found correct, carried no assurance
to appellant that such examinations had been made. That the
president and discount committee had from time to time, in the
regular course of business, examined the books and accounts of
the bank and found them correct cannot be disputed under the
evidence in this record. We therefore agree with the conclusion
of the trial court and the Appellate Court that the certificate of
January 22, 1902, was substantially true." It results from this
conclusion that the decree below and the judgment of the Appel
late Court should be affirmed unless the court erred in not award
ing appellee a decree for $20,000.
We do not think that the cross-errors can be sustained. The
renewal certificate contains this provision: “Provided the aggre
gate liability of the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company
from the date of the issuance of said schedule bond to the date









































































































































Sect. 1] GU.\RA1\"l‘Y co. v. FIRsr NATIONAL BANK 429
act or acts of any one of said persons, shall not exceed the sum
written opposite that person’s name upon the attached schedule.”
Appellee contends that each renewal of the bond was equivalent
to the issuing of a new contract, and that it is entitled to recover
$10,000 on the renewal for the year I902 and $10,000 on the
renewal for 1903. Appellee and appellant occupy a novel situation
in respect to the $3000 embezzled in 1901. Appellant’s contention
is that there is but one contract, and that the renewals merely con
tinued that contract in force for the time covered by the renewal
certificates. This being true, appellant concedes that each renewal
would extend the limitation in which the liability was to be dis
covered, one year from the time when the renewal expired. Ap
pellant therefore admits its liability to the extent of $3000 and
offers to pay that amount. On the other hand, appellee contends
that each renewal constitutes a new contract and that the limita
tion commenced to run on the bond of 1901 at the date of its
expiration, and that the embezzlement of June 6, 1901, not having
been discovered by the bank until November, 1903, the company
is not liable to appellee for that item. Thus we have the appel
lant admitting its liability and offering to pay $3000 to appellee,
and appellee trying to convince us that appellant is mistaken about
its liability under the contract of 1901 for this item. Under the
view we take of this case it is not necessary for us to decide which
of these parties has made the better case for the other. In our
opinion the clause above quoted from the renewal certificate pre
cludes appellee from recovering more than the face value of the
original bond, together with the interest thereon.
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SECTION 2. COMPARED WITH THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
136. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO. v.
RIDGLEY, 7o Neb. 622, 97 N. W. 836.
Supreme Court, Nebraska, 1903.
The contract of the compensated surety on a fidelity bond may
be not only between the insurer and insured, but also between the
insurer and the employee.
ERROR to the district court for Lancaster county: EDWARD P.
HoLMES, Judge. Reversed.
Mockett & Polk, for plaintiff in error.
Lionel C. Burr and Elmer E. Spencer, contra.
ALBERT, C.—Harry B. Ridgley, whom we shall call the plain
tiff, for present purposes, may be said to have been the owner
of several stores and engaged in selling goods on the instalment
plan, with headquarters at Des Moines, Iowa; one whom we shall
call the employee was in his employ as manager of such stores
in the city of Lincoln. The plaintiff required the employee to
furnish a fidelity bond, in the sum of $500, whereupon the em
ployee made application therefor to the defendant company, whose
home office is in the city of Baltimore, through its agents at
Lincoln. The application was supported by certain statements in
writing made by the plaintiff, in response to questions propounded
by the defendant, as to the nature of the employee's duties, extent
of his authority in the conduct of the business, etc. The ques
tions were on a printed blank furnished by the defendant and were
preceded by these words: “The company desires to have answers
to the following questions, and these answers will be taken as the
basis of the bond if issued.”
Among such questions and answers are the following:
Q. What will be the title of the applicant's position?
A. Manager Branch Store.
Q. Will he be authorized to pay out of the cash in his
custody any amounts on your account?
A. Commission to agents, and his salary, and salary of his
collector, and remit baiance to me.
Q. Is he required to make deposits in bank; if so how often?
A. Yes.
Q. State whether he is allowed to indorse check, drawn to
your order and for what purpose.









































































































































Sect. 2 GUARANTY CO. V. RIDGLEY 431
Will he be authorized to sign checks on your behalf?
No, sir.
How frequently will he make settlement?
Every Saturday.
What means will you use to ascertain whether his ac
counts are correct?
A. A perfect report system.
Q. How frequently will they be examined?
A. Every Monday morning.
The defendant accepted the application and forwarded the
bond, duly signed and sealed, to his agents through whom the
application was made, who delivered it to the employee upon the
payment by him of the premium thereon.
Among other conditions, appearing on the face of the bond,
are the following:
“And the said employee doth hereby, for himself, his heirs.
executors, and administrators, covenant and agree to and with
the said company, that he will save, defend and keep harmless the
said company from and against all loss and damage of whatever
nature or kind, and from all legal or other costs and ex
penses, direct or incidental, which the said company shall or
may, at any time, sustain, or be put to (whether before or after
any legal proceedings by or against it to recover under this bond
and without notice to him thereof) or for or by reason or in con
sequence of the said company having entered into the present
bond.”
The employee did not sign the bond but forwarded it
,
without
his signature thereto, to the plaintiff who, when he received it
,
examined it no further than to ascertain the amount, which was
satisfactory, and accepted it without knowing that the employee
had not signed it o
r
that his signature thereto was required.
This is an action on the bond brought b
y
the plaintiff against
the defendant to recover for money, securities and other personal
property o
f
the plaintiff which, it is alleged, the employee unlaw
fully converted to his own use.
The bond is made a part o
f




the employee's signature from the bond the plain
tiff alleges:
“That said bond was not so signed and witnessed b
y
said Frank
I. Kelsey the employee, but that said defendant corporation had
full knowledge that said bond was not so signed and witnessed and,
with full knowledge thereof, the president and secretary o
f
said









































































































































432 GU.\R.\NTY co. v. RIDGLEY [Chap.\~'III
the seal of the corporation, delivered said bond to the plaintiff,
who then and at all times herein mentioned was a resident of the
city of Des Moines, Iowa, and from him received and has ever
since retained the premium required to be paid therefor. That,
by reason of the foregoing acts and conduct of the defendant, it
has waived said stipulations and provisions of said bond and is
therefore estopped to deny its liability to plaintiff on said bond by
reason of said omission.”
The defendant answered, putting in issue the allegations of
the petition in avoidance of the omission of the employee to sign
the bond. The answer also contains the following allegations:
“The defendant further alleges that the plaintiff had full
knowledge of the delinquencies of the said Frank L. Kelsey, long
prior to the first day of May, 1901, that the bank account of the
plaintiff, kept by the said Kelsey in the city of Lincoln, was fre
quently overdrawn by said Kelsey with the full knowledge of the
plaintiff, although from exhibit “A” hereto attached he was not
authorized to draw against said bank account except for the
purpose as shown by the weekly reports.
“The defendant further alleges that the statements made and
subscribed to by the defendant in Exhibit “A” were warranties.
That the answers to questions 9 C, 1o A, 1 1, 12 A & B, 14, 15 in said
exhibit “A” are wholly false and were known to be false by the
plaintiff at the time the same were made, and that the duties of
and check upon the said Kelsey were not as set out in said answer,
and that the liability urder said bond was enlarged and varied
from that contained in said written statement, and that no check
whatever was had upon the said Kelsey during the life of said
alleged bond, that he was authorized to and did draw checks
uponthe said bank account, that settlements were not made once a
week as warranted, that there was not a perfect report system or
‘
any other system which would ascertain the condition of the
accounts of the said Kelsey once a week. That there has been a
breach of all of said warranties and that instrument is absolutely
void.”
The foregoing allegations were put in issue by the reply.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment was
given accordingly. The company brings error.
At the close of the testimony the company asked the court to
direct a verdict in its favor, and the overruling of its motion in
that behalf is now assigned as error. There are, perhaps, tech
nical objections to a consideration of that particular assignment,









































































































































Sect. 2] ouanarzrv co. v. mnomv 433
other parts of the record, the objections that might be urged
against their consideration under this assignment will be dis
regarded.
It is tacitly conceded that the omission of the employee’s sig
nature from the bond is fatal to a recovery in this case, unless it
appear that the defendant has waived this omission or is estopped
to urge it as a defense. The plaintiff contends that, by the de
livery of the bond to the employee without requiring him to sign
it
,
the defendant thereby made him its agent for the delivery of
the bond to the plaintiff, and that such delivery, taken in connec
tion with the receipt and retention by the defendant of the
premium, was a waiver of the condition that the bond should be
signed by the employee. In support of this contention the plaintiff
cites Billings v. German Ins. Co., 34 Neb. 502; Burlington Vol
untary Relief Department v. White, 4! Neb. 547; Germ-an Amer
ican Ins. Co. v. Hart, 43 Neb. 441 ; German Insurance 65' Savings
Institutions v. Kline, 44 Neb. 395 ; Rochester Loan fr Banking Co.
v. Liberty Ins. Co., 44 Neb. 537. These cases are all insurance
cases, and the rule underlying them and which is invoked in the
present case is that, where an insurer is informed of defects in
the contract of insurance which would avoid the policy but there
after continues to treat it as binding and thereby induces the
insured to act in the belief that it is binding, it will be held to be
a waiver of such defects. This rule is founded on the doctrine of
estoppel and its application is by no means limited to insurance
cases. The same principle underlies the rule that a bond, perfect
on its face, apparently duly executed by all whose names appear
therein and actually delivered to the principal without stipulation,
reservation or condition, cannot be avoided by the sureties on the
ground that they signed it on the condition that it should not be
delivered unless executed by other persons who did not execute
it
,
when it appears that the obligee had no notice of such condition
and that he had been induced, on the faith of such bond, to act
to his prejudice. A surety who signs a note upon an agreement
with the maker that it shall not be delivered to the payer [payee]
until signed by other sureties cannot plead, against an innocent
payer [payee] without notice of the agreement, the fraud of the
maker in delivering it without the additional sureties. It will be ob
served that one of the essential elements of the rule, whether ap
plied to a policy of insurance, a bond or commercial paper. is a lack
of knowledge on the part of the person for whom the indemnity
was intended of the defects in the contract. The importance of this
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law of suretyship. one of which is that, if the surety signs an
obligation in the body of which another is also named as surety,
on the condition that he shall not be bound unless such other also
sign, and delivers the bond to the principal who delivers it to the
obligee without complying with the condition, the surety is not
bound. Another is that, if the instrument in its body purports to
be signed by the principal but is not so signed, this is sufficient
notice to the obligee that it is imperfect, and the sureties may show
as defense that they signed on condition that the principal should
also sign. 2 Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty, secs. 408, 409, 411.
The importance of this element of the rule is further shown by
the following cases: Nash v. Baker, 40 Neb. 294; Brant v.- Vir
ginia Coal 6' Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326; Pettit v. Johnson, 15 Ark. 55;
Huse v. Den, 85 Cal. 390; Rockwell v. Coffey, 20 Colo. 397; Car
roll v. Turner, 54 Ga. 177; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294;
Wolfe \'. .S‘nlli'van, 133 Ind. 331; Clark v. Coolidge, 8 Kan. 189;
Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. Shartser, 83 Md. 10; Norman v.
Eckern, 6o Minn. 531; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263. There is
a total lack of evidence in this case that the defendant had knowl
edge that the employee had failed to sign the bond. The plaintiff
contends that knowledge of that fact is to be imputed to the de--
fendant because its agents delivered the bond to the employee with
out requesting him to sign it
,
and he was thereby made the agent
of the defendant to deliver the bond to the plaintiff. We do not
think the transaction will admit of that construction. It is true a
contract of this character is a form of insurance, as was held in
People v. Rose, 174 Ill. 310; People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
153 Ill. 25; Shakman v. United States Credit System Co., 92 Wis.
366; Robertson 6' Sons v. United Staves Credit System Co., 57
N. J. aw 12. But it is something more than a contract of insur
a11ce.IA
contract of insurance is usually based on the application
of th insured who pays the premium. and is between him and the
insurer alone. The bond in suit was issued 0n the application of
the employee who paid the premium, and, as drawn, contemplates
not only a contract of indemnity between the plaintiff and the
defendant but also a contract between the defendant and the
employee. By the express terms of the instrument the validity
of the defendant's undertaking td the plaintiff is made to depen
on the formal execution of the instrument by the employee als
\Vhen the defendant delivered the bond to the employee, duly
signed and completed so far as it was then in its power to com
plete it
,
the obligation of the defendant to the employee to furnish
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charged. By the delivery of the bond to the employee the defend
ant did not make him it




r for the delivery of the bond in it
s
then condition
to the plaintiff, but merely gave him what he had bought and paid
for, with the authority to make it effective by the addition thereto
o
f
his signature and it
s delivery to the plaintiff. Such authority was
limited b
y
the express provisions o
f
the instrument itself, and the
instrument therefore carried with it notice to the plaintiff o
f
such
limitation. When it was tendered to the plaintiff it showed on it
s
face that it was incomplete and not a binding contract. That he
omitted to read it and for that reason failed to discover its defects
does not relieve him from the consequence o
f
such defects. To
hold otherwise would be to place a premium on willful ignorance.
Much stress is laid on the fact that the defendant retained the
premium. It is argued that the defendant thereby waived the
signature o
f
the employee to the bond. The premium was paid b
y
the employee, and in consideration thereof the bond was delivered
to him as completely executed as it was within the power o
f
the
defendant to execute £ fact that the employee did not seefit to sign the bond and thereby make it effective would not, of
itself, entitle him to a return o
f
the premium. /To hold otherwise /
would be to say that a party to a contract, upon changing his mind,
is entitled to a return o
f
the consideration paid b
y
him. Besides,





the employee to sign the bond. In the
absence o
f
such knowledge there could be no waiver, because the
term waiver implies knowledge o
f





the person bound b
y
the waiver. Horie v. Home Ins. Co., 32
Conn. 21, 85 Am. Dec. 240; Shaw v. Spencer, Ioo Mass. 382,
97 Am. Dec. 107; Stewart v. Crosby, 5o Me. 130; Dawson v. Shil
lock, 29 Minn. 189. The court should have directed a verdict
for the defendant. What has been said seems to dispose o
f
this
case, but it may not be out o
f place to notice some other questions





the employee's application for the bond are in the
nature o




would defeat a recovery o
n
the bond. See Rice v. Fidelity & De
posit Co., 103 Fed. 427, and cases cited. One o
f
such warranties
is that the employee should not be authorized to sign checks on
behalf o
f
the plaintiff. There is evidence a
t
least tending to show
that the employee had such authority, and the defendant tendered
the following instruction based on such evidence:
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to the defendant on May 28, 1900, as a basis for the issuing of this
bond amount to warranties. If you find from the evidence that
the employee Kelsey was authorized to sign checks on behalf of
the plaintiff, said authorization would be a breach of the warranties
made by plaintiff and he could not recover on this bond.”
The court refused to give the instruction, and its refusal is
now assigned as error. The plaintiff insists that the statements
of the plaintiff show that the employee had authority to draw
checks on the bank for remittance to him, and that the instruction
is therefore too broad. We are unable to find anything in the
plaintiff’s statements that shows that the employee was to have
authority to draw checks for any purpose. One of the state
ments is to the effect that the employee would be allowed to in
dorse checks drawn to the plaintiffs order, “only for remmittance”
to the latter. But when it comes to the specific question, whether
the employee would be authorized to sign checks in the name of the
plaintiff, the answer is an emphatic negative. But the plaintiff
contends that the'defendant must have known from the state
ments, taken together, that the employee was authorized to sign
checks in behalf of the plaintiff for remittance to him, because
they show that the funds were to be deposited in a bank by the
employee, who was required to make remittances thereof from
time to time to the plaintiff. \/Ve are unable to adopt that view.
The authority to sign checks on behalf of the plaintiff for any
purpose, would be almost if not quite equivalent, in the hands
of a dishonest person, to authority to sign checks for all purposes,
and would materially increase the risk the defendant intended to
assume, and we do not think it can reasonably be inferred from
the statements that the defendant understood that such authority
was included.
It may be true. as plaintiff claims, that the parties must have
contemplated that the remittances should be made by draft, and
that the bank would issue such draft only on a check drawn against
the plaintiff’s account. But it does not follow that it was contem
plated that this particular employee should draw the checks. The
plaintiff may have had, or'the defendant may have supposed he
had, some other person in his employ whom he was willing to
trust with authority to draw checks in his name, or that some other
plan would be adopted which would not require this particular
employee to sign the plaintiffs name. The instruction, in our
judgment. should have been given.
A number of other questions are discussed but it does not
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in this court or the court below and, for that reason, they will
not be considered.
It is recommended that the judgment of the district court be
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings accord
ing to law.
BARNES and GLANvILLE, CC., concur.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the
cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
'
Reversed.
SECTION 3. COMPARED WITH THE CONTRACT OF PRIVATE
SURETYSHIP.
137. TEBBETS, et al., v. MERCANTILE CREDIT GUARANTEE
CO., 73 Fed. 95. I9 C. C. A. 281.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1896.
The comjicnsated surety is an insurer and not a: favorite of
the law.
In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York.
This case comes here on writ of error to review a judgment
of the circuit court, Southern dictrict of New York, in favor of
defendant in error, who was defendant below. The action was
brought on a policy of insurance against business losses or “un
collectible debts,” issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs. The
total amount of uncollectible debts for which it was claimed the
defendant was liable under the policy, without deducting the
“initial loss” to be borne by the plaintiffs, was $8,016.56, and they
were adjusted by defendant at that sum. The total gross sales
and deliveries made by the plaintiffs during the period covered by
the policy amounted to $778,015.08. Plaintiffs contended that the
initial loss to be borne by them was one-half of I per cent. of
that sum, which amounts to $3,890.07, and they asked judgment
for the balance of loss. viz. $4,126.29. The defendant insisted that
the initial loss, under the terms of the policy, was $9,000,—a sum
greater than the total loss, as adjusted. The circuit court sus
tained defendant’s contention, and directed a verdict in its favor.
Albert SticI.'nc_v, for plaintiffs in error.
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Before PECKHAM, Circuit Justice, and LACOMBE and SHIP
M .\1\, Circuit Judges.
L.-\co1\1n1:, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above.)
One question only is presented under this writ of error, and it
arises upon the construction of a written instrument. Insurance
against mercantile losses is a new branch of the business of umder
writing, and but few cases deahng with policies of that character
have as yet found their way into the courts. The necessarily nice
adjustments of the respective proportions of loss to be borne by
insurer and insured, the somewhat intricate provisions which are
required in order to make such business successful, and the lack
of experience in formulating the stipulations to be entered into
by both the parties to such a contract, have naturally tended to
make the forms of policy crude and difficult of interpretation.
One of these policies, differing in many respects from the
one under discussion in this case, was before this court in Guar
antee Co. v. Wood, 15 C. C. A. 563, 68 Fed. 529. Of a clause am
biguous in its phraseology and contradictory of other paragraphs
in the contract, the court said:
“As that contract is a voluminous document. prepared by the
company, any ambiguity in its phraseology should be resolved
against the draftsman. * * * If the particular clause requiring
interpretation cannot be brought into harmony with the rest of
the contract, and the instrument considered as a whole is am
biguous touching the precise loss which the policy covers, that
meaning is to be given to it which is most favorable to the
insured.”
In Wallace v. Insurance Co., 41 Fed. 742. the United States
Circuit court for the district of Iowa expresses the same principle
in this language:
“A contract drawn by one party, who makes his own condi
tions, will not be tolerated as a snare to the unwary; and if the
words employed, of themselves, or in connection with other
language used in the instrument, or in reference to the subject
matter to which they relate, are susceptible of the interpretation
given them by the assured, although in fact intended otherwise by
the insurer, the policy will be construed in favor of the assured.”
In Wadsworth v. Tradesmen’s Co., 132 N. Y. 540, 29 N. E.
1104, the court says:
“If this policy is so framed as to promise a payment of $4,000.
and then to impair the promise by the introduction of subsequent
and obscure clauses, difficult to be understood, or requiring expert









































































































































Sect. 3] TEBBETS V. GUARANTY CO. 439
struction which we think the insurer had reason to suppose was
understood by the insured.”
In the light of the well settled principle of law expressed in
these authorities, the contract under consideration must be con
strued. The cases cited by defendant in error holding that a
surety is “a favorite of the law,” and that a claim against him is
strictissimi juris, have no application. Corporations entering into
contracts like the one at bar may call themselves “guarantee” or









business, and with such restrictions o
f
their liability as may seem to
them sufficient to make it safe, undertake to assure persons against
loss, in return for premiums sufficiently high to make such busi
ness commercially profitable. Their contracts are, in fact, policies
o
f insurance, and should be treated as such.
The material parts o
f
the contract under consideration are
a
s follows. First comes the application o
f
the assured:
“No. 2,008. Amount, $15,000.
“The Mercantile Credit Guarantee Company o
f
New York.
“Head Office, 291 Broadway, New York. .













for a contract to purchase from him uncollectible ac
counts in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, for one year from Dec. 31,
1892, in the usual form o
f
contract issued by the company, and upon the
terms and conditions therein specified, and for that purpose selects the
Bradstreet Co. Mercantile Agency as his informant and guide, as desig
nated in said contract, and states that he is engaged in the business o
f
cottons and woolens, at 72 Bedford St., Boston, Mass., and 75-77 Worth:
St., N. Y., and that the amount o
f
his gross sales and deliveries o
f
mer
chandise for cash and on credit, and the percentage of losses on the same,
for the 14 months preceding the 1st day o
f
Dec., 1892, were, respectively,
as follows:
“Gross sales for year ending. . . . . . . . . . . . day o
f
. . . . . . . . . . . . $
“Gross losses not exceeding................................. $
“Gross sales for year ending. . . . . . . . . . . . day of... . . . . . . . . . $
“Gross losses not exceeding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $
“Gross sales for year ending. . . . . . . . . . . . day o
f
. . . . . . . . . . . . $
“Gross losses not exceeding. . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $
“Remarks.
“Cotton sales, Sept 1
, '91, to Dec. 1
, '92, $662,835.65.
“Gross losses, Weis Bros., Galveston, Texas, $479.69.
“Gross losses, M. J. Henry, N
. Y., $844.03.
“Goods sold 2%, 10 days and 30 days; special a/c, 4 months.
“This contract to cover all goods billed since Oct. 1, '92, not provable
under U. S. Credit System Co.'s contract No. 3,909, Series H., Class E
.
Have proved no excess on either cotton o
r
woolen goods under the U. S
.
Credit System Co. contract in 1892. Our woolen sales in 1892 were small
and form no basis for an estimate of probable losses in 1893.









































































































































440 TEBBETS v. GUARANTY co. [Chap. VIII
This application is a printed form. The parts italicized and
all subsequent to the word “Remarks” were originally blank, and
have been filled in with ink, presumably before the application was
finally presented for action. On the reverse side of the application
are a number of so-called “Special Terms and Conditions.” In
the record they cover 3% printed pages. The first few lines are
all that are material here. They read as follows:
“(Gum this margin to the contract.)
:Form N0. 7. Special Terms and C0nditi_ons of Contract. No. 2,008.
(1) This contract is issued on the basis that the yearly sales and
deliveries of the indemnified are between $1,8oo,ooo and $2,5oo,ooo dollars,
and shall only,” etc.
The parts italicized were originally blank, and have been
filled in with ink. The material parts of the policy itself are as
follows:
“No. 2,oo8. , $15,oo0
“The Mercantile Credit Guarantee Company, in consideration of the
sum of $472.50, hereby agrees to purchase from Tebbets, Harrison 6' Rob
ins, of . . . . .., an amount not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars of uncol
lectible debts owing for merchandise, sold and delivered in the regular
course of business between Dec. 31, 1892, at 12 o'clock noon, and Dec. 31,
I893, at 12 o’clock noon, on the total gross sales and deliveries made during
said period in excess of one-half of one per cent., subject to the terms
and conditions printed below and attached hereto.”
The italicized parts were originally blank. Then follow, in
the body of the policy, 13 terms and conditions and the execution
clause. Upon a blank space left in the body of the contract is
pasted an exact copy of the special terms and conditions, of form
No. 7, as above set forth.
The opening statement of what the consideration is, and of
what the company agrees to do in return for such consideration,
is awkwardly phrased, but, without resort to anything outside
of the policy, expresses the following agreement: The company
will buy of the assured—i. e. will pay to the assured— the amount
of certain uncollectible debts. These uncollectible debts must be
such as are owing for merchandise sold and delivered during the
year 1893. The amount of such debts which the company will
pay must be a part of the whole amount of debt arising on the
total gross sales and deliveries made during the year. It must
also be debt in excess of one-half of 1 per cent. on such total gross
sales; and in no event will the company pay more than $15,000.
In other words, of the total uncollectible debts arising on sales and
deliveries during the year, the assured is first to bear an initial









































































































































Sect. 3] TEBBETS v. GUARANTY co. 4.41
deliveries during the year ; and the residue of uncollectible debts
the company is to buy from the assured, up to the limit of
$15,000. It is not disputed that this is precisely what the first
clause of the contract provides, nor that, if it stood alone, such
would be the obligation which the company assumed. Moreover,
it is unambiguous. Crude and complicated though its Phraseology
is
,
it is susceptible of no other construction. It is,_ however,
qualified by the words “subject to the terms and conditions printed
below, and attached hereto.” This clause imports into the contract
both the I 3 general terms and conditions printed in the body of the
policy, and also the special terms and conditions of form 7, which
are attached to it. The only question presented here is whether
these terms and conditions, or any of them, so qualify the contract
expressed in the opening sentence of the policy as to change the
amount of the initial loss from one-half of one per cent. of the
total gross sales during the year to some other sum. The only
clause which it is contended has this effect is the special condition
above quoted and which reads as follows:
“This contract is issued on the basis that the yearly sales
nd deliveries of the indemnified are between $1,8oo,ooo and
2,500,000 dollars.”
The defendant insists that this is a stipulation on the part of
the insured that during the year 1893 his total gross sales and
deliveries shall be, at least, $1,800,000, and that the one-half of
one per cent. of initial loss shall be calculated at least on that
sum. The plaintiffs insist that this is merely an estimate as to
the amount of the plaintiff's probable sales in the future, and
supplies a basis for an estimate of plaintiflis’ probable losses in the
future. It will be noted that the form of application contains blanks
manifestly intended to be filled with statements of the total sales
and total losses for three years preceding the application. These,
as plaintiffs contend, would furnish data from which to make
an estimate of probable sales and losses for the ensuing year.
These blanks are not filled in plaintiffs’ application, possibly be
cause the firm _had not been in business for three years. A state
ment of their sales and losses in the cotton business for 14 months
is given, with the addition that their woolen sales in 1892 were
small. and form no basis for an estimate of probable loss in 1893.
In support of their respective contentions, counsel have pre
sented arguments based on the grammatical structure of the spe
cial condition. On the one side, it is urged that the clause reads
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7
been.’ On the other side, it is urged that the phrase beginning,
“this contract is issued on the basis,” etc., refers to the issuance
or inception of the contract, rather than to its construction; that
the word “yearly” carries the idea of a series of years; that the
use of the word “are,” instead of “shall be” or “are to be,” imports
a present expectation, not a future stipulation. Arguments based
merely upon grammatical construction, however. are of little aid
towards the interpretation of this contract. If its draftsman
possessed any appreciation of grammatical niceties, he has left
no trace of it apparent upon the face of the document. The spe
cial condition is so phrased that it is susceptible of interpretation
either way: and there are difficulties about accepting either inter
pretation. If it be construed as a statement of what it was estimated
would be the range _0f total sales for the year, it is manifestly an
arbitrary estimate, greatly in excess of what the experience of the
I4 prior months apparently warranted ; and no good reason is sug
gested why any such mere “estimate” should be inserted in the
body of the contract at all. The representations of the insured
as to what his past sales and losses had been were already made
a material part of the contract, by a general condition providing
that “fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation in obtaining this
contract ** * shall render this contract absolutely void.” On
the other hand, while it is manifest that, in order to make insur
ance business of this kind practicable, some definite initial loss
must be borne by the insured, it nowhere appears that such initial
loss may not with perfect safety be proportioned to the total gross
sales, for presumably, the gross losses would vary as the gross
sales. And, in fact, even on defendant’s construction of the
phrase, the initial loss is a variable quantity. The basis provided
for is that the yearly sales are “between $1,800,000 and $2,500,
ooo.” If they be $1,800,000, the initial loss would be $9.000. If
they be $2,000,000, the initial loss would be $10,000. If they be
$2,500,000, the initial loss would be $12,500. Moreover, if the
clause be construed so as to import a stipulation that the business
done shall not be less than $1,800,000, it must be construed as
importing also a stipulation that the business done shall not ex
ceed $2, 5oo,ooo,—a most extraordinary agreement for any busi
ness man to enter into, and certainly one not to be read into this
contract by any doubtful language. Under defendant’s interpre
tation, if the initial loss is to be in no event, however small the
sales, less than $9,000, the initial loss can in no event, however
great the sales, exceed $12,50o. The result would be that, al
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be required to bear an initial loss not of $20,000 (one-half of I
per cent. of the gross sales), but of $12,500 only, the same amount
he would be required to bear if his sales were only $2,500,000,
although the increase in total sales necessarily increased the total
losses. It is hardly conceivable that an insurance company would
enter into such a reckless stipulation, and no such meaning is to be
given to the policy upon any doubtful language.
We have, then, in the contract. a positive and unambiguous
agreement on the part of the company to pay losses (to the amount -
of $15,000) in excess of one-half of 1 per cent. on total sales.
The only other sentence in the policy which it is claimed modifies
this definite agreement is one which is itself ambiguous, equally ‘. /
. . y
susceptible of a construction favorable to the company and of one
favorable to the insured. Under the rule laid down in the author
ities above quoted, the ambiguous sentence is to be given the
meaning which the insurer had reason to suppose the insured
would attach to it; and that is such a meaning as would not oper
ate to contradict or modify to his disadvantage the precise and
unambiguous promise that the initial loss should be one-half of
I per cent. of the total gross sales and deliveries for the year 1893,
or, as expressed in the very beginning of the application, “Indem
nified stands }/
2 of 1%.”























































































































































































































































































guarantor entitled to notice of, when, I29, 131, 400.
not liable without notice of, by guarantee, 397.
one who offers his name as guarantor to whomsoever may accept
offer is entitled to notice of, 400.
notice of, when necessary, 143-147.
reasonable time for notice of, I72-174.
ACT,
married woman’s, of New York, contract under, 188.
ACTION,
cause of, accrues as against surety, when, 241.
existing in favor of principal, surety entitled to set off against
demand by creditor, 333.
surety cannot set up, by way of counterclaim, when, 335.
construction of “no action shall be brought,” 6-23.
for contribution, against whom, I14.
arises from implied undertaking, 273.
when lies against principal, promise of third person within statute,
I04.
none lies against party undertaken for, promise of third person,
original, 102.
none lies upon promise not in writing, 88.
ADDRESSEE,
in special guaranty, a particular firm, 150.
ADJUDICATION,
against principal, effect upon surety, 302.
Aonaanaur,
construction of, how reached, 40.
word “agreement,” 27-49.
coupled with word “promise,”note p. 27.
distinction between, and promise, 27.
embraces considerartion for promise as well as promise itself, 27.
import of, 35, 36.
meaning of, as used in fourth section of statute of frauds, 27.
oral, to share commissions and losses on stock exchange transactions
not within statute, 72. . .











































































































































to convert a separate into a joint debt is not within the statute, 59, 61.
pay debt of another may be proved by parol, 3.
use of, in English statute, 37.
what constitutes new agreement, 70, 71, 293, 294.
see, also, contract.
ALIQUOT-PART,
basis of determining in actions for contribution, 271.
measure of recovery, 273.
when surety may compel co-sureties to exonerate him to extent of
their, 287.
ALTERATION,
if change in original contract from its nature is beneficial to surety,
surety not discharged, 296.
of bond by act of legislature, effect of, 301.
when a defense, 392.
of contract, defense founded upon, 293.
surety not released, when, 30I.
of principal's contract, effect on surety, II4, 220, 224, 296, 298, 301,
302, 304, 306, 307.
AMBIGUoUs WoRDs,
employed by surety, effect of, 224.
interpretation of, 215.
view that they should be construed most strongly against promisor,
2I5.
when not binding, 212-214.
ANOTHER PERSON,
debt of, oral promise to pay within statute, 123.
promise to answer for, void if not in writing, 107.
promise to pay, 56.
made to creditor, 26.
BANK,
a debtor to depositor, 360.
absolute owner of money, 360.
right of, to apply depositor's account to satisfaction of debt, 360.
BLANKs,
in bond, authority to fill, 392.
BoND,
alteration of, by statute, effect on surety, 301.
when a defense, 304, 392.
blanks in, authority to fill, 392.
delivery of, by sureties to principal, sufficient to make their obliga
tion complete, 205.
for security for public work, statute concerning, function of, 114.
form of, 314.
condition, 387.











































































































































official, right of legislature to alter, 301.
penalty of, as limit of liability, 119.
signer bound to know contents unless prevented by fraudulent de
vise, 324.
surety on, not holden, when, 314.
of obligee's employee, how released, 298.







guaranty of, what amounts to, 181.
CoMPENSATED SURETY SHIP,







of material facts ground for invalidating contract, 400.
CoNDITION,
dehors his written contract, surety signing upon, 209.
of bond, form of, 387.
precedent to guarantor's liability, what constitutes, 181, 183.
CoNSENT,
subrogation not resting in, but in conscience, 252.
CoNSIDERATION,
assumption of responsibility a sufficient, 86.
contract of guaranty must be for a, 192.
difference between past and future, 143-146.
failure of, may be shown by surety, when, 335.
for promise to pay debt of another provable by parol, 48.
need not be expressed in writing, 46.
forbearance sufficient to support oral promise of executor to pay
debt of testator, 2.
if any part illegal, whole is void, 198-202.
money paid on oral agreement for purchase of lands is paid without,
2O.
mutual obligations of parties as, 224.
nature of, required, 196.
need not be recited in promise to pay debt of another, 32.
not required by statute to be set forth upon the written contract;











































































































































of general guaranty, 143.
parol evidence in proof of, inadmissible, 27.
promise without, made by father for minor son not actionable, 125.
sufficiency of, to support oral promise to pay debt of another, 1.
what constitutes, 143.
when new, required to support guaranty, 194.
no proof of distinct, necessary, 192.
promisor is beneficially interested in, 77.
- where moving consideration for promise is liability of third person,
there promise must be in writing, 70, 71.
see, also, contract.
CoNSTRUCTION,




alteration of, defense founded upon, 293.
effect on surety, 301, 306, 307.
competent parties to, 188-192.
construction of, 114, 116, 212-230.
in absolute guaranty, 163.
in conditional guaranty, 185.
in continuing guaranty, 158.
promise to answer for default of another, 220.
contribution among co-sureties not founded on, 277.
-
effect of change in original, on surety, 296. -
execution and delivery necessary, when, 204.




f principal is illegal, assuring is equally so, 313.
interpretation o
f
correspondence forming, in continuing guaranty, 161.






not enforceable as such, not the foundation o
f
legal obligations, 20.
of assurer when binding, 204, 215.
of compensated surety essentially one of insurance, 422.
of compensated surety on fidelity bond may be not only between in
surer and insured, but also between insurer and employee, 430.
o
f guaranty and that o
f indemnity distinguished, 72, 74.
collateral, 126.
how differs from other, 143, 144.
indemnity, not within statute, 84, 95, 100.
when tainted by illegality o
f transaction, 198.
of infant, see infant.
of insane person, see lunatic; insane person.
of married woman as surety, 188.












































































































































of surety companies, contract of insurance, 419.
of suretyship, direct, 126.
execution and delivery, 204-211.
of guaranty and suretyship distinguished, I29.
requisites of, 188-211.
right of surety to be subrogated not dependent upon, when, 245.
subrogation does not rest in, 252, 260.
suretyship indicated by joint, 131.
to secure faithful performance of, function of bond of contractor
for public works, 114.
under statute of frauds, 6.
void under statute of frauds, a mere nullity, 20.
when principal and assuring, executed at different times, 194.
concurrently, 192.
CONTRACTOR,
for public work, bond required of, 114.
surety liable on bond of, 119.
CONTRIBUTION,
action for, arises from implied undertaking, 269.
not by force of express contract, 269
among co-sureties, what is, 277.
as a rule in equity, 277.
at law each co-surety is liable to contribute only his proportionate
share, 271.
co-sureties entitled to, 282.
equitable before payment, 287.
founded on equality -and established by law of all nations, 277.
liability for, in action at law, 273.
suits in equity, 273.
measure of recovery in action at law, 271.
no express contract for, 269.
origin of doctrine of, 269.
results from maxim that equality is equity, 269.
right of, 269-283.
when right to, accrues, 271.
see, also, contract.
Coneorurrron,
commercial or industrial, contract of guaranty or suretyship of, I91.
Connasponnanca,
interpretation of, forming the contract of continuing guaranty, 161.
CO-SURETIES,
contribution between, of equitable origin, 269.












































































































































when parol evidence admissible to prove agreement to be liable as,
273.
sureties bound severally are, 282.




surety cannot set up, by way of, cause of action existing in favor
of principal against plaintiff creditor, 335.
CountER-SECURITY,
right of creditor to benefit of, 407.
CoveNANT,
when surety liable on, notwithstanding covenant of principal void, 321.
CoverTURE,
effect on surety if covenant of principal is void for, 321.
CREDITOR,
bound to diligence to exonerate surety, 365.
exercise only ordinary care to prevent loss, 351.
dealings of, with succeeding partner discharges surety, when, 231.
diligence required of, 183.
entitled to benefit of any collateral securities which debtor has given
to Surety, 4 II.
failure of, to sue debtor at surety's request, 340.
to use money within his control in payment of his claim, effect
of, 360.
how bound to respect rights or equities of surety, 231.
if information is withheld by, respecting principal, creditor must
suffer and not surety, 372.
must show notice of acceptance, when, 400.
not entitled to be subrogated to mortgages given by co-sureties, when,
4I3.
refusal of, to sue principal debtor does not discharge surety, 366.
right of subrogation to surety's securities, 407, 4II, 413.
to benefit of counter-security given by debtor to, 407.
DEBT,
future, guaranty of, within statute, 113.
none against principal, none against surety, 325.
of another, promise to answer for, not dependent upon form of ex
pression, 77.
promise to answer for, 77.
to pay, within statute, 91, 112, 123.
right of surety to be subrogated on payment of, 245.
to charge person with, undertaking must be clear and explicit, 212.











































































































































transfer of property to third person in consideration of agreement
of, to pay debt, 65.
DEFALCATIONS,
future, liability of surety for, 387.
D1-tFaum,
notice of, in absolute guaranty, 172.
of principal not essential to recovery from surety, 404.
of another, construction of contract for promise to answer for, 220.
DaF1-zusn,
founded upon absence of liability of principal debtor to creditor, 313
325
absence of notice of acceptance of guaranty and of default of
principal, 397-406.
extinguishment or suspension of liability of principal debtor to
creditor, 325-333.
failure of creditor to sue debtor at surety’s request, 365-368.
failure of creditor to use money within his control to pay debt,
354-364.
fraud or misconduct of principal toward surety, 390-396.
lack of notice to guarantor of principal’s default, 172.
material alteration of contract, 293-313.
non-disclosure by obligee of facts he ought to reveal to surety,
368-377
principal debtor’s right of set-off or counter-claim against credi
tor 333‘339
retention of principal in service after knowledge of his dishon
estyv
surrender or loss of securities by creditor, 340-354.
DELIvERY,
of contract essential, 204.
principal empowered to make, effect of, 209.
DEMAND,
of payment, must be made, when, 192, 193.
DILIGENCE,
exercise of, by creditor required, when, 183.
of creditor cannot be demanded when, 166.
what constitutes due, 181, 182.
DURESS,
a personal defense, 324.
to principal will not avoid obligation of -surety, 324.
EMPLOYEE,
retention of, after knowledge of his dishonesty, 387.
EourrraS,











































































































































contract of married woman may be enforced in, under what circum
stances, 188-190.
contribution between sureties originated with courts of, 269.
solvent sureties must divide loss between them in, 271.
subrogation the creation of 260.
surety can compel principal to exonerate him, in, 284.
-when subrogation is -an, 252-254.
EvIDENCE,
parol, -admissible to prove agreement to be liable as co-sureties, when,
273.





of a promise to contribute is employed by common law courts to ob
tain jurisdiction, 269.
FORBEARANCE,
effect of, upon surety, 137-138.
sufficient consideration to support promise, 2, 3.
FOR!-‘EITURE,, .
agreement for, within statute, when, 20.
FRAUD,
creditor chargeable with, must suffer and not surety, 372.
in absence of, when surety is liable, 317.
of principal cannot be set up by surety as defense, when, 390.
towards surety, 392.
surety is released if obligee has knowledge that sure'ty’s signature was
secured by, 394.
on bond of employee who had previously defrauded employer
cannot avoid liability on bond because of non-communica
tion of facts, if unknown to obligee, 374.
FUTURE LIABILITY,








absence of notice to, of acceptance of guaranty, 172.
and surety distinguished, 126—139.
cannot be sued with his principal, 163.












































































































































discharged by laches, when, 183.
engagement of, individual contract, 163.
entitled to notice, when, 129, 131, 400.
liability of, distinct from principal’s, 163.
not liable without notice of acceptance by guarantee, 397.
notice to, in special guaranty, 150.
of collection, obligation of, discharged, when, 183.
payment contrasted with guarantor of collection, 183.
payment, position of, that of surety, 166.
undertakes to perform contract if principal cannot, 137.
see, also, surety.
GUARANTY,
absolute, defined, 163, 166, 172.
form of 166.
what constitutes, 166—171.
addressed to no person in particular is general, 139.
collateral, contract of, 126.
concealment of dishonesty of servant—discharge of surety, 377.
conditional, 181, 183, 185.
construction of, 143, 185.
continuing, construction of the contract, 158.
contract of, must be for a consideration, 192.
interpretation of correspondence forming contract, 161.
limited as to amount, 158, 159.
what does not amount to, 154, 155.
contract of, as regards commercial or industrial corporaiton, 191.
differs how from other contracts, 143.
incomplete without acceptance, 397.
made only by mutual assent of parties, 397.
defined, 163, 164, 166-169.
distinguished from contract of surety, 126, 131.
from indemni-ty, 72, 74.
for single dealing, form of, 154.
general, consideration, notice, construction, 143.
general, may be enforced by any one who acts upon it
,
139.




rule of construction, 154.
not enlarged by construction, 224.
notice of, when necessary, 129.
of collection distinguished from guaranty of payment, 183.
what amounts to, 181.











































































































































of payment defined, 183.
form of, 163, 166.
not discharged by neglect to fix liability of indorser, 404.
not discharged by principal’s failure to take proceedings against
creditor, 404.
scope of, 163.
undertaking without condition, 404.
offer or proposal, when, 397.
right to revoke, 131.
special, as to persons, 150.
undertaking of, contrasted with that of surety, 166.
what amounts to, 161.
when a complete obligation, 172.




nothing can be added by way of, 137, 138.
INDEMNITY,
action for, when accrues, 241.
contract of, given to surety by third person does not relieve principal
of liability, 243.
made in furtherance of an unlawful scheme illegal and void, 198.
not within statute, 84, 95, 100.
principal with surety to indemnify him, takes effect, when, 240.
distinguished from guaranty, 72, 74.
law implies promise on part of principal debtor to indemnify surety,
238.
no, implied if consideration for suretyship is illegal, 198.
oral promise for, valid when, 91.
promise to indemnify, 84-102.
to indemnify implied, 238.
promisor’s right of against principal, 238.
retiring partner’s right to, 231.
right of, 238-245.
securities taken for, trusts, 411.
surety who ‘has paid debt of principal has claim upon him for, 241.
view that contract of, must be in writing, 88.
when right arises, 240.
see, also, contract; guaranty.
INFANT,
contract of, as surety voidable, note p. 188.
surety on contract of, liable, 319.
Insane PERSON,
not liable on contract as surety, note p. 188.
INSURANCE,
contract of, compensated surety one of, 422.











































































































































compensated surety is, and not a favorite of the law, 437.
contract of compensated surety may be not only between, and insured,
but between insurer and employee, 430.
INTENTION,
governs, when, 205.
see, also, contract; promise.
INTERPRETATION,
of correspondence, in continuing guaranty, 161.
JoINT DEBTORS,
sureties stand in relation to each other of, 283.
JoINT LIABILITY,
if promisor is jointly liable for debt with principal his contract
to pay is not within statute, 59.
JUDGMENT
against principal, how far binds surety, 302.
JURISDICTION,
fiction of promise to contribute employed by common law courts
to obtain, 269.
LACHES,
sufficient to discharge guarantor, 183.
LETTER of CREDIT,
effect of, when general, 157.
special, defined, 143.
LIABILITY,
absence of, of principal debtor to creditor, 314.
penalty named in bond, limit of, 282.
LIMITATIONs,




surety on contract of, liable, 319.
MARRIED WomAN,
surety on contract of, liable, 321.
MEMORANDUM or NoTE,
construction of words “memorandum or note” 49.
one having remedy against principal cannot have action against
assurer save upon, IO4.
MERCANTILE GUARANTIES,
either general or special, 150-152.
see, also, guaranty
MERCANTILE LAw AMENDMENT,
when adopted in England, note p. 27.
MINOR,












































































































































as used in statute, meaning of, 123.




of principal, how affects surety, 390, 392.
see, also, surety.
MoNEY,




vendor of land, subject to, which vendee agrees to pay is in position
of surety, 235.
when not security for payment of principal debt, 413.
MoTIVE,
inducing concealment of obligee not material, 368.
MUNICIPALITY,
surety on obligation of, liable when, 317.
NoTICE,
absence of, when defense to guarantor, 172.
guarantor entitled to, when, 129, 150, 400.
necessary when, 172.
of acceptance, see acceptance.
of default in absolute guaranty, 172.
of principal is not essential to recovery from surety, 404.
of general guaranty, 143.
of non-payment, when to be given, 192, 193.
when obligee not put on, effect of, 209.
OBLIGATION,
none implied against surety, 220.
of surety not avoided by duress of principal, 324.
ORIGINAL UNDERTAKING,
basis of collateral or secondary promise, 59.
see, also, promise.
PAROL EVIDENCE,
no resort can be had to, to add to incomplete writing, 19.
see, also, evidence.
PARTNER,
co-partners as sureties, when, 314.
continuing, bound to indemnify retiring partners, 231.
dealings of creditor with, discharges surety, when, 231.
retiring, cannot give note in partnership name after dissolution, 231.
entitled to indemnity, 231.
surety, when, 231.











































































































































by surety not new consideration, 241.
of debt, right of surety to be subrogated on, 245.
PENALTY,
stavted in bond limit of liability, 119, 282.
PRINCIPAL,
absence of liability of, to creditor, defense to surety, 314.
being presumptively liable, the assurer’s promise is void unless in
writing, 107.
cause of action existing in favor of, surety entitled to set off against
demand by creditor, 333.
claim barred as against, by statute of limitations, not necessarily
barred as against surety, 327.
barred as against surety also, 325.
compelled to exonerate surety, when, 284.
contract of, see contract.
duress of, no defense to surety, when, 324.
duty of, to exercise -good faith toward surety, 387.
fraud of, towards surety, 390, 392.
on part of, to withhold knowledge of employee’s previous dis
honesty, 387.
if creditor withholds information respecting, creditor and not surety—
must suffer, 372.
running of statute of limitations is suspended as to, it is sus
pended as to surety also, 329.
implied promise of, to indemnify surety, 241.
judgment against, not res judicala against surety, 302.
not relieved of liability, when, 243.
one having remedy against, cannot have action against assurer save
upon memorandum or note in writing, 104.
retention of, in service after knowledge of his dishonesty, 387.
surety of, not bound unless principal is, 314.
upon promissory note given by school district as, liable when, 317.
undertakes to perform contract of, if principal does not; guar
antor if principal cannot, 137.
whenever discharged on note, surety is also, 319, 320.
PROMISE,
assurer’s, void unless in writing, when, 107.




declaration is required to be special, 70, 72.
within statute, 102.
consideration for, what sufficient, 46, 86.
coupled with word “agreement,” note p. 27.
distinction between, and agreement, 27.











































































































































fiction of a, to contribute, employed by common law courts to
obtain jurisdiction, 269.
for reimbursement, within statute, 91.
guaranty of future liability within statute precisely as it would be
if liability existed when promise was made, 113.
how to determine whether original or collateral, 109.
implied by law, not within statute, 23.
in writing, to pay debt of another, not valid unless it show whole
terms of contract, 19.
interest in transaction as affecting character of, 77.
joint, to pay debt of one is original undertaking between promisors
and promisees and not within statute, 59.
made to creditor to pay debt of third person, when original, 65.
not within statute, 55-103.
on part of principal debtor to indemnify surety, implied by law, 238.
oral, evidence required to establish, 3.
invalid when debt remains payable by debtor, 107.
of executor to pay debt of testator good at common law, 2.
to pay debt of another, good at common law, 1.
not a valid consideration for a subsequent promise in writing,
19.
out of property of debtor placed in hands of promisor for
that purpose not within statute, 70.
valid and enforceable where made, not enforceable under statute,
15.
original and collateral contrasted, 59, 61, 77, 82, 95, 109.
what constitutes, 65.
special, construction of words “special promise,” 23-26.
to answer for ‘another, construction of, 23.
to answer for another, not ‘within statute if made to debtor, 26.
debt of another, within statute, 112-114.
default of another, 114-123.
construction of contract, 220.
to answer for miscarriage of another, within statute, 123-126.
to become answerable for debt may be shaped as an indemnity, 88, 90.
to indemnify, 84-102.
is implied, 238.
one for becoming guarantor for third person not within statute,
86.
to pay for goods supplied to third person not within statute, 56.
to pay for work already done without previous contract with or by
promisor is within statute, 112.
when one person induces another to indemnify him, not within
statute, I00.
when party for whom made, liable, 104-112.












































































































































without consideration and not in writing made by father for minor
son not actionable, 125.
written, to pay debt of another good without recital of considera
tion, 32.
PROMISOR,
original, what constitutes, 55-65.
undertaking to pay for work already done without previous contract
with, is within statute, 112.
when beneficially interested in consideration, 77.
virtually discharging his own debt, 65-77.
PROMIssoRY NoTE,
guarantor of payment of, not jointly liable with maker thereof, 163.





distinction between legal and equitable, 273.
RESOLUTION
of common council entered upon record constitutes a memorandum
or note, 49.
SEAL,
effect of addition to surety’s contract, 306.
SECURITIES,
collateral, creditor entitled to, when, 411.
when mortgages are not, 413.
SIGNATURE,
no consideration for, 196, 197.
time of, effect of, 194, 195.
without authority, effect of, 317.
SPECIAL GUARANTY,
can only be enforced by the one to whom addressed, 150.
see, also, guaranty.
SPECIAL PROMISE
to answer for debt of another, void if not in writing, 107.
see, also, promise.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs,
applies only to promises made to a person to whom another is
answerable, 26.
only to promises which are in the nature of guaranties for some
original or primary obligations to be performed by another,
59, 61.











































































































































construction of, applies only to promises made to the person to
whom another is answerable, 26.
applies only when contract is executory, 6.
not intent of, to enforce a promise before invalid, merely
because it was put in writing, 27.
operates only to prevent enforcement of contract by suit, 6.
surety having paid debt in pursuance of his oral promise may
recover from original debtor, 9.
words “no action shall be brought,” 6-23.
words “special promise,” 23-26.
word “agreemcnt,” 27-49.
words “memorandum or note,” 49.
contemplates -the mere promise of one man to be responsible for
another and cannot be interposed as a cover and shield
against the actual obligations of defendant himself, 77, 82.
contract of indemnity, not within, 95, 100.
void under, a mere nullity and cannot be used for any purpose, 20.
doctrine of Thomas v. Cook, as to an oral promise of indemnity
against liability as surety, 84.
fourth section of, applies only to procedure, 15.
guaranty of future liability, within, 113.
has no operation as between original debtor and his guarantor, 9.
if promisor is jointly liable for debt with principal his contract to
pay is not within, 59.
in Michigan Compiled Laws, notes pp. 19, 21.
joint promise to pay debt of one not within, 59.
not applicable to promise of third person who receives money or
property of debtor, 65.
not operative as between original debtor and his guarantor, 9.
operates upon contract only while it is executory, 11.
to prevent enforcemeent of oral promise though valid and
enforceable w’here made, 15.
oral agreement for purchase of lands, void under, 20.
to share commissions and losses, not within, 7 .
to answer for default of another within, 112.
to pay debt of another out of property of debtor
place\d
in hands
of promisor for that purpose, not within, 70.
parol promise not to be performed within a year from its making,
not enforceable by reason of, 15.
prohibits suits upon certain contracts, but does not make them void, 11.
promise for reimbursement, within, 91.
promise, not within, when, 56-103.
to answer for default of another, within, 107.
to answer for miscarriage of another, within, 123.
to indemnify does not fall within either the words or the policy
of the statute, 84.













































































































































compensated, essentially one of insurance and not ordinary sure
tyship, 422.
to pay for work already done without previous contract with or
employment by promisor, within, II2.
secondary or collateral promises, within, 59.
text of fourth section—note 4, p. 6.
true test whether statute applies or not, 95.
when agreement to assume and pay debt not within, 65.
within, when, Ioq-126.
STATUTE of LIMITATIONs,
begins to run, when, 243.
claim barred as against principal by, is not necessarily barred as
against surety, 327.
debt barred as to principal, barred as to surety, 325.
if running of is suspended as to principal, it is to surety also, 329.
runs against what claim, 241.
STATUTE of UNITED STATEs,
providing for security for public works 114.
STRICTISSIMI JURIs,
liability of surety is, 298.
meaning of, 224.
SUBROGATION,
creation of equity, 260.
creditor's right of, to surety's securities, 407, 411, 413.
creditors not entitled to, when, 413.
definition of, 260.
does not rest in contract, 252, 260.
right of, 245-268.
when volunteer not entitled to, 264.
why enforceable in equity, 252.
SURETY,
ambiguous words not binding on, when, 212-214.
and guarantor distinguished, 126-139.
cannot recover back money voluntarily or coercively paid by him, 6.
set up fraud as defense, when, 390.
claim barred as against principal by statute of limitations is barred as
against, also, 325.
not necessarily barred against, 327.
of, against principal debtor, not barred by latter's discharge in
insolvency, 241.
collateral securities taken by, are for benefit of creditor, when, 411.
companies, contracts of, are contracts of insurance, 419.
compensated, is an insurer and not a favorite of the law, 437.
concealment of facts will discharge, when, 400.
construction of contract of, 212, 220.
contract of, at common law construed most strongly against obligee,
2I2.











































































































































indemnity given to, by third person, does not relieve principal
of liability, 243.
married woman, as, 188.
must be strictly construed, 114-116.
not binding until delivered, 204.
not enlarged by construction, 220.
to be construed according to rules that apply to all con
tracts, 215.
contract with, to indemnify principal, takes effect, when, 240.




delivery of bond by, to principal, sutficient to make obligation com
plete, 205.
discharged, when, 131, 296, 297, 306, 319, 320, 340, 387, 394.
effect of ambiguous language employed by, 224.
on, if creditor withholds information respecting principal, 372.
of release by creditor of lien upon another security, 340.
entitled to benefit of securities taken by creditor, 340.
notice of employee’s dishonesty, 387.
pro rata share of dividend derived from assets of principal, 335.
recover full amount of note although he had not paid note, 285.
remedies of creditor against principal debtor, 269.
securities held by principal, 407.
set-off against demand by creditor, 333.
stand in place of principal creditor, 269, 407.
equities of, must be respected, 231.
exonerated by compelling principal to perform, 284.
from liability on failure of creditor to file for record mortgage,
354
In hke manner with guarantor, 356-358.
to extent of their aliquot part by co-sureties, 287.
to extent to which he is prejudiced by an omission of creditor
to act, 356-358
for ‘honesty of servant, effect on, if master continues to employ
servant with knowledge of his dishonesty, 377.
fraud of principal towards, 390, 392.
grantor of land sold subject to assumption and payment of mortgage
thereon stands in relation of, 23.
how affected by alteration of principal’s bond, 301.
bank’s failure to apply depositor’s account on principal's debt, 360.
creditor’s failure to use money within his control in payment
of his claim, 360.
principal’s loss or surrender of securities, 340.
how affected if principal fails to sue, 365.











































































































































-if running of statute of limitations is suspended as to principal, it
is as to, 329.
in equity, solvent sureties must divide loss between them, 271.
law implies promise on part of principal debtor to indemnify, 238.
liable on contractor’s ‘bond for unpaid labor and materials, 119.
covenant for faithful performance of principal’s covenant, when,
321.
liability of, amount stipulated the limit, 282.
is .rtricti.r.\'1'mi juris, 298
may recover from debtor amount paid in pursuance of his oral
promise, 9.
not bound unless principal is, 314.
not discharged, when, 137, 138, 296, 366.
not released on alteration of contract, when, 301, 302.
notice of default of principal not essential to recovery from, 404. /
obligation of, not avoided, by duress of principal, 324.
on bond for fidelity of agent to his employer, the obligee, when
bound, 368.
employee who had previously defrauded employer cannot avoid
liability, when, 374.
for public work, liability of, 119.
not holden if instrument is not executed by person named as
principal therein, 314. I
of 0bligee‘s employee is released by total change in position and
duties of employee, 298.
one who signs as, void contract of insane person bound, unless
fraud is shown, 319.




relation of one to another, that of joint debtors, 283.
released, when, 114, 224, 304, 307, 343, 345, 346.
relieved of liability if creditor refuses tender of amount of debt,
when, 356.
retiring partner, when is, 231.




to expedite proceedings against principal, 365.
to perform oral undertaking, 9.
rights of, 238-292.
several obligation of, 282.
signing upon condition dchors his written contract, effect of, 209.
subrogated to principal’s right of set-off, 335.
undertakes to perform contract if principal does not, 137.
undertaking of, contrasted with that of guarantor, 166.














































































































































upon promissory note, given by school district as principal, is liable,
when, 317.
vendor of land subject to mortgage which vendee agrees to pay is
in position of, 235.
see, also, contract; guaranty; suretyship.
SURETYSHIP,
by operation of law, 231-237.
compensated, 419, 422, 430, 437.
compared with contract of insurance, 430.
compared with private, 437.
nature and construction of contracts, 419, 422.
construction of contracts of, 224.
contract of, as regards commercial or industrial corporation, 191.
compensated surety, essentially one of insurance and not ordi
nary, 422.
consideration, 192-203.
nature and form at common law, 1-6.
when becomes binding, 131.
indicated by joint contract, 131.
obligation in, will not be implied, note p. 231.
subrogation not dependent upon contract, privity or strict, 260.
sec contract.
SURRENDER,
defense founded upon, or loss of securities by creditor, 340.
TENDER,
effect on surety if creditor refuses, 356.
THIRD P5115011,
promise to pay for goods.supplied to, 56.
see, also, debt; promise; statute of frauds.
UNDERTAKING,
must be clear and explicit to charge one person with debt of au
other, 212.
VARIATION
of surety's risk, 301, 304.
Vltnnon
of land subject to mortgage which vendee agrees to pay is in posi
tion of surety, 235.
VOLUNTEER
cannot be subrogated, when, 264.
WRITING,
contract of indemnity need not be in, 84, 95, 100.
principal being presumptively liable, assurer’s promise is void unless
in, 107.
promise not in, made by father for minor son and without con
sideration not actionable, 125.
view that contract of indemnity must be in, 88.
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